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"bald, quiet Joe Johnston,
T h e little precise Scotch-dominie of a general,
Stubborn as flint, in advance not always so lucky,
In retreat more dangerous than a running wolf-S l a n t shadow, sniffing the traps and the poisoned meat,
A n d going on to pause and slash at the first
U n w a r y dogs before the hunters came up.
G r a n t said of him once,
'I was always anxious with Joe Johnston in front of me,
I w a s never half so anxious in front of Lee.
He kissed his friends in the Nelson-way we've forgotten,
He could make men cheer him after six-weeks retreating.
A n o t h e r man said of him, after the war was done,
S till with that puzzled comparison we find
W h e n Lee, the reticent sword, comes into question,
'Yes, Lee was a great general, a good man;
B u t I never wanted to put my arms around his neck
As I used to want to with Johnston.
The two sayings
M a k e a good epitaph for so Scotch a ghost,
Or would if they were all.
They were not quite all,
He had to write his reminiscences, too,
A n d tell what he would have done if it had not been
F o r Davis and chance and a dozen turns of the w h e e l .
T h a t was the thistle in him--the other strain-B u t he was older then.
I'd like to have seen him
T h a t day as he galloped along beside Beauregard."
— Stephen Vincent Benet, John Brown's Body

To the memory of Carlton Smith, scholar and friend--the
r a r e s t of men, a teacher who could make history live,
breathe, laugh, and cry.
Without him, many things,
including this dissertation, would not have happened.
iii
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PREFACE

One of the more curious gaps in Confederate histori
ography is the lack of a modern study of the Department of
Northern Virginia under the leadership of General Joseph E.
Johnston.

Certainly the earlier stages of the Peninsula

Campaign did not lack drama:

Johnston's repeated confron

tations with Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee, the sorties
of the ironclad V i r ginia, the siege of Yorktown,
guard action at Williamsburg,

the rear

the Valley sideshow,

and the

final confused fight at Seven Pines all contain the elements
necessary for an interesting narrative.
ations lack significance.

Nor did these oper

Had the Confederates lost Rich

mond in the early summer of 1862, that defeat,

combined with

the Federal capture of Memphis, Nashville, New Orleans, and
Norfolk, would very probably have ended the war with George
Brinton McClellan elevated to the status of savior of the
Union.

Instead,

following Johnston's wounds at Seven Pines,

Lee took over the Army of Northern Virginia and drove the
Yankees away from Richmond in short order, not only saving
the capital for the moment but also beginning a period of
Confederate resurgence in Virginia that kept the Union Army
reeling for nearly three years.
Only two book-length treatments, written from a Confed
erate perspective,

have covered the Peninsula Campaign:
v
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volume one of Douglas Southall Freemein's Lee Lieutenants and
Clifford Dowdey's The Seven Days, the Emergence of Robert E.
Lee.

Robert G. Tanner's Stonewall in the Valley covers the

Valley Campaign and its relationship to events on the Penin
sula.

This is a surprisingly thin bookshelf for such a

critical campaign.
To make matters worse, all three books contain serious
flaws.

Tanner, while he deserves considerable praise for

unearthing new material on the Shenandoah Valley, based his
whole presentation of Johnston's and Lee's relations with
Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson on the interpretation o rig
inated by Freeman and extended by D o w d e y .

As a result he

failed to examine their basic assumptions, many of which
turn out upon close analysis to be at best on shaky ground
and at worst totally unfounded.
Dowdey's work has always been questionable in terms of
evidentiary foundation,
eschewed footnotes.

Though quite often the text made D o w 

dey's sources apparent,
strongest contentions

for while he wrote quite well he

there were many occasions when his

(or in Johnston's case accusations)

were erected entirely upon assertion rather than documen
tation.

This rather cavalier approach to scholarship was

combined with outright hero-worship of Lee, whom Dowdey
continually elevated through the literary device of con
trasting his virtues with Johnston's supposed shortcomings.
The theme of Dowdey's book can be summarized in a single

vi
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sentence:

Johnston's generalship was so inept that only the

caution of McClellan,

the Machiavellian maneuvers of Lee

behind the scenes, and the fact that Johnston was wounded
too badly to resume command of the army after Seven Pines
allowed the Confederates to avoid the loss of Richmond.
Dowdey derived much of his interpretation from Freeman,
though he extended it to the point of caricature.

Freeman,

though consistently judicious and measured in his evalua
tions, also viewed Johnston through the p r i s m of Lee.

In R .

E. Lee he made a point of trying to prove just how lax
Johnston's administration of the army had been before Seven
Pines,

and he repeated the performance at greater length in

Lee's L i e u t e n a n t ' s .

With prose more subtle and analysis

much more penetrating than Dowdey's,

Freeman nonetheless

pursued the idea that the proper study of the Army of N o r t h 
ern Virginia always begins and ends with R o bert E. Lee.
Johnston,

to Freeman, was a gallant man and a good soldier,

but only an adequate general at best.

As Lee stepped upon

the stage as commander of the army in either of Freeman's
works the reader can almost feel the author's relief:

the

prologue is over, time for the main act.
And that is the problem.

As long as the campaign lead

ing up to Seven Pines is considered as m e r e l y a prologue and
not as a separate entity,

Johnston's operations remain h o p e 

lessly obscured in the long, very deep shadow of Lee.
only way,

I have come to believe,

The

to understand the Confed-

vii
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erate army i n Virginia before L e e assumed command of the
Army of N o r t h e r n Virginia,
to the t e n u r e

is t o

limit the scope of inquiry

of Johnston's command.

Thus this narrative,

which c o m m e n c e s after a short c h a p t e r to introduce Joseph
Johnston,

b e g i n s with P r e s i d e n t

Jefferson Davis's mid-

February s u m m o n s of Johnston t o

Richmond to discuss with

drawing his a r m y from the P o t o m a c line, and ends when the
General t o p p l e s off his horse o n the evening of May 31,
1862.

It is

an unorthodox t r e a t m e n t for a military history,

for none of t h e battles are d e c i s i v e , more attention is paid
to c o n f e r e n c e s
and when the

in Richmond t h a n

any single combat action,

study ends M c C l e l l a n is still only a few miles

outside R i c h m o n d and the fate o f

the city is very much in

doubt.
Yet f o c u s i n g on the p e r i o d between mid-February and
late May a l l o w s time to deal w i t h several key issues in far
greater d e t a i l

than did F r e e m a n or Dowdey.

in Richmond w h i c h decided t hat

The conference

the army would pull back to

the R a p p a h a n n o c k received a l i n e

from Dowdey and two pages

from Freeman;

here it merits a

pletely.

question of J o h n s t o n ' s administrative compe

The

tence— o f t e n

chapter to explain it com

raised by his e n e m i e s and given great play by

historians — is thoroughly investigated,
strategic v i e w s ,

which turn o u t

as are his own

to have been much more com

plex and compr e h e n s i v e than h e r e t o f o r e suspected.
This s t u d y also takes p a i n s

to relate the war in Vir-

viii
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ginia to operations in the western Confederacy.

How did the

fall of Fort Donelson lead not only to Shiloh but also to
the withdrawal from the Potomac?

How did Beauregard's de

feat at Shiloh affect Davis's state of mind in the April 14
conference to determine whether or not Yorktown should be
held?

By restricting the focus to Johnston's portion of the

Peninsula Campaign,

these issues and others can be addressed

in depth.
Johnston as the commander of the Department of Northern
Virginia is, of course, the main subject of this work, but
time has been taken to present Davis, Lee, Gustavus Smith,
James Longstreet,

and others in sufficient detail to allow

the reader to understand the motives behind their actions,
the feelings that led them sometimes to irrational or emo
tional decisions.

How much of Johnston's decision to en

trust the attack at Seven Pines to Longstreet and not Smith
can be traced to his irritation at Smith falling asleep in
the April 14 conference?

In the same meeting,

can the

refusal of both Johnston and Lee to consider strategic com
promise with the other's view be attributed in part to the
competitive nature of their friendship?
The study that resulted from this approach is one that
concentrates on Johnston's role as army commander but hope
fully without slighting either the men who fought the bat
tles or the larger issues of Confederate policy-making.
While it will quickly become obvious that I believe that

ix
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Johnston's performance was far better than has usually been
credited,

I have not attempted to gloss over his failures or

his shortcomings as a commander.

I have tried to present

his case with a fair amount of objectivity and without re
course to special pleading.

It is my belief that such is

all that the General would have wanted.
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ABSTRACT

This s t u d y examines C o n f e d e r a t e military operations in
Virginia f r o m February 17 - May 31, 1862, focusing specifi
cally on the r o l e of Joseph E. J o h n s t o n as commander of the
Department o f North e r n Virginia.
It includes a detailed
c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f Confederate g r a n d strategy, Johnston's
withdrawal f r o m the Potomac River, the redeployment of the
army to Y o r k t o w n , the siege of Yorktown, and the Battles of
W illiamsburg a n d Seven Pines.
In F e b r u a r y , 1862, following the surrender of Fort
Donelson, P r e s i d e n t Jefferson D a v i s reoriented strategy in
Virginia f r o m a defense of the frontiers to a closer defense
of Richmond; h e also recalled G e n e r a l Robert E. Lee from
South C a r o l i n a to coordinate t h a t defense.
But the strate
gic concepts o f Davis, Lee, and J o s e p h Johnston (the senior
field c o m m a n d e r in Virginia) o f t e n differed a great deal,
leading to c o n f r o n t a t i o n and discord.
This s t u d y concentrates on following Johnston's point
of view d u r i n g the campaign, e s p e c i a l l y on his role as a
field army c o m m a n d e r .
The c o n c l u s i o n suggests that Johnston
was a s u p e r i o r strategist, administrator, and operational
commander, b u t suffered from se r i o u s deficiencies as in
tactical s u p e r v i s i o n of his o wn subordinates and an inabil
ity to deal t a c t f u l l y with his superiors.

xiii
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Chapter One
The General

The chance musket shot and the ricocheting shell
fragment which wounded General Joseph Eggleston Johnston in
the early evening of May 31, 1862, effectively ended the
Battle of Seven Pines.

While worried aides dragged their

commander to safety, the fighting, which had raged between
Richmond and the Chickahominy River for several hours,
degenerated into sporadic sniping.
collapsed in exhaustion.

Rebels and Yankees alike

The conflict resumed in a desul

tory fashion the next morning; but neither the Confederate
divisions defending the capital, nor Major-General George B.
McClellan's Federal Army of the Potomac could muster the
energy to strike a decisive blow.

Each army had suffered

about 5,000 casualties in a bloody stalemate.

Later, the

battle appeared significant more because Johnston's wound
resulted in the appointment of Robert E. Lee as his succes
sor than for any other reason.
Joseph Johnston always believed that his troops had
been on the verge of victory when those unlucky shots
knocked him off his horse and out of the battle.

His attack

had caught two corps of McClellan's army isolated from the
main body by the rain-swollen Chickahominy.

The right wing,

under Major-General James Longstreet, had driven the enemy

1
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in disarray from three successive lines.

The left, com

manded by Major-General Gustavus W. Smith, was advancing
under Johnston's eye to deliver the coup de g r a c e .
ness o n l y ," Johnston insisted,
of the Federals that night.

"Dark

prevented the complete defeat

Likewise, on the following

morning, he maintained it was simply the inaction of Smith,
temporarily in command, that saved several Union divisions
from destruction.

Such an accomplishment would have

silenced those who had begun to say that Johnston's only
skill as a general lay in his ability to retreat.

For the

rest of his life, Johnston remained convinced that it had
been his wounds which had prevented him from conclusively
vindicating the strategy by which he had conducted the
defense of Richmond.1
In retrospect,
too optimistic.

Johnston's tactical assessment was far

Unknown to him, by the time he was struck,

the entire senior command structure of his army had ceased
to function.

Smith had collapsed from a nervous

Smith's deputy,

ailment.

2

Brigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting, was

struggling vainly to coordinate the movements of five

^Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations
Directed During the Late War Between the States (Blooming
ton, IN: Indiana University Press, 1959), pp. 139-143;
Joseph E. Johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines," in Robert U.
Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, ed., Battles and Leaders of
the Civil War (Secaucus, N J : Castle, 1980, reprint of 1887
edition), II:
p. 215 (cited hereafter as B & L ).
^Benjamin Stoddert Ewell to Joseph E. Johnston, May 4,
1885, in Robert Morton Hughes Collection, Old Dominion
University, Norfolk, Virginia (cited hereafter as R M H ).
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brigades which were in varying states of disorganization,
across a field where undergrowth often limited vision to
less than ten paces.3

Far to the right, Longstreet's

failure to follow the correct road, and a quarrel over
seniority with Major-General Benjamin Huger,
ize their troops most of the day.

helped immobil

Those who did engage

fought under Major-General Daniel Harvey Hill, the most
junior division commander involved in the attack.

By dusk,

Hill's men had fought themselves out, and the General
himself had become thoroughly disgusted with superiors who
seemed content to sacrifice his soldiers while they bick
ered. 4

in short, though Johnston's plan had been sound

enough, botched execution produced a fiasco which resulted
in a drawn battle, only because conditions on McClellan's
side of the line were equally confused.
Later, Johnston's detractors argued that a mismanaged
battle was the appropriate punctuation to conclude a
mismanaged campaign.

Since March, his only major movements

had been a pair of retreats which exposed to the enemy all

^Gustavus W. Smith, "Two Days of Battle at Seven
Pines," in B & L , II:
p . 227.
^D.
H. Hill to Gustavus W. Smith, May 22, 1885, in
Gustavus
W. Smith, The Battle of Seven Pines (New York:
C.
C. Crawford, 1895), p. 66.
See also "Report of Maj.-Gen. D.
H. Hill,
C. S. Army, commanding division [at Seven Pines],"
-- -, 1862, in United States War Department, The War of the
Rebellion:
A Compilation of the Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, DC:
Government
Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series 1, XI (part 1): pp.
943-946 (cited hereafter as OR; all references are to Series
1 unless otherwise indicated).
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of Virginia north of the Rappahannock River and east of
Richmond.

Fredericksburg, Yorktown, and Norfolk had fallen

into Federal hands, as the Army of the Potomac marched
within five miles of Richmond.

His most severe critics

suggested that the General had originally intended to
surrender the Confederate capital without a fight.5
Such an appraisal is grossly unfair to Johnston.

It

ignores the fact that one of his retreats was ordered by
President Jefferson Davis, and that the other was rendered
necessary because Johnston was directed to place himself in
a strategic cul de sac at Yorktown.

Nor did Johnston

exercise undisputed control over his own department through
out most of the campaign.

For long periods, General Lee,

commanding in Richmond, directed the operations of four of
his eight divisions,

usually without Johnston's knowledge,

always without his consent,

and often in a pattern com

pletely at odds with Johnston's own intentions.
March and June,

Between

1862, Joseph Johnston spent almost as much

of his time reacting to the actions of his own superiors as
he did those of his opponent.
Nonetheless, Johnston's campaign in defense of Richmond
must be rated as a strategic victory for the Confederacy.
First and foremost,

it kept his army in being.

Given the

^Jefferson Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate
Government (New York:
Thomas Yoseloff, 1958, reprint of
1881 edition), II:
p. 120; John Bell Hood, Advance and
Retreat (Secaucus, NJ:
Blue and Grey, 1985, reprint of 1880
edition), pp. 153-155.
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odds
H i s

with which he had to contend,

this was no mean feat.

withdrawal from Yorktown successfully extricated the

C o n f e d e r a c y ' s only major eastern field army from a carefully
c r r a f t e d double envelopment.
skillful

than Johnston, McClellan might well have captured

t i n e entire force.
more

Opposed by any commander less

This accomplishment stands out as even

remarkable in light of the convulsions which racked the

sariny as a result of the first conscription act; Johnston
hold
t h e

his army together as a coherent fighting force despite
demoralizing and potentially destructive regimental

e 1 ections.
His operations also bought time, a commodity infinitely
more

valuable to the Confederacy than the territory for

which

he traded it.

lan's

advance,

In the mo'nths Johnston delayed McClel

the arms production centers he defended

s t a m p e d out thousands of new rifles and cast hundreds of
cannon.

^

Additional ordnance supplies filtered into

S o u t h e r n ports through the Federal

blockade.

7

„

At the same

^Tredegar Iron Works cast 164 pieces of field artillery
a n d thirty-nine heavy guns between January and June, 1862.
D u r i n g the same period, the Richmond arsenal produced at
l e a s t 6,000 new muskets.
See Charles B. Dew, Ironmaker to
t h e Confederacy, Joseph R. Anderson and the Tredegar Iron
W o r k s (Wilmington, NC:
Broadfoot, 1987, reprint of 1966
e d i t i o n ) , p. Ill; Richard D. Goff, Confederate Supply
( D u r h a m , NC:
Duke University Press, 1969), p. 31; Larry J.
D a n i e l , "Manufacturing Cannon in the Confederacy," Civil War
T i m e s I l l u s t r a t e d , Vol. XII, No. 7 (November 1973):
p. 10.
^Between April 27, 1862 and August 16, 1862, more than
4 8 , 0 0 0 small arms slipped through the blockade to arrive at
W i l m i n g t o n , Charleston, or Savannah.
This was more than
t h r e e times the total number of such weapons imported
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time, a combination of Johnston's administrative efficiency,
Lee's juggling of garrisons along the Atlantic Coast,

and

Rebel operations in the Shenandoah Valley and central
Virginia allowed the South to neutralize the overwhelming
numerical superiority with which McClellan opened his
campaign.

Three weeks after Johnston fell, Lee opened the

Battle of Mechanicsville with the largest Confederate army
ever sent into combat,
numerical parity.8

and met McClellan with virtual

Johnston's defense of Richmond was the

first and most critical Confederate success in 1862.
Certainly no one had expected anything less than
success from Joseph Johnston when the war began.

Resigning

his commission as Brigadier-General and QuartermasterGeneral of the United States Army upon Virginia's secession
in April,

1861, the fifty-four-year-old Virginian seemed

inevitably bound for glory.

His military career had already

spanned more than three decades,

including command or staff

service in every branch of the army.

Nine wounds and four

brevet promotions for gallantry attested to his coolness

between September, 1861 and February, 18 62.
See Frank
Vandiver, ed., Confederate Blockade Running Through Bermuda,
1861-1865, Letters and Cargo Manifests (Austin, TX:
University of Texas, 1947), pp. xviii, xxiv; Stephen R.
Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy, Blockade Running During
the Civil War (Columbia, SC:
University of South Carolina
Press, 1988), pp. 55-73.
^Thomas L. Livermore, Numbers and Losses in the Civil
War in America, 1861-1865 (Dayton, OH:
Morningside, 1986,
reprint of 1900 edition), p. 86.
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under

fire.^

He was one of the most widely read soldiers in

the army, an acknowledged scholar and expert in military
history.

Winfield Scott, the greatest American soldier

between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, had been his
m e n t o r . H i s

closest contemporaries— at once both friends

and rivals— were Albert Sidney Johnston and Robert E. L e e . H
"Johnston," concludes historian Jay L u v a a s , "was one of the
best prepared professional soldiers to enter Confederate
service."12
Not a large ma n — "rather below middle height" according
to British Colonel Arthur Fremantle--Johnston stood about
five feet eight inches and weighed less than 140 pounds.13
Yet there was something in the way he moved that made him
seem taller.

A reporter for the Southern Literary Messenger

overestimated his height by two inches, and added that "he

^Gilbert E. Govan and James W. Livingood, A Different
Valor, The Story of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. A.
(New York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), pp. 11-28.
l^Edward Johnston to John Warfield Johnston, January 2,
1848, in R M H ; Winfield Scott, Memoirs of L i e u t .-General
Scott, LL. P., Written By Himself (New York:
Sheldon and
Co., 1864), II:
p. 517; Govan and Livingood, Different
V a l o r , p. 20; Dabney H. Maury, "Interesting Reminiscences of
General Johnston," Southern Historical Society P a p e r s , Vol.
XVIII (1890):
pp. 178-179 (hereafter cited as S H S P ).
U G o v a n and Livingood, Different V a l o r , pp.

14, 21, 25.

12jay Luvaas, "An Appraisal of Joseph E. Johnston,"
Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. IV, No. 9 (January 1966):

p. 7.
l^walter Lord, ed., The Fremantle Diary
Little, Brown, & Co., 1954), p. 93.

(Boston:
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looks taller on account of his erect carriage."14

There was

a quality about him that demanded attention, but also defied
definition.

It was more than the piercing gray eyes, the

long straight nose, or the grizzled--though neatly trimmed-side-whiskers, mustache, and goatee.

This was something

more than the sum of his individual parts:

a sense of

presence.
He simply looked like a soldier.
recorded

F r e m a n t l e . -*-5

Kyd Douglas.-*-®

"Soldier-like,"

"Every inch a soldier,"

said Henry

"The beau ideal of a soldier," recalled

Richard Tayl o r . 1?

And Benjamin Stoddert Ewell, who served

under the General for three years and knew him as well as
any, told a group of veterans that Johnston "had more the
appearance of a soldier than anyone I ever met in the
Confederate,

or subsequently in the Union Army."l®

Some of

this martial quality still emanates from war-time photo
graphs of Johnston.

In them, he is always posed in a

14p. w. Alexander, "Confederate Chieftains," Southern
Literary M e s s e n g e r , Vol. XXXV, No. 1 (January 1863):
p. 35.
l®Lord, Fremantle, p. 93.
-*-®Henry Kyd Douglas, I Rode With Stonewall (Chapel
Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1940), p. 234.
-*-^Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction
York:
Longman's, Green & Co., 1955, reprint of 1889
edition), p . 42.
^ U n d a t e d notes for a talk
the Magruder-Ewel1 Camp, United
Benjamin Stoddert Ewell papers,
William and Mary, Williamsburg,

(New

by Benjamin S. Ewell before
Confederate Veterans,
Swem Library, College of
Virginia.
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position of not-quite-rigid attention, viewing the camera
inquisitively,

even suspiciously,

as if it were a courier

entering his headquarters in the middle of a battle, bearing
what might be unpleasant news.
His personality ranged from bursts of spontaneous
affection to guarded reserve.

Major Robert Stiles remem

bered that he liked to greet his close friends, with, a hug
and a

k is s.

19

"He loved good cheer," recalled staff officer

Archer Anderson,

"he enjoyed a glass of wine, and his

conversation at a dinner-table with congenial companions was
often fascinating and me m o r a b l e ."20

Yet there was the

colder side of Johnston's character; Brigadier-General
Bradley T. Johnson admitted him to be "quick-tempered and
imperious."21

"Genial and confiding as he was to the

friends he knew and trusted, he was reticent and ever
aversive to those whom he did not like," observed MajorGeneral Dabney Maury.

Maury also remembered that Johnston

"was quick to resent any freedom or liberty from those he
did not like or

k no w.

"22

"t

o

me he was extremely affable,"

confided Fremantle to his diary,

"but he certainly possesses

l^Robert Stiles, Four Years Under Marse Robert
ington, DC:
n. p., 1903), p. 90.

(Wash

20Quoted in Bradley T. Johnson, A Memoir of the Life
and Public Service of General Johnston (Baltimore:
R. H.
Woodward & Co., 1891), p. 313.
2 Ij bid. , p . 268 .
22Quoted in I b i d . , pp. 301-302.
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the power of keeping people at a distance when he chooses.

."23
Colonel Fremantle also noted that Johnston's "officers
stand in great awe of him.

. . .

Many of the officers told

me that they did not consider him inferior as a general to
Lee or anyone

e

l

s

e

.

"24

& considerable number of officers

who served under both Johnston and Lee held the opinion that
"Old Joe" was,
Robert."

at the very least,

the equal of "Marse

Lieutenant-General James Longstreet eulogized him

as "skilled in the art and science of war,
his quick,

penetrating mind.

..."

[and] gifted in

After the war, Long

street characterized Johnston rather than Lee as "the most
accomplished and capable" of Confederate

g

e

n

e

r

a

l

s

.

25

He was

praised by Lieutenant-General Richard Taylor for "great
coolness, tact, and judgment," while Lieutenant-General Wade
Hampton regarded him as a commander "in whose skill and
generalship I have always entertained implicit confidence.
. . ."26

Junior officers were,

23Lord,
2

4

j

b

i

d

if anything, more effusive

Fr e m a n t l e , p. 93.

.

25james Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox
(Secaucus, N J : Blue and Grey, 1984, reprint of 1896
edition, p. 100; Donald B. Sanger and Thomas Robson Hay,
James Longstreet (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State Univer
sity Press, 1952), p. 426; H. J. Eckenrode and Bryan Conrad,
James Longstreet, Lee's War Horse (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1936), pp. 326-327.
26Taylor, D estruction, p. 28; Wade Hampton, The Battle
of B entonville," B & L , IV:
p. 703; Manly Wade Wellman,
Giant in Gray, A Biography of Wade Hampton of South Carolina
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in their praise of Johnston.

Though he entitled his memoirs

Four Years Under Marse R o b e r t , Major Robert Stiles opined of
Johnston that "as a trained, professional soldier,
believe he had his superior,
continent..

. . ."27

I do not

if indeed his equal, on this

Likewise,

in I Rode With S t o n e w a l l ,

Major Henry Kyd Douglas concluded that "for clear military
judgment and capacity to comprehend and take advantage of
what is loosely termed

'the situation, ' General Johnston was

not surpassed by any general in either a rmy."28
During the summer of 1861, he seemed more than to
fulfill the promise of his earlier career.

In late July, he

slipped away from the Federal force assigned to pin him in
the Shenandoah Valley,

and rushed his small army to rein

force Brigadier-General P. G. T. Beauregard at Manassas.
Neither he nor anyone else had reason to suspect that July
21, 1861, represented the pinnacle of his career, the last
moment in the war before his reputation would be unstained
by controversy or recriminations.

All that was visible at

the time was the victorious general, the assured soldier.
With a perspective that the participants lacked on that hot,
dusty afternoon,

(New York:

Stephen Vincent Benet wrote wistfully of

Charles Scribner's Sons,

1949), p. 165.

27stiles, Four Y e a r s , p. 90.
28oouglas,

Sto n e w a l l , p. 66.
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Johnston,

"I'd like to have seem him that day.

Superficially,
spiral.

. . ."29

Johnston's career continued in an upward

He remained at Manassas after the battle and,

ranking Beauregard, took permanent command of their combined
armies.

During October, the War Department expanded his

authority over what was styled the "Department of Northern
Virginia," extending his control over all Confederate forces
in northwestern Virginia, the lower Shenandoah Valley,
around Fredericksburg,
Rappahannock to Urbana.

and down the south bank of the
When 1862 arrived, Johnston

commanded the largest, best-equipped Confederate army in the
entire South.30
But below the surface, all was not well.

In August,

Johnston was stung by newspaper assertions that Beauregard,

29stephen Vincent Benet, John Brown's Body (New York:
Book of the Month Club, 1980, reprint of 1927 edition), p.
93.
30johnston's Department of Northern Virginia contained
62,112 "effectives" on December 31, 1861, compared to 54,004
"present for duty" in Albert Sidney Johnston's Western
Department, the Confederacy's next largest army, on about
the same date.
But the difference between the equipment and
organization of the two armies was considerable; as Richard
McMurry has recently observed:
"The Army of Tennessee was
to suffer greatly because it was built on a foundation of
sand; the Army of Northern Virginia rested by comparison, on
a rock."
See "General Orders No. 15, Adjutant and Inspect
or-General 's Office, October 22, 1861," and "Abstract from
return of the Department of Northern Virginia, commanded by
General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, for the month of
December, 1861, in OR, V:
pp. 913-914, 1015; "Abstract from
return of Western Department, General A. S. Johnston,
commanding (Date about December 31, 1861)," in OR, VII:
p.
813; Richard M. McMurry, Two Great Rebel Armies, An Essay in
Confederate Military History (Chapel Hill, NC:
University
of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 74-86.
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not he, had been primarily responsible for winning the
Battle of

M a n a s s a s .

31

Questions arose about the army's

failure to follow up the victory with an invasion across the
Potomac.

Ludicrous as the idea appeared to anyone privy to

the actual strength of the army or the woeful inadequacy of
its supplies,

it nonetheless circulated quite freely

throughout the Confederacy.

Johnston could not respond to

insinuations of inactivity without revealing his weakness
and, therefore, had to suffer suspicions about his lack of
offensive intentions in

s i l e n c e .

32

In September, he quarreled with President Davis over
his rank.

Historians have often cited this as the main

factor contributing to later discord between Johnston and
Davis.

The incident,

asserted Douglas Southall Freeman,

"aroused in Johnston a resentment that colored his views
throughout the w a r . "33
however,

& n examination of the evidence,

suggests that the disagreement over rank may not

have been the primary cause of the General and the President
becoming "perfectly and entirely estranged and separated."34
The squabble began with a misreading by Johnston of
Confederate military law.

On August 31, President Davis had

3lFreeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I:

pp. 117-118.

32johnston, Narrative, pp. 59-63.

York:

33oouglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee, A Biography
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), I: p. 559.
34johnson, J o h nston, p. 251.
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submitted his list of nominations to the rank of "general"
to Congress, which immediately confirmed them.
the commissions read:

Samuel Cooper, May 16, 1861; Albert

Sidney Johnston, May 28,
Joseph E. Johnston,
July 21, 1861.35

The dates of

1861; Robert E. Lee, June 14, 1861;

July 4, 1861; and P. G. T. Beauregard,

Johnston read the list with "surprise and

mortification" about two weeks later.

His understanding of

the appropriate statutes had lead him to believe that he
should have ranked first instead of fourth.

Since he could

not conceive of Davis, a former Secretary of War, U. S.
Senator, and the preeminent constitutional

lawyer alive,

misreading the law, he presumed that his reduction was an
intentional slight.

He had to complain,

significant of acquiesence.

"lest my silence be

. . ."36

In such temper, when he sat down to pen his letter,
Johnston thought that events called for strong language.

He

baldly stated his belief that "this is a blow aimed at me
alone," which resulted in "the benefit of persons neither of
whom has yet struck a blow for the C onfederacy."37

Contrary

to what he later asserted, however, Johnston consulted with

35je fferson Davis to Howell Cobb, August 31, 1861, in
James D. Richardson, e d . , The Messages and Papers of
Jefferson Davis and the Confederacy, Including Diplomatic
Correspondence, 1861-1865, 2 volumes (New York:
R. R.
Bowker, 1966), I: p. 129; Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson
Davis, September 12, 1861, in OR, Series 4, I:
p. 605.

1861,

36joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, September 12,
in OR, Series 4, I:
pp. 607-608.
37i b i d . , p. 609.
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his brother Beverly on the phrasing of the letter,

and

deleted 350 words so heated that, even when infuriated, he
realized he could not send to the President.38
Stripped of invective,
logical.

Johnston's argument seemed

Five brigadier-generals had been created by the

acts of March 6 and March 14, 1861.

Section five of the

second act provided
That in all cases of officers who have resigned,
or who may within six months tender their resigna
tions from the Army of the United States, and who
may be appointed to original vacancies in the Army
of the Confederate States, the commissions issued
shall bear one and the same date, so that the
relative rank of officers of each grade shall be
determined by their former commissions in the U.
S. Army, held anterior to the secession of these
Confederate States from the United States.39
An amendatory act on May 16 allowed for the conversion of
the title of "brigadier-general" to "general," a change
which,

Johnston contended,

could not affect the relative

seniority of the office-holders.

The determination of

seniority would then be according to the precedence of pre
war commissions.

"The order of rank established by l a w ," as

3 8An incomplete draft of the letter, in the handwriting
of Beverly Johnston, is in R M H . Aside from the deleted
paragraph, marked out with a large "X" (see Appendix-A), the
differences between the draft and the published copy are
mostly differences of syntax.
Johnston, N a r r a t i v e , pp. 7273; Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, September 12,
1861, in OR, Series 4, I:
pp. 607-608.
3 9 "An Act Amendatory of an Act for the Organization of
the Staff Departments of the Army and an Act for the
Establishment and Organization of the Army of the Confeder
ate States of America," March 14, 1861, in OR, Series 4, I:
p. 164.
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Johnston saw it,

"was— first, J. E. Johnston

general U. S. A.); second,
third, A. S. Johnston

S. Cooper

(brigadier-

(colonel U. S. A.);

(colonel U. S. A.);

fourth, R. E. Lee

(lieutenant-colonel U. S. A.). "40
Johnston was correct in assuming that the Confederate
Congress guaranteed resigning officers of the United States
Army the same relative rank they had enjoyed before the war.
What he missed was the fact that the act of March 6, 1861,
changed the manner in which that rank was calculated.
Section twenty-nine wiped out any practical use for brevet
rank beyond courts martial and boards of inquiry.
specified that an officer's seniority,

It also

for purposes of

command, would be determined from his highest commission in
the corps or arm in which he currently served.41
This provision accounted, quite legally,
drop in the rankings.

for Johnston's

Samuel Cooper held a staff colonelcy

^Ojohnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 72.
41-Though certainly not aimed at Johnston personally—
the law had been passed before he resigned from the U. S.
A r m y — this provision was probably included at Davis's
instigation.
He was a long-time opponent of brevet rank,
and did not believe that staff officers should be entitled
to exercise command.
"An Act for the Establishment and
Organization of the Army of the Confederate States of
America," March 6, 1861, in OR, Series 4, I:
p. 131.
For
Davis's opinion on brevet rank, see Robert M. Utley,
Frontiersmen in Blue, The United States Army and the Indian,
1848-1865 (Lincoln, NE:
University of Nebraska Press,
1967), p. 33; his view on staff officers in command posi
tions is .found in Jefferson Davis to James Lyons, August 30,
1878, in Dunbar Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist,
His Letters, Papers, and Speeches (Jackson, MS:
n. p.,
1923), VIII:
p. 257.
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as the United States Army Adjutant G e n e r a l .

He was assigned

the same post in the Confederacy— with a specific prohibi
tion against ever commanding troops— so his staff commission
counted toward his seniority as a general.42

Johnston, on

the other hand, had been transferred out of the Quarter
master's Department and back to the line of the army.

By

Confederate law, he then could only claim his highest 1ine
commission--lieutenant colonel of cavalry— in figuring
seniority relative to Albert Sidney Johnston and Robert E.
Lee.

In those terms, he was junior to

b o t h .

43

The proce

dure Davis followed in arriving at the rank order of his
senior generals was consistent with the letter of the law.
Davis was ill when he received Johnston's letter of
protest, and he had reason to believe that the General knew

42jn contrast to U. S. Army regulations, Confederate
law specifically prohibited staff officers from assuming
command.
The U. S. Army operated on the principle that rank
"shall always confer the right to command, whether the same
be by ordinary commission, by brevet commission, or by staff
commission. . . . "
The Confederates provided that staff
officers, "though eligible to command, according to the rank
they hold in the Army of the Confederate States of America,
shall not assume command of troops unless put on duty under
orders which specially so direct by authority of the Presi
dent."
"Report of Board of Officers, November, 1850;
Opinion of Secretary of War Charles M. Conrad, 1851; both in
Letters and Telegrams Received, Secretary of War, Main
Series, 1801-1870, National Archives, M-567, Reel 192; "An
Act for the Establishment and Organization of a General
Staff for the Army of the Confederate States of America,"
February 26, 1861, in OR Series 4, I:
p. 115.
4 3see the Official Army Register for August 1, 1855
(Washington, DC:
Adjutant General's Office, 1855), p. 9,
for the relative ranks of the two Johnstons and Lee when the
1st and 2nd Cavalry Regiments were organized.
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that when he sent it.44

His state of health may have

contributed to the terseness of this reply.

Had Johnston

written a more diplomatic letter, the President might have
explained his reasoning, no matter how sick.
attack, Davis fired back his famous bullet:

Stung by the
"I have just

received and read your letter of the 12th instant.
language is, as you say, unusual;
ments utterly one-sided,

Its

its arguments and state

and its insinuations as unfounded

as they are unbecoming."45
Despite the heat of their rhetoric, however, both men
acted in such a way as to bury the conflict rather than
escalate it.
official

Davis did not retain Johnston's letter in the

f i l e s . 4 6

Johnston neither threatened to resign nor

intimated--then, or in the future--that he would not accept
orders from any of the three generals senior to him.

Both

men refrained from speaking of the issue to anyone besides
their closest friends, and the conflict did not surface

44oavis had mentioned his illness repeatedly in letters
to Johnston throughout early September.
See Jefferson Davis
to Joseph E. Johnston, September 5, 1861, and Jefferson
Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, September 8, 1861, both in OR,
V:
pp. 829-830, 833-834; Rembert W. Patrick, Jefferson
Davis and His Cabinet (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State
University Press, 1944), p. 36.
45je fferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston,
1861, in OR, Series 4, I:
p. 611.

September 14,

46ne gave the letter to Assistant Secretary of War
Albert Bledsoe with instructions not to file it.
See Joseph
E. Johnston, "Responsibilities of the First Bull Run," B & L ,
II:
p. 24 On.
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publicly until much later.47

in fact, all that either man

actually seems to have done was to write one intemperate
letter and then return to this duties.
Admittedly,
less frequent.

their correspondence became more formal and
"My Dear General" and "Your Friend" disap

peared from the headings and closings of their letters.48
The reduction in the number of letters was not, however,
result of personal disharmony.

the

The exchange had coincided

closely with the appointment of Judah P. Benjamin as
Secretary of War.

Because he trusted the former Louisiana

^ S t e p h e n Mallory was the only cabinet member who
mentioned the incident at the time, though Judah Benjamin
must certainly have been aware of it.
Likewise, in Johns
ton's entourage, only the sometimes overzealous A. H. Cole
commented on the issue at the time, in an October letter to
Brigadier-General Roswell S. Ripley in Charleston.
Mary
Chesnut, as close as she and her husband were to both the
Davis and Johnston families, apparently caught no hint of
the feud; editor C. Vann Woodward dismissed the entry in the
first publication of her diary as an afterthought, probably
inserted in the 1 8 8 0 's.
Entry for September 18, 1861,
Stephen Mallory diary, Southern Historical Collection,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC; C. Vann
Woodward, ed., Mary Chesnut's Civil War (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1981), p. 136n; Extract from A. H.
Cole to Roswell S. Ripley, October 10, 1861, in Ellsworth
Elliot, West Point in the Confederacy (New York:
G. A.
Baker and Co., 1914), pp. 84-86.
^®For examples of correspondence which predates the
rank controversy, see Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis,
August 19, 1861; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston,
September 5, 1861; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston,
September 8, 1861; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston,
September 13, 1861.
The cooler attitude between the two is
in evidence in Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston,
September 18, 1861; Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis,
September 22, 1861; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston,
November 10, 1861, all in OR, V:
pp. 797-798, 829-830, 833834, 850-851, 857, 872, 945-947.
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Senator so completely,

Davis delegated nearly all of the

routine details of the War Department to him, and the
President's personal correspondence with all his generals
diminished during the fall of 1861.49
Johnston and Davis kept working together in harness,
and only someone privy to their earlier letters would have
detected the shift away from their previous informality.

In

November when Davis needed support for his contention that
he had not prevented a pursuit of the defeated Federals
after Manassas, Johnston promptly and unequivocally provided
it.50

Johnston wrote flatteringly of Davis's personal

popularity in February,

1862:

"Your presence here now or

soon would secure to us thousands of excellent troops.
. . ."51

This obviously pleased Davis, who replied,

visit the Army

...

"I will

as soon as other engagements will

49The correspondence between Davis and his two other
senior generals, Lee and Albert Sidney Johnston, can be
cited as examples of the lessening of direct presidential
correspondence.
Between November 8, 18 61 and March 3, 18 62,
the OR shows only a single entry as correspondence between
Lee and Davis, against fifteen between Lee and the War
Department;
see OR, VI:
pp. 928-929.
Between November 20,
1861 and March 4, 1862, the number of entries for c orre
spondence between A. S. Johnston and Jefferson Davis is
three, against thirty-one between Johnston and the War
Department.
See OR, VII:
p. 980; see also Patrick,
Jefferson Davis and His C a b i n e t , pp. 164-165.
50je fferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, November 3,
1861, in OR, II:
pp. 511-512; Joseph E. Johnston to
Jefferson Davis, November 10, 1861, in OR, LI (part 2):
p.
374 .

1862,

51Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 5,
in OR, V:
p. 1062.
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permit,

although I cannot realize your complimentary

assurance that great good to the army will result from it.
. . ."52

Davis even essentially defended Johnston's actions

in March,

1862, in a letter to W. M. Brooks of Alabama:

"though General Johnston was offended because of his
relative rank, he certainly never thought of resigning.
."53
The issue, as far as the public was concerned, stayed
buried.

No controversial articles appeared in the Richmond

newspapers, as they did when Davis and Beauregard conflicted
over that general's report of the Battle of

M a n a s s a s .

54

Surprisingly, the ranks of the senior generals were not
common knowledge.

In January,

1862, the Richmond Enquirer

reprinted from the Charleston Courier what purported to be a
definitive listing of the relative ranks of Confederate
generals.

It is significant because it was inaccurate,

citing the top four generals in order as Samuel Cooper,
Albert Sidney Johnston, Joseph E. Johnston, and Robert E.
L e e . 55

no

protests or correction of the list ever ran,

which probably would have been the case had the rank
controversy still been boiling.

Five months later, the same

52je fferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, February 14,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 1072.
53je fferson Davis to W. M. Brooks, March 15, 1862,
O R , Series 4, I:
p. 999.
54preeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I:
55Richmond E n q u i r e r , January 10,

pp.

102-106.

1862, p. 3.
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newspaper editorialized positively on the lack of any
friction between Johnston and Lee:
distinguished Generals,
r a n k .

"56

"with neither of the

is there any mawkish punctilio about

while relations between the two were considerably

more strained at Seven Pines than this account suggested, it
was, nonetheless, an indicator that the question of senior
ity had not become fuel for public debate.
Yet throughout the campaign in defense of Richmond
there was a noticeable and increasing tension between Joseph
Johnston and Jefferson Davis.

If this developing rift was

not directly attributable to Johnston's disaffection over
his rank, then what caused it?

Johnston became more

contentious with the President because he believed that
Davis had allowed Benjamin and the rest of the military
bureaucracy in Richmond to begin meddling in his legitimate
prerogatives of command.

Davis, at the same time, was

receiving reports from the War Department that Johnston
could not be depended upon to carry out legitimate admini
strative directives.

Under the tremendous pressure of

completely redirecting Confederate strategy in the wake of
the Fort Donelson disaster, the President failed to investi
gate these contradictory allegations as thoroughly as he
should have.

Instead, he believed the accusations of

Benjamin and mildly rebuked Johnston for non-cooperation.
Compared to the other decisions Jefferson Davis faced

56Richmond E n q u i r e r , May 30,

1862, p. 2.
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in February,

1862,

it seemed a trivial matter.

Yet,

it came

near the beginning of the critical period in which the fate
of Richmond would be decided, a time at which trust between
the General and the President was becoming especially
important.

Unfortunately,

it turned out to be a time when

trust was increasingly being replaced by suspicion.
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Chapter Two
The Department of Northern Virginia

Centreville,

in northern Virginia, is eighty-five miles

distant from Richmond.

On February 13, 1862, when Jefferson

Davis folded and sealed the letter he had just written to
Joseph Johnston, he knew that the envelope would not reach
the General for at least two, probably three, and possibly
as many as five days.

A clerk would collect it from his

office and bundle it with the daily correspondence from the
Secretary of War and the Adjutant and Inspector-General
which was also addressed to the headquarters of the Depart
ment of Northern Virginia.

Sometime later, the postman

would toss that bundle into his sack and carry it several
hundred yards to the Virginia Central railroad Depot on
Broad Street.

In all probability, the presence of official

mail in the bag did not weigh heavily on his mind or speed
his steps; the mail train to Centreville only departed once
a day, early in the morning.-*-

Besides,

if the President or

the Secretary of War or the Adjutant General had themselves
felt any particular urgency about their correspondence,
could have sent a telegram.

*-See the train schedules published daily in the
Richmond newspapers, for example, Richmond E x a m i n e r ,
February 13, 1862, p. 1.
24
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When the train pulled out of Richmond in the morning,
two to three hours late— often as not--and crowded with
soldiers returning from furlough or a stay in the hospital,
the locomotive struggled to keep up enough steam to maintain
a speed of just under ten miles per hour.

In 1860, the run

would have been faster, but by the second year of the
American Civil War, the lack of spare parts produced in
Northern factories was already being felt on Virginia
railroads.

Couplings and bearings had to be used long after

they should have been replaced because there were not, and
would never be, enough replacements while the war dragged
on.

The engineers knew this, and babied their machines,

despite all the fuming of generals and politicians.2
If the route was slow, it was also circuitous.

First,

the Virginia Central swung northeast in a shallow arc that
eventually curved back west to intersect the Richmond,
Fredericksburg,

and Potomac at Hanover Junction.

The

junction stood twelve miles north of the city, but the train

^The general condition of prewar railroads in Virginia,
while among the best in the South, was hardly that good in
the best of times.
The rails were made of soft iron, not
steel, were usually shaped in a weak "T"-rail configuration,
but often still included older wooden "stringers" along many
stretches.
Robert C. Black, The Railroads of the Confeder
acy (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press,
1952, pp. 12-14, 31-32; John F. Stover, Iron Road to the
West, American Railroads in the 1 8 5 0 's (New York:
Columbia
University Press, 1987), pp. 65, 203; see also Angus J.
Johnston II, Virginia Railroads in the Civil War (Chapel
Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1961), pp. 917; Charles W. Turner, "The Virginia Central Railroad at
War, 1861-1865," Journal of Southern History, Vol. XII, No.
4 (November 1946):
pp. 510-533.
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meandered more than twice that distance before arriving
t h e r e .3

Following a brief stop, the train headed forty

miles northwest, more nearly in a straight line, to Gordonsville.
At Gordonsville some baggage handler or detailed
soldier plucked the mailbag off the train and carried it
across to the freight ramp serving the Orange and Al e x a n 
dria.

In theory, the train from Richmond should have made a

fairly close connection every afternoon with the one
travelling north from Charlottesville to Manassas; but that
was only theory.

Most days the schedule ran so far out of

kilter that the mail could sit there for nearly twenty-four
h o u r s .

^

Once tossed aboard a northbound car, however,

process moved more quickly:
House,

the

eight miles to Orange Court

sixteen more to Culpeper, and a further thirty-nine

to Manassas Junction, most of it straight and well-graded.
Manassas was only about six and one-half miles from Ce n t r e 
ville.
Those six and one-half miles were, however, among the
most difficult in the state.

Winter storms had turned the

3George B. Davis, Leslie J. Perry, Joseph W. Kirkley,
and Calvin D. Cowles, The Official Military Atlas of the
Civil War (New York:
Arno Press, 1978, reprint of 1891-1895
editions), Plate CXXXVII (hereafter cited as OR A t l a s ).
S c h e d u l e s for the Orange and Alexandria were also
printed in the Richmond newspapers on a daily basis, as well
as persistent stories of delays in those schedules and
m issed connections.
See Richmond E x a m i n e r , February 10, p.
1; February 13, p. 1; February 19, p. 1.
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roads of northern Virginia into muddy troughs that seemed to
have no bottoms.

A rider on a strong horse could only

manage two miles an hour, and few of the horses hauling
supplies— or m ail— from the depot to Johnston's headquarters
were strong or well fed.^

Overworked and undernourished,

horses and even mules simply fell down in the mud and died
by the hundreds.

Teamsters pushed their carcasses to the

side of the road, where they stiffened and rotted, raising
"a putrifaction that makes it quite unpleasant to go along
t h e r e ."®
Johnston,

in a desperate attempt to improve the flow of

supplies to his army, had decided in December to extend a
railroad spur from Manassas to Centreville.

He was able to

procure the track from Major-General Thomas J. "Stonewall"
Jackson who had made off with nearly a dozen miles of Yankee
rails in a raid a few months earlier on the Baltimore and

^Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, January 14,
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 23,
1862, in OR, V:
pp. 1028, 1079; Joseph E. Johnston to
Abraham C. Myers, January 14, 1862, in Letters and T ele
grams Received, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office,
Confederate States of A m e r i c a , National Archives, M-474,
Reel 27 (hereafter cited as L R - A I G O ); Mary Conner Moffett,
e d . , Letters of General James Conner, C. S. A. (Columbia,
SC:
R. L. Bryan, 1950), p. 60.
^Testimony of J. S. Potter, March 12, 1862, in 3rd
Congress, 3rd Session, Report of the Joint Committee on the
Conduct of the War (Washington, DC:
Government Printing
Office, 1863), I:
p. 244 (hereafter cited as J C C W ; all
citations are from Volume I unless otherwise indicated); see
also Augustus P. Dickert, History of Kershaw's Brigade
(Newberry, SC:
Elber H. Aull, 1899), p. 89.
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Ohio.7

Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond produced the spikes

and nails to tie them together, while local landowners,
albeit under duress, provided their slaves to grade the
roadbed and lay the track.8

He found a former railroad

engineer, Captain Stephen W. Presstman,

serving in the 17th

Virginia, and detached him to supervise their labor.9
Johnston's railroad had just gone into bareboned
service when Davis's letter arrived at Manassas Depot.

Only

one dilapidated locomotive, impressed from the Orange and
Alexandria, plied the line.

The lack of a turnaround at the

end forced the engineer to back cautiously over the bumpy
road and across the shaky bridge spanning Bull Run in order
to make his return trip.^8

No fueling stations existed

^Joseph Miles Hanson, Bull Run Remembers . . . The
History, Traditions, and Landmarks of the Manassas (Bull
Run) Campaigns Before Washington, 1861-1862 (Manassas, VA:
National Capitol Publishers, 1953), pp. 40-41.
^Dew, Ironmaker, p. 128; Joseph E. Johnston to A. W.
Barbour, February 12, 1862, in Joseph E. Johnston papers,
Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg,
Virginia (hereafter cited as (J J W M ) .
^ A s s i s t a n t
Adjutant General to Stephen W. Presstman,
January 9, 1862, in Letters and Telegrams Sent, Army of
Northern Virginia, January 1862-March 1863, National
Archives (Hereafter cited as L T S - A N V A ) ; Secretary of the
Congress to Jefferson Davis, February 17, 1862, in L R - A I G O ,
M-474, Reel 11; James L. Nichols, Confederate Engineers
(Tuscaloosa, AL:
Confederate Publishing Co., 1957), p. 97;
George Wise, History of the Seventeenth Virginia Infantry,
C. S. A. (Baltimore:
Kelly, Piet, & Co., 1870), p. 18.

l^Though there are very few written sources on the
railroad itself, it shows up surprisingly in maps made by
Federal topographical engineers after the Second Manassas
campaign, as well as in photographs taken either upon
McClellan's occupation of the Centreville position in March,
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along the route, so that if the train ran out of wood,

the

crew had to get off and cut down the nearest t r e e s . H
Freight, baggage, soldiers, and official mail were all
unloaded unceremoniously into a muddy field near Centre
ville, and left there for the army's staff to sort out as
best they could.12
Eventually, when one aide or another recognized the
mail sack among the flotsam, he would have taken it to Major
Thomas G. Rhett, Assistant Adjutant-General,
de facto Chief of Staff.

and Johnston's

Rhett sorted the mail, every day

sifting through hundreds of reports; requests for furlough,
appointment, or discharge;

recruiting notices; and miscella

neous trivia for official letters directed to his commander.
When he was satisfied that he had found them all, he took
them the final few feet to the next room: General Johnston's
office.
A letter from the President demanded, of course,
immediate attention.

Unfortunately,

Davis's February 13

letter to his general does not seem to have survived, and

1862, or during Major-General Irwin McDowell's operations
during the summer.
See Hanson, Bull R u n , pp. 40-41; OR
A t l a s , Plates XXII (3), (4), (6), (7), XXIII (1); William C.
Davis, e d . , The Image of War, 1861-1865 (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1982), II: pp. 406, 407.
^ A b r a h a m C. Myers to Joseph E. Johnston, January 20,
1862, in Letters and Telegrams Sent, Quartermaster-General,
Confederate States of A m e r i c a , National Archives, T-131,
Reel 8 (hereafter cited as LS-QMG).
l^Hanson, Bull R u n , pp. 40-41.
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only Johnston's indirect paraphrase years later, combined
with the inferences which can be drawn from a telegram and
letter he dispatched in response,

suggest the content of the

letter that set in motion Johnston's campaign to defend
Richmond.
recalled,

"I was summoned to Richmond by the President," he
"who wished to confer with me on a subject in

which secrecy was so important that he could not venture, he
said, to commit it to paper, and the

m a i l .

"13

Despite the leisurely pace at which it was delivered,
the summons must have contained some element of immediacy.
At once, Johnston felt compelled to dash off a telegraphic
answer, which requested a delay of one or two days while his
second-in-command, Major-General Gustavus Woodson Smith,
recovered from his most recent bout with a chronic nervous
ailment.1^

It must also have suggested to the General,

despite his later recollection,
ered.

the subject to be consid

Both men had been concerned for some time with the

exposed state of Johnston's army, strung out along the
Potomac frontier.

The paragraph in Johnston's letter to

Davis the same day, concerning the possible withdrawal of
his forces deeper into Virginia, appears almost unmistakably
to be the answer to a direct question,

a question not

13johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 96.

1862,

l^Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 16,
in J J W M ) .
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contained in any of Davis's earlier letters.15
Johnston certainly had good reason to be worried about
the vulnerable disposition of his troops.

The Department of

Northern Virginia controlled the operations of all Confeder
ate forces north of the Rappahannock River and in the
Shenandoah Valley.

To cover his front with even a thin

crust of pickets and detached garrisons required Johnston to
disperse his 47,617 effectives in a dangerous manner

(see

Map N o . 1).
Nearly half his strength was deployed in semi-independ
ent columns, most of which were too far divided to march
rapidly to reinforce each other in case of an attack.
Jackson had 5,394 men in the Valley,

isolated by a march of

several days from Johnston's main position at Centreville.
Brigadier-General Daniel Harvey Hill held an exposed outpost
at Leesburg with just 2,460 soldiers; his correspondence
throughout the winter revealed his sensitivity to the
possibility of being cut off by a quick Federal thrust
across the Potomac.

Along the Potomac south of Washington

D. C., Brigadier-General William Henry Chase Whiting's
command of 7,596 protected ten miles of Johnston's exposed
right flank from a surprise amphibious landing, but it was

ISjoseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 1074.

February 16,

16"Abstract from Return of the Department of Northern
Virginia, General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, command
ing, for the month of February, 1862," in OR, V:
p. 1086.
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spread so thin that Whiting also lived in a continual state
of anxiety about the security of his position.

Likewise,

Major-General Theophilus Holmes' 5,956 troops could only
maintain a fragile screen of pickets from Aquia Creek down
to Urbana on the Rappahannock.

This left General Johnston

at Centreville with a field army that, even if he counted
his reserve artillery park, all his cavalry, and the
permanent garrison at Manassas, numbered only 26,211
North of the river,

m e n .

17

in an arc that paralleled Johns

ton's line from Harper's Ferry to the Eastern Shore,
McClellan's Army of the Potomac reported 185,420 "present
for duty"--almost four Yankees to each Rebel.1®
numbers, but disparity of equipment,

Not only

favored the Federals;

everything Johnston's troops lacked— rifles, cannon, horses,

l^The breakdown of strength is drawn from I b i d .; for D.
H. Hill's concerns about his position's vulnerability, see
D. H. Hill to Judah P. Benjamin, February 7, 1862, in OR, LI
(Part 2):
p. 465; D. H. Hill to Samuel Cooper, February 7,
1862, D. H. Hill to Judah P. Benjamin, February 22, 1862, in
L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 23; Thomas J. Jackson to D. H. Hill,
February 20, 1862, Thomas J. Jackson to D. H. Hill, February
22, 1862, in D. H. Hill, "The Haversack,” Land We L o v e , Vol.
I, No. 2 (June 1866):
p. 116.
On the vulnerability of
Whiting's line, see Joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin,
January 3, 1862, in Letters and Telegrams Received, Secre
tary of War, Confederate States of A m e r i c a , National
Archives, M-618, Reel 8 (hereafter cited as L R - S W ); Joseph
E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, December 5, 1861, Joseph E.
Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, December 6, 1861, Wade Hampton
to Joseph E. Johnston, December 8, 1861, in OR, V:
pp. 985987 .
18"Extract, embracing the 'First Period,' from Maj.
Gen. George B. McClellan's report of the operations of the
Army of the Potomac from July 27, 1861, to November 9,
1862," in OR, V:
p. 12 (hereafter cited as "McClellan's
Report (I )" ).
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wagons, medicines, or rations— was available in abundance on
the other side of the Potomac.

A French observer with the

Union army commented that "the volunteer is provided with
everything,

and is supplied so liberally with rations that

he daily throws away a part of them," adding dryly that "one
may imagine what such an army must cost."19

Even McClel

lan's most strident critics accredited him as the master
organizer.

Journalist and historian William Swinton wrote

that "if other generals,

the successors of McClellan, were

able to achieve more decisive results than he, it was,
again,

in no small degree, because they had the perfect

instrument he had fashioned to work

w i t h a l .

"20

Despite the immensely greater handicaps under which he
labored,

neither his contemporaries nor historians have

tended to award similar accolades to Joseph Johnston.
Brigadier-General Robert Toombs complained in September,
1861 that "I never knew as incompetent [an] executive
o f f i c e r . "21

Secretary of War Benjamin regularly accused

Johnston of every administrative shortcoming from failure to

l^The Prince de Joinville, The Army of the Potomac:
Its Organization, Its Commander, and Its Campaign (New York:
Anson D. F. Randolph, 1862), p. 13.
20W ii liam Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the
Potomac, A Critical History of Operations in Virginia,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania from the Commencement to the
Close of the War, 1861-1865, revised edition (New York:
University Publishing Company, [1881]), p. 67.
21u. B. Phillips, e d . r The Correspondence of Robert
Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb (Washington,
DC:
n. p., 1913), p. 557.
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file reports to neglecting to provide winter quarters for
his

t r o o p s .

22

"Discipline had been lax under Johnston;

drunkenness had been frequent; many things were at loose
ends," concluded Douglas Southall Freeman, who took meticu
lous pains to praise Lee, not Johnston,

for nearly every

positive step toward the organization of the Army of
Northern

V i r g i n i a .

23

Clifford Dowdey characterized Joseph

Johnston as lacking energy, and contended that "while social
life at headquarters was genial and relaxed,

Johnston was a

slovenly administrator and careless about details.

He liked

to be liked."24
Johnston's performance as an administrator that winter
deserves more credit than he has been allowed.

Few, if any,

Confederate commanders ever organized an army facing such a
disparity of numbers, had to contend with more serious
shortages of munitions,

or had to deal with such a high

degree of bureaucratic interference from Richmond.

If he

was not always completely successful in his efforts, and if
he sometimes became less than tactful in his communications,
the difficulty of his circumstances has to be pleaded in

22por representative examples, see Judah P. Benjamin to
Joseph E. Johnston, September 29, 1861, Judah P. Benjamin to
Joseph E. Johnston, January 25, 1862, Jefferson Davis to
Joseph E. Johnston, March 1, 1862, in OR, V:
pp. 883, 10451046, 1089.
23Freeman, R. E. L e e , II:

p. 87.

24clifford Dowdey, The Seven Days, The Emergence of
Robert E. Lee (Boston:
Little, Brown, & Co., 1964), p. 36.
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extenuation.
Johnston's rebel soldiers were not merely outnumbered,
but man for man they were badly outgunned.

The scarcity of

firearms which plagued the Confederacy in the first year of
the war was so severe in the Department of Northern Virginia
that the weapons of soldiers in the hospital had to be
consolidated to drill recruits in unarmed regiments.25
Those rifles and muskets actually on hand were a baffling
mix of calibers,

brands, and qualities.

The best of them

were issued to the infantry, while much of Brigadier-General
J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry made due with sabers, pistols,

and

shotguns.26
The state of Johnston's artillery was even more dismal
than that of the infantry.

The fact that the army contained

several men who would become the premier cannoneers of the
war could not outweigh the scarcity of guns or the insuffi
ciency of powder.

Though the precise number is elusive,

Johnston's entire department probably did not contain more
than 175 pieces of field artillery, while McClellan could

25 q . W. Smith, "Council of war at Centreville, October
1, 1861, P. G. T. Beauregard to Samuel Cooper, October 25,
1861, Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, November 16,
1861, Joseph E. Johnston to S. Bassett French, January 29,
1862, in OR, V:
pp. 886, 921, 958, 1051-1052; Judah P.
Benjamin to Jefferson Davis, March 6, 1862, in OR, Series 4,
I:
p. 971.
2®Stephen Z. Starr, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War
(Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 1979,
1985), I:
pp. 218-221.
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deploy 465.27

Many of the cannon Johnston did possess were

six-pounders, which had too small a caliber to be effective
on the Civil War battlefield.28
The nationwide shortage of gunpowder prevented the
batteries he did possess from conducting enough live-fire
training to assure their efficiency in combat.
gunners did get to practice,
izing.

When the

the results were often demoral

In order to stretch its meager supply of powder,

the

Ordnance Department mixed in a proportion of less potent
blasting powder.

Brigadier-General Samuel French, command

ing the Confederate artillery--both light and heavy--with
which Whiting was attempting to blockade the lower Potomac,
remembered that his ammunition "was very indifferent."
"Sometimes," he recalled,

"the Armstrong gun, at the same

elevation, would not throw a shell more than halfway across

27This figure may actually be on the high side for the
field artillery of the Department of Northern Virginia,
because the count may have included thirty-five to forty
heavy guns on the lower Potomac.
Jennings C. Wise, The Long
Arm of Lee, The History of the Artillery of the Army of
Northern V i r g i n i a , one-volume edition (New York:
Oxford
University Press, 1959, reprint of 1915 edition), p. 143; J.
Thomas Scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy From
Its Organization to the Surrender of Its Last Vessel (New
York:
Rogers & Sherwood, 1887), pp. 95-99.
28johnston believed six-pounders to be less than half
as effective on the battlefield as twelve-pounders, and
recommended decreasing them as a proportion of his a rtil
lery.
See Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 10,
1861, Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, August 13,
1861, in OR, V:
pp. 777, 784; Wise, Long A r m , pp. 67, 7172, 79, 110, 136, 145; Daniel, "Manufacturing Cannon," p.
40; Jack Coggins, Arms and Equipment of the Civil War
(Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1962), pp. 63-64, 66.
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the river; then again far over the

r i v e r . " 2 9

such unpre

dictable differences in performance hardly instilled
confidence in Johnston's cannoneers.
Aside from being outnumbered and inadequately armed,
Johnston's troops also suffered from a high rate of sick
ness.

Throughout the fall and winter,

the number of

soldiers confined to the hospitals, either near Centreville
or further back in Richmond or Charlottesville, varied
between 13,000 and 16,000— the equivalent of two fullstrength divisions!

Hundreds died each month, and hundreds

more were discharged by surgeons who pronounced them
permanently unfit for military

d u t y . 30

Four circumstances beyond his control accounted for the
high incidence of disease in Johnston's department.

First,

a significant proportion of his regiments had come straight
to his army upon organization,

instead of remaining in camps

of instruction for the first few weeks following their
induction.

Consequently, they experienced the normal run of

"camp diseases" prevalent among new soldiers in both armies

29samuel G. French, Two Wars:
An Autobiography of Gen.
Samuel G. French (Nashville:
Confederate Veteran, 1901), p.
143; see also Samuel French to Samuel Cooper, February 12,
1862, Samuel French to Samuel Cooper, February 14, 1862, in
L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 18; J. B. Walton to Samuel Cooper,
January 17, 1862, in LR-A I G O , M-474, Reel 52; Wise, Long
Arm, p. 144.
30This information cannot be derived from the "ex
tracts" of monthly departmental returns in OR, but shows up
in the originals.
The originals of the monthly returns for
the Department of Northern Virginia for October, November,
and December, 1861 are in JJWM.
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— mini-epidemics of everything from typhus to influenza— in
the field.31

This condition was exacerbated by the severity

of winter in northern Virginia which, to unprepared troops
from the deep South, must have seemed nearly indistinguish
able from the blizzards of the Arctic.

Exposure to cold,

wind, rain, and snow, combined with the inadequate shelters
that the army could provide

("negro cabins," Toombs called

t h e m ) , increased the vulnerability of green troops to
disease to such an extent that several whole regiments had
to be withdrawn to Richmond because they were totally
incapacitated.32

Medical care at the front ran from

rudimentary to nonexistent,

simply because there were

neither enough doctors nor enough medicine.

Many of the

physicians available were apparently incompetent; D. H. Hill

3lBell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb, The Common
Soldier of the Confederacy (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana
State University Press, 1978, reprint of 1943 edition), pp.
251-254.
3 2t w o examples of regiments from the deep South which
suffered heavily were the 3 5th Georgia and the 14th Alabama.
Disease in the 14th Alabama was so prevalent that Secretary
Benjamin had to order it to Richmond in December, 1862 in
order for it to recover.
Judah P. Benjamin to Theophilus
Holmes, January 5, 1862, in OR, V:
p. 1020; Phillips,
Correspondence, pp. 575, 578; Wiley, Johnny R e b , p. 59;
Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, October 7, 1861,
Theophilus Holmes to Samuel Cooper, October 9, 1861, Judah
P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, October 13, 1861, Joseph
E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, November 2, 1861, Judah P.
Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, November 7, 1861, Joseph E.
Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, November 11, 1861, Joseph E.
Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, November 13, 1861, Judah P.
Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, November 17, 1861, C. W. C.
Dunnington to R. M. Smith, December 16, 1861, in OR, V:
pp.
891, 893, 896-897, 934, 941-942, 948-949, 951, 962, 998-999.
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suggested that the health of the army would be vastly
improved if "one half of our surgeons were
finally,

h u n g .

"33

A n d

the diet of the soldiers was chronically low in

vegetables and anti-scorbutics, while high in half-baked
bread and sinewy pork and beef of questionable

q u a l i t y .

34

Even if more plentiful supplies of weapons, ammunition,
accoutrement, medicines, and rations had existed,

it is

doubtful that the logistical situation of the Department of
Northern Virginia that winter could have been significantly
improved.

The supply lines leading from Richmond to

Manassas, as has already been seen, consisted of rickety,
single-track railroads served by deteriorating equipment,
and administered so poorly that the government,

the army,

and the railroad companies sometimes lost sight of dozens of
loaded freight cars for months at a

t i m e .

35

Distribution at

the receiving end was no more efficient due to the inade-

33QUOted in Jeffrey Wert, "I Am So Unlike Other Folks,"
Civil War Time Illustrated, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (April 1989):
p. 16; see also extract from the Journal of the Provisional
Congress, reporting on the Quartermaster's Commissary, and
Medical Departments, January 29, 1862, in OR, Series 4, I:
pp. 887-890.
34£xtract from the Journal of the Provisional Congress,
reporting on the Quartermaster's Commissary, and Medical
Departments, January 29, 1862, in OR, Series 4, I:
pp. 887.
35je fferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, September 18,
1861, Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, September 19,
1861, Joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, September 20,
1861, W. L. Powell to Jefferson Davis, September 20, 1861,
Abraham C. Myers to Judah P. Benjamin, September 21, 1861,
Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, September 22, 1861,
in OR, V:
pp. 857, 867, 871-873.
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quate number of horses and mules which attempted to haul
supplies over the muddy roads.

Whiting's command on the

Potomac provided a telling example of the consequences:
though none of his troops were stationed farther than thirty
miles from the railhead at Manassas Junction--and some as
close as sixteen m i l e s — he had to put his division on half
rations several times during the

w i n t e r .

36

There were

rations in the depots but his dilapidated wagon trains could
not bring them up fast enough to keep pace with daily
consumption,

let alone quickly enough to build up his own

reserve stock.
The inevitable repercussion was a gradual erosion in
the morale of Johnston's soldiers.

Men who had sustained

themselves through the fall on the flush of victory genera
ted at the Battle of Manassas slowly found their will to
continue eaten away by months of inactivity and intolerable
living conditions,

neither of which showed any immediate

prospect of improving.

Regiments from Tennessee and Alabama

petitioned the government to send them home.3 7

Hundreds of

36w. H. C. Whiting to Theophilus Holmes, March 21,
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, January 14,
1862, in OR, V:
pp. 529, 1028.
3?The 1st (Provisional), 7th, and 14th Tennessee, as
well as the 4th Alabama petitioned the government to be sent
home during the winter.
Robert E. Lee to Edmund Kirby
Smith, April 7, 1862, in OR, X (part 2):
p. 397; George
Maney to Otho R. Singleton, February 23, 1862, in OR, VII:
pp. 901-903; Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston,
February 12, 1862, in Letters and Telegrams Sent, Secretary
of War, Confederate States of A m e r i c a , National Archives, M522, Reel 3 (hereafter cited as L S - W D ).
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soldiers illegally extended their furloughs by skulking
about Richmond instead of returning promptly to the army.3 8
Alcohol abuse, up to and including blatant drunkenness on
duty by company and regimental officers,

soared.39

The

recruiters swarming over his camps found Johnston's men
quite willing to sign up for almost any unit of any kind
which could guarantee them that they would serve out their
terms almost anywhere

e l s e . 40

as the months of March,

April, and May approached, when the enlistments of more than
half the department's soldiers would expire, everyone from
Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Congress down to Joseph
Johnston and his subordinates feared the worst:

the army

threatened to simply melt away without ever fighting another
battle.41

38Entries for January 23, 1862, January 28-29, 1862,
February 10-12, 1862, Thomas Bragg diary, typescript,
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Caro
lina, Chapel Hill, NC, pp. 123, 127, 141-144.
39phill ips, Correspondence, p. 5 92; Entry for January
8, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 104; W. D. Camp to Samuel Cooper,
February 13, 1862, in LR-A I G O , M-474, Reel 11; Joseph E.
Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 10, 1862, in L R - A I G O , M474, Reel 27.
40johnston, N a r rative, pp.

90-91,

99-101.

41joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, January 14,
1862 (with enclosure showing the organization of troops
assigned to the Department of Northern Virginia), Joseph E.
Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, January 18, 1862, Judah P.
Benjamin, January 25, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston, February 1,
1862, in OR, V:
pp. 1028-1032, 1036-1037, 1045-1046, 10571058; Judah P. Benjamin to Howell Cobb, December 14, 1861
(with enclosure "Statement of the number of troops now in
the service enlisted for the war and of the States from
which they have volunteered"), Henry Hill to the Chairman,
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The fact that an army in more than name even existed in
February,

1862, was due primarily to the efforts of General

Johnston.

Contrary to the image with w h i c h his memory has

been saddled, the General worked dili g e n t l y to prepare his
divisions to face the enemy and bent e v e r y resource he
possessed toward maintaining their strength and propping u p
their sagging morale.
many of his officers,

Unlike the m a j o r i t y of his men and
Joseph Johnston allowed himself no

vacations from the responsibilities of command:

from the

day he took charge at Manassas in July 1861, until he
travelled to Richmond on Jefferson Davis's direct orders
February,

in

1862, Johnston remained with the army.42

Recognizing the dangers of his army's dispersal,
Johnston instituted a policy of quick response to enemy
actions designed to allow his widely separated columns to
react without wasting time to refer to headquarters for
specific orders.

Jackson,

in the Valley,

and Hill, at

Leesburg, were encouraged to communicate with each other
directly and authorized to send reinforcements to any p o i n t

Committee on Military Affairs, House of Delegates, Virginia,
January 20, 1862 (with enclosure "An abstract showing the
commencement of the termination of service of the v o l u n t e e r s
of Virginia who went into the service in April, May, and
June, 1861"), "Statement of troops in the service of the
Confederate States," March 1, 1862, in OR, Series 4, I:
pp.
788-790, 859-861, 962-964.
42johnson, J o h n s t o n , p. 78.
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of attack without consulting C entreville.43

jn the same

manner, Johnston instructed Whiting, on the lower Potomac,
and Holmes, near Fredericksburg, to coordinate an immediate
response to any Federal landing in their

a r e a s .

44

Johnston

required Major-General Earl Van Dorn, who might have to
march his troops on short notice to reinforce any of these
positions,

to have accurate maps of the roads on his flank,

and assure that the bridges along his line of march were
kept repaired.4 5

jn this manner, Johnston hoped that the

speed of his reaction to any Union offensive might somewhat
offset his inferiority of numbers.

In the event that it did

not, he ordered entrenchments built on the northern bank of
the Rappahannock River to secure key bridges in case of a
retreat.46
Johnston actively employed what would today be called
counter-intelligence procedures to deceive McClellan with
regard to his weakness.

He had logs painted black and

discarded locomotive stovepipes mounted in the embrasures of

43joseph E. Johnston to Thomas J. Jackson, January 24,
1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 27.
44 a . P. Mason to W.
H. C. Whiting, February 4, 1862, in
LS-ANVA; Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, December 5,
1861, Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, December 6,
1861, Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, December 7,
1861, in OR, V:
pp. 982, 986-987.
45joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, December 7,
1861, in OR, V:
p. 986; Hanson, Bull R u n , p. 37.
46joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 9,
1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 27; Joseph E. Johnston to R.
W. Hughes, April 9, 1867, in R M H ; Johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 445.
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his defenses at Centreville to conceal the fact that the few
heavy guns Whiting deployed along the Potomac were all that
the army owned.
crews. 4 7

Scarecrows were even erected to mimic gun

Until winter storms rendered major movements

impractical, he kept his infantry brigades shuffling across
his front as ostentatiously as possible, with the objective
of convincing Yankee spies to count the same soldiers two or
even three times.48

Likewise, French's field batteries on

the Potomac stayed on the move all winter, digging in and
firing a few rounds across the river, then limbering and
deploying to a new location so that Federal pickets could
never get an accurate count of their numbers.

A small

passenger steamer, rechristened the C. S. S. George P a g e ,
was outfitted with one or two light cannon and "armored"
with spare bits of iron.

The vessel was then run back and

forth between the Occoquan River and Chopawamsic Creek in a
remarkably successful attempt to convince the enemy that the
Confederates had managed to place a real ironclad warship on

^ T e s t i m o n y of J. S. Potter, March 12, 1862; Testimony
of Irwin McDowell, April 1, 1862, in J C C W , pp. 243, 247,
258; Robert T. Bell, 11th Virginia Infantry, 1st edition,
(Lynchburg, VA:
H. E. Howard, 1985), p. 18; Davis, Image of
W a r , I I : p . 398.
48 a . M. Barbour to Abraham C. Myers, January 23, 1862,
in Letters and Telegrams Received, Quartermaster-General,
Confederate States of A m e r i c a , National Archives, M-469,
Reel 1 (hereafter cited as L R - Q M G ); Robert Rodes to Lieuten
ant Ingraham, December 25, 1861, in Jubal A. Early papers,
Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.
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the Potomac.49

The fortuitous combination of Johnston's

efforts with the incompetence of McClellan's intelligence
service and the Federal commander's own innate caution
resulted in the Northern general's firm conviction that the
rebels in the Department of Northern Virginia numbered
150,000

instead of the 47,000 effectives actually present.50

There was little Johnston could do directly to improve
the shortages of weapons, ammunition, equipment,
and medicines which plagued his army.

rations,

He tried to augment

his food supply locally, and an officer was sent to the
capital to secure anti-scorbutics.51

He also dispatched

Brigadier-General William Nelson Pendleton, his Chief of
Artillery,

to Richmond,

for the harnesses,

Staunton,

and Lynchburg to scavenge

caissons, and forges necessary to make

his field batteries tactically mobile.52

jn the meantime,

the Chief of Ordnance, Major E. P. Alexander,

concentrated

T. Street to R. H. Wyman, December 11, 1861, R. H.
Wyman to Gideon Welles, December 12, 1861, R. H. Wyman to
Gideon Welles, December 18, 1861, in United States Navy
Department, War of the Rebellion:
Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Navies (Washington, DC:
Government
Printing Office, 1921), Series 1, V:
pp. 4-5, 7-8 (Here
after cited as N O R ; all citations are from Series 1 unless
otherwise i n dicated); Naval History Division Navy Depart
ment, Civil War Naval Chronology, 1861-1865, one-volume
edition, (Washington, DC:
U. S. Government Printing Office,
1971), VI:
p. 237; Samuel French to Samuel Cooper, February
7, 1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 18.
5 0 "McClellan's Report

(I)," in OR, V:

p. 53.

51 a . P. Mason to H. Cole, January 25, 1862,

in LS-A N V A .

52susan P. Lee, e d . , Memoirs of William Nelson Pendle
ton (Philadelphia:
n. p., 1893), pp. 155-156.
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on keeping rigid control over the expenditure of every grain
of precious powder that the army had been issued, while
carefully organizing his slender reserves into mobile trains
to accompany the divisions when active operations c o m 
menced
But Johnston reserved his primary efforts for improving
the efficiency with which supplies were delivered from the
railhead at Manassas to the troops in the field.

As noted,

he constructed a six-and-one-half-mile rail spur to cut down
the hauling distance for his overworked teams.

Sawmills

which had been set up to cut lumber for the army's winter
quarters were kept running to cut planks with which to
corduroy the worst

r o a d s .

54

He appointed an Inspector of

Transportation to initiate a systematic program of caring
for the army's draft animals and maintaining its fleet of
w a g o n s .

55

To assist the department's Chief Quartermaster,

Johnston assigned another officer to take over specific
responsibility for administering the stockpiles of materials

5 3Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a
Confederate (New York:
n. p., 1907), pp. 52-53.
54joseph E. Johnston to A. W. Barbour, February 1,
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Abraham C. Myers, February 1,
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Abraham C. Myers, February 3,
1862, in J J W M .
55j0 seph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 14,
1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 10; General Orders No. 24,
Department of Northern Virginia, February 13, 1862, in O R ,
LI:
p. 468.
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at M a n a s s a s . M a j o r

Rhett, the Chief of Staff, constantly

badgered the division and brigade commanders, pursuant to
Johnston's instructions, to submit accurate and timely
strength reports, so that only those supplies absolutely
necessary would have to be carted forward to their p osi
t i o n s . ^

Although the fundamental weakness of the entire

Confederate war effort could not be offset by his program to
increase the efficiency of his own supply services,

it is

evident that Johnston spared no energy in trying to get the
most out of the little his country could provide him.
The General's other priority was to shore up the
spirits of his soldiers.

He believed firmly that his

personal example and as rigorous a regimen of drill and
discipline as the weather permitted were key ingredients to
elevating morale.

The sight of Johnston riding around the

camps near Centreville, became a daily occurrence for the

56joseph E. Johnston to P. G. T. Beauregard, December
9, 18 61, in E. Murray Smith collection, United States
Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
5^For typical examples of Johnston of his Assistant
Adjutant General remonstrating with his subordinates over
their paperwork, see A. P. Mason to Thomas J. Jackson,
January 4, 1862, A. P. Mason to E. K. Smith, January 6,
1862, A. P. Mason to P. G. T. Beauregard, January 7, 1862,
Thomas G. Rhett to William Nelson Pendelton, January 7,
1862, "Assistant Adjutant General" to Theophilus Holmes,
January 7, 1862, A. P. Mason to J. E. B. Stuart, January 9,
1862, Circular Letter, A. P. Mason to James Longstreet,
Jubal Early, and D. H. Hill, February 7, 1862, in L S - A N V A ;
J. B. Washington to Theophilus Holmes, January 31, 1862,
Joseph E. Johnston to Theophilus Holmes, February 13, 1862,
Joseph E. Johnston to Thomas J. Jackson, February 13, 1862,
in JJWM.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49

soldiers in the main field army.

Like McClellan, Johnston

held parades and reviews, personally complimenting those
regiments that proved they had mastered the evolutions of
the company and the battalion.

In addition, however, he

demanded that his commanders pay attention to tactical
training.

Exercises were conducted throughout the winter on

both brigade and division levels.

Idleness on days without

formal drill was not tolerated; each morning, in every
company, orderly sergeants called off the names of the men
detailed to improve the Centreville entrenchments,

unload

supplies from the freight cars, or upgrade the makeshift
short

l i n e .

58

Johnston understood fully the importance of symbols to
his soldiers.

After General Beauregard designed a new

Confederate battle flag, Johnston wrote to the governors of
the states from which he drew his troops,

requesting that

each chief executive forward flags for his own regiments.
Although only Governor John Letcher of Virginia responded,
Johnston used the occasion for as much ceremony as possible,

58oorsey Pender to Fanny Pender, September 11, 1861,
Dorsey Pender to Fanny Pender, November 21, 1861, in William
W. Hassler, The General to His Lady, The Civil War Letters
of William Dorsey Pender to Fanny Pender (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1962, pp. 59, 96-97;
Wise, Seventeenth V i r g i n i a , pp. 4 3-44, 49; Samuel French to
Theophilus Holmes, February 13, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474,
Reel 17; Richard M. McMurry, John Bell Hood and the War for
Southern Independence (Lexington, K Y : University Press of
Kentucky, 1982), pp. 30-31; Donald B. Sanger and Thomas
Robson Hay, James Lonqstreet (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana
State University Press, 1952), p. 33.
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holding a series of reviews for the governor to present the
new b a n n e r s . ^

Later, he tried unsuccessfully to convince

the President to ride up and address the army, hoping that
an appeal from Davis would stimulate more reenlistments.60
On his own, Johnston granted leaves and furloughs to as many
of the soldiers as he considered could be safely spared at
one time.61
Johnston also applied the rod.

He attempted,

through

out most of the winter, to crack down on the drunkenness of
his officers,

convinced that such was a prerequisite for

enforcing abstinence among the rank and file.

Officers

found intoxicated on duty were court-martialed, and recom
mendations sent to Richmond that they be drummed out of the
s e r v i c e .

62

Resolutely, Johnston signed the first orders

ever given in the Department of Northern Virginia for the
execution of deserters and others found guilty of heinous

59 f . n . Boney, John Letcher of Virginia (University of
Alabama:
University of Alabama Press, 1966), p. 149.

1862,

60joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 5,
in OR, V:
p. 1062.

61joseph E. Johnston to Judah
P. Benjamin, February 1,
1862, in OR, V:
pp. 1057-1058; A. P. Mason to Thomas J.
Jackson, January 4, 1862, A. P. Mason to E. K. Smith,
January 6, 1862, A. P. Mason to P. G. T. Beauregard, January
7, 1862, in LS-A N V A .
62joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 10,
1862, in LR-A I G O , M-474, Reel 27; W. D. Camp to Samuel
Cooper, February 13, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 11;
Phillips, Correspondence, p. 592; Terry L. Jones, Lee"s
Tigers, The Louisiana Infantry in the Army of Northern
Virginia (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University
Press, 1987), pp. 35-39.
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c r i m e s .

63

Although generally unnoticed, the scope and

effectiveness of Johnston's program to support his soldiers'
t

spirits and improve the effectiveness of his army was not
surpassed by any other commander under similar conditions at
any time during the war.

It was only rivalled by his own

efforts with the Army of Tennessee and those of Lee with the
Army of Northern Virginia in the winter of 1863-1864.
Johnston's quiet accomplishments stand out as all the
more remarkable in light of the fact that the civil-military
bureaucracy in Richmond seemed consciously determined to
undermine him.

In nearly every area, either Secretary

Benjamin, Adjutant General Samuel Cooper, Quartermaster
General Abraham Myers, or Commissary General Lucius Northrop
directly opposed the field commander.

Each official

quarreled with Johnston in what amounted to the petty
vindictiveness of an administrator insistent on sustaining
his own titular authority regardless of the consequences to
the cause he served.

Taken in sum, the counter-productive

measures pursued by the Confederate administration con
stantly threatened to undo everything Johnston had striven
to accomplish.
He clashed constantly with the War Department over the
question of weapons.
ments,

Despite its lack of adequate arma

Johnston's army was the strongest in the Confederacy.

^^Taylor, Destruction, p. 25; Jones, Lee's T i g e r s , pp.
40-42 .
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For this reason,

Secretary Benjamin and General Cooper

pressured him incessantly to ship "surplus" muskets - - w h i c h ,
in their minds included those of soldiers sent to the
hospital— to Richmond for distribution to new

r e g i m e n t s . 64

When Johnston demurred, arguing that "this deprives the
different regiments of the means of arming their men who
return from the hospitals," he found himself subject to a
sudden surprise inspection by Cooper

h i m s e l f .

65

Finally,

in

order to retain sufficient muskets to arm his own infantry,
Johnston was forced to turn a blind eye while his subordi
nates illegally concealed guns from the Richmond authori
ties .66
Despite the well-known numerical and qualitative
inferiority of Johnston's cannon, the Confederate War
Department actually attempted,

in September,

1861, to halt

the Tredegar Iron W o r k s ' production of field guns in favor

64special Orders No. 147, Adjutant and Inspector
General's Office, October 19, 1861, Judah P. Benjamin to
Joseph E. Johnston, October 19, 1861, P. G. T. Beauregard to
Samuel Cooper, October 25, 1861, Joseph E. Johnston to
Samuel Cooper, January 28, 1862, in OR, V:
pp. 897, 905,
921, 1049; Entry of January 17, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 116.
65judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, January 24,
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 28, 1862,
Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 29, 1862,
Samuel Cooper to Joseph E. Johnston, January 29, 1862,
Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 2, 1862,
Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 3, 1862, in
O R , V:
pp. 1043, 1049, 1050, 1059.
66joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, February 12,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 1069; Thomas J. Jackson to A. R.
Boteler, January 24, 1862, in Thomas J. Jackson papers,
Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.
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of immobile coastal defense artillery.67

Johnston had to

dispatch a special representative to Richmond to beg that
the policy be changed.

Even then, though the casting of

field artillery was resumed,

seacoast guns remained the

government's priority.68
Both the Quartermaster General and the Secretary of War
inhibited Johnston's initiatives to improve the health of
his troops.

When Johnston requisitioned additional blankets

for his men, Myers peevishly demanded that the General first
provide the names of the troops who needed them; he com
pletely ignored the request for anti-scorbutics.69

The War

Department failed to require the hospitals in the rear areas
to notify commanders when their soldiers died or received
discharges, which left Johnston completely ignorant of the
fate of soldiers sent to the rear, until they happened to
reappear in camp.

The few hospital administrators conscien

tious enough to try on their own to communicate this
information to the army,

found themselves blocked by the

reluctance of the Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office to

6^Dew, I r o nmaker, p. 114.
68Between Pendleton's July, 1861, mission to Richmond
and the end of February, 1862, Tredegar produced 103 pieces
of heavy artillery and only forty-nine field guns.
See
Ibi d ., p . 111.
69 a . P. Mason to R. H. Cole, January 25, 1862, in LSANVA; Abraham C. Myers to William L. Cabell, December 21,
1861, in L S - Q M G , T-131, Reel 8.
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provide them with the appropriate

f o r m s .

70

Johnston's attempts to improve the efficiency of his
supply system were stymied at every turn by Myers and
Northrop, and occasionally by Cooper's complicity.

By way

of answering Johnston's desperate pleas for more forage for
his horses, the Quartermaster General observed that "consid
erable savings would be affected [sic]," if "the animals
could be subsisted without h a y . "

He suggested that Johnston

substitute a mixture of "corn shucks, wheat straw and wheat
chaff,
b r a n .

cut into and m ixed with corn meal, or corn meal and

"71

Myers stood on the letter of an obscure technical

ity to prevent Johnston's subordinates at outlying posts
from naming their own chief quartermasters, a response
echoed by Northrop with respect to com m i s s a r i e s .72

when

William L. Cabell, Johnston's Chief Quartermaster, was
transferred, Myers opposed Johnston's choice for a succes
sor, and allowed the eventual nominee to become embroiled in

70&. P. Mason to A. P. Hill, February 10, 1862, in LSA N V A ; Judah P. Benjamin to P. G. T. Beauregard, January 12,
1862, in L S - S W ; Samuel Cooper to P. G. T. Beauregard,
January — , 1862, Braxton Bragg to Samuel Cooper, January 8,
1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 5; John B. Magruder to Samuel
Cooper, January 10, 1862, John B. Magruder to Samuel Cooper,
January 16, 1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 32; Phillips,
Correspondence, p. 586.

1861,

71-Abraham C. Myers to William L. Cabell, December 21,
in L S - Q M G .

72 d . H. Hill to Judah P. Benjamin, February 12, 1862,
in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 23; Nathan Evens to R. H. Chilton,
January 3, 1862, A. W. Barbour to A. C. Myers, February 8,
1862, in LR-AIGO.
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a distracting fight over relative seniority.73

Northrop

contested Johnston's plan to supplement his troops' diet by
local purchase,

sticking to a centralized system of acquisi

tion that sometimes required food bought in northern
Virginia to travel to Richmond on the overtaxed railroad
before turning around to return to Johnston's

d e p a r t m e n t .

74

When he finally did locate a meat-packing plant in Johns
ton's area, it was over Johnston's vociferous protests;
Thoroughfare Gap, the site of the plant, was a tactically
vulnerable location.75

Cooper refused to sanction Johns

ton's appointment of an Inspector of Transportation,

and

delayed action on many other requests by Johnston and his
subordinates to increase their logistical staffs.

As

Longstreet acidly observed in early 1862, it represented a
sorry state of affairs when the government reduced a
division commander to personally inspecting wagon axles for
grease by its reluctance to appoint a captain to do the

73&. c . Myers to Joseph E. Johnston, December 11, 1862,
A. C. Myers to Joseph E. Johnston, January 2, 1862, in LSQ M G , T-131, Reel 8: Thomas T. Fisher to Samuel Cooper,
January 27, 1862, in LR-A I G O , M-474, Reel 17; Joseph E.
Johnston to P. G. T. Beauregard, December 9, 18 61, in E.
Murray Smith Collection, U. S. Military History Institute.
74Goff, Confederate S u p p l y , pp. 18-19, Leroy Pope
Walker to Lucius B. Northrop, September 7, 1861, Lucius B.
Northrop to Leroy Pope Walker, September 9, 1861, in OR, V:
pp. 883, 835-836.
75johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 104.
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jo b .7^
But possibly the most egregious outrage with which
Johnston had to contend was the unceasing campaign by
Benjamin to undermine his command authority.

The Louisi

anian ruled the War Department as if it were a personal
fiefdom.

He sent orders directly to Johnston's subordinates

without consulting or even informing the General.77

He

first acknowledged, then arbitrarily repudiated Johnston's
organization of the army into two

c o r p s .

78

Benjamin

fostered a climate in the War Office which made it accepta
ble for everyone,

from the lowest private to a general

officer, to send him requests without channeling them

7^Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 14,
1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 10; Joseph E. Johnston to
Abraham C. Myers, January 14, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel
27; James Longstreet to Samuel Cooper, April 9, 1862, in LRA I G O , M-474, Reel 30; General Orders No. 24, Department of
Northern Virginia, February 13, 1862, in OR, LI (part 2):
p . 468 .
77judah p. Benjamin to Earl Van Dorn, October 31, 1861,
Judah P. Benjamin to D. H. Hill, January 18, 1862, Judah P.
Benjamin to Thomas J. Jackson, January 30, 1862, in OR, V:
pp. 930, 1036, 1053.
V8V . D. Groner to Samuel Cooper, September 30, 1861
(with enclosure "List of generals having independent
commands; also general officers subordinate to them"), in
O R , Series 4, I:
pp. 626-633; Judah P. Benjamin to Robert
Toombs, September 24, 1861, Jefferson Davis to Gustavus W.
Smith, October 10, 1861, Jefferson Davis to P. G. T.
Beauregard,
October 17,
1861, Judah P. Benjamin to P. G.T.
Beauregard,
October 17,
1861, Circular Letter, Judah P.
Benjamin to P. G. T. Beauregard, Joseph E. Johnston and
others, October 19,
1861, Jefferson Davis to P. G. T.
Beauregard,
October 20,
1861, in OR, V: pp. 877, 894, 904906 .
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through the department commander.79

More often than not,

even when official papers passed through Johnston's hands,
Benjamin would overrule his decision in what seemed to be a
matter of course.

Much of Johnston's trouble eradicating

alcoholism among his brigades could be traced to Benjamin's
refusal to implement the recommendations of Johnston's
courts

m a r t i a l . 80

Unsuccessfully,

the General remonstrated

with the Secretary, complaining that "the rules of military
correspondence require that letters addressed to you by
members of this army should pass through my o f f i c e . "
wrote, Johnston grew both angrier and more acerbic:

As he
"Let me

ask, for the sake of discipline, that you have this rule
enforced.

It will save much time and trouble, and create

the belief in the army that I am its commander.

. . ."81

At the same time, Benjamin undercut Johnston's furlough
and reenlistment program by granting authorization to dozens
of recruiters to move among Johnston's camps to try to

^ F o r typical examples, see Wade Hampton to Judah P.
Benjamin, February 1, 1862, George H. Steyart to Judah P.
Benjamin, February 22, 1862, in OR, Series 4, I:
pp. 902,
946-947; A. T. Rainey to Judah P. Benjamin, February 8,
1862, in L R - S W , M-618, Reel 8; D. H. Hill to Judah P.
Benjamin, January 22, 1862, D. H. Hill, to Judah P. Be n 
jamin, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 23; Judah P. Benjamin to
Joseph E. Johnston, February 12, 1862, in L S - S W , M-522, Reel
3.
80Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 10,
1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 27; "Copy of endorsement on
letter of Col. Radford of Feb. 5, 1862, to the Adjt. &
Inptr. G e n l .," in JJWM.
81joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, February 16,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 1075.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

58

entice unhappy infantrymen into signing up for new companies
of artillery and cavalry.

These recruiters arrived armed

with furloughs approved by the Secretary of War which
Johnston possessed no power to contravene.

Johnston also

confronted Benjamin on this issue, pointing out:

"you will

readily perceive that while you are granting furloughs on
such a scale at Richmond I cannot safely grant them at all."
There should be a system, Johnston insisted.

"If the War

Department continues to grant these furloughs without
reference to the plans determined on here, confusion and
disorganizing collisions must be the result."82
The secretary denied that he had ever acted so improp
erly, even though the most superficial glance at the letter
books of the War Department would have proven him to be a
l i a r .

83

Following this exchange, D. H. Hill forwarded a

sheaf of authorizations signed by Benjamin to General
Cooper, with the sarcastic request:

"Will you be kind

enough, G e n e r a l [,] to forward this note to the Hon. J. P.
Benjamin that he may be advised that there is a forger in
his

o f f i c e .

"84

jn order to keep his army from evaporating,

Johnston directed his commanders to stop granting any other

82joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, February 1,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 1057.
83je fferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 4, 1862,
in OR, V:
p. 1089.
But see literally dozens of Benjaminapproved furloughs in L S - S W , M-522, Reel 3.
84 q . H. Hill to Samuel Cooper, March 5, 1862,
AIGO, M-474, Reel 23.

in LR-
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furloughs,

and again looked the other way when some of his

subordinates began to toss the ubiquitous recruiters into
the guard house.85

&s Major-General Richard S. Ewell fumed

in a letter to his fiancee,

"Had the Secretary of War's

orders and permits been carried out by General Johnston as
regards Artillery and Cavalry,

the whole army would have

been broken up except those two branches."86
Eventually, Johnston would bring his complaints about
the Secretary's interference in internal army affairs to the
attention of Jefferson Davis.

Instead of inspecting the

evidence, Davis simply asked Benjamin for an explanation.
The Secretary's response was a collection of misleading— if
technically correct--statements, facile half-truths,
outright falsehoods,

and

all tied together by his lawyer's

charisma into a rationalization that a close friend could
find perfectly acceptable.87

Johnston,

in fact, came out

85jubal Early to Jefferson Davis, March 28, 1878, in
Rowland, Jefferson D a v i s , VIII:
pp. 139-140; James Longstreet to Samuel Cooper, February — , 1862, in LR-AIGO, M474, Reel 30.
^ Q u o t e d in Percy G. Hamlin, "Old Bald Head" (General
R. S. Ewell), The Portrait of a Soldier (Strasburg, VA:
Shenandoah Publishing House, 1940), p. 78.
87Be njamin told Davis in early March that "he has not
granted leaves of absence or furloughs to soldiers for a
month past. . . . "
This was technically true; the Secretary
of War himself had stopped granting furloughs, but he had
continued to allow recruiters to enter the Department of
Northern Virginia armed with documents that empowered them
to grant furloughs and leaves of absence in his name.
"The
authority to re-enlist and change from infantry to artil
lery," Davis told Johnston, "the Secretary informs me, has
been given but in four cases. . . . "
This was simply not
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of the exchange with a mild rebuke, Davis observing that
Benjamin "has complained that his orders are not executed,
and I regret that he was able to present to me

. . . many

true.
Not only had Benjamin permitted twelve rather than
four infantry companies to convert into artillery, he
continued well into February to authorize ambitious officers
to recruit throughout Johnston's command for new companies
of heavy artillery and cavalry— at least ten in the six
weeks prior to Johnston's protest to Davis.
See Judah P.
Benjamin to M. P. Dyerle, December 17, 1861, Judah P.
Benjamin to J. W. Anderson, December 18, 1861, Judah P.
Benjamin to N. Caliborne Wilson, December 19, 1861, Judah P.
Benjamin to J. F. Waddell, December 19, 1861, Judah P.
Benjamin to T. D. Caliborne, January 4, 1862, Judah P.
Benjamin to J. P. Boyd, January 4, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin
to R. Otey, January 6, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E.
Johnston, January 4, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to J. B.
McMullen, January 15, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to H. G.
Bowie, January 15, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to St. George
Junkin, January 16, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to A. B. Rhett,
January 28, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to A. B. Rhett, February
9, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, February
11, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to Mat. C. Moore, February 12,
1862, Judah P. Benjamin to W. Saunders, February 14, 1862,
Judah P. Benjamin to C. S. Peyton, February 14, 1862, Judah
P. Benjamin to C. Harwood, February 14, 1862, Judah P.
Benjamin to F. J. Reiley, February 14, 1862, Judah P.
Benjamin to George W. Clement, February 14, 1862, Judah P.
Benjamin to J. L. Wilson, February 14, 1862, Judah P.
Benjamin to M. Hewitt, February 17, 1862, in L S - S W , M-522,
Reel 3.
This list is, if anything, an underestimation of
the number of permits that Benjamin issued during the
period.
Only those permits which give some indication,
either by the unit involved, or the address of the recruit
er, that they are to be recruited within the limits of
Johnston's department have been included.
This, for
instance, eliminated most of the cavalry transfer and
reorganization requests, which are much more ambiguous, and
seem to have been sent out either through the War Department
or through General Cooper.
For an example, see John R. Hart
to George W. Randolph, April 26, 1862, in L R - A I G O , which
recounts the issue of a permit to a company of Georgians to
whom Benjamin issued a permit to go home to acquire horses
for a transfer to the cavalry. Benjamin's self-justification
is found in Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 4,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 1089.
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instances to justify that complaint.

. . ."88

In response to the official roadblocks and Davis's
refusal to consider his case, Johnston felt an increasing
sense of bitter alienation from his own superiors,

a

sentiment which had already been growing for months.
letters to Whiting,
subordinate,
1861.

His

a close friend as well as a trusted

began to reveal this mood as early as November,

On November 9, he predicted blackly that "the

Secretary of War will probably establish his headquarters
within this department

s o o n .

"89

& n d

three days later,

Johnston advised Whiting that "General Cooper replied today
that the guns you asked for should be sent without delay.
This does not encourage me much as to time.

In Richmond

their ideas of promptitude are very different from o u r s . "90
Concerned in January that the government was seeking a
pretext on which to replace him, Johnston joined Beauregard
and G. W. Smith in an effort to begin saving papers and
drafting memoranda to prove that they had been doing all
they could, despite Richmond's interference,

to strengthen

88jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 4, 1862,
in OR, V:
p. 1089.
89joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, November 9,
1861, in OR, V:
p. 944.
90joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, November 12,
1861, in OR, V:
pp. 949-950.
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the army.91
By t h e ‘time he started to the capital in answer to the
President's summons, the gulf between Joseph Johnston and
Jefferson Davis was,

like the distance between Centreville

and Richmond, much greater than it first appeared.

91"Council of War at Centreville," Gustavus W. Smith,
October 1, 1861 (countersigned by Joseph E. Johnston and P.
G. T. Beauregard on January 31, 1862); P. G. T. Beauregard
to Joseph E. Johnston, December, 1861, in OR, V:
pp. 884887, 990.
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Chapter Three
Decision in Richmond

Lead-grey clouds invaded the sky over Richmond on
February 19, 1862.

Steady rain suited the mood of the city.

Despite Davis's pending inauguration as the Confederacy's
permanent president,
optimistic.

few Richmonders felt either festive or

In little more than a month, an unbroken string

of defeats had destroyed the confidence of the city on the
James River.

The gloomy atmosphere deepened as the list of

catastrophes lengthened:

a rout at Fishing Creek; the fall

of Fort Henry and Roanoke Island; and now some dire,
although still unspecified, disaster at Fort Donelson.

An

aide to the Governor observed that depression paralyzed the
city.

Businesses closed, and in the streets, hotels, and

bars "people did nothing but collect together in groups and
discuss our d i sasters."1
The uneasy crowds wandering the city grew larger every
day.

The influx of people associated with the Confederate

administration, expanding industries, and the armies
defending Virginia had swollen the population of Richmond to
more than twice the prewar total of 3 8,000.

Camps of

^Charles W. Turner, ed., Captain Greenlee Davidson,
CSA, Diary and Letters, 1851-1863 (Verona, VA:
McClure,
1975), pp. 34-35; the weather was reported in the entry of
February 20, 1862, Bragg Diary, p. 156.
63
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instruction and military hospitals had been established
throughout the city.

Hundreds

(possibly thousands,

no one

kept an accurate tally) of soldiers on furlough loitered in
the streets,

searching for a place to spend the night.

Makeshift prisons housed several thousand Federal prisoners,
and Yankee officers who had filed paroles with the Provost
Marshal were allowed to walk around freely.

Refugees from

occupied portions of the state migrated to the c a p i t a l .
Their numbers,
inauguration,

too, are impossible to estimate.

The

scheduled to occur in three days, had attract

ed an additional horde of visitors, making conditions even
more o v e r c r o w d e d .2
These invasions had predictable results.

Already

inflated prices of food and lodging kept climbing.

"Grocer

ies are very high without any fixed price," complained one
Richmond newspaper, adding that "it is very difficult to
give correct quotations as prices are changing every day."^
Renters bitterly attacked landlords who "run up miserable
wooden shells, or . . . lease crazy brick tenements,

in

convenient locations, and ask the most enormous rents for

^Emory M. Thomas, The Confederate State of Richmond
(Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1971), pp. 24, 59-62,
78; Virginius Dabney, Richmond, The Story of a City (Garden
City, NY:
Doubleday, 1976), pp. 166-168; Rudolph Von Abele,
Alexander H. Stephens, A Biography (New York:
Alfred K.
Knopf, 1946), p. 206; Richmond Examiner, February 21, 1862,
p . 3.
^Richmond Religious H e r a l d , February 20,

1862, p. 2.
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uncomfortable r o o m s . V i s i t o r s
stay in private homes.

who could afford it paid to

Hotels sold space on cots spread

around their lobbies at exorbitant prices, but even this
expedient could not meet the demand for temporary housing.
Those who found no other place to stay frequented the bars
and gambling "hells" as late in the evening as possible, and
then slept wherever they could.^

The crime rate soared:

murder--especiaily strangling— and highway robbery became
particularly prominent,
erated.

and "disorderly houses" prolif

The Richmond Examiner observed that "a glance at

the police report

. . . must convince everyone that this

city is not a safe place to

'thrash' about in at night.

The Dispatch pointedly recalled that the English had only
solved their crime problem by resorting to liberal use of
the death penalty.^
The gross overcrowding of the city created an atmo
sphere in which rumors multiplied like mosquitoes on a
stagnant pond.

Real intelligence about the war was conspic

uous by its absence,

and the most improbable tales circu

lated with full credence.

Richmond newspapers printed every

^Richmond W h i g , January 1, 1862, p. 1.
^Wilfred Buck Yearns, The Confederate Congress (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1960), p. 14; Thomas, Richm o n d ,
pp. 73-74.
^Richmond E x a m i n e r , February 21, 1862, p. 3; February
22, 1862, p. 3.
^Richmond D i s p a t c h , February 21, 1862, p. 2.
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report and hoped for the best.

On February 19, the fate of

Fort Donelson was still the subject of wild speculation.
Neither the President nor the War Department had released
any firm news.8
At 8:00 A. M . , Davis and his cabinet secretaries had
sequestered themselves on the second floor of the Customs
House, which had been donated by Virginia to the national
government.

The meeting continued for hours, the partici

pants apparently oblivious to the curious bystanders in the
street below, while clerks and assistants transacted the
routine business of government.

Questions of grand strate

gy, it was assumed, were under consideration, and specula
tions about potential decisions started circulating.9
Into this climate of depression, uncertainty,

and

misinformation, the morning train from Centreville,

late as

usual, wheezed slowly along the Shockoe bottom into Rich
mond, bearing new grist for the rumor mills.

At the

Virginia Central Railroad Depot on Broad Street, passengers
began the normal struggle to exit the ramshackle cars.
Couriers carrying official dispatches,

soldiers on furlough

commissary officers, recruiting agents, newspaper reporters
and the few private citizens who still held passes to ride

^Newspapers published the following day still printed
conflicting stories about whether or not a large garrison
had surrendered at Donelson.
See Richmond Dispatch,
February 20, 1862, p. 3; Richmond W h i g , February 20, 1862,
p. 2; Richmond E x a miner, February 20, 1862, pp. 2-3.
^Johnston, Nar r a t i v e , p. 96; Thomas, R i c h m o n d , p. 44.
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the densely packed train bumped up against each other as
they pressed toward the street.

The one exception,

the man

who would have waited until the crowd passed, or for whom it
would have instinctively parted, was Joseph Johnston.10
Johnston had not visited the capital since June,

1861,

and his arrival now raised new and much more direct fears
for the safety of the c i t y . H
Richmond?

Why had Johnston come to

As he walked up Broad Street and turned past

Capitol Square,

the question would have followed him.

he come in response to a presidential summons,
on his own initiative?

Had

or travelled

Revealing nothing of his purpose,

the General strode straight into the Customs House; Jeffer
son Davis's secretary immediately interrupted the meeting to
inform the President of his caller.12
imminent in northern Virginia,

could disaster be

or were the recent Union

advances about to be answered by a counter-invasion across

l^In his memoirs, Johnston made two errors relating to
his visit to Richmond.
The first was that he stated that it
began on February 20, and the second was that he only
recounted a single day's meeting with Davis and the cabinet.
Bragg's diary, however, makes it clear that the General
arrived on February 19, and was present at cabinet sessions
on both February 19 and 20.
Johnston, Nar r a t i v e , p. 96;
entries of February 19 and February 20, 1862, Bragg diary,
pp. 154-157; see also Turner, "Virginia Central," pp. 510-533.
11-Bradley T. Johnston does not document his assertion
that Johnston had not visited Richmond since the previous
year, but a careful study of Johnston's correspondence
indicates that he is correct; see Johnson, J o h n s t o n , p. 78.
l^ib i d . ; Johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 96; Govan and Livingood, Different V a l o r , p. 93; entry of February 19, 1862,
Bragg diary, p. 154.
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the Potomac?

In the hotels and bars the questions flowed

along with the drinks.

Why had Johnston come to Richmond?

The majority of the cabinet was just as mystified by
the General's sudden appearance as the uncertain citizens of
Richmond.

The expressed purpose of the meeting had been to

edit a draft of Davis's inaugural address. -*-3

Though he

certainly did not consider his advisors to be ”a cabinet of
dummies," as did the Richmond W h i g , Davis had limited his
confidence in dealing with the military crisis to Secretary
of War, Judah P. Benjamin.14

The remaining five officers—

Secretary of the Treasury Christopher Memminger, Secretary
of the Navy Stephen Mallory, Attorney-General Thomas Bragg,
Postmaster-General John Reagan, and acting Secretary of
State William Browne— though they had access to better
military intelligence than the public, had no inkling that
the President had chosen this particular day to announce a
major shift in Confederate strategy.
To appreciate the significance of Davis's pronounce
ment,

it is necessary to understand his grand strategy for

the first year of the war.

In the fall of 1861, the

President had coolly accepted a desperate but calculated
gamble on behalf of his new nation.
rifles,

Without sufficient

cannon, powder, or shot to conduct decisive military

operations, he boldly authorized his generals to push their

l^Entry of February 19, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.
14Richmond W h i g , February 22,

1862, p. 2.
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poorly equipped,
as

p o s s i b l e .15

severely outnumbered armies as far forward
if audacity could disguise abject weakness

long enough, he believed that a combination of home produc
tion and imports through the blockade would provide them
with the weapons to launch real offensives.^-®
l^The policy initiated by Davis in the fall of 1861 has
often been discounted derisively as a cordon defense,
adopted as a result of the combination of the President's
mediocre strategic insight, demands for local defense on the
part of Confederate governors, and an unwillingness on the
part of the administration to recognize that there was a
substantial Federal threat in the west.
This is the
argument presented by Thomas Connelly and Archer Jones.
They do not see the creation of the Western Department as
part of a comprehensive strategic plan, asserting that Davis
"merely desired to provide some semblance of command on the
western front while it was preoccupied with affairs in
Virginia."
In making their case for Davis's inability to
see beyond departmental administration, Connelly and Jones
rely on trying to prove by induction rather than hard
evidence (with an assist from some hazy cause-and-effect
chronology on the organizational dates of the major depart
ments) that Davis had no grand strategic plan for the
conduct of the entire war.
They also ignore a considerable
amount of material written by the President, either during
or after the war, in which he explained his concept.
Jefferson Davis to W. M. Brooks, March 15, 1862, in O R ,
Series 4, I: pp. 998-999; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E.
Johnston, November 10, 1861; "Council of War at Centre
ville," Gustavus W. Smith, October 1, 1862; both in OR, V:
pp. 884-887; Davis Rise and F a l l , I:
pp. 406, 449-452; II:
p. 43; Thomas Lawrence Connelly and Archer Jones, The
Politics of Command, Factions and Ideas in Confederate
Strategy (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University
Press, 1964), pp. 92-101.
l®Even the most hostile recollection of Davis's policy
acknowledged that he advocated constant harrying of the
enemy across the Potomac.
At his conference with Generals
Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith on September 26, 1861, "the
President proposed that, instead of an active offensive
campaign, we would attempt certain partial operations— a
sudden blow against Sickles or Banks or to break the bridge
over the Monocacy."
See "Council of War at Centreville,"
Gustavus W. Smith, October 1, 1861, in OR, V:
p. 887;
Johnston,
Nar r a t i v e , p. 78.
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It was an outrageous bluff, extending far beyond Johns
ton's Department of Northern Virginia.17

while part of

General Albert Sidney Johnston's army attempted to blockade
the Mississippi River from Columbus,

Kentucky,

the remainder

had invaded the central portion of the state, and rattled
sabers loudly at Bowling Green.

"Create the impression that

this force is only an advance guard," he instructed MajorGeneral William J. Hardee.
could do:

Making noise was the best they

most of the troops in the department were either

sick or u n a r m e d . F r o m

southern Missouri, Major-General

Sterling Price and his ragtag regiments, many of which had
not even been formally sworn into Confederate service,

tried

their best to maintain a threatening posture, while in west
Texas Brigadier-General Henry Hopkins Sibley marched his
motley 3,700-man "Army of New Mexico" toward Arizona.

The

rest of the Confederate Army guarded the Atlantic or Gulf

1 ^McClellan's "Aggregate present" on October 15 was
143,647; Johnston's, for the month of October, was 52,435.
See "McClellan's Report (I)" and "Abstract from return of
the Army of the Potomac, General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S.
Army, commanding, for the month of October, 1861," both in
OR, V:
pp. 12, 932.
l®Albert Sidney Johnston to William J. Hardee, November
9, 1861, in OR, IV:
p. 531; Charles Roland, Albert Sidney
Johnston:
Soldier of Three Rep u b l i c s , Austin, TX:
Univer
sity of Texas, 1964, pp. 261-277; Thomas Lawrence Connelly,
Army of the Heartland, The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862
(Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 1967),
p . 63.
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coasts against amphibious descent by the United States
Navy.
For months,

following the Confederate victory at

Manassas, the strategy worked.

McClellan believed the

intelligence estimates that attributed to Johnston's army
more than twice its actual strength.20

in Kentucky, Major-

General William T. Sherman insisted in November,

1861 that

Confederate troops at Bowling Green "far outnumber u s . "21
His successor, Major-General Don Carlos Buell, was more
skeptical about Rebel numbers, but still counted almost

l^war Department returns for December 31, 1861 indi
cated that 59.3% of the Confederate troops "Present for
duty" were under the command of either Joseph or Albert
Sidney Johnston.
Roughly 36.2% defended the coasts, and
4.5% were deployed in western Virginia.
These percentages
were only approximate, as the returns upon which they were
based were somewhat fragmentary, omitting, for instance,
both Sibley's brigade in New Mexico and Price's division in
Missouri.
Yet adding those forces to the rest would only
emphasize more clearly that President Davis had pushed the
bulk of his meager armies to the periphery of the Confedera
cy.
"Consolidated abstract from returns of the Confederate
forces on or about December 31, 1861," in OR, Series 4, I;
p . 822 .
20A s an example of his habitual inflation of Confeder
ate numbers, McClellan thought Johnston's army numbered
115,500 in early March, while the departmental return for
the end of February showed him with only 47,306 "Aggregate
present for duty."
See "McClellan's Report (I)" and "Ab
stract from return of the Department of Northern Virginia,
General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding, for the
month of February, 1862," both in OR, V: pp. 53, 1086.
21william T. Sherman to Lorenzo Thomas, November 4,
1861, in OR, IV:
p. 332.
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every Confederate soldier

t w i c e .

22

aggressive southern military policy,

Partly as a result of an
the major Union armies

remained inactive through the fall and into the winter.
When 1861 ended, Jefferson Davis could look out over a
national defensive perimeter that was essentially intact.
The necessary weakness of the President's strategy was
that by committing his available effective troops to the
frontiers of the Confederacy he could not maintain a
substantial reserve.

His expectation that sufficient arms

could be obtained to create such a reserve was not realized.
Since September,

1861, only 15,000 rifles had slipped

through the blockade, nearly half of which arrived on a
single vessel.

These arms had to be rushed to the front as

soon as they were unloaded at the docks.23

internal

production was gearing up, but, when the crisis struck,

22on January 3, 1862, Buell estimated Albert Sidney
Johnston's force between Columbus and Bowling Green at
80,000 men.
Johnston's December 31, 1861 return placed his
"Present for duty" strength at those points at 43,661.
While that return failed to count two brigades newly arrived
at Bowling Green, the omission was roughly offset by
counting some of the troops in Polk's district which were
west of the line that Buell was considering.
See Don Carlos
Buell to George B. McClellan, November 27, 1861; Don Carlos
Buell to George B. McClellan, December 23, 1861; Don Carlos
Buell to George B. McClellan, December 29, 1861; Don Carlos
Buell to Henry Halleck, January 3, 1862; "Abstract from
return of Western Department, General A. S. Johnston,
commanding [Date about December 31, 1861]"; all in OR, VII:
pp. 450-452, 511, 520-521, 528-529, 813.
23The ship was the F i n q a l , the first ship to brave the
blockade solely on the government's account, which landed in
Savannah, Georgia in November carrying 7,520 Enfield rifles.
Vandiver, Confederate Blockade Running Through B e r m u d a , pp.
xiv, xxxix; Wise, L i f e l i n e , pp. 52-55.
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Colonel Josiah Gorgas's Ordnance Department required an
entire month's production of rifles to outfit a single
regiment.24
dismal.

The situation with regard to powder was equally

Of the 400,000 pounds that Gorgas projected that

the Confederacy must import,

so little powder had arrived in

Southern ports that Davis admitted to the cabinet in late
January that there were fewer than twenty-five charges per
gun available to the batteries defending the coasts.25
Thus, when Federal offensives cracked open the eggshell in
Kentucky, Tennessee,

and North Carolina,

almost nothing

stood between the Northern armies and the heartland of the
Confederacy.
Like many gamblers, Davis had refused to fold his hand
and start a new game until his losses were

e n o r m o u s .

26

gy

2 4only the Richmond arsenal was dependably turning out
weapons on schedule in February, 1862, at the rate of 1,000
rifles a month.
See Richard D. Goff, Confederate Supply
(Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1969), p. 31.
25Entries of January 6, 1862, January 14,
16, 1862, in Bragg diary, pp. 99. 110, 112.

1862, January

26in Davis's defense, however, it should be said that
while Fishing Creek, Fort Henry, and Roanoke Island were all
significant reverses, it was the capitulation of Fort Donel
son and the loss of 11,000 soldiers that represented the
major disaster, and that defeat was due far more to the
incompetence of the political generals in command there than
to the deficiencies of Davis's strategy.
The troops commit
ted there did not face overwhelming odds, were as well armed
as any in the Confederacy, and acquitted themselves honora
bly on the field.
As William Preston Johnston, the son of
Albert Sidney and later a presidential aide, remarked bit
terly in his defense of his father's record:
"The answer to
any criticism as to the loss of the army at Donelson is that
it ought not to have been l o s t . That is all there is of it
[italics in original]."
William Preston Johnston, "Albert
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February 17, when he learned that Fort Donelson had surren
dered, the overall military situation was grave.
General Ulysses Grant's army,

Brigadier-

supported by gunboats,

stood

between the two wings of Albert Sidney Johnston's depart
ment,

in perfect position to strike the communications of

either.

Meanwhile,

Buell advanced slowly but inexorably

through central Kentucky toward Nashville.

The success of

Major-General Ambrose Burnside's amphibious expedition into
Albemarle Sound not only proved the ability of the Federal
Navy to land Union troops along almost any stretch of coast
line, but also directly menaced Norfolk and the crucial
railroad line between Richmond and W i l m i n g t o n .27
Only the front in northern and eastern Virginia
remained quiet, and it was apparent that this represented
the calm before the hurricane.

Johnston had pointed out to

Davis in his February 16 letter that McClellan "controls the
water, however, and can move on the Potomac as easily now as
in midsummer.

..."

Furthermore, the General cautioned,

"We cannot retreat from this point without heavy l oss.

If

we are beaten, this army will be broken up, and Virginia,

Sidney Johnston at Shiloh," B & L , I:

at

p. 548.

27jyicClellan's "aggregate present" on February 1, 1862
(which did not include some of the forces in western
Virginia opposite Johnston's Valley District) was 208,086,
compared to 56,392 in the Department of Northern Virginia.
See "McClellan's Report (I)" and "Abstract from return of
the Department of Northern Virginia, General Joseph E.
Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding, for the month of February,
1862," both in OR, V:
pp. 12, 1086.
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least,

lost.

"28

The President later admitted his miscalculation, though
even in his eulogy for the failed strategy, Davis did not
repent having accepted the risks.

"I acknowledge the

error," he wrote on March 15, 1862,
of my attempt to defend all of the frontier, sea
board, and inland; but will say in justification
that if we had received the arms and munitions
which we had good reason to expect, the attempt
would have been successful and the battle-fields
would have been on the enemy's s o i l . 29
But belying his reputation for inflexibility, as soon as the
surrender of Donelson was confirmed,

Davis totally reori

ented Confederate grand strategy in less than forty-eight
hours.
His deliberations were certainly influenced by the
opinions of senior generals throughout the Confederacy, many
of whom had recently written concerning ominous increases in
Federal strength, often including specific strategic
suggestions.

General Robert E. Lee, in whose judgment Davis

had implicit trust, had advised from South Carolina on
January 8 that
The forces of the enemy are accumulating, and
apparently increase faster than ours.
I have
feared, if handled with proportionate ability with
his means of speedy transportation and concentra
tion, it would be impossible to gather troops
necessarily posted over a long line in sufficient

28joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 16,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 1074.
29jefferson Davis to W. M. Brooks, March 15, 1-862, in
O R , Series 4, I:
pp. 998-999.
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strength to oppose sudden movements.
Wherever his fleet can be brought no opposi
tion to his landing can be made except within
range of our fixed batteries.
We have nothing to
oppose to its heavy guns. . . . The farther he
can be withdrawn from his floating batteries the
weaker he will become. . . .30
Lee reiterated his warning on February 10, admitting that
while "I exceedingly dislike to yield an inch of territory
to our enemies they are, however, able to bring such large
and powerful batteries to whatever point they please, that
it becomes necessary for us to concentrate our s t r ength."31
On February 15, Major-General Braxton Bragg, another
officer whose views the President valued, had addressed
Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin with his own suggestions:
"Our means and resources are too much scattered.
protection of persons and property,
abandoned,
the cause.

The

as such, should be

and all our means applied to the Government and
Important strategic points only should be held."

Bragg advised the removal of Confederate troops from all but
the largest ports on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts,

as well

as the complete military evacuation of Texas, Florida, and
Kentucky.

"A small loss of property would result from their

occupation by the enemy; but our military strength would not
be lessened thereby, whilst the enemy would be weakened by

30Robert E. Lee to Samuel Cooper, January 8, 1862,
OR, VI:
p. 367.
3lRobert E. Lee to Judah P. Benjamin, February 10,
1862, in OR, VI:
p. 380.
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the d i spersion."32
Nor did the President lack the opinions of the two
Generals Johnston.

Joseph Johnston had, as previously

noted, warned on February 16 of the vulnerability of his own
extended line.

Though Albert Sidney Johnston remained out

of contact on February 16 and 17, almost a month earlier he
had posted to Richmond a similar warning of imminent
calamity, ending it with a simple, though extreme,

sugges

tion to prevent disaster:
The enemy will probably undertake no active
operations in Missouri and may be content to hold
our forces fast in their position of the Potomac
for the remainder of the winter, but to suppose
with the facilities of movement by water which the
well filled rivers of the Ohio, Cumberland, and
Tennessee give for active operations, that they
will suspend them in Tennessee and Kentucky during
the winter months is a delusion.
All the re
sources of the Confederacy are now needed for the
defense of T e n n e s s e e . ^
Thus,

the consensus among those

placed the greatest t r u s t — and their

generals in whom Davis
opinion was shared

by

other key figures--was that the survival of the Confederacy
depended upon a concentration of its limited resources in
defense of a few critical points, even at the risk of losing

1862,

32Braxton Bragg to Judah P. Benjamin,
in OR, VI:
p. 826.

February 15,

33Albert Sidney Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 22,
1862, quoted in Roland, Albert Sidney J o h n s t o n , p. 227; for
the inability of Davis and Benjamin to contact Johnston
during the two days in question, see Judah P. Benjamin to
Albert Sidney Johnston, February 18, 1862, and William J.
Hardee to Jefferson Davis, February 18, 1862; both in OR,
VII:
p. 890.
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large sections of territory with less military value.34

Yet

34jt should be emphasized, however, that the opinions
of Lee, Bragg, and the Johnstons carried the bulk of the
weight with Jefferson Davis.
Others of prominence who
counseled a concentration of resources included General P.
G. T. Beauregard; Secretary of War Benjamin; and former
Secretary of War, and currently Brigadier-General, Leroy
Pope Walker.
Beauregard had written to Congressman Roger
Pryor, his indirect contact with the administration, on
February 14 that "we must give up some minor points and
concentrate our forces to save the most important lines, or
we will lose them all in succession."
Connelly and Jones
use this quotation--curiously citing the manuscript source
rather than the identical printed letter in OR— to buttress
their case for Beauregard as the chief architect of the
concentration of troops that created Johnston's army at
Shiloh.
But there is no direct evidence that Pryor communi
cated the essence of Beauregard's letter to Davis, and his
February 18 letter to Samuel Cooper dealt only with the
specific question of a withdrawal from Columbus, not grand
strategy.
Even if it could be proven that Davis read
Beauregard's earlier letter, his influence on the President
at the time would seem to have been m i n i m a l . Twice in
January, Davis had spoken less than favorably about the
Louisiana general in cabinet sessions.
Thomas Bragg
recorded, on January 8, that when discussing the merits of
the Confederate generals, Davis "never mentions Beauregard.
I think, after all, he does not like him or think much of
him."
And on January 31, when discussing Beauregard's
pending assignment to command at Columbus, "the President
spoke of his engineering talent as good, but did not seem to
entertain a high opinion of his talents as a General."
Secretary Benjamin indicated in a February 23 letter to
Major-General Mansfield Lovell that he had thought for some
time that Davis's commitment to dispersed garrisons along
the coasts was a mistake.
Referring specifically to
Mississippi, he told Lovell that the orders to do so "were
issued against my judgment, but the urgency of the members
of that State on the President was so great that it was not
politic to refuse at the time to gratify their wish."
But
while Benjamin had the respect and the constant ear of
Davis, his biographers agree that he did not, as Secretary
of War, push hard to bring the President around to his views
on strategic policy.
As Robert Douthat Meade put it,
Benjamin would "offer suggestions to Davis when he felt he
could do so without causing undue offense, but he would not
lay his head on the block."
Ex-secretary Walker offered
unsolicited strategic advice to his successor on February
17, but, given the fact that he had left the War Department
partly as the result of a strategic disagreement with Davis,
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in the end, Davis had to face the situation by himself,
directly assisted only by an inexperienced Secretary of War.
Davis acted both resolutely and quickly in the crisis.
By February 18,

letters drafted by Benjamin at the Presi

dent's direction had been dispatched to the department
commanders.

These instructions represented a dramatic

reversal in strategy.

Union numerical and naval superiori

ty, combined with the Confederate arms shortage and the
arguments of his generals, had convinced Davis that "it may
not be possible, with our limited means, to protect every
point which the enemy can attack by means of his fleets.
. . ."35

Benjamin's orders to Bragg stated the case even

more frankly:

"The heavy blow which has been inflicted on

us by the recent operations in Kentucky and Tennessee
renders necessary a change in our whole plan of campaign.
•

•

•

..36

any direct effect of his views on the President's eventual
decisions is doubtful.
Judah P. Benjamin to Mansfield
Lovell, February 23, 1862, in OR, VI:
p. 829; P. G. T.
Beauregard to Roger A. Pryor, February 14, 1862; Leroy Pope
Walker to Judah P. Benjamin, February 17, 1862; P. G. T.
Beauregard to Samuel Cooper, February 18, 1862; all in O R ,
VII:
pp. 880, 889, 890; Entries for January 8, 1862,
January 31, 1862, Bragg diary, pp. 104, 130; Connelly and
Jones, Politics of Command, pp. 97-100; Patrick, Davis and
His Cabi n e t , p. 176; Robert Douthat Meade, "The Relations
Between Judah P. Benjamin and Jefferson Davis:
Some New
Light on the Working of the Confederate Machine," Journal of
Southern H i s t o r y , Vol. V, No. 4, (November 1939):
p. 472.
35je fferson Davis to W. W. Avery,
OR, IX:
p. 436.

February 18, 1862,

36jucjah P. Benjamin to Braxton Bragg, February 18,
1862, in OR, VI:
p. 828.
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The new strategy subordinated considerations of local
defense to a national effort concentrated on preserving the
economic vitals of the Confederacy.

Garrisons would be

ruthlessly stripped away from less important points and
transferred to more critical theaters of war.

The emphasis

of military operations was to be changed from static,
defense,

linear

to the more active "offensive-defensive" with field

armies maneuvering and counterpunching the enemy.

"We must

dismiss all ideas of scattering our forces in defense of
unimportant points and concentrate them at vital lines,"
Benjamin told Major-General Mansfield Lovell.37
Davis contemplated a reduced, but still viable,
defensive perimeter.

The first priority was to seal off

Federal penetrations in Tennessee,

safeguarding both the

material resources of Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and
eastern Tennessee,

and the Confederacy's only direct rail

connection between Virginia and the Mississippi River.

"No

effort will be spared," Benjamin assured Major-General
Leonidas K. Polk, on February 18,

"to save the line of

communication between Memphis and Bristol,

so vital to our

defense."38
To provide General Albert Sidney Johnston the means to
defend his department,

troops were withdrawn from almost all

1862,

37juc3ah P. Benjamin to Mansfield Lovell, February 23,
in OR, VI:
p. 829.

1862,

38judah P. Benjamin to Leonidas K. Polk, February 18,
in OR, VII:
p. 894.
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quarters of the country.

Along the Atlantic coast, eastern

Florida and parts of eastern North Carolina were abandoned
outright, as were the small islands off the coast of South
Carolina and Georgia.

The only ports to be held in strength

were Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah.39
the Confederates quit Pensacola,

jn the Gulf,

removed all but heavy

artillerymen from Mobile and the small Texas ports, and
severely reduced the forces defending New Orleans.4 0
from Missouri were ordered east of the Mississippi,
garrison at Columbus,

Troops

and the

Kentucky evacuated its fixed position

to join the army in the field.
Despite the resistance that Davis knew he would meet
both from Congress and the State governments, he saw his
decision as a purely military one, and, as such, above the
bounds of factional politics.

He believed, as he had

written to Major-General Leonidas Polk in September,

1861,

that "it is true that the solution of the problem requires
the consideration of other than the military elements
involved in it; but we cannot permit the indeterminate
qualities,

18,

the political elements,

to control our action in

39l b i d ., Judah P. Benjamin to Robert E. Lee, February
1862, in OR, VI:
p. 390.

40judah P. Benjamin to Leonidas K. Polk, February 18,
1862, in OR, VII:
pp. 893-894; Judah P. Benjamin to Braxton
Bragg, February 18, 1862; Judah P. Benjamin to Mansfield
Lovell, February 23, 1862; Judah P. Benjamin to P. 0.
Hebert, February 23, 1862; all in OR, VI:
pp. 828-830.

1862,

41judah p. Benjamin to Leonidas K. Polk, February 20,
in OR, VII:
p. 893.
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cases of military nec e s s i t y ."42

gy January,

after months of

bickering with governors who seemed to balk at every war
measure, no matter how essential, Davis stated himself far
more bluntly.

General Thomas Bragg recorded,

in his diary,

that Davis stated in a cabinet meeting, that
if such was to be the course of the States towards
the Gov't the carrying on [of] the war was an
impossibility--that we had better make terms as
soon as we could, and those of us who had halters
around our necks had better get out of the Country
as speedily as possible. . . .43
Nor was he mistaken in his belief that any strategic
decision would provoke a public outcry from his political
opponents.

As Davis convened his advisors to inform them of

his decisions, the House of Representatives was counting the
electoral votes to certify his election as President under
the permanent Constitution.

No sooner had they finished,

and the results been confirmed, than Tennessee Congressman
Henry S. Foote rose and demanded "that a committee be
appointed to enquire into the

cause of the recent

which have befallen our arms.

. . ."44

disasters

The cabinet was the first group of civilian politi
cians, albeit a friendly one, to whom Davis announced the

42jefferson Davis to Leonidas K. Polk, September 15,
1861, in OR, IV:
p. 188.
43gntry of January 17, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 115; see
also Boney, Letcher, pp. 132-134; Frank L. Owsley, "Local
Defense and the Overthrow of the Confederacy," Mississippi
Valley Historical R e v i e w , Vol. XI, No. 4 (March 1925):
pp.
493-494, 498.
44Ric’
n mond E x a miner, February 20, 1862, p. 2.
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radical shift in policy.

Explaining in detail the dismal

state of military affairs,

"the P r e s 't said the time had

come for diminishing the extent of our lines--that we had
not men in the field to hold them and must fall back."45
The news astounded his audience, and in some way it directly
affected each of them.

Both Postmaster-General Reagan of

Texas and Navy Secretary Mallory of Florida hailed from
states Davis had already ordered to be denuded of troops.
The weakening of garrisons at key ports was of special
concern to Mallory, whose department had ironclads under
construction at Norfolk and New Orleans.

He was already

contemplating dispatching the completed Virginia into the
Chesapeake to "make a dashing cruise on the Potomac as far
as Washington," and dreamed of using the armored frigate to
attack New York.46

Davis's bombshell meant to him that his

bases of construction might no longer be secure.

Christo

pher Memminger, the Treasury Secretary, had to calculate the
impact that the withdrawals would have on an already
faltering economy and the credibility of $130,000,000 worth
of Confederate bonds soon to be issued, while acting State
Secretary Browne would have to find ways to minimize the

45Entry of February 19, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 153.
46Mallory's rather fantastic plans were laid out in
letters to the V i r g i n i a 's commander, who then had the
unpleasant job of informing his superior just how unsea
worthy the frigate really was.
See Stephen Mallory to
Franklin Buchanan, February 24, 1862, and Stephen Mallory to
Franklin Buchanan, March 7, 1862; both in N O R , VI;
pp. 776777, 780-781.
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negative diplomatic effects of surrendering large tracts of
territory without a contest.

For Attorney-General Thomas

Bragg, the President's revelations sparked a more personal
response:

this was the first he had heard of his brother,

Major-General Braxton Bragg, being ordered out of the quiet
Gulf toward the crumbling front in Tennessee.

Already

pessimistic about the Confederacy's chances, he found that
Davis's news
anything

left him too distracted to concentrate on

e l s e .

47

But the President had not even finished explaining his
new strategy.

His second priority,

after solidifying a line

in Tennessee, was the defense of Richmond.

Johnston's army,

as well as those of Major-Generals John B. Magruder and
Benjamin Huger guarding the coastal approaches to the city
at Yorktown and Norfolk, had been among the few Confederate
organizations not drained of troops in the concentration on
T e n n e s s e e .

48

g u t the catastrophes in the west, and the more

immediate defeat at Roanoke Island had also brought Davis to
the belief that the extended line of defense in Virginia was

4^Entry of February 19,

1862, Bragg diary, pp.

152-154.

48johnston had lost three Tennessee regiments in early
February from the Army of the Northwest, which was temporar
ily attached to Jackson in the Valley District.
While this
transfer was partly motivated by Grant's expedition against
Fort Henry, disaffection among those particular regiments
over their winter quarters and the belief that they would
not reenlist if stationed in Virginia were the primary
motivations for the War Department's orders.
Judah P.
Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, February 7, 1862, in OR, V:
pp. 1066-1067.
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equally vulnerable to dismemberment by Federal naval power.
"The President was farther of the opinion," wrote Bragg,
"that we must fall back from Manassas and in the Valley of
Va. as far as Stanton

[sic]."49

Davis's concern for the safety of the capital was not
the result of some unbalanced, monophobic refusal to
acknowledge threats to the other theaters of war.

He was

quite aware of the resources and industrial potential of the
Mississippi Valley and the interior of Georgia.

Those

regions held his nation's future— if it was to have one—
because only by retaining them and developing their produc
tive capacity could the Confederacy hope to sustain a long
war.

But what Davis also fully recognized was the fact that

the loss of Richmond in the first half of 1862 would have
almost immediately ended the war.

If the western heartland

did represent the Confederacy's future, the eastern capital
was its present.
"Richmond," wrote historian Peter Parish,

"was in

effect the economic as well as the political capital of the
Confederacy.

. . ."50

city's four largest banks had

combined assets exceeding $10,000,000,

a figure that

appeared especially significant to a capital-poor nation

49sntry of February 19,

1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.

^Opeter J. Parish, The American Civil War
Holmes and Meier, 1975), p. 307.

(New York:
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like the C o n f e d e r a c y .51

Richmond was the major flour-

milling center for the southeast,

and an important transpor

tation terminus for the region as well;
radiated out like spokes from a wheel,

five railroad lines
and heavy barge

traffic plied the upper James River canal system, while
ocean-going vessels could dock just below the c ity.52

The

only arsenal in the South capable of mass-producing smallarms was located in Richmond.53
But as important to the survival of the Confederacy as
all those attributes

were,

they were secondary to the city's

capability for heavy

manufacturing.

"Iron was the key to

Richmond's greatest economic advantage to the Confederacy,"
concluded Emory Thomas.
The city was the center of the industry south of
the Potomac.
In 1860 she claimed four rolling
mills, fourteen foundries and machine shops, a
nail works, six works for manufacturing iron
railing, two circular-saw works, and fifty iron
and metal w o r k s . 54
Yet rather than the breadth of Richmond's iron industry what
made it critical to the Confederacy was the concentration of

51-Thomas, R i c h m o n d , p. 23.
52Thomas, R i c h m o n d , p. 21; see also Thomas S. Berry,
"The Rise of Flour Milling in Richmond," Virginia Magazine
of History and Bio g r a p h y , Vol. LXXVII, No. 4 (October,
1970):
pp. 387-408.
53The arsenals seized by the Confederates at Nashville,
Baton Rouge, Montgomery, Mount Vernon, Augusta, Charleston,
and Savannah were only capable of making accoutrement and
(with a supply of powder) cartridges.
Goff, Confederate
S upply, p p . 15, 31.
^Thomas,

R i c h m o n d , p. 23.
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production capability in a single firm:

Joseph R. Ander

son's Tredegar Iron Works.
Tredegar's capacity carried the South through the first
year of the war.

There were eighty-one establishments

turning out bar, sheet, or railroad iron in the Confederacy.
Tredegar alone accounted for better than 37% of the total
production.

By the end of February,

1862, Anderson's firm

had delivered sixty-eight field guns and 197 pieces of heavy
artillery, while most of the other establishments were
either still in the process of tooling up to cast cannon, or
had defaulted on their contracts.

Mallory's ironclads would

have been impossible without Tredegar;

the plant cast the

metal plates that covered the Virginia as well as her rifled
guns, and was forging the main shaft for the Mississippi.55
Beyond simply supplying the armed forces,

Tredegar

possessed the unique capability, given enough time, to bring
other industrial plants up to its level.

Though there were

ten rolling mills in the South after secession, only
Anderson's company owned the steam hammer so necessary for
sustained mass production.

This gave Tredegar the ability

not only to manufacture ordnance materials, but also to
create new manufacturing establishments and supplement
existing ones.

Tredegar repaired the rifling machinery

captured at Harper's Ferry that would soon be sending 500
new weapons a month to the front from the Fayetteville

S^Dew,

Ironmaker,

pp.

86, 88, 111,

119.
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arsenal.

Even as Davis and his cabinet met,

the firm had

just completed the twelve rolls, six bed circles, and ten
shafts necessary to put the huge Augusta Powder Mill into
operation.

A second steam hammer, cast in Richmond, would

eventually allow the Confederate foundry at Selma, Alabama
to begin manufacturing heavy guns.

Virtually none of the

munitions plants or navy yards that would sustain the
Confederate military economy in spite of the blockade could
have been built without the support of the Tredegar Iron
W o r k s .56
Later, diversification of ordnance production somewhat
diminished the critical importance of Tredegar,
February,

but in

1862— and for some six months thereafter— Joseph

Anderson's company represented the single resource without
which the Confederacy could not survive.

So as politically

important as defending northern Virginia might be, and as
agriculturally significant as was the Shenandoah Valley,
President Davis subordinated both to the defense of Rich
mond .
With a flourish of real-life dramatic timing, the
President had just mentioned his intention to withdraw from
the frontiers of Virginia when General Johnston's arrival
was

a n n o u n c e d .

57

Davis's February 13 letter to Johnston was

56oew, Ironmaker, pp. 86, 124-125; Kathleen Bruce,
Virginia Iron Manufacture in the Slave Era (New York:
The
Century Co., 1931), pp. 331, 349.
57gntry of February 19, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.
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unknown to most of the cabinet, and because Johnston had
been forced to delay his trip due to G. W. Smith's illness,
even the President had not known exactly when to expect
him.5 8
Davis left the room to confer with Johnston for a few
minutes before bringing him into the meeting.

He first

wanted to assure the General that rumors of an impending
transfer of G. W. Smith to east Tennessee were false.^9
After that, the President brought Johnston up to date on the

^ F r e e m a n , following the Narrative and Davis's February
19 letter to Johnston, mistakenly asserted that Davis
summoned Johnston on February 19.
Davis's order to Johnston
on February 16 has not been found, but the gist of it can be
inferred from the General's telegraphic response the same
day.
There is no extant letter that shows that Johnston
ever informed Davis of when he would arrive.
Freeman, Lee's
Lieutenants, I:
p. 134n; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E.
Johnston, February 19, 1862, in OR, V:
p. 1077; Joseph E.
Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 16, 1862, in Joseph E.
Johnston Letterbook, in JJWM.
59johnston had raised the question in his February 16
letter.
Davis had responded on February 19, in a letter he
had presumably mailed prior to the cabinet meeting, but
realized that Johnston could not possibly have yet received.
This was welcome news to the General, of course, but
tempered by the fact that the rumor was mistaken only as to
initials:
Major-General E. K. Smith, not G. W. Smith was
being detached from the Department of Northern Virginia on
the request of Albert Sidney Johnston to be sent as comman
der from the east to take over the mountainous district.
Benjamin had already informed Johnston that E. K. Smith was
being transferred on February 15, but the fact that Johnston
did not actually issue the order until after his trip to
Richmond suggests that he may have protested it directly to
Davis.
Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, February
15, 1862;
Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February
16, 1862; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, February
19, 1862; Special Orders No. 56, Headquarters Department of
Northern Virginia, February 21, 1862; all in OR, V:
pp.
1073-1074, 1077-1078; Albert Sidney Johnston to Judah P.
Benjamin, February 14, 1862, in OR, VI:
p. 879.
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latest intelligence from the west, explained his concentra
tion in Tennessee,

and told him that he was just in time to

help decide the question of withdrawing his own army.^O
Johnston readily admitted that,

from a purely military

point of view, withdrawal from his exposed lines in northern
Virginia to a more concentrated and more defensible position
behind the Rappahannock was desirable.

But he emphasized

the difficulties of such a movement while winter lingered,
calling them,

"almost insurmountable."61

in his memoirs,

Johnston's account of the list of problems he presented to
the cabinet is sustained by Thomas Bragg's diary entry that
same evening:

the General described

the present condition of the roads, the want of
means by Rail Road Road [sic] to do it expedi
tiously, and the great sacarfices [sic] we would
have to make, as any movement of the kind would be
very soon known to the enemy.
He seemed to think
that the enemy could and would advance by coming
down to Aquia Creek and getting to Fredericksburg.
Our heavy guns could not be well moved or got away

60ln the published version of the N a r rative, Johnston
did not mention his conference outside the larger meeting,
and implies that he was ushered directly into the room and
only informed in front of the secretaries as to the subject
of the discussion.
But, in his first draft of his memoirs,
Johnston stated that "in the office of his A. D. C., he
[Davis] informed me that the withdrawal of the army was the
subject to be considered."
That proposition would not have
made sense to Johnston without at least a short explanation
of the overall strategic context.
Johnston's unpublished
version is followed here because it accords with Bragg's
contemporary account.
Johnston, N a rrative, p. 96; Draft of
Johnston's Narrative in Box 28, Folder 4, in the Robert
Morton Hughes collection, Old Dominion University; entry of
February 19, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.
SlEntry of February 19,

1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.
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from Evansport.62
This last comment evidently provoked a lively discussion
about the ways and means of retiring Whiting's heavy
artillery from the Potomac.

Aside from mentioning the

practical difficulties of such a removal, Johnston finally
ended the discussion by pointing out that new Federal
positions on the Maryland shore made it now impossible to
perform any such maneuver in secret.

At that, Davis tabled

the matter, asked Johnston to consider the issue more fully
and return the next day to continue the debate.63
Before the cabinet returned to the original business of
the day--editing the President's inaugural address— Davis
made several more important comments on his strategy in
Virginia.

According to Bragg, Davis said "that unless

something of the kind was d o n e " — referring to a withdrawal
by Johnston— "Richmond would be taken,

that we must have

troops in supporting distance to repel an attack from North
or South by Burnside, who he thought would endeavor to
advance to Suffolk,

isolate Norfolk which must fall & then

advance upon Richmond."

He believed that Federal strate

gists would also divert Commodore Porter's mortar fleet to
assist Burnside.

Recognizing that the forces deployed in a

broad defensive arc around the capital were commanded by

62johnston, N a r rative, p. 96; entry of February 19,
1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.
• G e n t r y of February 19, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 154.
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five independent generals,

the President admitted that he

had been recently considering the recall of General Robert
E. Lee from Georgia to orchestrate their operations.
Lee, Davis revealed,

But

felt that Savannah was in immediate

danger of attack, and did not think he could safely depart
the area for at least a week, perhaps more.

"It was left

undecided," wrote Bragg.64
After all these revelations, the cabinet abruptly
returned to work on the speech.

Some of the members were

perhaps relieved to get back to politics, a subject they
more fully comprehended,

and devoted several hours to

arguing nuance and syntax.

But Thomas Bragg, whose brother

was heading into battle, and whose home state of North
Carolina seemed to be rapidly disappearing into enemy hands,
could not concentrate on the task in front of him.
it seemed rather a useless waste of time.

"To me

My mind was away,

and I was thinking of how we were to escape the Storm which
threatened to overwhelm both Gov't & people."65
Exactly when Johnston left the meeting is not clear.
Bragg's diary can be read as implying that he was dismissed
prior to Davis's comments about recalling Lee to Virginia,
but the entry is too ambiguous to be offered as definitive
evidence.

Johnston never stated, then or later, whether he

had heard the remarks, although his correspondence with Lee

64I b i d ., pp. 154-155.
6 5 I b i d ., pp. 155-156.
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the next month can also be read in such a manner as to
indicate that he did.

That question notwithstanding,

Bragg's notes clearly settle two key issues.

First, the

idea for withdrawing Johnston's army originated with Davis;
it was, in fact, under discussion before Johnston ever
entered the room.

Secondly, the Attorney General's journal

also confirms explicitly that Davis was considering the
transfer of Lee back to Virginia to exercise a specific
coordinating command function.

The context also suggests,

though again stopping short of outright assertion,

that the

President had no intention of turning complete control of
the defense of Richmond over to Joseph Johnston.
Johnston,

for his part, regardless of when he left the

Mechanic's Institute, probably had other matters on his
mind.

Immediately, he wanted to see his wife,

at a Richmond hotel.

then residing

Though she had visited him frequently

--his critics said excessively— during the winter at Centreville,

he had not seen her in some weeks.

On his way to the

hotel,

his natural reserve and his sense of military

security would have served to deflect the inquiries of
curious civilians as to his business at the capital.

But in

the hotel lobby, General Johnston met a man whose questions
he could not so easily avoid.
Twenty-eight-year-old Colonel Dorsey Pender of the 6th
North Carolina had just finished a thirty-day leave to see
his wife; he had signed into the hotel overnight to await
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the morning train back to Centreville.
arrived in Richmond that morning,

From the moment he

Pender had been hearing

rumors that the cabinet was in session to discuss the
withdrawal of the army from Centreville and Manassas.

The

dozens of details such a move would entail for a regimental
commander must already have been running through his mind
when he saw his commander enter the hotel.

Without hesita

tion, Pender approached Johnston and put the question
directly:

was the army being withdrawn?

Johnston,

horrified at this breach of security,

politely brushed off the Colonel's inquiry with a negative
answer, but one which did not totally convince the younger
officer.66

The exchange also served to place Johnston into

an even more defensive frame of mind with reference to the
administration.

Davis had ordered him to Richmond with a

secret summons, and now he found the subject being bantered
openly in the streets.

How far could he trust civilian

politicians with military secrets?
According to Bragg, the General never broached that
subject at the cabinet meeting on the following morning.
Johnston did say that he considered a withdrawal

from

66johnston, Narrative, p. 97; Dorsey Pender to Fanny
Pender, February 21, 1862, in Hassler, General to His L a d y ,
pp. 113-114.
Pender's letter also provides additional
confirmation that Johnston was in Richmond for three days
instead of the two he claimed in his memoirs.
Pender's
February 21 letter says that he reached camp "last evening"--February 20— which would have placed his meeting with
Johnston in Richmond in the afternoon of February 19.
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Manassas "advisable, but every means of doing it and saving
our artillery & stores, especially the heavy guns on the
Potomac,

seemed to be wanting— it was next to impossible."

This was followed by an exchange of opinions— "a prolonged
discussion" as Johnston remembered it somewhat derisively—
by the cabinet secretaries over various schemes to save
Whiting's exposed

c a n n o n .

67

Nothing in this conversation

would have improved the professional soldier's view of his
civilian superiors.
The meeting "terminated without the giving of orders,"
recalled Johnston,

"but with the understanding on my part

that the army was to fall back as soon as practicable."68
Bragg's diary supports this statement,

and notes with

reference to the selection of a new position that Johnston
"was directed however to have a reconnaisance [sic] of the
country in his rear with reference to another line, and it
is probable the Rappahannock will be selected."69
Three years later, Jefferson Davis asserted that a
reconnaissance had been necessary because Johnston himself

67gntry of February 20, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 157.
68johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 96; Johnston's memory of the
event had changed, however, by the time he prepared an
article for the Century a few years later.
There he con
tended that "the President directed me to prepare to fall
back from Manassas, and to do so as soon as the condition of
the country should make the marching of troops practicable.
. . ."
But his first recollection more nearly matched
contemporary evidence.
Johnston, "Responsibilities," B & L ,
I ; p. 256.
6^Entry of February 20, 1862, Bragg diary,

p. 157.
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did not have any idea of the country behind him:
On enquiry into the character of his position
at Centreville, he stated that his lines there
were untenable; but, when asked what new position
he proposed to occupy, declared himself ignorant
of the topography of the country in his rear.
This confession was a great shock to my confidence
in him.
That a General should have been for many
months in command of an Army, should have selected
a line which he himself considered untenable, and
should not have ascertained the topography of the
country in his rear, was inexplicable on any other
theory than that he had neglected the primary duty
of a commander.7 0
The charge reflected the antipathies of 1865 rather than the
realities of 1862.

Johnston was hardly ignorant of the land

behind him; he had already ordered a survey of the Rappahan
nock line when his engineers fortified the bridge cross
ings .71
But the question of exactly where Johnston's retreat
would cease was left undecided.

In the absence of indisput

able evidence, one logical reason for this omission suggests
itself.

The stated object of a withdrawal from northern

Virginia was to move Johnston's troops into closer support
ing distance of Richmond,

should either McClellan or

Burnside launch and amphibious attack on the city.

Obvious

ly, such a movement would also entail a retrograde by
Jackson's forces in the Shenandoah, which would, otherwise,

70jefferson Davis to James Phelan, February 18, 1865,
in Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, VI:
pp. 493-494.
71joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 9,
1862, in LR-A I G O , M-474, Reel 27; Joseph E. Johnston to R.
W. Hughes, April 9, 1867 , in R M H ; Johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p.
445 .
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have been left in a position far too exposed to be safe.
Neither Johnston nor Davis wanted to yield an inch of soil
unnecessarily,

and so both would have favored a position for

Johnston's main army close enough to defend Richmond, but
far enough north to support Jackson as far down the Valley
as possible.

The Rappahannock looked like the natural

choice for such a deployment, but, as trained soldiers, both
men would have known that the final decision was a judgment
call based in large measure on the Federal reaction to
Johnston's movements.

Further, Johnston was aware that the

defense of Richmond was now the administration's stated
priority, and only someone in Richmond, receiving daily
intelligence reports from northern Virginia, eastern
Virginia,

and North Carolina,

could decide exactly how much

nearer to the capital he should withdraw.

So his destina

tion, while provisionally the Rappahannock River, had not
been finally determined.
Leaving the meeting, probably sometime in the early
afternoon,

Johnston spent the remainder of the day trans

acting minor administrative affairs with Adjutant-General
Cooper.72

planned to return to Centreville the following

morning, and did not, of course, mention the outcome of the
cabinet meeting to anyone not already privy to the decision.
But that evening,

if the memoirs of an ardent congressional

72samuel Cooper to Theophilus Holmes, February 20,
1862, in LS-AIGO, Vol. 36, Reel 2.
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foe of the Davis administration are to be believed, the
General may have committed an indiscretion of another sort.
Just a few days earlier, Henry Stuart Foote had arrived
in Richmond,

newly elected to the permanent Confederate

Congress from Nashville, Tennessee.

Foote, originally a

Mississippi politician who had defeated Davis for governor
of that state in a particularly acrimonious race in 1853,
was an avowed opponent of both secession and the current
administration.

"That Confederate Tennesseans elected pro-

Union Foote to the Southern Congress," wrote historian
Patricia Faust,

"is almost as puzzling as their representa

tive's willingness to serve."73

perhaps it was not love of

the Confederacy but hatred for Davis that convinced Foote to
accept his election,

for he wasted no time pillorying the

administration's war policies.

Even as Johnston prepared to

leave the cabinet meeting on February 20, Foote,

"an orator

of the fist-pounding Bible-spouting variety," rose on his
first day in Congress to attack Jefferson Davis so bitterly
that he missed ending up in a duel with Albert Gallatin
Jenkins of Virginia by only the narrowest of

m a r g i n s .

That night, according to Foote's 1866 memoirs,

74

"I

^ P a t r i c i a j. Faust, "Henry Stuart Foote," in Patricia
J. Faust, ed., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of
the Civil War (New York:
Harper & Row, 1986), p. 266
(hereafter cited as H T I E ).
^ E l i n . Evans, Judah P. Benjamin, The Jewish Confeder
ate (New York:
Macmillan, 1988), p. 148; Richmond E x a m i n e r ,
February 21, 1862, p. 3.
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chanced to be invited to a dinner-party,
of

where some twenty

the most prominent members of the two houses of the

Confederate Congress were congregated,

including the Speaker

of the House of Representatives, Mr. Orr of South Carolina,
and others of equal rank."

Johnston, Foote asserted, had

also been invited, but seems to have taken little part in
the conversation, at least until the subject turned to
Secretary of War Judah Benjamin.
min's

While discussing Benja

"gross acts of official misconduct," Foote recorded,
one of the company turned to General Johnston, and
inquired whether he thought it even possible that
the Confederate cause could succeed with Mr. Ben
jamin as War Minister.
To this inquiry, General
Johnston, after a little pause, emphatically
responded in the n e g a t i v e . This high authority
was immediately cited in both houses of Congress
against Mr. Benjamin, and was in the end fatal to
his hopes of remaining in the Department of W a r . 75
No specific corroboration for Foote's anecdote has been

found beyond the fact that Arkansas Congressman Thomas B.
Hanly called for Johnston's appearance before the House on
February 25, to testify during the confirmation debates.
But considerable circumstantial evidence suggests that such
an act would not have been out of character for Johnston.
James Orr, the only other individual mentioned by name in
the story, had been colonel of the 1st South Carolina Rifles
before he had resigned to enter Congress;

it is not unlikely

that he would have invited Johnston to the dinner.

Johns-

Foote, War of the Rebellion; or Scylla and
(New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1866), p. 356.

75flenry s.

Charbydis
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ton's alleged comments were certainly in accordance with his
personal beliefs, as both his own memoirs and contemporary
correspondence testify.

The early postwar date at which

Foote wrote gives his account more credibility,

for most of

the controversies over Johnston's defense of Richmond that
might have colored his memory had not yet

s

u

r

f

a

c

e

d

.

76

If Foote's account is accurate, Jefferson Davis's
friends in Congress could hardly have avoided telling him
that Johnston's opinions were being quoted in debates in
order to discredit Benjamin.

Such an indiscretion on the

part of the General at the expense of his friend would have
only advanced the President's distrust of his field command
er.

Even if the anecdote was fabricated or exaggerated,

it

is indicative of a climate of suspicion that already existed
between Johnston and Davis in February,

1862, at a time when

the need for absolute mutual confidence had become para
mount.
That level of trust declined again,
the following day.

in Johnston's mind,

Riding the slow-moving train back to

76poote claimed that Johnston's comments torpedoed any
chance of Benjamin's reappointment as Secretary of War
because it was widely quoted in Congressional confirmation
hearings.
Benjamin biographer Robert Douthat Meade credited
this story, though he did not cite any other sources.
See •
Steward Sifakis, Who Was Who in the Civil War (New York:
Facts on File, 1988), pp. 479-480; Foote, Scylla and
Ch a r b y d i s , p. 356; Robert Douthat Meade, Judah P. Benjamin,
Confederate Statesman (New York:
Oxford University Press,
1943), p. 235; "Proceedings of the First Confederate
Congress— First Session," in Southern Historical Society
P a p e r s , Vol. XLIV (June 1923):
p. 50.
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Centreville, he made profitable use of the hours by d i s 
cussing details of the upcoming withdrawal with one of his
quartermasters, Major B. P. Noland, who chanced to be riding
in the same

c a r .

77

They were interrupted by a friend of

Johnston's,

"an acquaintance from the county of Faquier,

too

deaf to hear conversation not intended for his ear," who
told Johnston that he,

like Dorsey Pender,

the army was being withdrawn from

M a n a s s a s .

had heard that
78

Aghast,

General asked him for the source of his information.
come, Johnston said later,

the
It had

"from the wife of a member of the

C a b i n e t ."79

77Lucius B. Northrop to Jefferson Davis, January 14,
1885, in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, IX:
p . 32 6.
78johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 97.
79First draft of N a r r a t i v e , p. 18, in Box 28, Folder 1,
RMH.
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Chapter Four
Withdrawal from the Frontier

The rain came down even harder in Richmond on Inaugura
tion day.

The deluge "fell in torrents, and the streams and

gutters were like the flowing of little rivers."-*-

Jefferson

Davis and his Negro footmen approached the wooden platform
beside the statue of George Washington attired in somber
black.

"This, ma'am, is the way we always does in Richmond

at funerals and such like," one coachman told an inquisitive
spectator.2

The tall Mississippian bent to kiss the Bible,

and then stood bareheaded in the rain and delivered his
speech.

It was vintage Davis,

logical and concise, if not

inspiring; Attorney General Bragg remarked that, after all
the in camera editing,

"it is the best seasoned document

surely that ever was issued."

Bragg also said that February

22 was "one of the worst days I ever saw."2

"Very few heard

the inaugural address" over the drumming of the rain,
recalled one observer, and in the depression gripping the

1-Sally Putnam, Richmond During the War;
Four Years of
Personal Observation by a Richmond Lady (New York:
G. W.
Carleton & Co., 1867), p. 106.
2Quoted in James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom,
the Civil War Era (New York:
Oxford University Press,
1988), p. 403.
^Entries of February 20,
diary, pp. 156, 160-A.

1862, February 22,

1862, Bragg

102
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crowd there was a common feeling that the war had passed the
point where the words of the politicians mattered much
a n y w a y .4
In Centreville that Saturday,

it was also raining, but

General Johnston met with his staff indoors where they could
hear him.

He had been back from the capital fewer than

twenty-four hours, and he was determined to waste no time in
executing the order to withdraw his army.

He hoped quietly

to remove enough of his supplies and heavy guns in about two
weeks to allow himself freedom of maneuver.
It was an optimistic time-table, perhaps excessively
so, considering the difficulties that Johnston faced.
Neither his subordinate generals nor his staff had much
experience in planning the movement of an entire army on so
much as a route march, much less a retreat with all baggage
over muddy roads.

Likewise,

his troops, though well-drilled

in tactical evolutions, were innocent of real marching
experience.

Mountains of supplies— from an unwanted

4,000,000 pounds of meat at Thoroughfare Gap to the excess
trunks of his gentlemen-officers— had to be removed down the
inadequate railroad line.

Something had to be done with

Whiting's cannons along the Potomac.
accomplished in complete secrecy,

And it all had to be

lest McClellan scent that

something was afoot and attack one of the outlying garrisons
just as the withdrawal began.

^Putnam, R i c h m o n d , p. 107.
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Johnston knew that the command structure of his army
was dangerously weak.

In a little more than three months,

General Beauregard; Major-Generals Edmund Kirby-Smith and
Earl Van Dorn; and Brigadier-Generals Milledge Bonham,
Charles Clark, Philip St. George Cocke, Nathan G.

"Shanks"

Evans, W. H. T. Walker, Henry C. Wayne, and Louis T. Wigfall
had all left the army due to a variety of causes ranging
from transfer, to election to Congress; aggrieved resigna
tion, to

s u i c i d e .

5

The result, as Johnston wrote Davis, was

that
The army is crippled and its discipline greatly
impaired by the want of general officers.
The four
regiments observing the fords of the Lower Occoquan are
commanded by a lieutenant-colonel; and, besides a
division of five brigades is without generals; and at
least half the field officers are absent— generally
sick.6
Nor could Johnston feel absolutely confident in the
abilities of those officers left to him.
general,

His senior major-

forty-one-year-old Kentuckian, Gustavus Woodson

Smith, was a personal friend from prewar days who had
received his commission based primarily on his reputation as
an engineer and Johnston's own recommendation:

"Smith is a

5E zra J. Warner, Generals in Gray, Lives of the
Confederate Commanders (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State
University Press, 1959), pp. 23, 29, 51, 57, 84, 280, 315,
323, 329, 337.
^Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 25,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 1081.
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man of high ability,

fit to command in chief."7

But Smith

had "gone South" later than most, missing the Battle of
Manassas, and had, thus far, little chance to prove Johnston
correct or live up to his own aura of self-assurance.

He

had been impressive as an administrator during the winter—
even the irascible Robert Toombs admitted that "the army has
been a great gainer by his appointment."®

But Smith

suffered from some mysterious nervous malady which, without
warning,

could send him to bed for days at a time.

Such an

attack had already caused Johnston to delay his trip to
Richmond for three days; would the stress of active o pera
tions make his condition worse?®
A year older and physically Smith's opposite, James
Longstreet had the robust constitution of a draft horse.
fighter,

A

rather than a thinker by nature, Longstreet

actually benefitted by being slightly deaf, as one cavalry
officer remembered:

"he impressed me then as a man of

limited capacity who acquired reputation for wisdom by never
saying anything--the old story of the o w l .

I do not

remember ever hearing him say half a dozen words beyond

^Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 19,
1861, in OR, V:
p. 797; see also Longstreet, Manassas to
Appom a t t o x , p. 103; Warner, Generals in G r a y , pp. 280-281.
^Phillips, Correspondence, p. 579.
^Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 16,
1862, in JJWM.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

106

'yes' and

'no,' in a consecutive sentence.

. . ."10

He owed

an early commission as a brigadier-general to an accident of
timing, but justified it, and his next promotion, with his
performance at Manassas.
an administrator,

Like Smith, he proved his worth as

reputedly paying more attention to

drilling his division than any other o f f i c e r . H
Yet, as Johnston began to consider his evacuation, he
had reason to worry about Longstreet's state of mind.
Throughout most of the winter, Longstreet had joined in the
rather convivial atmosphere around headquarters,
on prewar notoriety as a skilled poker

p l a y e r .

12

enlarging
But in

early February, not long before Davis summoned Johnston
Richmond, tragedy had struck the Georgian.

to

In a single

week, three of his children died of a fever in Richmond; by
February 25, Longstreet had only just returned from an
emergency leave to bury his dead.

Now his silence appeared

to be the silence of brooding and depression; how would this
affect him as a division

c o m m a n d e r ? ! ^

10w. W. Blackford, War Years with Jeb Stuart
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945), p. 47.
Hwise,

(New York;

Seventeenth V i r g i n i a , p. 49.

l^Moxley Sorrel, Recollections of a Confederate Staff
Officer (New York:
Neale, 1905), pp. 37-38.
1 ^Longstreet's children died on January 25, 26, and
February 1, 1862; see Sanger and Hay, James L o n g s t r e e t , pp.
3 6-37.
Sorrel remarked in I b i d . about the great change that
appeared in Longstreet after the loss.
In his recent
revisionist book, Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant, James Longstreet and His Place in Southern H i s t o r y , William Garrett
Piston argues that Longstreet was, nonetheless, Johnston's
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The third major-general with Johnston's field army had
just received his second star; Richard Stoddert Ewell
advanced to division command on January 24, 1862, two weeks
prior to his forty-fifth birthday.14

"Bald as an eagle,"

recalled one staff officer, Ewell "looked like one; had a
piercing eye and a lisping speech."15

He was a hypochondri

ac, sometimes an insomniac, and when he grew excited, he
swore until "he made the air blue";
trics,

in an army of eccen

"Dick" Ewell stood out as a genuine character.16

what of his military capacity?

But

Richard Taylor remembered

most trusted subordinate, and that the army commander wished
that the Georgian and not Smith were second in command. He
cites the fact that Johnston "constantly gave him greater
responsibilities and more difficult assignments than Smith."
But Piston's sources do not bear out his contention that in
February, 1862, Johnston considered Longstreet superior to
Smith.
Piston cites only the Sanger and Hay biography and
two reports from the Peninsula campaign:
Johnston's of
Williamsburg and Longstreet's own from Seven Pines.
In
point of fact, it was Smith, not Longstreet, that Johnston
considered on February 16, 1862, to be "necessary here as
the commander of the main body. . . . "
And Longstreet
himself admitted that prior to April, 1862, Smith stood
higher in Johnston's councils than he himself did.
On
balance, however, Piston's book provides a much-needed
corrective view of Longstreet's performance and place in
Confederate historiography.
William Garrett Piston, Lee's
Tarnished Lieutenant, James Longstreet and His Place in
Southern History (Athens, GA:
University of Georgia, 1987),
pp. 18, 193; Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February
16, 1862, in OR, V:
p. 1074; Longstreet, Manassas to
A p p o m a t t o x , p. 60.
l^Warner, Generals in G r a y , pp. 84-85; the best recent
treatment of Ewell is Samuel J. Martin, "The Complex
Confederate," Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. XXV, No. 2
(April, 1986):
pp. 26-33.
ISsorrel, Recollections, p. 53.
l ^ D o u g l a s ,

S t o n e w a l 1 ,

p.

53.
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that more than once Ewell turned to him and asked,

"What do

you suppose President Davis made me a major-general for?"17
His deployment on the Confederate right flank had kept him
from winning any great acclaim at Manassas, and the bleak
fall and winter had not given him any chance to demonstrate
any potential for higher responsibilities.
that Ewell was a Virginian had helped.

Perhaps the fact

Virginia had

contributed enough troops to the army to fill one of its
four divisions; but, after Jackson's transfer to the Valley
District and before Ewell's promotion, there had been no
major-generals from the Old Dominion, and only three
brigadiers.

Maintaining a careful, political balance

between the number of regiments and the number of generals
hailing from each state had always concerned Jefferson
Davis, and as the senior Virginian under Johnston's immedi
ate command, Ewell quite- possibly benefitted as much from
his state affiliation as from any military reputation.18
Though neither Smith nor Longstreet had proven his ability
to handle a division in combat, both must have represented

^Taylor,

Destruction, p. 37.

18Martin, "Complex Confederate," p. 28; for the
President's sensitivity to the issue of balancing the
regiments, brigades, and g e n e r a l s 'from the various states,
see Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, October 7, 1861,
Jefferson Davis to Gustavus W. Smith, October 10, 1861,
Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston, November 15, 1861,
General Orders No. 18, Adjutant and Inspector General's
Office, November 16, 1861, Gustavus W. Smith to D. H. Hill,
December 26, 1861, Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston,
January 7, 1862, in OR, V:
p. 892, 893-894, 954, 960-961,
1008, 1023.
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less of a question mark in Johnston's mind than Ewell, who
had not yet had enough time to prove himself competent at
even the administrative level.
The two other major-generals assigned to the Department
of Northern Virginia--fifty-seven-year-old North Carolinian,
Theophilus H. Holmes, and thirty-eight-year-old Virginian,
Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson— both held detached commands.
Holmes,

in charge of the Aquia District, had been a friend

of Jefferson Davis and a classmate of Joseph Johnston at
West Point

(though at the far end of the class— Johnston

finished thirteenth and Holmes forty-fourth of forty-six).^ 9
He had advanced to the rank of major in the infantry in
1861, due more to tenacity and the inexorability of army
seniority than any spark of talent; nonetheless,
that Holmes was one of only fifteen active,

the fact

field-grade

officers to resign his commission had guaranteed him early
p r o m o t i o n . F r o m his relatively quiet headquarters at
Fredericksburg, Holmes had had no opportunity to prove
himself competent or otherwise, though Johnston had already
had at least one occasion to criticize him for dilatory

^ W a l t e r p. Fleming, "Jefferson Davis at West Point"
Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, Vol. X
(1909):
p. 267.
20see Official Army Register for 1861 (Washington, DC:
Adjutant General's Office, 1861), and compare it to Official
Army Register for 1862 (Washington, DC:
Adjutant General's
Office, 1862).
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performance of his duties.21

But the question of Holmes'

abilities would not have weighed too heavily on Johnston's
mind, because the withdrawal would necessarily affect the
Aquia command least of all.
Jackson, however,
dangerous post.

held a much more critical and more

Wintering his troops at Winchester, he

already faced growing Federal threats from the north and
west; when Johnston withdrew the main army from Centreville,
a quick thrust by McClellan from the east could trap Jackson
in a very tight sack.

Yet both political and military

realities demanded that,

in avoiding capture or defeat by

Union forces, Jackson not relinquish a foot more of Valley
soil than was absolutely necessary.

It was an assignment

that demanded equal portions of boldness,

judgment, and

skill— all talents which the next few months would reveal
that Jackson possessed in abundance.
But it is important to remember that in February,

1862,

no one suspected Jackson of harboring the seeds of genius.
Jefferson Davis had characterized him in a January 31
cabinet meeting as "utterly incompetent."

Both the Presi

dent and Secretary Benjamin thought him a poor administrator
who played favorites with his troops when assigning the best

21joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 19,
1861, in OR, V: p. 797.
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q u a r t e r s .

22

His own subordinates verged on outright mutiny

during the winter,

complaining directly to Richmond of

mistreatment at the hands of their

g e n e r a l .

23

His personal

ity, prior to his rise to fame, tended to be seen as
arbitrary and querulous, rather than eccentric and endear
ing, and his appearance did not improve his image.

"Above

the average height, with a frame angular, muscular,

and

fleshless," wrote Henry Kyd Douglas,

Jackson "was,

in all

his movements from riding a horse to handling a pen, the
most awkward man in the a r m y . "24

Even after his rise to

fame, Jackson's peers respected him more than they loved
him; A. P. Hill characterized Jackson in November,

1862 as

"that crazy old Presbyterian fool," and suggested that "the
Almighty will get tired of helping Jackson after a while
[sic], and then he'll get the d — ndest thrashing.

. . ."25

Johnston, who had been Jackson's superior since May,
1861 at Harper's Ferry, had his own opinion of the dour

22Entry of January 31, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 130;
Jefferson Davis to Judah P. Benjamin, January 29, 1862, in
OR, V:
p. 1050.
23william B. Taliaferro et a l . to W. W. Loring, January
25, 1862, W. W. Loring to Judah P. Benjamin, January 31,
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 7, 1862,
in OR, V:
pp. 1046-1047, 1054-1056, 1065-1066.
24oouglas,

Stonewal1 , p. 226.

25 a . P. Hill to J. E. B. Stuart, November 14, 1862, in
James Ewell Brown Stuart papers, Virginia Historical
Society, Richmond, Virginia; see also Mark Grimsley,
"Jackson:
The Wrath of God," Civil War Times Illustrated,
vol. XXIII, No. 1 (March 1984):
pp. 10-17.
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Virginian, one which seems to have been more favorable than
the consensus.

Jackson, unlike many other officers, always

filed his reports on time, kept Johnston apprised of his
position and intentions, and appeared to be capable of
critically evaluating intelligence about enemy numbers and
intentions.

Johnston did believe that Jackson tended to be

overly aggressive.

Commenting on Jackson's plan for a

winter campaign in November,

1861, Johnston observed:

"It

seems to me that he proposes more than can well be accom
plished.

..."

the operation,

But once the government had committed to
Johnston whole-heartedly supported Jackson

against all his critics,

from private soldiers to the

President of the Confederacy.

After an embarrassing

directive from Benjamin countermanded his own orders,
Jackson attempted to resign,

and Johnston felt strongly

enough about him to delay his letter and press for a
reconsideration.
pointedly,
s u p p l i e d .

To the Secretary of War, Johnston wrote

"I don't know how the loss of this officer can be

"26

Johnston implied after the w a r — as

d i d

almost

everyone else— that he had seen early signs of talent for
independent command that Jackson later demonstrated,
evidence does not support this

a s s e r t i o n .

27

still,

but the
i t

is

26joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, November 22,
1861, endorsement on Thomas J. Jackson to Judah P. Benjamin,
January 31, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Thomas J. Jackson,
February 3, 1862, in OR, V:
pp. 966, 1053, 1059-1060.
27johnston, N a rrative, pp. 86-89,

106-107.
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clear that Johnston rated Jackson much higher in February,
1862, than did almost anyone else.
Among Johnston's brigadiers,

four would have figured

most significantly in his plans for maneuvering the army:
Jubal Early, D. H. Hill, J. E. B. Stuart, and W. K. C.
Whiting.

All were West Point graduates and Johnston

recommended at least three of them for

p r o m o t i o n .

^8

In the

absence of government action, the General decided unilat
erally to advance them to higher levels of responsibility,
in fact, if not in title.
Early was a forty-five-year-old Virginian who had
resigned from the army in 1838 to pursue a legal and
political career in his home state, interrupted only by
volunteer service in the Mexican War.

He had opposed

secession, but quickly devoted himself to the Confederacy,
accepting the colonelcy of the 24th Virginia.

His conduct

at Manassas won him a general's star, and by February,

1862,

28warner, Generals in G r a y , pp. 79, 136-137, 296-297,
334-335; Johnston's recommendation for Early's promotion may
be inferred from the fact that he assigned him to a division
command prior to receiving the appointment of Richard S.
Ewell, who was senior to Early.
See General Orders No. 22,
Department of Northern Virginia, February 5, 1862, in OR, V:
pp. 1061-1062; for Johnston's recommendation of Stuart, see
Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 10, 1861, in
OR, V:
p. 77; Johnston referred to Whiting in glowing terms
throughout the winter and spring, but Whiting's difficulties
with Jefferson Davis over the command of a Mississippi
brigade kept Johnston from actually submitting a recommenda
tion for promotion until April.
See Joseph E. Johnston to
George Wythe Randolph, April 20, 1862, i n W . H. C. Whiting,
Compiled Service Record, Record Group 94, National Archives.
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Johnston had begun using him as a division
Stoop-shouldered,

c o m m a n d e r .

29

addicted to chewing tobacco, argumenta

tive, ambitious, and profane, Early elicited extreme
responses from his peers:
him.

Longstreet,

they either liked him or hated

in particular,

found him distasteful and

distrusted his capabilities, but Johnston disagreed, and
consistently handed Early critical assignments.30
Daniel Harvey Hill, as previously noted, commanded the
detached garrison at Leesburg,

stronger than a brigade but

not quite as large as a division.

A forty-one-year-old

North Carolinian, Hill had resigned from the army in 1849 to
become a professional educator.

An ardent Southern nation

alist who eagerly embraced secession in 1861, Hill had won,
as colonel of the 1st North Carolina, the Battle of Big
Bethel,

the first land engagement in Virginia,

promotion to

b r i g a d i e r - g e n e r a l

.21

securing his

His coolness under fire

was already well-known among his soldiers:

at Leesburg,

29warner, Generals in G r a y , p. 79; General Orders No.
22, Department of Northern Virginia, February 5, 1862, in
OR, V:
pp. 1061-1062.
30Longstreet's poor opinion of Early seems to have
stemmed from an inability to make the Virginian follow
orders on outpost at Fairfax Court House in the late summer
of 1861.
By the Battle of Williamsburg, his assessment had
fully crystallized into a belief that Early was incompetent
to handle a brigade.
See James Longstreet to Thomas Jordan,
undated, but by context from August or September, 1861, in
James Longstreet, Compiled Service Record, Record Group 94,
National Archives; Longstreet, Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x , p.
78; Sorrel, Recollections, p. 56.
31warner, Generals in G r a y , pp. 136-137.
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when he wanted to know the range and calibre of enemy guns
across the river, Hill paraded up and down the banks with an
ostentatious escort until the Federals fired on them.
rounds fell short and others flew overhead.

Some

Before the

barrage ended, Hill casually took a pick and began digging
up shells embedded in the ground to measure their size.32
Notoriously moody, his letters and reports read more like
newspaper editorials than military correspondence.

Sarcas

tic comments about a forger in the War Department and the
incompetence of army surgeons have already been cited; on
another occasion, he complained that "it was my hopes

[sic]

to have been a soldier in this war, but I have only been a
passport clerk."33

Hill's competence and nerve were

essential components in any withdrawal plans, because for
one to two days after the movement began, the Leesburg
garrison would be outside its fortifications and too far
away from the rest of the army to be reinforced if attacked.
Covering the withdrawal would be the responsibility of
the army's cavalry brigade, commanded by James Ewell Brown
"Jeb" Stuart, a Virginian who had just turned twenty-nine.
Stuart had been a protege and special favorite of Johnston's
when the two men had served as lieutenant and lieutenantcolonel of the 1st Cavalry on the Kansas border in the

32Sti les, Four Y e a r s , p. 67.
33 d . H. Hill to George Wythe Randolph, March 22, 1862,
in OR, LI (part 2):
p. 513; see also D. H. Hill to Joseph
E. Johnston, May 25, 1885, in RMH.
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1850 's.

The two men were reunited in June, 1861, when

Stuart commanded Johnston's cavalry in the Shenandoah Valley
and screened the movement to Manassas so successfully that
the Federal commander did not even know Johnston's army had
departed for several days.34

He was flamboyant and seemed,

at times, not to take the war any more seriously than a
jousting tournament;

his headquarters' camp rang with music

and laughter throughout most nights,

and was decorated in

front with a captured Blakely rifled cannon, next to which
was chained a trained raccoon.35

g ut on duty, even his

critics admitted that Stuart was the consummate profession
al.

Johnston described his cavalry commander to Davis as "a

rare man, wonderfully endowed by nature with the qualities

^ D u r i n g the time that Johnston had served in the 1st
Cavalry in the 185 0 's, he had become embroiled with the
regiment's commander, Colonel Edwin Vose Sumner, in a feud
so divisive that the War Department had been forced ulti
mately to split the regiment into two sections.
Johnston's
partisans in the regiment included Major William H. Emory,
Captain George B. McClellan, and probably First Lieutenant
J. E. B. Stuart.
Sumner had relieved Stuart of the post of
regimental quartermaster, and his promotion to captain was
recommended by Johnston protege, Emory.
Warner, Generals in
G r a y , pp. 2 96-29 7; Emory M. Thomas, Bold Dragoon, The Life
of J. E. B. Stuart (New York:
Harper and Row, 1986), pp.
40, 47, 60, 69-73; Robert Ransom to W. T. Walthall, March
23, 1879, in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist,
VIII:
pp. 370-371; Govan and Livingood, Different V a l o r ,
pp. 21-23; Stephen W. Sear, George B. McClellan, The Young
Napoleon (New York:
Ticknor and Fields, 1988), p. 50;
Albert Gallatin Brackett, History of the United States
Cavalry (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1865), pp. 141-145,
177; Joseph E. Johnston to Flora Cook Stuart, September 28,
1861, in James Ewell Brown Stuart papers, Virginia Histori
cal Society.
35Thomas, Bold D r a g o o n , pp.

90-93.
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necessary for an officer of light cavalry.
acute, active,

and enterprising,

Calm,

firm,

I know no one more compe

tent than he to estimate the occurrences before him at their
true v a l u e . "36
William Henry Chase Whiting commanded the de facto
division of three brigades blockading the lower Potomac and
guarding Johnston's right flank.

The thirty-seven-year-old

Mississippian had a well-deserved reputation as one of the
best engineers in the army; he had not only graduated first
in his class at West Point in 1845, he had achieved the
highest grades ever recorded.
engineers,

In June, 1861, as a major of

he had been assigned to Johnston's staff as chief

engineer of the Army of the Shenandoah, and planned the rail
movement of the army to Manassas.

Johnston and Whiting had

been friends long before the war, and both that acquaintance
and Johnston's professional evaluation of Whiting's skills
led to his promotion to brigadier-general on July 21,
1861.^7

Johnston's choice of Whiting to supervise the line

of the lower Potomac was an example of putting the right man
in the right place.

Whiting constructed multiple firing

positions for each of his few heavy guns and kept them
constantly rotating from one to the next,

successfully

disguising his weakness from the Federals across the river.

36joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 10,
1861, in OR, V:
p. 777.
37tyjarner, Generals in G r a y , pp. 334-335.
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These positions were fortified only from the front, and left
in the direct line of sight of concealed field batteries
placed further back from the river, so that if a Union
raiding party ever seized one of his forward batteries he
could drive them off almost immediately.38

Johnston relied

implicitly on Whiting's judgment as a military engineer,

and

thought highly of his administrative capabilities.
But for all his competence, Whiting could often become
a management problem for his commander.

Though personally

popular with the troops, who dubbed him "Little Billy," he
was notoriously pessimistic;
that "though of brilliant,

Longstreet recalled of Whiting

highly cultivated mind,

the dark

side of the picture was always more imposing with h i m . "39
This trait was aggravated by periodic bouts of severe
depression and impulsive outbursts.

Johnston occasionally

chided him gently about the former, and repeatedly had to
protect him from the consequences of the latter.
January,

In

1862, an intemperate letter from Whiting to the War

Department concerning the reorganization of Mississippi
troops into exclusive brigades had aroused President Davis's
wrath, and he had demanded that Whiting be stripped of his

3 8 w i H i a m T. Street to R. H. Wyman, December 11, 1861,
R. H. Wyman to Gideon Welles, December 12, 1861, R. H. Wyman
to Gideon Welles, December 18, 1861, R. H. Wyman to Gideon
Welles, March 11, 1862, in N O R , V:
pp. 4-5, 7-8, 25.
39c. B. Denson, "William Henry Chase Whiting," Southern
Historical Society Pap e r s , Vol. XXVI (1898):
p. 140;
Longstreet, Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x , p. 113.
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general's rank and demoted back to a major of engineers.
Only some uncharacteristically diplomatic letter-writing by
Johnston, and an abject apology he forced out of Whiting,
sufficed to save his commi s s i o n .40

as

Johnston sat down fewto

plan his withdrawal on February 25, he was aware that
Whiting had become despondent over the news of the fall of
Fort Donelson,

and the Mississippian's state of mind would

have to figure prominently in his calculations.41
Thus,

the state of the senior command structure of the

Department of Northern Virginia in late February,
hardly a cause for optimism.
in the past few months.

Ten generals had left the army

None of Johnston's division

commanders had ever marched,
divisions.

1862 was

let alone fought,

their

His second-in-command was in precarious health.

Three key commanders--Longstreet, Hill, and Whiting— were,

40For Johnston remonstrating with Whiting over the
Mississippian's bouts with depression, see Joseph E.
Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, March 6, 1862,
in OR, V: pp.
1091-1092; for the controversy over Whiting and the Missis
sippi brigade, see Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston,
December 27, 18 61, Joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin,
January 1, 1862, Judah P. Benjamin to Joseph E. Johnston,
January 5, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Judah
P. Benjamin,
January 14, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin,
January 16, 1862, in OR, V:
pp. 1011-1012, 1015-1016, 1020,
1028, 1035; Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 12,
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 13, 1862,
Joseph E. Johnston to Judah P. Benjamin, January 13, 1862,
in L R - S W , M - 618, Reel 8; W. H. C. Whiting to Samuel Cooper,
January 5, 1862, in L R - S W , M-437, Reel 21; Joseph E.
Johnston to Samuel Cooper, January 7, 1862, in LR-A I G O , M474, Reel 27, W. H. C. Whiting to Samuel Cooper, January 5,
1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 52.
41joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, March 6,
1862, in OR, V:
pp. 1091-1092.
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for various reasons, deeply depressed.

Jackson, Stuart,

and

Whiting were all in disfavor with the authorities in
Richmond.42

The leadership of Johnston's department looked

like that of an army recently defeated in battle, rather
than one about to conduct a major movement.
Nor could Johnston lean too heavily on his staff.

He

had written Davis in the letter of February 16 that he had
"no competent staff," a condition that existed for three
reasons.42

First,

neither West Point nor the prewar United

States Army had emphasized staff training.

Those officers

who had somehow acquired staff experience, with few excep
tions, preferred field command to a supporting role,

and

thus, most staff billets were filled either with untrained
civilians, political appointees, or officers of such
mediocre talent that they could not manage a higher commis
sion.

Finally, Confederate law followed United States

precedent and parsimoniously restricted the number of staff
officers even an army commander could appoint to ridicu
lously inadequate figures; Johnston's entire staff for the
Department of Northern Virginia numbered just eleven
42Davis criticized Stuart's performance in a letter
erroneously dated February 6, 1862 when printed in OR; a
careful reading of Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis,
March 3, 1862, reveals that the letter concerning Stuart
should carry the date March 6, 1862; Jefferson Davis to
Joseph E. Johnston, February [sic] 6, 1862, Joseph E.
Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 3, 1862, in OR, V:
pp.
1063-1064, 1088.
42Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 16,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 1074.
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officers,

supplemented by about a half-dozen aides-de-

camp .44
As Civil War staffs went, Johnston's was about average.
Five of the eleven--Colonel G. W. Lay, Acting InspectorGeneral; Colonel W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery;
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert G. Cole, Chief Commissary; Major
E. P. Alexander, Chief of Ordnance; and Major Thomas G.
Rhett, Assistant Adjutant-General— were West Pointers.

Two

of the others— Major A. J. Foard, Chief Surgeon and Captain
E. J. Harvie, Assistant Adjutant General--were former
officers in the regular army, but not Academy graduates.
Taking the family connections of several of these officers
into consideration,

it could be argued, with some justice,

that Johnston shared the vice of many other generals in
staffing his headquarters:

he surrounded himself with the

sons of the Confederate elite,

sometimes to the detriment of

effective operations.

44Return of the Department of Northern Virginia,
December 31, 1861, in JJWM; Russell F. Weigley, History of
the United States A r m y , enlarged edition (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 240-241; Testimony of
J. H. Simpson, July 26, 1860, Testimony of A. M. McCook,
July 26, 1860, Robert C. Buchanan to J. C. Ives, August 3,
1860, J. G. Barnard to J. C. Ives, August 21, 1860, Edward
Otho Cresap Ord to J. C. Ives, August 17, 1860, George G.
Meade to J. C. Ives, August 30, 1860, in Thirty-sixth
Congress, Second Session, Report of the Commission appointed
under the eighth section of the act of Conqress of June 21,
1860, to examine into the organization, system of discipline, and course ; of instruction of the United States
Government
Military Academy at West Point (Washington, DC:
Printing Office, 1860), pp. 85, 86, 236-237, 330-331, 334,
345; see also J. D. Hittle, The Military Staff, Its History
and Development (Harrisburg, PA:
Stackpole, 1961), p. 67.
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Lay and Rhett,

among the professionals,

had the most

impressive family pedigrees of anyone on the staff.

Yet,

despite the fact that they had prewar experience commensu
rate with their positions in the Department of Northern
Virginia, both men turned out to be something of a disap
pointment at Johnston's headquarters.

Lay was the son-in-

law of Supreme Court Justice and Assistant Confederate
Secretary of War, John Archibald Campbell and the former
aide of Lieutenant-General, Winfield Scott.

He was also one

of the very few officers to resign from the United States
Army as a lieutenant-colonel, and never achieve a general's
star during the war.

Though experienced, he lacked energy:

War Department staff officer, Robert G. H. Kean, thought Lay
possessed "sound principles of administration but . . .
little vim in the head."
alcoholic.45

He was also,

by some reports, an

Thomas Rhett had both lineal and marital ties

4^Lay ended the war working as the Inspector-General of
the Bureau of Conscription; even there, General Braxton
Bragg criticized him as indolent.
J. B. Jones, A Rebel War
Clerk's Diary at the Confederate State Capital (New York:
Old Hickory Bookshop, 1935), II:
pp. 249, 278; Mrs. Burton
Harrison, Recollections Grave and Gray (New York:
Charles
Scribner's Son's, 1911), p. 79; Edward Younger, ed., Inside
the Confederate Government, The Diary of Robert Garlick Hill
Kean (New York:
Oxford, 1957), pp. 84-85; "List of Officers
in duty in the Bureau of Conscription, August 29, 1864,"
endorsement, Braxton Bragg to Jefferson Davis, September 5,
1864, in OR, Series 4, II:
pp. 609-610; Elliot, West P o i n t ,
pp. 370-371; Joseph H. Crute, Confederate Staff Officers,
1861-1865 (Powhatan, VA:
Derwent Books, 1982), pp. 19, 104,
116; Francis Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of
the United States Army, from Its Organization . . . to 1903
(Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1903), I:
pp.
620; Jon L. Wakelyn, Biographical Dictionary of the Confed
eracy (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1977), pp. 122-123;
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to the top of Confederate society:

his uncle was South

Carolina fire-eater, Robert Barnwell Rhett; his father-inlaw, Virginia politician Thomson F. Mason; and his wife's
uncle, Confederate diplomat,

James M. Mason.

In April,

1861, Rhett had been a major and an army paymaster--the same
position that James Longstreet resigned for a brigadiergeneralcy— and when he entered Confederate service, he did
so at his old rank.

Rhett's failure to advance with his

peers seems to center around his personality; he was goodnatured company and a fine poker player, but hated paper
work, and only served on the staff as a personal favor to
Johnston.

There were, of course, persistent rumors that

Jefferson Davis discriminated against him because of his
uncle's persistent anti-administration stance.46

C. Vann Woodward and Elisabeth Muhlenfeld, The Private Mary
Chesnut, The Unpublished Civil War Diaries (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 28n; Woodward, Mary
Chesnut's Civil W a r , pp. 28n, 121, 125.
^ T h o m a s Rhett was twice related to the Mason family:
his brother had married his wife's sister.
He was the only
one of South Carolina's early brigadier-generals not to
eventually receive an equivalent commission in the Confed
erate Army.
See Charles E. Cauthen, South Carolina Goes to
War, 1860-1865 (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North
Carolina Press, 1950), p. 115; Laura A. White, Robert
Barnwell Rhett:
Father of Secession (New York:
Century,
1931), p. 220n; Elliot, West P o i n t , p. 417; Heitman,
Historical R e g i s t e r , I:
pp. 641, 826; Crute, Staff Offi
cers , pp. 104, 178; Sorrel, Recollections, p. 31; Woodward
and Muhlenfeld, Private Mary Chesnut, pp. 65n, 150n;
Wakelyn, Biographical D i c t i o n a r y , pp. 314, 367-368; Burton
J. Kendrick, Statesmen of the Lost Cause, Jefferson Davis
and His Cabinet (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1939), pp.
237-240; Robert E. Lee to Samuel Cooper, June 3, 1862, in
L R - A I G O , M - 4 7 4 , Reel 3.
/
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Among the rest of the professionals there were men from
whom more might be hoped.
staff officer,

Harvie was competent as a junior

possibly because he was doing more or less

the same job that he had as a lieutenant in the 9th U. S.
Infantry.

Cole had managed the food supplies at Manassas

efficiently,

but his authority did not extend to the meat

packing plant at Thoroughfare Gap.

Only twenty-four medical

officers of the United States Army resigned their commis
sions to enter the Confederate Army; as an assistant
regimental surgeon with nearly eight years" experience, A.
J. Foard represented a treasure to the new nation.
testimony to his talents,

As a

in the very fine Confederate

Medical Department, Foard spent the entire war as Chief
Surgeon in either the Department of Northern Virginia or the
Department of Tennessee.

Often, Foard's standard operating

procedures were accepted by the Surgeon-General for the
entire Medical Department.

Pendleton and Alexander repre

sented equally bright spots on the professional side; both
men were excellent administrators; between them, they would
account for two of the four general o f f i c e r s ' commissions
ever granted to artillerymen in the Army of Northern
V i r g i n i a .47

4 7pendleton came under much fire later in the war
because he was not a field commander, and was misplaced as a
field artillery commander, so much so that Lee's reorganiza
tion of the reserve artillery prior to Gettysburg can be
viewed as an attempt to limit the scope of his influence.
Sorrel called him "a well-meaning man, without qualification
for the high post he claimed. . . . "
But for the first few
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The four non-professionals were Major A. H. Cole,
Inspector of Transportation; Major A. P. Mason, Assistant
Adjutant General; Major Alfred W. Barbour,

Chief Quartermas

ter; and Major B. P- Noland, the Commissary of Subsistence
at Thoroughfare Gap.

Cole, a loyal Johnston partisan, was

energetic, outspoken, and assertive in carrying out his
duties, regardless of any lack of training.
formal standing,

He had no

as the War Department still declined to

acknowledge the need for an Inspector of Transportation;

so,

though competent and active, his authority was seriously
l i m i t e d . ^8

Mason was another case of an officer who

months of the war, dealing with the minutiae of organizing
the artillery arm, scavenging for material, and setting up
the foundation for the army's artillery, Pendleton was,
perhaps, the perfect choice.
Alexander earned a reputation
for thoroughness, precision, and effectiveness at every
assignment he ever accepted, from arranging the Confederate
signal service to Johnston's Chief Ordnance, eventually
rising to Chief of Artillery for the First Corps, Army of
Northern Virginia, earning the accolade of Lee's "top
tactical artilleryman" from historian Larry J. Daniel,
although Jennings C. Wise found fault with Alexander's
sometimes overly critical nature.
See H. H. Cunningham,
Doctors in Gray, The Confederate Medical Service (Glouces
ter, MA:
Peter Smith, 1970), pp. 34, 161, 249; Richard B.
Stark, "Surgeons and Surgical Care of the Confederate States
Army," Virginia Medical M o n t h l y , vol. LXXXVIII, No. 10:
p.
607; Warner, Generals in G r a y , pp. 3-4, 234-235; Elliot,
West P o i n t , pp. 271-272, 287, 316-317, 408; Sorrel, R ecol
lections , p. 114; Larry J. Daniel, Cannoneers in Gray, The
Field Artillery of the Army of Tennessee, 1861-1865 (Univer
sity, AL:
University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 135; Wise,
Long A r m , pp. 76-78, 193-195; Crute, Staff officers, pp. 14,
21, 103, 115, 189; Heitman, Historical R e g i s t e r , I:
pp.
426, 503.
48see the arguments over the appointment of an Inspec
tor of Transportation, cited in Chapter Two.
Cole eventu
ally rose to become Inspector of Transportation for the
Confederate Army.
A. H. Cole is sometimes confused with R.
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probably acquired his commission as a result of family
influence.

He was the son of Thomson F. Mason and, there

fore, Thomas Rhett's brother-in-law.

He was the son-in-law

of Judge Campbell, which made him G. W. Lay's brother-inlaw, as well.

Mason seems to have adapted well, but his

assignment was primarily clerical.49
There is considerable evidence that in February,

1862,

Johnston already doubted the competence of both Barbour and
Noland, which was an ominous sign, since the Quartermaster
and Commissary Departments would be primarily responsible
for evacuating the bulk of the goods stored near Centreville, Manassas,

and Thoroughfare Gap.

Neither man had any

formal training for his post, and, in Johnston's opinion,
neither showed much natural inclination toward his duties.50

G. Cole.
See Crute, Staff O f f icers, pp. 68, 103, 115, 125;
Elliot, West P o i n t , pp. 84-86, 316; Goff, Confederate
Supply, p. 72.
49Mason's abilities as a staff officer can be inferred
from the fact that he served almost continuously as the A.
A. G. to army commanders from Johnston to Robert E. Lee to
Johnston again and then John Bell Hood.
Men without talent,
no matter their family connections, tended to be relegated
eventually to minor posts.
Woodward and Muhlenfeld, Private
Mary C h e s n u t , p. 65n; Stewart Sifakis, Who Was Who in the
Civil War (New York:
Facts on File, 1988), p. 436; Crute,
Staff O f f i c e r s , pp. 104, 116; Wakelyn, Biographical Diction
a r y , p. 314; Kendrick, Statesmen, pp. 237-240.
50johnston had not wanted to lose W. L. Cabell, his
former Chief Quartermaster, and did not want Barbour to
replace him; see the dispute over the position of Chief
Quartermaster for the Department of Northern Virginia in
Chapter Two.
Whether it was Noland personally, or the
Subsistence Department in general that Johnston distrusted,
is not clear.
What is evident from his correspondence and
memoirs was a general belief that the department was riddled
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Unfortunately,

it was these two officers of all his staff

that Johnston was powerless to replace, because Confederate
law gave the right of appointment for those positions to the
bureau chiefs in Richmond:

Johnston's implacable enemies,

Myers and Northrop.51
Thus, Johnston's staff represented that uneven mixture
of talent and mediocrity peculiar to most Civil War era
headquarters.
movements,

Even if the staff could plan the army's

and the subordinate generals could direct them,

just how well the troops could execute them was another
critical question.

The rebel soldiers inhabiting the camps

in northern Virginia in February,

1862 were not yet the

lean, fast-marching infantrymen that would outpace the
Federal army time and again in the last two years of the
war.

Instead, Johnston's brigades, which were composed of

men who had fought no more than a single, short battle

(and

only about half the soldiers present in February had done

with inefficiency, waste, and possibly corruption.
That
Johnston did not have the highest opinion of Noland can be
inferred from the manner in which he limited his assignment
during the withdrawal, discussed later in this chapter.
There is also the fact that Johnston waxed— for him-eloquent on the merits of the army's first Chief Commissary
and bemoaned his loss, and was also complimentary' toward R.
G. Cole, but did not mention Noland by name in his memoirs.
Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 16, 1861,
Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, August 17, 1861,
Leroy Pope Walker to Lucius B. Northrop, September 7, 1861,
Lucius B. Northrop to Leroy Pope Walker, September 9, 1861,
in OR, V:
pp. 789-790, 833, 835-836; Johnston, N a r r a t i v e ,
pp. 67-68; Crute, Staff O f f i c e r s , p. 103.
51-Goff, Confederate S u p p l y , p. 21.
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that),

spent a winter drilling in the muddy fields alongside

their camps.

They naively believed that this experience

would make them seasoned veterans.

"A trunk had come with

each volunteer," Johnston later bemoaned,
extent of his soldiers' baggage.52

recalling the

After spending four

pages detailing the long list of items that Confederate
soldiers thought essential to camp life in the first year of
the war, Carlton McCarthy of the Richmond Howitzers writes
in 1882 that
It is amusing to think of the follies of the early
part of the war, as illustrated by the outfits of the
volunteers.
They were so heavily clad, and so burdened
with all manner of things, that a march was torture.
. . . Subordinate officers thought themselves entitled
to transportation for trunks, mattresses, and folding
bedsteads, and the privates were as ridiculous in their
d e m a n d s .53
When Johnston issued an order to reduce the troops '
impediments to "light marching order," reluctance to part
with the luxuries of camp life combined with an ignorance of
military terminology to create tremendous confusion.
exactly was "light marching order"?

Captain James Conner of

the Hampton Legion recorded that the term meant,
unit,

"nothing but blankets and overcoats,

rations,

cooked,

in their haversacks.

What

in his

and one day's

The wagons followed

52johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 98; see also Jubal A. Early,
War Memoirs; Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the
War Between the States (Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University
Press, 1960), pp. 53-54.
53carlton McCarthy, Detailed Minutiae of Soldier Life
in the Army of Northern Virginia, 1861-1865 (Richmond:
Carlton McCarthy and Co., 1882), pp. 16-20.
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with two days' rations and the cooking utensils."54
Brigadier-General Richard Taylor allowed his men a blanket,
an extra shirt, an extra pair of drawers, two pairs of
socks, and an extra pair of shoes; officers were allowed to
strap a tent "fly" to their saddles.55

The most tragi

comical description of "light marching order" came from
Colonel Thomas W. Thomas of the 15th Georgia, who had
grappled with the problem a few months earlier:
I have had to decide how much a frying pan
weighed, how much a skillet, how much a tin pail, how
much a coffee pot--even if a credit was to [be] allowed
because the handle was off.
We were ordered to put ourselves in 'light
marching order'— what that was I had to figure out.
Now allowing that the officers have theirs, it requires
2 lbs. of cooking utensils to the man, counting non
commissioned officers and privates--this will d o — it is
light marching order and less will not do. . . .
Cooking utensils was the most vexed question before me
— my ten company commanders were at all points about
it. . . . Why Sir a treaty can be made with England
and France, yea with the North itself, with less
diplomatic skill and talent than it required to settle
that question of skillets.
Besides this I settled the
officer's clothing question, the knapsack question, the
blanket question, the tent question, the mess chest
question, the barrel question, and the extra arms
question— all in four hours, among ten disputants, when
no two had similar ideas at the beginning. . . .56
Besides troops, the sheer bulk of supplies and equip
ment possessed by the Department of Northern Virginia
represented an almost insurmountable obstacle to rapid
movement by Johnston's army.

In Richmond, Johnston had

54Moffet, Conner, p. 62.
S^Taylor, Destruction, p. 40.
56Phill ips, Correspondence, pp.

582-583.
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emphasized to Davis and the cabinet that "saving our
artillery & stores, especially the heavy guns on the
Potomac" would be "next to impossible."57

From Aquia to

Evansport, Whiting deployed some forty-five heavy cannon,
ranging in size from 8-inch rifled guns to 42-pound Naval
smoothbores.

Some of these guns had limited mobility,

and

these were the ones that Whiting constantly maneuvered from
point to point, but most of the heavy cannon were firmly
planted on siege carriages which rendered them almost
unmovable.

Not only did Whiting lack enough teams of draft

animals to haul the guns off if field carriages could be
improvised, but his horses and mules were among the weakest
in the depar t m e n t .58

Plainly,

some other method of removing

the guns would have to be found.
The question of saving Whiting's guns, as a .logistical
problem, paled by comparison to the mountains of supplies
that had grown in the rear of the army.

They collected all

winter because Johnston did not have the wagons to distri
bute the goods.

Considering every category of goods— from

food and uniforms to ammunition and blankets--3,240,354
pounds of supplies had accumulated at Manassas Junction,
despite Johnston's attempts in January and February to have

S^Entry of February 20,

1862, Bragg diary, p. 156.

5®Scharf, Confederate States N a v y , pp. 95-99; W. H. C.
Whiting to Theopnilus Holmes, March 21, 1862, in OR, V:
p.
529 .
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deliveries from Richmond halted.59

on the army's immediate

left flank, at Thoroughfare Gap, stood a meat-packing plant
erected by the Commissary Department,
o bjections.60

over Johnston's

On the train back from his Richmond confer

ence, the General found in his discussions with Major
Noland, that the surplus piled up both in warehouses and
sitting in open fields was far greater than he had imagined.
There were 1,510,819 pounds of pork and 1,195,914 pounds of
beef which had to be evacuated out of Union reach.61
Without even considering the supplies on hand at the
division or brigade level, Johnston had to calculate just
how to use his inadequate trains and a dilapidated railroad
effectively enough to spirit away nearly 6,000,000 pounds of
material!
Johnston's final problem was secrecy.

Outnumbered

nearly four-to-one, he could not afford to have McClellan
divine his intentions and attack his columns during the
vulnerable days after leaving their old entrenchments and
before arriving at their new positions.
threats existed.

A variety of

The Federals might combine an attack out

of the Allegheny Mountains with an advance against Winches-

59johnston, N a r r a t i v e , pp. 98-99.
60Frank G. Ruffin to Lucius B. Northrop, January — ,
1862, in OR, Series 4, vol. 2, p. 522; Johnston, Narrative,
p. 99.
61 b . P. Noland to Lucius B. Northrop, March 27,
in OR, Series 4, I: pp. 1038-1039.

1862,
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ter to trap Jackson's division.
west from Alexandria,

Likewise, a thrust n orth

simultaneous with one southeast from

Harper's Ferry, could potentially pick off D. H. Hill as he
retired from Leesburg.

Nor was the least of Johnston's

fears a sudden amphibious landing on the lower Potomac,
within hours of the time Whiting deserted his batteries on
the river.

This would put Brigadier-General Joseph Hooker's

division of Yankees in among Whiting's trains before his
division had struggled more than a few miles down the muddy
roads.
Only an impenetrable cloak of deception could cover
Johnston's army through the first, critical hours of the
retreat, and, as Johnston reviewed his position,
have been obvious that such would be difficult,
impossible, to achieve.

it must
if not

He had just experienced the

incredible security leaks which prevailed in the Confederate
capital; no details confided to the government could be
considered safe.

Quite probably, Johnston guessed, even as

he called his staff together, McClellan already knew that a
retreat was being discussed.

If not, the Federal commander

would become aware almost as soon as the railroads began
hauling supplies away from instead of toward Manassas; both
Union and Confederate lines were simply too porous to keep
such an operation secret.

Worse,

still, Hooker's men on the

Maryland side of the Potomac had been busily erecting new
observation towers, which might spot any withdrawal the
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moment it began.62

Once the army began to move,

its only

protection would be the screen provided by Stuart's cavalry
brigade— 1,300 horsemen organized into five-and-one-half
regiments— which could find itself opposed by more than
8,000 blue troopers.

To make matters worse,

Johnston begun his preparations,

no sooner had

than the Adjutant and

Inspector-General attempted to strip him of one of his best
regiments.^3

if removing the army from the frontiers of

Virginia seemed to be a monumental task, removing it
secretly must have seemed impossible.
Johnston met the challenges of mobilizing his depart
ment for a withdrawal behind the Rappahannock River with the
same systematic efficiency that he had applied to maintain
ing the strength and morale of his army through the winter.
He broke the problem down into its constituent parts, and
assigned the best officer available to each particular job.
Like a master chef, he stood back from detailed management
of the preparations once everyone had been assigned his
respective responsibilities,

G e n t r y of February 20,

stepping forward only when it

1862, Bragg diary, p. 156.

63ihe regiment which the Richmond authorities attempted
to withdraw was Colonel Robert Ransom's 1st North Carolina
Cavalry.
"Abstract from the return of the Department of
Northern, Virginia, General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army,
commanding for the month of February, 1862," "Abstract from
the return of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by M a j .
Gen. George B. McClellan, U.S. Army, for the month of
February, 1862," in OR, V:
pp. 732, 1086; Joseph E.
Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February 27, 1862, Joseph E.
Johnston to Samuel Cooper, March 3, 1862, in JJWM.
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was necessary to adjust the overall design.

Johnston's

administrative skill, assisted by a healthy dose of McClel
lan's usual timidity, resulted in a well-executed maneuver,
unmolested by the Federals and accompanied by a minimal loss
of supplies.
Even before his first staff meeting, Johnston tackled
the problem of removing more than 6,000,000 pounds of
supplies.

He directed Major Noland to proceed immediately

to the meat-packing plant at Thoroughfare Gap and shut down
the operation.

Noland was then to begin removing the bulk

of the meat from the store-houses to the loading platforms
by the railroad, while shipping off what he could directly
to Warrenton in his own few wagons.
were to be burnt or disassembled.

The empty buildings
Agents were to be

appointed and dispatched to Mount Jackson and Orange
Courthouse to arrange for the reception and storage of the
meat.^^

At the same time, Johnston delegated to Major Cole

the responsibility for arranging special trains to Thorough
fare to pick up the tons of beef and pork.

Noland assured

Johnston that if enough trains ran to Thoroughfare, he could
empty the facility in little more than a w e e k . 65
To Lieutenant-Colonel Cole and Major Barbour fell the
task of emptying the depots at Manassas the Centreville.

6 .
P. Noland to Lucius B. Northrop, March 27,
in OR, Series 4, I: p. 1039.

1862,

65Ibid.
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Instead of continuing the system of assigning labor details
on a revolving basis from each brigade in turn,

they

received a permanent working party detached from Ewell's
division, to be under their exclusive control for the period
of the e v a c u a t i o n .66

Johnston distrusted both Barbour's

competence and energy, so he limited the quartermaster's
direct orders to preparing the stocks on hand for removal,
and delegated the actual coordination of transportation to
the two Coles and Brigadier-General Isaac Trimble.

The

Coles were to supervise the wagon trains and Trimble, with
his brigade,

to attend to loading the trains.

The appoint

ment of Trimble to that position represented Johnston's
attention to detail:

the Maryland brigadier had been a

railroad engineer and administrator for thirty years.

He

could be expected to know how to handle any crisis which
arose.67

Colonel Pendleton and Major Alexander were

assigned complete responsibility for the preparation of
their respective commands— the Reserve Artillery and the
ordnance train--for the move,

but were told that when the

time came they would each be subordinated to one of the
division commanders for purposes of security and marching

66a . P. Mason to Richard S. Ewell, March 2, 1862, in
L S-ANVA.
67jubal A. Early to Jefferson
1877, in Rowland, Jefferson Davis,
p. 3; Warner, Generals in G r a y , p.
Joseph E. Johnston, March 7, 1862,

Davis, September 22,
Constitutionalist, VIII:
310; Abraham C. Myers to
in L S - Q M G , T-131, Reel 8.
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orders.68
The army's remote detachments, Johnston handled
differently.

Obviously,

at his extreme distance from the

main body, Jackson could not be closely supervised by
Johnston's staff.

Instead, Johnston relied on Jackson's

already proven administrative competence,

entrusting him

with the general outlines of the operation and leaving him
the details to work out by himself.

Jackson was ordered on

March 1 to prepare his command to move in case the main army
had to fall back.

Johnston's letter of instruction has not

been found, but Jackson's response two days later made it
clear that he understood his assignment to be "keeping
between you and the enemy and at the same time opposing his
advance along the

v a l l e y . "6 9

The logistics of preparing the

Army of the Valley for eventual retreat were far simpler
than those facing Johnston, both because his force was but a
fraction of the size of the main army and because Jackson's
staff had received some extremely useful— if uncomfortable
--training for the conduct of rapid movements in the Romney
operation.

Without any fuss, Jackson had his sick and

wounded gradually shipped back to Staunton and Charlottes
ville, his main depot relocated from Winchester to Mount
Jackson, and the movable supplies of the army loaded onto

68special Orders No. 70, Department of Northern
Virginia, March 5, 1862, in OR, V:
p. 1091.
69Thomas J. Jackson to Joseph E. Johnston, March 3,
1862, in OR, V:
pp. 1087-1088.
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the wagons.

Major John A. Harman, his profane Chief

Quartermaster, had the wagon trains ready to move several
days before Jackson would actually order the evacuation of
Winchester.

So effectively did Jackson plan his own

withdrawal that no question ever arose in anyone's mind
concerning a waste of supplies in the Valley District.70
Holmes's task in the Aquia District was even simpler,
from a logistical point of view.

His main depot at Freder

icksburg would still be within his lines after the retreat,
and the only evacuation of men or supplies that he would
have to accomplish was the withdrawal of Brigadier-General
John G. Walker's brigade from Aquia and Potomac Creeks, and
the destruction of a few miles of railroad.

His most

pressing task would be to safeguard Johnston's right flankspecifically Whiting's division— from a surprise Federal
landing during the movements.

Johnston decided, almost

immediately upon his return from Richmond,

to keep communi

cation to Holmes down to an absolute minimum, because the
North Carolinian had little more to do than react to direct
orders.

Besides, there was no telegraphic link between

Centreville and Fredericksburg, which meant that any
messages the army commander sent had to pass through

^ T h o m a s J. Jackson to Joseph E. Johnston, March 6,
1862, in OR, V:
pp. 1092-1093; Joseph E. Johnston to T. H.
Williams, February 27, 1862, in JJWM; Robert G. Tanner,
Stonewall in the Valley, Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's
Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring of 18 62 (Garden City, NY
Doubleday, 1976), p. 106.
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Richmond, which now, more than ever, equated,

in Johnston's

mind, to an open breach of security.71
The main question with Hill's Leesburg garrison was not
logistical but strategic:
troops march?

to what point should Hill's

Jackson clearly felt that Hill should

withdraw into the Valley and join his division, and kept
trying to bring Johnston around to this view even after the
retreat had begun.

He wrote his commander on March 8:

And now, general, that Hill has fallen back, can
you not send him over here?
I greatly need such an
officer; one who can be sent off as occasion may offer
against an exposed detachment of the enemy for the
purpose of capturing it.
But his command is mostly
needed for holding the valley, and I believe that if
you can spare Hill and let him move here at once, you
will never have any occasion to regret it.
The very
idea of re-enforcements coming to Winchester would, I
think, be a damper to the enemy, in addition to the
fine effect that would be produced on our troops, who
are already in fine spirits.72
There was undeniable logic in Jackson's argument, but in the
end, Johnston decided that to dispatch Hill into the Shenan
doah would run contrary to the general strategy behind the
withdrawal that Davis had ordered:

to bring as many troops

as possible into supporting distance of Richmond.

Hill

would rejoin the main army.
Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, September 5,
1861, Robert E. Lee to Theophilus H. Holmes, March 14, 1862,
in OR, V:
pp. 830, 1099; Theophilus H. Holmes to Samuel
Cooper, March 9, 1862, in OR, LI (part 2):
p. 497; Archer
Anderson to W. H. F. Lee, March 11, 1862, in George Bolling
Lee papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.

1862,

72Thomas J. Jackson to Joseph E. Johnston, March 8,
in OR, V:
p. 1095.
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In the meantime, his primary requirement was security.
The Confederates at Leesburg were too few to quit their post
without the advantage of surprise.

Johnston advised Hill

not to burn any supplies or facilities he might have to
abandon not only because he probably could not do a thorough
job of destruction, but also because the flames would
attract enemy attention hours earlier than necessary.

The

retreating column was, however, to set fire to every
railroad bridge along its line of march.

So that Hill's

troops could concentrate on swift movement instead of
protecting bulky trains, Johnston had provisions for 3,200
men stationed along his route for immediate c o n s u m p t i o n .73
Hill kept his own counsel until the last couple of days
prior to the move.

He even kept the patriotic ladies of

Leesburg sewing flannel cloth into powder bags for the
cannon until the very day of the evacuation.
artilleryman, however,

One sharp

noticed that the ladies had been

instructed to concentrate on producing smaller bags for
field guns rather than the larger items, which would have
been required for the handful of siege guns that Hill
planned to abandon on the banks of the Potomac.74
Besides the mountains of supplies at Thoroughfare and
Manassas, Whiting's heavy artillery along the Potomac was

73joseph E. Johnston to D. H. Hill, March 6, 1862, in
OR, V:
p. 1091.
74stiles, Four Y e a r s , pp. 71-72.
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Johnston's other major concern.

It was obvious that the

understrength teams which had not been able to effectively
transport even rations during the winter could not be
expected to evacuate the supplies of an entire division,
plus forty-five guns that each weighed somewhere between
8,000

and 17,000 pounds.75

The only other option seemed to

be building rafts and attempting to float some or all of
Whiting's artillery down the Potomac to the railhead at
Aquia right under the noses of Federal lookouts.

Whiting

had been ordered to investigate that possibility as soon as
Johnston had returned from Richmond.

He consulted French,

his chief of artillery, as well as Captain Frederick Chatard
of the Confederate Navy and Colonel J. Johnston Pettigrew,
commanding a regiment of North Carolina troops supporting
many of the guns.

Pettigrew believed that it might be

physically possible to build rafts to carry the guns, but
French and Chatard were adamant that the operation was not
safe.

"I deem the attempt to get them there

by water with our means,

[Aquia Creek]

in the face of the enemy,

impracti

cable and hazardous," French reported to Whiting on February
24.

"The steamers guard the river closely and the enemy

from the opposite shore see everything at the batteries,

and

you may rest assured that by the time two-thirds of the guns
are dismounted it will be discovered and an attack be made

^^Coggins, Arms and Equipment, p. 88.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

141

by the steamers and from the guns o p p o s i t e ."76

Johnston

received this information and passed it on to the President
the next day, taking responsibility himself for the decision
not to try to haul the guns off by land:
portation would,

"The land trans

it seems to me, require too much time and

labor, even were the roads tolerable.

They are not now

practicable for our field artillery with their teams of four
h o r s e s . " 7 7

The only thing that could be done was to try to

destroy the guns in place so that, at the very least, the
enemy would not benefit from their capture.
Meanwhile,

as Johnston dealt with each of the periph

eral issues of evacuation,

the major impediment to tactical

mobility--the 6,000,000 pounds of supplies at Thoroughfare
and Manassas— stubbornly refused to cooperate with the
department commander's timetable.

The primary reason was

the inefficiency of the Confederate railroads upon which
Johnston was forced to depend.

To remove 6,000,000 pounds

of cargo, based on an average carrying capacity of 16,000
pounds per freight car, required at least 375 cars.

The

Orange and Alexandria, which would have primary responsibil
ity for evacuating everything— at least as far as Gordonsville--had begun the war with only 140 box cars and flat

76w. H. C. Whiting to Samuel G. French, February 24,
1862, Samuel G. French to W. H. C. Whiting, February 24,
1862, in OR, LI (part 2):
pp. 477-478.

1862,

77joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, February 25,
in OR, V:
p. 1081.
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cars.

A significant number of these had been seized by the

Federals in Alexandria and, since then, the slow, steady
drain of wartime service without replacement parts had
whittled the fleet down even further.

Because the run from

Manassas to Gordonsville passed over a single line of track
with short and infrequent turn-outs for passing trains in
opposite directions,

scheduling was of paramount impor

tance .78
Still, difficult as the operation appeared, it should
have been possible in the time Johnston allotted.

With the

average locomotive pulling fifteen freight cars, the entire
stockpile of the Department of Northern Virginia should have
required just slightly more than two trains a day during the
period Johnston allowed for the e v a c u a t i o n .79

gut because

of the reluctance of the Confederate government to., assume
complete control of railroads, even in an active military
theatre, Johnston's staff officers found themselves c o m 
pelled to negotiate with the civilian superintendents and
engineers of the rail lines rather than simply requisition
ing what they needed.

Johnston himself had little more real

c o n t r o l .80
The result was that while Johnston's subordinates could

70johnston, Virginia Railroads, p . vll; Black, Rai l 
roads , p. 18; Turner, "Virginia Central Railroad at War,"
pp. 521-522.
79Black, R a i l r o a d s , 'p. 18.
80i b i d ., p . 7 6 .
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prepare their supplies for timely removal, once that had
been accomplished they could do little more than sit beside
the loading docks and wait for a train to happen along.

At

Thoroughfare Gap, Major Noland began disassembling the m e a t 
packing plant on February 22; tons of meat were "taken from
the houses and placed on platforms for convenience of
loading the cars.

The force of hands was increased,

and

every possible arrangement on our part was made for sending
off the property."

But no trains came.

Agreements made

between Commissary Department agents and the superintendent
of the railroad were not honored, and even Major Cole could
only manage to conjure up a total of forty-five usable
freight cars in early March.

Noland frantically commenced

loading as much of the m e a t — now starting to spoil— as
possible into his inadequate fleet of wagons,
Noland reported angrily,

"although,"

"many trains passed the point and

several of them were entirely empty."81

The process of

removing the meat actually delayed Johnston's withdrawal by
several days, and continued even after the infantry had
marched south.

It ended only when Lieutenant Colonel Thomas

T. Munford of the 2nd Virginia Cavalry,

commanding the last

rear guard of Stuart's cavalry screen, ordered the remains
of the stockpiles burned at noon on March 12, as the last

81 b . P. Noland to Lucius B. Northrop, March 27,
in OR, Series 4, I: pp. 1039-1040.

1862,
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Confederate troops quit northern

V i r g i n i a .

82

While the aroma of burning meat certainly pervaded the
district for many hours,

the scale of the waste and dest r u c 

tion has been distorted by participants and historians out
of all proportion to reality.

Jubal Early contended after

the war that so much meat was lost that it "embarrassed us
for the rest of the war, as it put us at once on a running
s t o c k .

"83

Johnston himself is often cited for his comment

to Jefferson Davis on March 13, 1862 that "more than half of
the salt meat at Thoroughfare was left there for want of the
means of bringing it a w a y . "84

Comparing this ratio to the

total amount of meat reported at the plant, Douglas Southall
Freeman concluded that "more than 1,000,000 pounds were
destroyed or given to farmers in the neighborhood."85
has become the standard account of the affair,
expanded and exaggerated by later writers,
tragi-comic proportions,

This

further

until it reached

exemplified by Robert Tanner's

description in his Stonewall in the V a l l e y ;

"Unable to

empty an army packing plant, Johnston consigned a million
pounds of beef to the flames, and his ill-fed retreating

82 ibid.
83Early, War M e m o i r s , pp.

54-55.

84Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 13,
1862, in OR, LI (part 2):
pp. 1073-1074.
83preeman, Lee's L ieutenants, I:

p. 140.
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columns were tormented by the aroma of sizzling

s t e a k .

"86

Aside from the fact that every one of Johnston's
soldiers except a few hundred cavalrymen had already passed
Thoroughfare Gap before the fire started, nothing close to a
million pounds of meat was burned.

According to the

official report of Major Noland— filed on March 27, two
weeks after Johnston made his off-the-cuff estimate to the
President— of the 2,706,733 pounds of pork and beef at
Thoroughfare on February 22, 86.3% of it was successfully
evacuated,
Of that,

leaving only 369,819 pounds beside the railway.

in the last two days before the burning, Noland

estimated that at least 200,000 pounds was given away to
neighborhood farmers,

leaving only 169,819 pounds to be

incinerated— a far cry from 1,000,000 pounds.87
Yet, a loss in excess of 389,000 pounds of meat seems,
at first,
really?

like a very sizable one.

But how important was it

The total stockpile at Thoroughfare Gap represented

2,971,156 daily rations of meat, figured at the often
optimistic official standard of three-quarters of a pound of
pork or one-and-a-quarter pounds of beef for one soldier for
one day.

Against the "Aggregate Present"

(ration strength)

for the Potomac District at the end of February,

42,860

officers and men, this amounted to a stockpile of 69.3 days

86Tanner, Stonewall in the V a l l e y , p. 98.
87g. p. Noland to Lucius B. Northrop, March 27,
in OR, Series 4, I:
pp. 1038-1039.

1862,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

146

worth of meat.

The total poundage either given away or

burned amounted to no more than a 9.8 days' meat ration for
Johnston's entire force; the supposed towering mountain of
food condemned to the fire represented somewhere between
three and five days' rations for the withdrawing soldiers,
hardly enough to have seriously "embarrassed" the Confeder
ates for the rest of the month,

let along the rest of the

w a r . 88
The situation at Manassas Junction was equally,
more, troublesome.

if not

General Trimble, Johnston's designee to

handle the loading of supplies on the trains running south,
found that no one respected his requests.

Conductors

complained about him to the Quartermaster General, Myers,
and lesser officers from both the Quartermaster and the
Commissary Departments felt themselves empowered to contra
dict him and appropriate space as they chose.

Myers's

unique solution to these problems was to rebuke Johnston for
having given Trimble any authority, and to suggest to
Jefferson Davis that Johnston was requiring too many
t r a i n s !88
Making the best of a bad situation, Trimble, Barbour,

88Ibid.; "Abstract from the return of the Department of
Northern Virginia, General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army,
commanding, for the month of February, 1862," in OR, V:
p.
1086; Goff, Confederate Supply, pp. 17-18n.
88Joseph E. Johnston to Abraham C. Myers, March 2,
1862, in JJWM; Abraham C. Myers to Joseph E. Johnston, March
7, 1862, in LS-QMG, T-131, Reel 8; Abraham C. Myers to
Jefferson Davis, March 7, 1862,'in OR, V:
p. 1093.
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and the two Coles made the tough choices necessary to keep
the operation even close to their commander's schedule.

Any

equipment already damaged, or rations that had spoiled, was
shoved to the side; Trimble's men endeavored to load only
the best materials on the trains.

What they could not load,

they passed out to the troops retreating through the town,
or attempted to destroy.

It is more difficult to pin down

just what fraction of the total had to be abandoned, because
no report as thorough as Noland's was ever filed respecting
the evacuation of Manassas Junction.

Only Lieutenant-

Colonel R. G. Cole's 1871 letter, cited by Johnston in his
Narrative, provides any quantification for the total amount
of supplies in the depot, and his account is questionable on
two grounds.

The first is the normal vagaries of hindsight,

which make his ability to recall exact quantities nine years
later somewhat suspect.

The second problem is that Cole's

letter is phrased somewhat ambiguously, and it is difficult
to tell whether or not his figure of 1,434,316 pounds of
supplies left behind includes the 369,817 pounds of meat at
Thoroughfare or not.

Cole's account does make clear that at

least 443,000 pounds of bread,

flour, and vinegar was

abandoned because it had already spoiled.90
Without specific Confederate statistics, the best
information on just what Johnston's army left behind can be

90jc>hnston, Narrative, pp. 98-99n;
Image of W a r , II:
pp. 370-373.

see also, Davis,
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found in Federal reports.

Just two days after Johnston

evacuated Manassas, J. S. Potter entered the town with the
first Union cavalry scouts.

On March 12, he testified

before the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of
the War concerning his observations:
Several hundred barrels of flour, that they had
attempted to destroy by burning lay there in a pile
partly consumed.
There was also a part of a train of
cars there, partially destroyed.
Among other things, I
found a very complete printing office, with press,
type, forms standing, and imposing stone, army blanks,
&c., and I should think a little paper had been printed
there.
The place was generally in a ruin.
The depot
was burned, some cars and a locomotive or two de
stroyed, a bridge blown up, several buildings de
stroyed, and altogether the most desolate scene, it
seemed to me, that the human eye could rest upon.91
More dispassionately, McClellan, who certainly had the best
of motives to exaggerate the booty found in Confederate
camps, reported to the Secretary of War that he had found
"many wagons," but only "some caissons, clothing, ammuni
tion, personal baggage, &c.

[italics added]."

In fact, he

closed his description by noting that "the country
entirely stripped of forage and provisions."92

[was]

The context

of Federal accounts, supported by numerous Rebel reminiscen
ces,

strongly

Manassas fell

suggests that most of what was abandoned at
into one of three categories:

spoiled

rations, excessive personal gear, or broken down transport.

^ T e s t i m o n y of J. S. Potter, March 12, 1862, JCCCW, p.
244 .
92ceorge B. McClellan to E. B. Stanton, March 11, 1862,
in OR, V:
p. 742.
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From a logistical standpoint, therefore, Johnston's evacua
tion of Thoroughfare Gap and Manassas Junction deserves to
be applauded rather than scorned.
The withdrawal has also been criticized on operational
grounds.

Freeman again censured Johnston's organization of

the movement severely in L e e 's L ieutenants:
The orders, which wer.e issued piecemeal, were
wretchedly drawn.
In some instances, clarity was
lacking.
Marches were not precisely timed in relation
to one another.
Gen. T. H. Holmes, commanding at the
northern terminus of the R. F. & P. Railroad, actually
was not informed of the withdrawal or told what to do
with the troops or heavy guns on his sector.
Neither
the President nor the Secretary of War was advised when
the movement would begin or what the lines of retreat
would b e . 93
Freeman's assessment,

which has become the accepted standard

account of the withdrawal,

neglects many key points,

and

rests on very slender evidence.
Moving several columns simultaneously over roads that
Captain James Conner of the Hampton Legion characterized as
"awful;

stiff clay, mud,

and water; we stalled about every

hundred yards," could not have been organized on a precise
minute-by-minute timetable.94

Instead, Johnston followed

the principal of decentralized authority that he had
instituted during the winter.
first,
roads.

Early's division marched

followed by G. W. Smith and Longstreet on parallel
Smith was assigned to direct the movements of

93preeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I:
^Moffet,

p. 140'.

C o n n e r , pp. 84-85.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

150

Pendleton's Reserve Artillery and D. H. Hill's Leesburg
garrison, while Longstreet supervised Colonel Walton's
Washington Artillery Battalion, in addition to his own
division.

Ewell's division formed the infantry rear guard,

with the dual assignment of supporting Stuart's cavalry
screen and scouring the country one last time for provisions
and f o r a g e .95
As with his efforts to maintain the strength of the
army throughout the winter, the withdrawal from the frontier
was marked through with little touches that bespoke Johns
ton's attention to detail.

Extra tents had been ordered to

shelter the troops turned out of winter cabins.96

Small

parties of pioneers were dispatched to improvise temporary
crossings over rain-swollen streams.97

Each division had a

bridge on the Rappahannock assigned to it, and when the
troops arrived at the river, they discovered that the
railroad bridges had already been planked over to accommo
date

w a g o n s .

98

They also found Johnston's previously

prepared entrenchment and stacks of incendiary material

95special Orders No. 70, Department of Northern
Virginia, March 5, 1862, in OR, V:
p. 1091; Taylor,
D estruction, p. 38.
96joseph E. Johnston to Abraham C. Myers, February 26,
1862, in J J W M ; Abraham C. Myers to Joseph E. Johnston, March
2, 1862, in LS - Q M G , T-131, Reel 8.
97Taylor, Destruction, p. 36.
98Abraham C. Myers to Thomas R. Sharpe, March 8, 1862,
in LS-QMG, T-131, Reel 8; Dickert, Kershaw's Brig a d e , p. 93.
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piled neatly beside the right of way,

just in case Federal

pursuit might be quicker than anyone imagined.99
maneuver,

recalled Richard Taylor,

The entire

"was executed with the

quiet precision characteristic of General Johnston, unri
valed as a master of logistics."100

of course, the march

was muddy and uncomfortable for the soldiers, who were
neither accustomed to long marches nor yet resigned to the
reality that active campaigning meant giving up the luxuries
of camp life; but,

this result was unavoidable and, in

Johnston's eyes, probably not a bad thing.101
Whiting's withdrawal from the Potomac was not conducted
under Johnston's direct eye, but Whiting and French both
received considerable supervision from Johnston in terms of
the manner in which he wanted the evacuation conducted.
Johnston spoke at length with each man on at least one
occasion during the planning stages, and dispatched at least
five letters of instruction to Whiting and three to French
during the two weeks prior to the m o v e . 102

99McHenry Howard, Recollections of a Maryland Confed
erate Soldier and Staff Officer under Johnston, Jackson, and
Lee (Baltimore:
Williams and Wilkins, 1914), p. 68; Gary
Gallagher, Fighting for the Confederacy, The Personal
Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander (Chapel
Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1989), p. 72.
lOOTaylor, D e s t r u c t i o n , p. 36.

1862,

H.
H.

101Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 13,
in OR, LI (part 2):
p. 1074.

102prencj1, Two W a r s , p. 143; Joseph
C. Whiting, February 27, 1862, Joseph
C. Whiting, February 28, 1862, Joseph

E. Johnston to W.
E. Johnston to W.
E. Johnston to W.
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These letters spelled out Johnston's intentions very
clearly.

Heavy guns to be abandoned were to be destroyed in

place as quickly and quietly as possible.

Whiting was

instructed to phase his withdrawal from north to south:
I telegraph

"If

'it is time, ' give your orders and move.

Hampton should have a start of some hours.
for him to start after dark,

How would it do

leaving pickets, and march to

the road leading from Bacon Rice to your camp, bivouac, and
march at your hour next morning."103

Johnston later

admonished that, since his would be the first brigade in the
department to withdraw,
as possible."104

"Hampton must move off as cunningly

Whiting, as the senior brigadier-general

present, would supervise the movement until he reached the
Fredericksburg area, where he would automatically come under
the authority of Holmes.10^
Holmes, of course, had been intentionally left in the
dark by Johnston until March 8, the day the evacuation
began.

The decision to do so, while defensible on the

H. C. Whiting, March 5, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C.
Whiting, March 6, 1862, in OR, V:
pp. 1082-1083, 1085,
1090-1093; Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel G. French, February
27, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel G. French, March 6,
1862, W. H. C. Whiting to Samuel G. French, March 7, 1862,
in OR, LI (part 2):
pp. 481, 487, 488.
Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, March 5,
1862, in OR, V:
pp. 1090-1091.
104Joseph E. Johnston to W. H. C. Whiting, March 6,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 1092.
105Ibid.
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grounds of security and the limited participation of the
Aquia District in the removal of troops and stores, ce r 
tainly infuriated Holmes, who felt he had been misused, and
complained immediately to the Adjutant and InspectorGeneral .

But his very complaint indicated how thorough

Johnston's orders,

once they arrived, had been:

I was notified yesterday by General Johnston that
he had ordered General French to abandon Evansport, and
that he and General Whiting with their commands would
immediately march on Fredericksburg.
He advised me to
place these troops beyond the Rappahannock and only to
hold the Potomac with strong outposts, breaking up the
wharf at Aquia and being ready to destroy the railroad
from thence to Fredericksburg.
As the outpost for the
Potomac, I purpose to keep General Walker's brigade at
Aquia as it is.
I am at a loss whether to remove the
guns from the batteries there, and will be obliged if
you will inform me by telegraph. . . .
I have not been
informed of the object of these sudden and, to me, very
unexpected movements, and therefore can only strive to
be ready for anything. . . . Since writing the above
General French has arrived here and reports his brigade
en route to Fredericksburg, that all the guns at
Evansport have been or will be destroyed there before
the rear guard leaves. . . .106
This letter, which is the mainstay of Freeman's contention
that Holmes was ill-informed, actually indicates that the
commander of the Aquia District received reasonably complete
instructions in a timely fashion, although it is obvious
that Johnston could have taken a few more pains to assuage
his subordinate's ego.
Most likely, Holmes's aggrieved letter to General
Cooper was the first formal notice that Richmond received of

1862,

106Theophilus H. Holmes to Samuel Cooper, March 9,
in OR, LI (part 2):
p. 497.
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the beginning of the movement.

Johnston had been purpose

fully vague about his starting date in all his communica
tions with Davis, because he worried that to be specific
might result in further leaks that would cost him the
several hours of secrecy he needed to extricate Whiting's
and Hill's commands from their exposed positions.
from that consideration,

Aside

since Johnston had been given

positive orders to conduct the withdrawal— as opposed to the
contingent orders Davis later claimed had been issued— he
reckoned that setting the exact date was a decision com
pletely within the army commander's purview.
Johnston always acknowledged that he did not communi
cate with Richmond until the movement was well under way:
"The withdrawal from Centreville was not known in Richmond
until after the army had taken its position on the Rappahan
nock. "107

He sent his first official notice of the move

four days after it began, on March 12, by which time
Smith's, Longstreet's, and Early's divisions had all crossed
the river, and both Whiting and Hill had reached safe
h avens.-*-08

In a purely military sense, Johnston's decision

seemed justifiable.

Whiting's evacuation was reported by

Hooker within less than a day, Hill's retreat from Leesburg
by Colonel John Geary in about twelve hours.

Federal

107jo]-mSi-onf draft of Nar r a t i v e , in Box 28, Folder 3,
in R M H .
108josep]-i e . Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 12,
1862., in OR, V:
pp. 526-527.
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cavalry uncertainly probed Stuart's cavalry screen in the
Manassas area on March 8 and 9.109

The Richmond Examiner

published complete reports of the movement on March 11, even
correctly inferring that the intent of the operation was to
place Johnston's army in better position to participate in
the defense of

R i c h m o n d .

HO

Attorney-General Bragg's diary

indicates that the withdrawal may already have been common
knowledge in the Confederate capital. m
What Johnston overlooked,

underestimated,

or ignored

was the very predictable result that his reticence had on
the mind of Jefferson Davis.

109josep]1 Hooker to Randolph B. Marcy, March 9, 1862,
Philip Kearney to E. S. Purdy, March 9, 1862, John W. Geary
to R. Morris Copeland, March 9, 1862, in OR, V:
pp. 524,
537, 549.
H O R i c h m o n d E x a m i n e r , March 11,
IH-Entry of March 10,

1862, p. 2.

1862, Bragg diary,

p. 178.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter Five
Enter Lee

Even as Confederate rear guards at Leesburg and
Dumfries spiked the heavy guns and laid powder trails into
their magazines,

and Major Noland waited impatiently for the

trains to cart away his mountains of beef and pork, two
events occurred that would have distinct implications for
the defense of Richmond.

The first was the return of

General Robert E. Lee to the capital city, after an absence
of several months;

the second was the sortie of the iron

clad, V i r g i n i a , into Hampton Roads.

The combination of the

two served to confuse an already strained relationship
between Joseph Johnston and Jefferson Davis.
General Lee rode the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad
into the city, accompanied only by a single aide, twentyfour-year-old Captain Walter H. Taylor.

Lee's arrival was

so unheralded that it is still impossible to determine with
absolute certainty whether he entered the capital on
Thursday, March 6 or Friday, March 7.1

What is clear is

that as the train lumbered over the James River bridge below
the smokestacks of the Tredegar Iron Works, Lee himself had

^Freeman, R. E. L e e , I:
p. 628; Clifford Dowdey and
Louis H. Manarin, ed., The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee
(New York:
Bramhall House, 1961), p. 124.
156
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no idea why Jefferson Davis had abruptly summoned him to
Richmond.
He was the son of Revolutionary War hero and Virginia
Governor,

"Light Horse" Henry Lee.

He had served on

Winfield Scott's personal staff in Mexico,

earning three

brevet promotions for gallantry; and, twice held the
prestigious position of Superintendent of the United States
Military Academy.

So when Lee had resigned his commission

as Colonel of the 1st Cavalry, and turned down an offer of
command of the Union Army in April,
great expectations.2

1861, he went South to

Virginia immediately conferred upon

him command of the state's forces, Governor John Letcher
citing his "talent, experience, and devotion to the inter
ests of

V

i

r

g

i

n

i

a

.

"Whether we have the right of secession

or revolution," said Jubal Early on the floor of the
Virginia State Convention,
phant.

"I want to see my State trium

I do believe that it will be triumphant under the

lead of Major-General

L e e . "4

When Virginia formally entered

the Confederate States, Jefferson Davis appointed Lee as
third-ranking general officer in the army, behind only
Samuel Cooper and Albert Sidney Johnston.5

^ W a r n e r , Generals in G r a y , pp. 179-183.
^George H. Reese, ed. , Proceedings of the Virginia
State Convention of 1861, February 13 - May (Richmond:
n.
p., n. d.), IV:
p. 363.
4Ibid.
^Warner, Generals in G r a y , p. 180.
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But for Lee, who turned fifty-five in January,

1862,

the first ten months of the war were filled with personal
frustration and public criticism.

"There is no place I can

expect to be but in the field," he wrote his wife on May 2,
1861, anticipating that his administrative assignment to
coordinate the defense of Virginia from Richmond would end
with the establishment of the Confederate government.^
was mistaken;
summer.

He

Davis retained him at his desk throughout the

Much to Lee's disappointment,

his only contribution

to the victory at Manassas was the necessary, but personally
unsatisfying, task of forwarding troops and supplies to
Johnston and Beauregard.
In August,

the President allowed Lee into the field

with an ill-defined supervisory command in western Virginia.
At first, he was ebullient at the prospect of active duty,
and sent his wife optimistic letters filled with descrip
tions of the country:
to the tops,
white clover.

fertile

covered with the richest sward of blue grass &
The inclosed fields waving with the natural

growth of timothy.
country.

"The mountains are beautiful,

. . ."7

. . .

This is magnificent grazing

But within a month, the realities of his

position eroded his confidence and depressed his buoyant
spirits.

His outnumbered troops had few supplies, and

6Robert E. Lee to Mary Lee, May 2, 1861,
Manarin, Wartime Papers, p. 18.

in Dowdey and

^Robert E. Lee to Mary Lee, August 9, 1861,
p . 63 .

in Ibid.,
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measles raged through their camps.

His subordinates,

politician-generals untutored in military operations,
with each other and ignored his instructions.
seemed to have turned against him:

feuded

Even nature

"Rain, rain, rain, there

has been nothing but rain," he complained to his son.

"So

it has appeared to my anxious mind since I approached these
mountains.
Lee first discovered the biting criticism of the
Southern press when the incompetence of Brigadier-Generals
John Floyd and Henry Wise combined with Lee's own inexperi
ence in coordinating field operations and resulted in an
inglorious failure to drive the enemy off Cheat Mountain in
mid-September.

Beauregard might be hailed as the Confedera

cy's Napoleon and Jackson nicknamed "Stonewall," but the
sobriquets reserved for him were "Granny" and "Evacuating
L e e . "9

At first, he was stoic:

even the good.

"Everybody is slandered,

How should I escape?"!^

But,

by October,

the harshness of the Richmond papers had become so unrelent
ing that even the reserved Lee could not keep himself from
reacting,

at least to family and close friends:

I am sorry . . . that the movements of the
armies cannot keep pace with the expectations of
the editors of the papers.
I know they can
^Robert E. Lee to G. W. C. Lee, September 3, 1861, in
Ib i d ., p. 7 0.
^Freeman, R. E. L e e , I:

pp. 602-603.

lORobert E * Lee to Mary Lee, September 9, 1861, in
Dowdey and Mandarin, Wartime Papers, p. 71.
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regulate matters satisfactorily to themselves on
paper.
I wish they could do so in the field.
No
one wishes them more success than I do & would be
happy to see them have full swing.
Genl Floyd has
the benefit of three editors on his staff, I hope
something will be done to please t h e m . H
Jefferson Davis, however,

had been fully aware of the

handicaps under which Lee had attempted to operate, and
never allowed public opinion to shake his faith in those he
trusted.

In November,

he recalled Lee from the rain-soaked

mountains and dispatched him to oversee the coastal defenses
of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida.

The assignment did

not bring a respite from either politicians or publishers,
but did carry the unequivocal authority of a department
c ommander.
He inherited the same dismal conditions as did Johnston
in northern Virginia:

"The volunteers dislike work & there

is much sickness among them besides.
ammunition,

& more m e n . "12

Guns too are required,

Faced with the prospect of

defending hundreds of miles of coastline with fewer than
30,000 soldiers and inadequate artillery, Lee instituted a
policy of defense in depth at critical points,

abandonment

of isolated or insignificant islands, and the maintenance of
a mobile reserve along the coastal rail line.

The key to

his defensive system was to avoid direct confrontation with

ll-Robert E. Lee to Mary Lee, October 7, 1861,
p . 80 .
l^Robert E. Lee to G. W. C. Lee, January 19,
OR, VI:
p. 106.

in Ibid.,

1862,
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the "enemy's big boats;"

"I am in favor of abandoning all

exposed points as far as possible within reach of the
enemy's fleet of gunboats & of taking interior positions,
where we can meet on more equal terms."13

Several letters

that Lee posted to Richmond during this period were critical
in providing the President with his rationale for shortening
the lines of the Confederacy on a much larger scale.14
By the end of February, Lee's scanty resources had been
seriously depleted by Davis's strategic redeployment of
several of his regiments to Tennessee.

Unhappily,

and in

the face of great local opposition, he ordered an almost
complete withdrawal of Confederate forces from eastern
Florida,

and cut his garrisons along the Georgia and South

Carolina coasts to the bone.

Certain that the Federals

would assault Savannah when they learned of his reduction in
force, Lee went to that city in order to personally direct
its defense.

He was there on March 2 when an abrupt and

unrevealing telegraph from the President arrived:

"If

circumstances will, in your judgment, warrant your leaving,
I wish to see you here with the least del a y . "15
His state of mind, by this point, was gloomy, although

l^Robert E. Lee to Roswell S. Ripley,
1862, in OR, VI:
p. 394.

February 19,

l^See chapter Three.
l^Robert e . Lee to Joseph E. Brown, February 22, 1862,
Robert E. Lee to J. H. Trapier, February 24, 1862, Robert E.
Lee to John H. Milton, February 24, 1862, Jefferson Davis to
Robert E. Lee, March 2, 1862, in OR, VI:
pp. 397-400.
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hardly desperate.

The same day he received Davis's tele

gram, Lee had written to his daughter, Annie, that times
"look dark at present,
enough,
. . .

& it is plain we have not suffered

labored enough, repented enough, to deserve success.
Our people have not been earnest enough, have thought

too much of themselves & their ease, & instead of turning
out to a man, have been content to nurse themselves & their
dimes, & leave the protection of themselves & families to
others."

Though he could not dismiss the numerical superi

ority of the Federals— "against ordinary numbers we are
pretty strong, but against the hosts our enemies seem to be
able to bring everywhere, there is no calculation"— he was
still combative:

"if our men will stand to their work, we

shall give them trouble & damage them

y e t .

"16

Lee delayed his departure just long enough to write out
detailed instructions for Brigadier-General A. R. Lawton,
commanding in Georgia,

and to turn over the department to

his deputy, Major-General John C. Pemberton.

Leaving

Savannah on March 3, he arrived in Charleston the next day,
and took the train north for Richmond on March 5.17
Whatever speculation the Virginian made on the nature of
Davis's orders,

it is almost certain that he did not

l^Robert E. Lee to Annie Lee, March 2, 1862,
and Manarin, Wartime Pa p e r s , pp. 121-122.

in Dowdey

l^Robert E. Lee to A. R. Lawton, March 3, 1862, General
Orders No. 6, Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and
Florida, March 4, 1862, in OR, VI:
pp. 400-401; Freeman, R .
E. L e e , I:
p. 628.
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anticipate that the President wanted to appoint him Command
ing General of the Confederate Army.
Even had Lee been publicly expected in Richmond,

the

events of March 8 would have immediately overshadowed his
entrance.

Shortly after noon, the Confederacy's first

ironclad, the converted frigate Merrimac— rechristened the
Virginia— steamed slowly out of the Norfolk Navy Yard, down
the Elizabeth River, and into Hampton Roads.

The V i r g i n i a ,

recalled Captain John Taylor Wood, who commanded her aft
gun,
was an experiment in naval architecture, differing
in every respect from any then afloat.
The offi
cers and the crew were strangers to the ship and
to each other.
Up to the hour of her sailing she
was crowded with workmen.
Not a gun had been
fired, hardly a revolution of the engines had been
made, when we cast off . . . .
From the start we
saw that she was slow, not over five knots; she
steered so badly that, with her great length, it
took thirty to forty minutes to turn.
She drew
twenty-two feet, which confined us to a compara
tively narrow channel in the Roads; and, as I have
before said, the engines were our weak point.
She
was as unmanageable as a water-logged vessel.-'-®
But she was also nearly invulnerable.

In an action

lasting four hours, Admiral Franklin Buchanan's ship rammed
and sank the thirty-gun sloop Cumberland, pounded the fiftygun Congress into surrender with her rifled cannon, and ran
the frigate Minnesota aground.

Shot after shot ricocheted

harmlessly off her angled iron plating.

Watching the

unequal fight from Ragged Island on the south bank of the

l®John Taylor Wood,
B & L , I : p . 696.

"The First Fight of Ironclads,"
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James River, Brigadier-General Raleigh Colston found that a
freak acoustical effect imparted an air of eerie unreality
to the conflict:

"to our amazement,

not a sound was heard

by us from the beginning of the battle.

A strong March wind

was blowing direct from us toward Newport News.

We could

see every flash of the guns and the clouds of white smoke,
but not a single report was audible.
The repercussions of the engagement, however,
and clear.

rang loud

The Virginia "made obsolete the navies of the

world," observed historian Shelby Foote,
sunset of that one day.

. . ."20

"between noon and

The clash, editorialized

the Richmond E x a m i n e r , "opens a new chapter in naval
warfare,

and marks a new era in the struggle which the South

is engaged in . "21

The effect of the news on the Confederate

capital, recalled one Richmonder,

"was electrifying.

. . .

For days, this glorious engagement filled all hearts and
minds.

Nothing else was talked of.

. . ."22

The "gunboat

fever" which had haunted the city on the James evaporated in
hours; one newspaper commented wryly about residents who
claimed to have been able to hear the sound of the battle.^3

19 r .

e

. Colston,

"Watching the

'Merrimac,'" B & L , I:

713 .
2 0shelby Foote, The Civil War, A Narrative
Random House, 1958), I:
p. 255.

(New York:

2lRichmond E x a m i n e r , March 11, 1862, p. 2.
22putnam, R i c h m o n d , pp.

111-112.

^ R i c h m o n d E x a m i n e r , March 11, 1862, p. 2.
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Even the appearance of an opposing ironclad,

the M o n i t o r ,

the next day could not keep the optimistic citizens from
visualizing a fleet of Virginias smashing the blockade and
securing Southern independence.
Commanders, on the spot, predicted far less grand
results.

Naval officers knew that "at no time did the

Virginia attain the power and capacity of a seagoing vessel
or exceed the measure of usefulness originally designed for
her— that of harbor defense."24
commanding at Norfolk,

Major-General H u g e r ,

did not want to keep risking the

ironclad in Hampton Roads,
to operating inside Norfolk

and suggested that she be limited
H a r b o r .

25

Writing from York-

town, Major-General John B. Magruder predicted that "the
Merrimac

[sic] will make no impression on Newport News,

in

my opinion, and if she succeeds in sinking the ships lying
there it would do us little or no good.

. . ."26

But, despite these cautions, the first genuinely good
news in months introduced an atmosphere of optimism into the
Confederate high command.

War Secretary Benjamin admonished

Huger that "none of us are of the opinion that it would be

24"Extracts from a general court-martial convened at
the city of Richmond, V A . , on the 5th day of July, 1862, for
the trial of Flag-Officer Josiah Tattnall, C. S. Navy," in
N O R , VII:
p. 793.
2^Benjamin Huger to Judah P. Benjamin, March 13, 1862,
in OR, IX:
p. 65.
26john B. Magruder to Samuel Cooper, March 6, 1862, in
O R , IX:
p. 57; see also John B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee,
March 20, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 386-388.
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proper to lose the vast advantage resulting from the enemy's
fright at the bare idea of the Virginia reappearing among
the wooden

ships.

"27

Naval Secretary Mallory, who fervent

ly believed in the ironclad's ability to "make a dashing
cruise on the Potomac as far as Washington" or even New
York, where "she could shell and burn the city and the
shipping," was extremely reluctant to give up his dreams.
He pressed the ship's commander for the next month to make
"a dash in York River, or even further.

. . ."28

General

Lee was never optimistic enough to plan raids on Northern
cities, but he also subscribed to the idea that the vessel
could cruise into the York River and disrupt Federal
shipping there.29

An inflated idea of the V i r g i n i a 's

capabilities probably influenced Jefferson Davis to believe
that the ship could so effectively protect Norfolk and
Yorktown that he could afford to transfer a substantial
number of troops from eastern Virginia to the Department of
Northern Virginia.

He telegraphed Johnston on March 10 that

"further assurances given to me this day that you shall be
promptly and adequately reinforced, so as to enable you to

27judah P. Benjamin to Benjamin Huger, March 15, 1862,
in OR, I X : p . 68.
28stephen R. Mallory to Franklin Buchanan, February 24,
1862, Stephen R. Mallory to Franklin Buchanan, March 7,
1862, in N O R , VI:
pp. 776-777, 780-781; Stephen R. Mallory
to Josiah Tattnall, April 12, 1862, in N O R , VII:
p. 224.
29Robert E. Lee to Stephen R. Mallory, April 8, 1862,
in N O R , VII:
p. 761.
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maintain your position.
Johnston,

. . ."30

of course, had already begun his withdrawal

from the frontier, though Davis would not know that for
several more days.

The juxtaposition of his decision not to

inform Davis of the start of the operation with Lee's
appearance in Richmond and the brief elation at the early
exploits of the V i r ginia, led to a further deterioration of
relations between Johnston and the President.

It also put

Lee in a position to begin modifying Davis's plans for the
defense of Richmond.
Exactly when Davis knew Johnston had evacuated his
position is difficult to determine.

He told Johnston that

he had received his "first information of your retrograde
movement" on March 15, though he later admitted that "I have
had many and alarming reports of great destruction of
ammunition,

camp equipage, and provisions,

precipitate retreat;

indicating

but, having heard no cause for such a

sudden movement I was at a loss to believe it . "31

Yet

Thomas Bragg's diary suggests that the cabinet discussed the
issue on March 10:
everything back.

"Our Army of the Potomac is moving
I fear it will be a bad business."^2

is consistent with the timing of Davis's telegram to

30jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 10,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 1096.
31jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 15,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 527.
32Entry of March 10, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 178.
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Johnston the same day concerning reinforcements.

And the

President could hardly have been unaware of the operation
after March 11, when the Richmond newspapers began to report
the story.
The most thorough coverage came from the anti-adminis
tration Richmond Examiner, which perhaps not coincidentally
had close ties to Joseph Johnston.33

Characterizing the

operations as "the judicious movements of our army," the
Examiner detailed not only the extent of the retreat but
correctly named Johnston's new line and even analyzed the
strategic thinking behind Davis's decision to pull back:
The grand movement of the army on the
Potomac, in withdrawing from its offensive line on
the river of that name, and assuming a defensive
one on the line of the Rappahannock and Rapidan,
places a new complexion on the entire war in
Virginia.
The policy of this change of position with
reference to the intended attack of the enemy is
obvious.
The Potomac was the proper base for
offensive operations against Maryland and Washing
ton city; but as a line of defense for Richmond,
or for general resistance, it is the most danger
ous that could be held. . . .34
The paper further asserted that "General Johnston is
understood to have the confidence of the administration to

^ F o r m e r editor R. W. Hughes had married Johnston's
niece Eliza, the adopted daughter of John B. Floyd.
The
current editor, John M. Daniel, had served the first few
months of the war on Floyd's staff.
Robert M. Hughes, "Some
Letters from the Papers of General Joseph E. Johnston,
William and Mary Q u a rterly, Vol. XI, 2nd Series, No. 4
(October 1931):
p. 320; Jedediah Hotchkiss, V i r g i n i a , Vol.
Ill of Confederate Military Hist o r y , expanded edition
(Dayton, OH:
Morningside Bookshop, 1975), p. 94 9.
^ R i c h m o n d E x a m i n e r , March 11,

1862, p. 2.
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such an extent that, as a singular exception, he has the
control and direction of military movements in his depart
ment entirely in his own discr e t i o n ."35

while the paper's

antagonistic stance certainly alienated the President,
Bragg's diary indicates that topics covered in the Examiner
were often discussed in cabinet meetings.

It stretches

credulity to the breaking point to believe that no one in
the cabinet or his own entourage would have brought such an
important story to the President's attention.36
There were other indicators that the move had com
menced.

Theophilus Holmes's complaint about not having been

informed of

Johnston's imminent retreat was posted to Cooper

on March 9,

and Lee's response,

dated March 14, reveals that

he already knew for certain that the march was under

w a y . 3 7

Johnston himself mailed a letter announcing the change of
base to Davis on March 12, although the President never
acknowledged its

r e c e i p t .

38

35i b i d .
36The cabinet even discussed buying the Richmond
Enquirer during early February,
in order to have a newspaper
friendly to the government being printed in the Confederate
capital.
Robert G. Cleland, "Jefferson Davis and the
Confederate C a b inet," Southwestern Historical Q u a r t e r l y ,
Vol. XIX, No. 3 (January 1916):
p. 216; Entries for January
3, 1862, January 8, 1862, February 5, 1862, Bragg diary, pp.
94, 104-105, 135.
37Theophilus Holmes to Samuel Cooper, March 9, 1862, in
O R , LI (part 2):
p. 497; Robert E. Lee to Theophilus
Holmes, March 14, 1862, in OR, V:
pp. 1099-1100.
38joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 12,
1862, in OR, V:
pp. 526-527.
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Given the evidence that Davis must have been aware of
Johnston's action well prior to March 15, why did the
President deny any such knowledge?
suggest themselves.

Two possibilities

The first is that Davis had convinced

himself that he never issued positive orders for the
retreat, that it was only discussed as a contingency plan,
and that Johnston had not been authorized to initiate it
without further consultation.

The preserved correspondence

between Davis and Johnston from February 23 through March 6
is unfortunately quite ambiguous.

Davis later cited it to

prove he had never ordered or authorized the move,

and

Johnston quoted many of the same letters in his own memoirs
to argue the opposite

c a s e .

39

Davis's first significant letter of the period,

dated

February 28, began by admitting that Johnston's apprecia
tions of McClellan's intention to advance very soon "clearly
indicate prompt effort to disencumber yourself of everything
which would interfere with your rapid movement when neces
sary.

..."

Following a discussion of potential defensive

lines and the likelihood of reinforcing Johnston's army, the
President returned to the topic of retreat:
In the mean time, and with your present
force, you cannot secure your communication from
the enemy, and may at any time, when he can pass
to your rear, be compelled to retreat at the
sacrifice of your siege train and army stores, and

39je fferson Davis to Marcus J. Wright, October 14,
1980, in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, VI:
pp. 502-504; Johnston, N a rrative, pp. 100-101, 482-483.
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without any preparation on a second line to
receive your army as it retired.
As heretofore
stated in conversation with you, it is needful
that the armies on the north, the east, and the
proximate south of this capital should be so
disposed as to support each other.
With their
present strength and position the armies under
your command are entirely separated from the
others.
Threatened as.we are by a large force on the
southeast, you must see the hazard of your
position, by its liability to isolation and attack
in rear, should we be beaten on the lines south
and east of Richmond; and that reflection is
connected with consideration of the fatal effect
which the disaster contemplated would have upon
the cause of the Confederacy.
Again, Davis commented on the need to save supplies and
munitions,

and then presented his analysis of Jackson's

position in the Vall e y . 40
To this point,
appreciation; but,

the letter resembled a strategic
in the last few lines, the President

included three sentences rife with the potential to be
interpreted in different ways:

"As has been my custom,

have only sought to present general purposes and view.

I
I

rely on your special knowledge and high ability to effect
whatever is practicable in this our hour of need.

. . .

Let

me hear from you often and fully."41
Honorable men could disagree concerning Davis's
intentions in crafting those sentences, and be so sure of
their reading that they never realized the ambiguity

1862,

^Ojefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, February 28,
in OR, V:
pp. 1083-1085.
41Ibid.
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inherent, therein.

Obviously, Johnston had been given

authority to maneuver his army as he saw fit if directly
attacked, but could he order a retreat without enemy action?
Johnston firmly believed that he had already been given
instructions to conduct the withdrawal, and would have read
those sentences as confirmation that the President had left
the timing up to him.

But, to Davis, the phrase "let me

hear from you often and fully" may well have betokened a
desire to be consulted prior to any non-emergency action.
Unfortunately,

each man was so sure of his own interpreta

tion of the words that after February 28 neither bothered to
make sure of the other's intentions.
Certainly the letter that Davis dispatched to Johnston
on March 6 showed clearly that the President, hopedjthat
events would render the evacuation unnecessary:

"I am

making diligent effort to re-enforce your columns.

It may

still be that you will have the power to meet and repel the
enemy.

..."

Yet, Davis remained pessimistic, observing

that "it is not to be disguised that your defective position
and proximity to the enemy's base of operations do not
permit us to be sanguine in that result.
necessary to make all due preparations

It is therefore

for the opposite

course of events."42

42je fferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, February
[March] 6, 1862, in OR, V:
p. 1063.
The argument concern
ing the dating of this letter is made in the notes of the
preceding chapter.
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Though Davis ended the letter with the admonition to
"please keep me fully and frequently advised of your
condition," he coupled this with a reiteration of the army
commander's latitude of action.

"You will be assured that

in my instructions to you I did not intend to diminish the
discretionary power which is essential to successful
operations in the field, and that I fully rely upon your
zeal and capacity.

. . ."43

iphe letter, which probably

arrived after Johnston had already begun the withdrawal, did
not decisively clear up potential misunderstandings.
So it is possible that Davis simply did not credit the
early reports of Johnston's withdrawal, because he could not
believe that even Johnston would disobey what the President
evidently considered direct orders.

But it is also possible

that Davis's response to the retrograde may have been
colored by Lee's arrival in Richmond.

For Lee, to Davis's

great surprise, did not agree with his plans to reduce the
length of Confederate lines in Virginia.
As soon as the President had developed his strategic
concept of subordinating all operations in Virginia to the
defense of Richmond, he had realized that a major command
problem existed.

The city itself was the logical central

point from which to coordinate the movements of Johnston's
department with those of Magruder, Huger, and the Richmond
defenses.

And while Davis undoubtedly believed himself

43i b i d ., pp. 1063-1064.
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competent to direct those armies, he was realist enough to
understand that he could not do so while also performing as
the country's chief executive.44
So what were his choices?

As much as the President

admired Judah Benjamin personally and supported his tenure
at the War Office, he realized the folly of entrusting an
untrained,

if brilliant,

operational command.

civilian with what amounted to an

Adjutant General Cooper had evidenced

neither the talent nor the inclination to handle such an
assignment.

Johnston himself, as the ranking commander in

the area, would naturally command any combined army; but,
for several reasons,
responsibility.

he was a poor choice for the overall

Probably most important to Davis was his

belief that Johnston's presence was essential to the morale
of the Department of Northern Virginia.

111 had no wish,"

Davis remarked later, and in a slightly different context,
"to separate him from the troops with whom he was so
intimately acquainted,

and whose confidence I believed he

deservedly possessed."45

Less significant, but also

presumably a consideration, was the friction that Davis
recognized existed not only between himself and Johnston,
but between the general and the Secretary of War, Adjutant
General,

Quartermaster General, and Commissary General.

44Patrick, Jefferson Davis and His Cabi n e t , pp.

34, 44-

45.
45Davis, Rise and F a l l , II:

p. 88.
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This fact argued against bringing him to Richmond, espe
cially when combined with Johnston's apparent willingness to
be openly friendly with the administration's political
enemies.
In order for Johnston to be retained in command of his
own army, yet subordinated to the orders of a supervising
commander, Confederate law required that the new officer
outrank him.

Eliminating Cooper from consideration, only

Albert Sidney Johnston and Robert E. Lee met that qualifica
tion.

The other Johnston,

deeply involved in the campaign

to redeem the disasters in Tennessee, was obviously not a
candidate for the post.

Almost by default,

as soon as Davis

settled on his new concept for defending Richmond,

to

include establishing a theatre command, the choice fell on
Lee.
None of the foregoing should be construed to suggest in
any wa y that, to Davis, Lee represented Hobson's Choice.
The President had unwavering faith in Lee's capacity as a
commander, despite his superficially disappointing Confeder
ate career.

As an additional plus, Lee had been the

original architect of Virginia's defenses,

had planned most

of the fortifications now under construction, and had a
thorough knowledge of the terrain in northern and eastern
Virginia.Davis

may have also believed that the rank-

46por the most detailed assessment of Lee's part in
designing Virginia's defenses, see Freeman, R. E. L e e , I:
pp. 479-486, 497-500.
Davis made his opinion of Lee freely
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sensitive Johnston might be more amenable to accepting
direction from an old friend.
The position that Davis planned for Lee was originally
to be entitled "Commanding General of the Armies of the
Confederate States," following the United States practice of
depositing that title on the senior general officer in
service at the nation's capital.

This would allow Lee not

only to control operations in Virginia, but also to deal
with a variety of military matters throughout the Confederacy--matters which were not readily resolved by civilians, as
had been proved by the experience of having Leroy Pope
Walker and Benjamin in the War Office.

Davis's friends in

Congress introduced a bill to create the appointment.
the President's opponents supported the measure,

Even

because

they believed that it would take much of the management of
the war out of his hands.47
The only problem which resulted was from the wording of
the legislation, which Davis considered entirely too strong:
[T]he said officer shall be appointed by the
President by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate.
His usual headquarters shall be at
the seat of government, and shall be charged,
under the direction of the President, with the
general control of military operations, the

known throughout Rise and Fall ; see also Arthur Martin Shaw,
e d . , "Some Post-War Letters from Jefferson Davis to his
former Aide-de-camp, William Preston Johnston," Virginia
Magazine of History and B i ography, Vol. LI, No. 2 (April
1943):
p. 152.
^ R i c h m o n d E x a m i n e r , March 6, 1862, p. 2; Yearns,
Confederate C o n g r e s s , p. 108.
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movement and discipline of the troops, and the
distribution of the supplies among the armies of
the Confederate States, and may, when he shall
deem it advisable, take command in person of our
army or armies in the field.^8
It was the last line that gave Davis pause,

for it put the

assumption of field command at the general's discretion,
that of the President.

not

Douglas Southall Freeman has

suggested that this question of constitutional authority
represented Davis's major objection:

"strict construction

of the organic law was a matter of political conscience,

for

which he would do battle even if the enemy's divisions were
a t

t h e

d o o r s

o f

t h e

c a p i t o l . " 4 9

Compelling as this argument seems, Davis's veto message
contained a second line of reasoning, which may have come to
him from consultation with Lee, or upon reflection on the
personality of Johnston.
prepare troops for battle,

"[N]o general would be content to
conduct their movements, and

share their privations during a whole campaign if he
expected to find himself superseded at the very moment of
a c t i o n .

"50

impatient to install Lee officially, Davis

resolved his dilemma by using his own executive power on

48"An Act to create the office of commanding general of
the armies of the Confederate States," March 6, 1862, in O R ,
Series 4, I: pp. 997-998.
^Freeman,

R. E. L e e , II:

p. 5.

^ J e f f e r s o n Davis to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, March 14, 1862, in OR, Series 4, I:
p.
997; see also entry of March 14, 1862, Bragg diary, pp. 183184.
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March 13 to order Lee "assigned to duty at the seat of
government" and "under the direction of the President . . .
charged with the conduct of military operation in the armies
of the Confederacy."51
Lee did not welcome another desk assignment--"I cannot
see either advantage or pleasure in my duties"--and the
newspapers denigrated it as a reduction "from a commanding
general to an orderly s e r g e a n t ."52

Historians have tended

to interpret Lee's distaste and the public derision of the
position as supporting the view that Davis had nominated him
for an essentially powerless advisory post.
described the assignment thus:

Freeman

"Broadly speaking, Davis

entrusted to him the minor vexatious matters of detail and
the counseling of commanders in charge of the smaller
armies.

On the larger strategic issues the President

usually consulted him and was often guided by his advice,
but in no single instance was Lee given a free hand to
initiate and direct to full completion any plan of magni
tude.

He had to work by suggestion rather than by command.

. . .

"The grandiose official designation was almost

meaningless," contended Clifford Dowdey,

"and he was advisor

5lGeneral Orders No. 14, Adjutant and Inspector
General's Office, March 13, 1862, in OR, V:
p. 1099.
52Robert E. Lee to Mary Lee, March 14, 1862, in Dowdey
and Manarin, Wartime P a p e r s , pp. 127-128; Freeman, R . E .
L e e , I I : p . 6.
53preeman, R. E. L e e , II:

pp. 6-7.
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in name only.

From the beginning,

Davis apparently regarded

Lee as something of an executive assistant.

. . ."54

More

recently, historians Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones have
argued that "Davis created informally through Lee's appoint
ment a modern chief of staff," an interpretation that
credits Lee with more power than previously assumed,

but

still characterizes him as having no actual command authori
ty. 55
This was not the case.

From March 14 until June,

1862,

Robert E. Lee styled himself and functioned as the Confeder
acy's commanding general.

Davis referred to him as the

"Commanding General" as did the Secretary of

W a r .

^5

Walter

Taylor described his duties as "military advisor to the
President and as commanding general of all the armies in the
f i e l d . "57

Colonel

T.

A.

Washington and Major

A.

L. Long,

both of whom soon joined Lee's staff, habitually referred to
him as the commanding general, and phrased letters in his

54oowdey and Manarin, Wartime P a p e r s , p. 124.
55Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won,
A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana, IL:
University
of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 124.
56je fferson Davis to the editor of the Louisville
Courier-Journal, May 7, 1887, in Rowland, Jefferson Davis,
Constitutionalist, XI:
p. 553; George W. Randolph to Robert
E. Lee, April 2, 1862, in L S - S W , Vol. 6-7.
57walter H. Taylor, Four Years with General Lee (New
York:
D. Appleton, 1877), p. 43; see also Walter H. Taylor,
General Lee, His Campaigns in Virginia, 1861-1865, with
Personal Reminiscences (Norfolk:
Nusbaum, 1906), p. 38.
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behalf as definitive orders and not requests.58

Lee acted

directly, and not at all as if he believed his title to be
purely nominal.

On his own authority he issued General

Orders to the army, transferred troops from one department
to another, and directed the Adjutant-General's Office to
settle organizational questions to his specifications.

He

signed the majority of his letters to the commanders of
departments as "Robert E. Lee, General, Commanding."^9
Following United States Army precedent, Lee did not
seek to closely control the activities of Albert Sidney
Johnston, because Johnston's commission outranked Lee's
appointed position.

But,

in all his dealings with other

generals, there is ample evidence that Lee's command
authority was acknowledged throughout the army.

General

Cooper immediately began to forward all operational inquir
ies from field commanders to "General Lee, Commanding."

The

list of general officers who directly addressed Lee as the

S^For example, see T. A. Washington to Samuel Cooper,
April 4, 1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 30.
59The correspondence preserved in OR is not necessarily
representative of Lee's habits in signing his letters or
with respect to his personal command authority.
Many of the
direct orders that he issued during the period under
consideration were of a direct technical nature and not
chosen for inclusion.
See Robert E. Lee to Benjamin Huger,
March 18, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, March
18, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Theophilus Holmes, March 19,
1862, Walter H. Taylor to Benjamin Huger, March 25, 1862,
Robert E. Lee to Gustavus W. Smith, April 1, 1862, in Robert
E. Lee Letterbook, National Archives, Washington, DC
(hereafter cited as Lee Letterbook) ; Robert E. Lee to Samuel
Cooper, April 17, 1862, Robert E. Lee to George W. Randolph,
April 20, 1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 30.
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commanding general included P. 0. Hebert in Texas, Henry
Heth and Humphrey Marshall in western Virginia, Benjamin
Huger in Norfolk, John Bankhead Magruder in Y o r k t o w n , John
Pemberton in South Carolina,

and even Joseph Johnston

h i m s e l f .60
Clearly, Jefferson Davis did not recall Lee from the
Atlantic coast to serve as a figurehead.

Though Lee

commanded "under the direction of the President," this
qualification existed in both Davis's appointment orders and
the vetoed legislation.

In point of fact, the only diminu

tion of power intended by the President was the prohibition
against Lee assuming a field command without positive
orders.

To have emasculated the post would have defeated

the intent of Davis to make Lee the direct supervising
commander for the defense of Richmond.
The problem that developed in the triangular relation
ship between Davis, Johnston,

and Lee was not, therefore,

one of any ambiguity in Lee's authority.
strategic conception:

It was one of

Lee did not agree with the premise

upon which Davis and Johnston had agreed to conduct o pera
tions.

Though necessity had required him to retire inland

60por the best explanation of United States Army
precedent for the conduct of the commanding general, see
Robert F. Stohlman, Jr., The Powerless Position, The
Commanding General of the Army of the United States, 18641903 (Manhattan, K S : Kansas State University, 1975), pp. 212, in which he discusses the position in the prewar army.
For an early situation in which rank distinctions played a
part in limiting the Commanding General's authority, see
Weigley, History of the United States A r m y , pp. 170-172.
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to oppose the Federals along the coast, Lee consistently
disapproved of intentionally relinquishing territory in
anticipation of an enemy offensive.

He outlined his

rationale for retaining positions as far forward as possible
in a letter to Major-General John C. Breckinridge in March,
1864:
The enemy generally, in his advances in the
country, threatens several sections and rapidly
advances against one, and concentration of our
troops can only be made on a retired line.
The
longer, however, he can be held on an advanced
line the more certainly can concentration be made
to oppose him in retired positions.61
There was an emotional as well as an intellectual
component to Lee's disinclination to yield Virginia soil to
the Yankees.

Much of his personality was tied up with his

identification as a Virginian; during the secession crisis,
Freeman represents Lee as "determined from the outset that
he would adhere to Virginia and defend her from any f o e . "62
Though it is probably incorrect to extend this argument as
far as have Thomas Connelly and Archer Jones, and to assert
that "one might infer that Lee was fighting for Virginia and
not the South," there is little room to doubt that Lee felt
a special obligation to contest the Federals grudgingly for
every piece of the Old Dominion's

t e r r i t o r y .

63

6lRobert E. Lee to John C. Breckinridge, March 23,
1864, in OR, XXXIII:
p. 1239.
62preeman, R. E. L e e , I:

p. 434.

63connelly and Jones, Politics of Comm a n d , p. 46.
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Lee had even more personal reasons to reject strategic
withdrawals.

He had already lost his ancestral home at

Arlington to Union occupation in 1861, which concerned Lee
for financial as well as emotional reasons:

"everything at

Arlington will I fear be lost," he had written G. W. C. Lee
in January, 1862,

"& it will take all the land at the White

House & Romancoke to pay the legacies to the girls with
interest."64

But a Federal advance up York River would

threaten White House directly, endangering not only the
family's financial stability but also the safety of Lee's
invalid

w i f e .

65

These were, however, secondary considera

tions.

Lee,

like many other Southerners, was willing to

risk personal ruin and family disaster to achieve indepen
dence .
To Lee, Davis's plan to withdraw Johnston's a r m y — and
Jackson's detachment in the Valley— simply made little,

if

any, military sense, especially in the light of the Vi r g i n 
ia 's apparent ability to defend the mouth of the James
River.

After the war, he confided to Colonel John S. Mosby

that he believed that Johnston's withdrawal had been a great
mistake.66

Attorney-General Bragg noticed on March 10 that,

64Robert E. Lee to G. W. C. Lee, January 19, 1862, in
Dowdey and Manarin, Wartime P a p e r s , p. 105.
65Robert E. Lee to Mary Lee, April 4, 1862, in Ibid.,
p . 142 .
66charles Wells, Russell, ed., The Memoirs of Colonel
John S. Mosby (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Co., 1917), p.
375 .
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with respect to Johnston's withdrawal, Lee "had not been
informed of it, I suppose, and to me it seemed he did not
approve of the m o v e m e n t . " ^
Lee's letter to Holmes on March 16 is also significant
with regard to his appreciation of the military situation in
Virginia.

After observing that the muddy condition of the

roads would probably prevent a general advance by McClellan,
he continued:
but that he will advance upon our line as soon as
he can, I have no doubt.
To retard his movements,
cut him up in detail if possible, attack him at
disadvantage, and, if practicable, drive him back,
will of course be your effort and study.
It is
not the plan of the Government to abandon any
country that can be h e l d , and it is only the
necessity of the case, I presume, that has caused
the withdrawal of the troops to the Rappahannock.
I trust there will be no necessity of retrograding
farther.
The position of the main body of the
Army of the Potomac seems to have been taken in ■
reference to the reported advance of the enemy up
the Shenandoah Valley.
A report from General
Johnston of his plans and intentions has not yet
been received.
His movements are doubtless
regulated by those of the enemy. . . . [emphasis
added
For Lee, ten days after arriving in Richmond, and three days
after his appointment to the army's senior post,

to say that

"it is not the plan of the Government to abandon any country
that can be held," represented a complete reversal of
Jefferson Davis's pronouncement to an astonished cabinet on
February 19 that "the time had come for diminishing the

67Entry of March 10, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 178.
®®Robert E. Lee to Theophilus Holmes, March 16,
in OR, V:
p. 1103.

1862,
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extent of our lines.

..."

Thus, Davis's hard line in

response to Johnston's withdrawal may well have been a
reaction to Lee's strongly held opinion that strategic
retreats were not only unnecessary but positively dangerous.
If such was the case,

then it would explain the next

immediate controversy between Davis and Johnston:
position his army.

where to

At the February 20 cabinet meeting,

Davis ordered Johnston "to have a reconnaissance of the
country in his rear with reference to another line, and it
is probable the Rappahannock will be selected."69

But

Johnston had trouble securing sufficient engineers to
perform such a

s u r v e y .

^0

Besides, Davis's February 28

letter lead him to think that the position of his forces was
a strategic,

rather that a tactical,

question; he would

locate his army however close the President thought it
should be to Richmond,

and fortify that position as best he

could.
Accordingly, on March 13, Johnston informed Davis that
as soon as he had emptied the reserve depot at Culpeper
Court House "I shall cross the Rapidan and take such a
position as you may think best in connection with those of
other troops."71

The President asserted in 1865 that he

^ E n t r y of February 20, 1862, Bragg diary, p.

156.

^Ojohnston, Narrative, p. 445.
71-Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 13,
1862, in OR, LI (part 2):
p. 1073.
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took this as a declaration that Johnston was "ignorant of
the topography of the country in his

r e a r .

"72

yet Johns

ton's letter itself contains strong evidence that such was
not the case, for it included a well-conceived suggestion
for the positioning of the army.

"By proper management of

the railroad it seems to me that,

from the neighborhood of

Gordonsville 20,000, or even 30,000, men might be thrown
into Richmond in a single day."

Centering his divisions on

Gordonsville would also leave Johnston ready to dispatch
troops quickly to support Jackson in the

S h e n a n d o a h .

73

But the President chose to interpret Johnston's letter
in the narrowest possible terms, and essentially to repudi
ate his own strategic design of the previous month.

Instead

of acknowledging his intent to bring Johnston's army within
supporting distance of the capital, Davis wrote to the
General:
I have not the requisite topographical knowledge
for the selection of your new position.
I had
intended that you should determine that question.
. . . The question of throwing troops into
Richmond is contingent upon reverses in the West
and Southeast.
The immediate necessity for such a
movement is not anticipated.74
"To further inquiry from General Johnston as to where

72je fferson Davis to James Phelan, February 18, 1865,
in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, VI': pp.
493-494.

1862,

73joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 13,
in OR, LI (part 2):
p. 1074.

1862,

74jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 15,
in OR, V:
pp. 527-528.
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he should take position," Davis said in his memoirs,

"I

replied that I would go to his headquarters in the field,
and found him on the south bank of the river, to which he
had retired,
ges. "75

in a position possessing great natural advanta

The narrative of this visit is extremely confusing,

and many of the specifics are contradicted by other evi
dence.

Davis implied that the visit began at Rapidan

Station and continued to Fredericksburg only when Johnston
expressed ignorance of the defensive potential of the lower
part of the Rappahannock River.

But Johnston and his staff

consistently denied throughout the decades following the war
that the President had ever visited the main body of the
army.76

The dates and locations of the correspondence of

Davis and Johnston, as well as casual references to the trip
by Lee and Bragg, all suggest that the President took the
train to Fredericksburg on March 21 and returned to Richmond
in the evening of March 22.77

He did, however, travel to

Fredericksburg via Gordonsville, but there is no direct

75oavis, Rise and F a l l , I:

p. 465.

7^The testimony of Johnston's aides was omitted in the
abridgement of his article from the Century Magazine for
publication in B & L ; see Johnston, "Responsibilities," B & L ,
I: p. 257; Joseph E. Johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines,"
Century M a g a z i n e , Vol. XXX, No. 1 (May 1885):
pp. 109-110.
77Robert E. Lee to Mary Lee, March 22, 1862, in Dowdey
and Manarin, Wartime P a p e r s , pp. 133-134; entries of March
21, 1862, March 24, 1862, Bragg diary, pp. 190-191.
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evidence that he visited Johnston's lines

t h e r e .

when he was collecting evidence for his memoirs,

^8

Even

all the

statements submitted to Davis in 1885 only mentioned a visit
to Fredericksburg, not to the
Specific itinerary aside,
Joseph Johnston at all?

R a p i d a n . ^ 9

why did Jefferson Davis visit

Davis claimed that he did so to

help Johnston select a satisfactory defensive position, a
task made necessary because Johnston "had neglected the
primary duty of a commander" in determining a safe line of
retreat.

If this was the case, it is difficult to explain

why the President waited a week after receiving Johnston's
inquiry to act.

By the time Davis met Johnston, the army

had already taken a permanent line on the south bank of the
Rappahannock,

complete with artillery emplacements on

commanding hills and entrenchments around the bridges.

Nor

does it make sense for the Chief Executive of the Confeder
ate States to spend two days surveying a defensive line
forty miles north of the capital when he had just appointed
a commanding general to supervise the operations of the
armies in the field.
Contemporary letters and telegrams suggest that Davis

7®hnn Eliza Gordon to Douglas A. Gordon, March 22,
1862, provided by Robert K. Krick, to whom I am indebted for
the information.
79j. t . Doswell to William S. Barton, August 10, 1885,
John L. Mayre to William S. Barton, August 11, 1885,
statement of Frank T. Forbes, August 15, 1885, in Rowland,
Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, IX:
pp. 377-378, 381383 .
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visited Johnston for another reason entirely.

Federal

advances in North Carolina and the first landing of troops
from the Army of the Potomac at Fortress Monroe had co n 
vinced Davis— and L e e — that the main Union effort was to be
made against either Richmond or Norfolk from the south
east.^^

The President went to see Johnston in order to

gauge personally the feasibility of withdrawing some
infantry and artillery from the Department of Northern
Virginia to reinforce the other departments defending
Richmond.

He also needed to find a senior commander to

accompany the troops.81

Fully aware of Johnston's sensitiv

ity to having his army raided for general officers, Davis
probably decided that it would be better to confront the
issue in person.
Davis planned to have two brigades of infantry,
supported by an artillery battery,

each

sent to the capital,

from

which they could be deployed with about a day's notice to
North Carolina, Norfolk, Yorktown, or even back to the
R a p p a h a n n o c k .

82

Loath as he was to part with any of his

soldiers, Johnston recognized that this sort of maneuver was

SORobert E. Lee to John B. Magruder, March 18, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 3):
pp. 385-386; Robert E. Lee to Jefferson
Davis, March 22, 1862, in OR, LI (part 2):
p. 512.
81jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 22,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 392; Robert E. Lee to Jefferson Davis,
March 22, 1862, in OR, LI (part 2):
p. 512.
82jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 22,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 392; Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel
Cooper, March 24, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 27.
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precisely why he had been withdrawn closer to Richmond,

and

he could not have argued against the logic of establishing a
centrally located reserve, no matter how small.
Besides, Davis's plan allowed Johnston to rid himself
of one general in whom he had little confidence,
another for whom he had great plans.

and advance

Theophilus Holmes had

never been a favorite with his commander, and his loud fits
of pique at being kept in the dark during the withdrawal had
greatly embarrassed Johnston.

Since then, even though

reinforced by Whiting's 7,000 men, Holmes maintained an
incessant barrage to Richmond on the untenability of his
p o s i t i o n .

83

Unfortunately, his date of rank made him senior

to every other Major-General in the Department of Northern
Virginia except G. W. Smith.84

gut as a native North

Carolinian, Holmes was a politically acceptable choice if a
senior officer had to be sent to oppose Burnside.

Johnston,

therefore, was hardly unhappy about agreeing to let him go.
Holmes's departure paved the way to advance Smith from
division commander to the semi-independent command of the
Aquia District.85
Johnston and Davis seem to have had only one prolonged

83Theophilus Holmes to Robert E. Lee, March 14, 1862,
Theophilus Holmes to Robert E. Lee, March 15, 1862--Lee's
correspondence in reply indicates that Holmes also wrote on
March 16 and 17; see OR, V:
pp. 1100, 1103, 1104-1105,
1106.
84warner, Generals in G r a y , pp. 84,

141, 151,

192, 281.

85johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 109.
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private conversation during the President's stay in Freder
icksburg.

That occurred around midday on March 22, when the

two men rode north across the Rappahannock onto Stafford
Heights, accompanied only by a few aides, who discreetly
fell back out of earshot.®®

What they discussed remains a

subject for conjecture; neither man

ever alluded to the

conversation in letters or memoirs.

But,

at the end of the

ride, President Davis did agree with General Johnston that
the north bank of the river, and even the city of Freder
icksburg,
attack.

could not be held against

a determined enemy

To one of Holmes's aides Davis quipped,

"To use a

slang phraze [sic], your town of Fredericksburg is right in
the wrong place."87

Following this excursion,

the President

met with several delegations of townspeople; drafted the
orders detaching Holmes,

two brigades, and two batteries

from Johnston's army; and caught the afternoon mail train
back to Richmond.®®
Those two weeks,

from March 7 to March 22, 1862,

represented a definite,

if undramatic,

Confederate defense of Richmond.

turning point in the

Davis, once committed to a

close defense of Richmond, was now vacillating between his

®®J. T. Doswell to William S. Barton, August 10, 1885,
in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, IX:
pp.
377-378.
® 7I b i d .

1862,

®®Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, March 22,
in OR, V:
p. 392.
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own concept and that of Lee, which envisioned keeping the
Federals at arm's length for the longest practical time.
Eventually, by mid-April, Davis would subscribe totally to
Lee's idea of defending as much of Virginia as possible,
instead of concentrating on the defense of the c a p i t a l .

But

between March 22 and April 17, 1862, neither Davis nor Lee
had complete control of Confederate strategy.
From Johnston's perspective, the result was a series of
mixed messages from his high command.

First, the President

seemed to authorize his withdrawal from the frontier, and
then he essentially repudiated it.

Next, Davis told

Johnston on March 15 that there was no immediate need to
consider shuttling troops into the capital, and reversed
himself a week later.

Johnston represented the President

during this visit in his Narrative as "uncertain," and his
correspondence over the next few weeks indicated that he
often wondered just who was in charge of operations in
Virginia— Davis or

L e e ? 8 9

89j0hnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 109.
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Chapter Six
Should Yorktown Be Defended?

Sixty miles south of Norfolk, on March 20, 1862, the
Federal transport, D e l a w a r e , deposited two companies of
Colonel Thomas G. Stevenson's 24th Massachusetts on the
undefended wharves at Washington, North Carolina.

The

cannon had been removed from the batteries designed to
protect the town, and the pilings sunk to obstruct the Tar
River were too far under the water to keep back a shallowdraft transport.

A drill-master of some repute in the

prewar Massachusetts militia, Stevenson formed his men up
and marched them smartly into the center of the town.

At

the court house "we nailed the Stars and Stripes to a flag
pole" while "the band played national airs and the men
cheered."

The Bay State soldiers then reshouldered arms,

marched to their boats,
Sound.

and steamed back down to Pamlico

The astonished residents of Washington had been

"occupied" for about an hour, but the message was clear:
the United States Navy could land troops almost anywhere
along the unprotected Confederate coast.-*But as disquieting as was the news out of North

1 "Report of Col. Thomas G. Stevenson, Twenty-fourth
Massachusetts Infantry," March 23, 1862, in OR, IX:
pp.
269-270; Sifakis, Who Was W h o , p. 624.
193
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Carolina, a more ominous storm was finally breaking; when
Joseph Johnston and Jefferson Davis conferred in Fredericks
burg, McClellan had already begun his much-delayed grand
offensive.

New York Times reporter William Swinton watched

in awe as the Army of the Potomac struck its camps around
Washington, D. C. and marched down to the docks at Alexan
dria and Annapolis.
schooners,

Four hundred assorted steamers and

escorted by the North Atlantic Blockading

Squadron, had been contracted to shift McClellan's entire
army to Fortress Monroe as the prelude to his advance on
Richmond.

Swinton watched, day after day, as the troops

tramped across the wharves and jammed themselves into the
transports.

The figures went down in his notebook as the

Yankee soldiers boarded the boats:

"one hundred and twenty-

one thousand five hundred men, fourteen thousand five
hundred and ninety-two animals,

forty-four batteries, and

the wagons and ambulances, ponton-trains
materials,

[sic], telegraph

and enormous equipage required for an army of

such magnitude.

. . ."2

The movement of such a considerable host, spread out
over several weeks, could not be concealed.

Confederate

pickets stationed near Gloucester Point on York River
reported "Twenty-eight steamers,

four floating batteries,

[and] twenty-six sails of different kinds" heading for Fort

^Swinton, C a m paigns, p. 100.
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Monroe on March 2 0.3

From Norfolk the same afternoon,

a

signal officer observed the arrival of "nineteen steamers
loaded with troops and nine schooners" in Hampton Roads.4
The flotilla seemed endless:

"sometimes I counted several

hundred vessels at the anchorage, and among them twenty or
twenty-five large steam transports waiting for their turn to
come up to the quay and land the fifteen or twenty thousand
men whom they brought," recalled the Prince de Joinville.3
A civilian reported to Magruder's pickets on March 24 that
"the re-enforcements of the enemy that arrived at Old Point
yesterday

. . . extend as far as the eye can observe toward

Hampton.

The force is immense— entirely out of my power to

estimate."^

From Yorktown, Magruder had no such qualms

about guessing:

he placed Federal numbers between Fortress

Monroe and Newport News that day at 35,000.

"Should he

advance now he would carry all the strong points, and r e 
enforcements would be too late,"

Magruder warned the

Secretary of War.^
The problem for the Confederates was that McClellan's

3Charles A. Crump to John B. Magruder, March 20,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 388.

1862,

4James S. Milligan to John B. Magruder, March 20,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 388.

1862,

3de Joinville, Army of the P o t o m a c , p. 34.
^Charles Collins to John A. Winston, March 24,
OR, XI (part 3):
p. 394.

1862,

1862,

7john B. Magruder to George W. Randolph, March 24,
in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 392-393.
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intentions were far from clear.

That the Union commander

might be moving his entire army down the Chesapeake Bay was
only one of a number of options which Davis and Lee had to
consider.

McClellan could be planning to deploy one or two

corps to Fortress Monroe to attack Yorktown or Norfolk to
draw Confederate reserves away from a projected advance from
Manassas or Aquia Creek.

Hampton Roads might also be just a

temporary stopping place for divisions reinforcing MajorGeneral Ambrose Burnside's operations in Pamlico Sound,
which threatened Norfolk from the South.

Nor could a

similar transfer of troops to augment the long-awaited
Federal attack on Savannah be ruled out.
Lee had no choice but to entrain Holmes and his two
brigades for North Carolina as soon as they arrived in
Richmond, to prop up the sagging defenses and morale of the
state.®

Thus, Jefferson Davis's central reserve had been

committed at the very start of the campaign.

The remaining

troops around Richmond were dispatched to Magruder, but this
amounted to no more than two Alabama infantry regiments
which had been kept at the capital because they suffered
from a high degree of sickness, and the cavalry battalion of
the shattered Wise Legion.

Lee also alerted Magruder and

Huger to be prepared to reinforce each other in an emergen-

®Robert E. Lee to Theophilus Holmes, March 23, 1862,
Special Orders No. 67, Adjutant and Inspector General's
Office, March 24, 1862, in OR, IX:
pp. 450-451.
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cy.9

Once those moves had been made, Confederate forces in

a long arc from the lower Shenandoah Valley, extending along
the line of the Rappahannock to Fredericksburg, down the
York River to Gloucester and Yorktown, across the James to
Norfolk, along the line of the Wilmington and Weldon
Railroad through North Carolina, and down the South Carolina
and Georgia coasts, had been fully deployed.

No point could

be materially strengthened without a corresponding weakness
at another, and no substantial field army could be collected
without denuding some vital position almost completely.
Such dispersal bothered the President,

in part because

it seemed like a return to the fully extended lines which
had failed so miserably in Tennessee, and in part because he
had become a believer in concentrating larger field armies
for offensive blows.

Lee, on the other hand, had a distinct

propensity for conducting operations with separate columns,
and never seems to have doubted his own ability to delay the
enemy long enough with detachments to force him to reveal
his objective.

Once that happened, Lee would marshal his

own forces to fight it out on ground of his own c h o o s i n g .10

^Walter H. Taylor to John B. Magruder, March 24, 1862,
George W. Randolph to John B. Magruder, March 25, 1862,
Robert E. Lee to Benjamin Huger, March 25, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 3):
pp. 393-394, 396-397.
lOjohn Morgan Dederer, "The Origins of Robert E. Lee's
Bold Generalship:
A Reinterpretation," Military A f f a i r s ,
Vol. XLVI (1985):
pp. 117-123; Connelly and Jones, Politics
of C o m m a n d , pp. 31-33; see also Louis H. Manarin, "Lee in
Command:
Strategical and Tactical Policies," (Ph.D.
dissertation, Duke University, 1965).
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In this case, as soon as Lee became convinced that McClellan
was intent on advancing up the York-James Peninsula,

he

commenced shuffling reinforcements to the Yorktown line.
Douglas Southall Freeman described his policy as "a
most interesting example of provisional reconcentration to
meet an undeveloped offensive," and a "daring, piecemeal
reconcentration" accomplished with the full support of
Jefferson Davis.

Freeman also asserted that Lee's concept

had to be implemented in spite of the resistance of Johns
ton:

"several days' exchange of correspondence

. . .

convinced Lee that his old friend would not willingly fall
in with his plan."!-*-

Freeman's interpretation overstates

the concord between Lee and Davis,

and exaggerates the

apparent friction between Lee and Johnston out of all
p roportion.
Davis,

in fact,

favored a proposal made by Magruder as

early as March 21 that, given 30,000 reinforcements from
Johnston's army,

he would attempt to "crush the enemy,

and

perhaps with the assistance of the Virginia take Fort
Monroe.

. . ."12

ijlie President directed Lee to sound out

Johnston on the feasibility of the plan, which the command
ing general did on March 25, but in language that carefully
disowned responsibility for the idea:

HFreeman,

R. E. L e e , II:

"The President

pp. 14, 17, 19.

12john B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, March 21, 1862,
OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 389-390.
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desires to know with what force you could march to re
enforce the Army of the Peninsula or Norfolk.

. . .

[F]rom

the accounts received nothing less than 20,000 or 30,000 men
will be sufficient, with the troops already in position,
successfully to oppose them."

[emphasis added]13

Lee knew

that such a number of troops represented the majority of
Johnston's force, and that for him "to organize a part of
your troops to hold your present line, and to prepare the
remainder to move to this city, to be thrown on the point
attacked," would be tantamount to exposing central Virginia
to the F e d e r a l s .14

Later correspondence indicated that he

had expected Johnston to object to such a proposition, which
may have accounted for his repeated emphasis that the plan
had been originated by Davis:

"The object of the President

is to prepare you for a movement which now appears impera
tive, as no troops are available but those of your army to
meet the enemy concentrating on the coast."

[emphasis

a d d e d ]15
Lee wrote to Johnston concerning a wholesale shift of
his army because Davis instructed him to do so.

But a

subsequent letter to Margurder clearly indicated that he did
not think it yet time to begin decisively concentrating the

l^Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, March 25, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 397.
14I bid.
ISlbid.
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Confederacy's forces.

That letter, dated March 26, revealed

that his own thinking ran along different lines.

He began

by observing that it was still impossible to tell whether
the Union Army intended to attack Norfolk or advance on
Richmond.

Thus, he concluded,

"until some conclusion can be

drawn as to his point of attack it would be manifestly
improper to accumulate at either the army to oppose h i m ."
[emphasis added]
But Johnston had no reason to suspect that Lee and
Davis did not completely agree on proper strategy.

Besides,

Lee's March 25 letter accorded perfectly with what Johnston
had understood to be Davis's original strategy for protect
ing Richmond:

utilizing interior lines to transfer troops

from one threatened point to another.
of Holmes's two brigades,

After the departure

the Department of Northern

Virginia deployed about 3 5,000 men between Fredericksburg
and the Rapidan.

Johnston,

in a response that seems to have

confounded Lee, quickly agreed to the premise of a massive
transfer of his divisions:

"If summoned to Richmond,

I

shall leave on this

frontier only such a force as

is now

employed on outpost

duty, for the mere purpose of

masking

the movement.

will enable me to take to Richmond at

This

least 25,000 men.

. . ."■'-7

^ R o b e r t E. Lee to John B. Magruder, March 26,
OR, p. 398.

1862, in

e. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, March 26, 1862,
(part 3):
pp. 400-401.

l^Joseph

in OR, XI
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The next day,

in support of his belief that a movement

away from his line could be successfully covered by a
screening force with little risk, Johnston forwarded to
Richmond an intelligence report from Ewell's Division.

The

letter contained several observations which indicated that
the Federal forces around Manassas had no intention of
advancing.

"Soldiers are in good spirits,

not expect another battle will be fought.

saying they do
. . .

They are

working very slowly at Bull Run Bridge, apparently for
effect.

No other repairs are going on.

. . .

[A]ll the

soldiers now at Manassas look to be removed to another
point."18
Much to Johnston's surprise,

a telegram arrived from

Lee on March 27, ordering him not to move his army to
Richmond as previously suggested,

but to detach and forward

10,000 men to the Confederate capital.19
no sense to Johnston:

The decision made

"the division of the troops of this

department made by the telegram of this afternoon leaves on
this line a force too weak to oppose an invasion, and
furnishes to the threatened point a re-enforcement too small
to command success."

But he obediently ordered 7,500 men

from the main body and a brigade of 2,500 from G. W. Smith's

18w. Stoddert to Joseph E. Johnston, March 26,
OR, XI (part 3):
p. 401.

1862, in

l^The telegram has not been preserved, but Johnston's
reponse is Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, March 27,
1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 405.
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district entrained for Richmond.

Johnston's only remon

strance against the order was a request that the authorities
in Richmond reconsider their original plan:

"I beg leave,

with all deference, to suggest to the President the expedi
ency of transferring to the point about to be attacked the
whole available force of this department."20
Again he forwarded intelligence reports that suggested
that the Federals had no offensive intentions in northern
Virginia or the Valley, beyond movements designed to
distract Confederate attention from the true point of
attack.

There was activity among the Yankees around

Manassas, but Johnston's pickets were quite skeptical about
any possibility of a Federal attack.

General Stuart

concluded from the reports of his cavalry outposts that
Major-General Edwin V. Sumner's II Corps "made a great to-do
crossing and recrossing Cedar Run, firing artillery at a few
vedettes,

and the like.

mere demonstration."21

. . .

I begin to think this is a

Jackson reported that, after his

abortive attack at Kernstown,

"the enemy are still at

Strasburg, and I see no indication of an

a d v a n c e .

"22

Lee responded on March 28 with two very confusing

20joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, March 27, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 405.
21j. E. B. Stuart to Joseph E. Johnston, March 27,
1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 406-407.
22'i1homas J. Jackson to Joseph E. Johnston, March 27,
1862, in OR, XII (part 3):
p. 840.
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The first indicated that when the dispatch

ordering Johnston to detach 10,000 troops had been sent,
Johnston's own letter agreeing to bring 25,000 had not yet
been received in Richmond.

The letter then placed upon

Johnston the responsibility of deciding how many troops to
send, but without giving him any indication of whether
northern or eastern Virginia was considered to be the most
threatened point.

"[I]t is inferred that you apprehend to

attack upon your line.

If this inference is correct, you

can commence the movement of your troops to this place."
Next, Lee informed Johnston that President Davis had been
responsible for reducing the number of troops to be trans
ferred from 25,000 to 10,000, because he desired "to have a
portion in position here to throw where required, while the
balance might follow if necessary.

..."

Reiterating that

it was still not possible to determine the ultimate objec
tive of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ended by leaving the
decision completely up to Johnston:

"You can therefore,

with this understanding of the case, proceed to forward the
desired re-enforcements in part or whole, as in your
judgment they can be spared from the defense of your
l i n e ."23
This letter left more questions unresolved than it
answered.

Having sent Holmes and his two brigades to North

23Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, March 28, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 408.
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Carolina, was it the intent of Davis and Lee to reestablish
a central reserve at Richmond and attempt to hold every
where?

If so, the idea seemed to contradict the earlier

precept of throwing the entire army against one Federal
advance.

Nor did Lee ever explain why it would not be

preferable to have a large force at Richmond, regardless of
whether McClellan planned to attack Yorktown or Norfolk.
"With this understanding of the case," Lee had said,
Johnston could use his discretion in deciding whether to
send 10,000 men or himself bring 25,000 to Richmond.

But

there was no such "understanding" to be derived from the
letter— it included no hint of just how high a priority
Johnston should assign to the Rappahannock line.
Lee's second letter could only have deepened Johnston's
confusion.

In it, Lee suggested that the greatest disaster

that could happen would be the loss of the upper Shenandoah
Valley, which he believed would follow if Johnston were
forced off his present line.

The decision as to whether to

detach 10,000 or march with 25,000 men was still to be
Johnston's, but now Lee had added an entirely new con
straint, protecting the rail line between Richmond and
Staunton.

"As a mode of expressing to you the limit which

it is intended to affix I will cite the remark of the
President,

that the loss of the Central road and communica

tion with the valley at Staunton would be more injurious
than the withdrawal from the Peninsula and the evacuation of
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"24

This sentence would have stood out in Johns

ton's view as distinctly as if it had been written in red
letters a foot high, because it represented yet another
reversal on the part of Jefferson Davis.

Just a month

prior, the President had informed Johnston and his cabinet
that he planned to withdraw up the Shenandoah Valley as far
as Staunton as an integral part of his strategy to subordi
nate the defense of Virginia to the defense of Richmond.
Now Johnston was being told that the loss of Norfolk--whicn
necessarily entailed the loss of the shipbuilding capacity
at the Navy Yard as well as the probable scuttling of the
Virginia— and a retreat up the Peninsula which would allow a
Federal advance within a dozen miles of Richmond— were both
preferable to the loss of his line on the Rappahannock.

It

almost seemed as if Lee intended to provide Johnston with
reasons not to move his army to Richmond.
In the wake of these letters, Johnston declined to send
any more of his brigades to Richmond without specific
orders; he was not willing to take the responsibility for
denuding a line suddenly declared critical by his commanding
g e n e r a l .

25

He possessed no estimates of the strength of the

enemy on the Peninsula, or, for that matter,

any information

concerning the numbers of M a g r u d e r 's army or the reliability

24Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, March 28, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 409.
25phillips, Correspondence, p. 593.
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of his defensive line.

Nor did he feel that such a decision

should be his to make— was the coordination of the several
armies defending Richmond not why Lee had returned to
Virginia?

He could only speculate about the reasons for the

hesitations and vacillations of his superiors,

and their

inconsistencies did not relieve him from the responsibility
to defend his own lines until directed elsewhere.
Thus, Johnston spent the next few days consolidating
his own defenses.

Jackson's abortive attack on a Federal

division at Kernstown on March 23 revealed the strength of
Major-General Nathaniel Banks' Union forces in the lower
Shenandoah.

Johnston ordered Jackson to avoid further

combat unless he could lure the enemy far enough south to
make rapid reinforcement from the main army and a surprise
attack with superior numbers feasible.26

Ewell's Division

and Stuart's Cavalry Brigade, the army's only units north of
the Rapidan River, had been left to picket as actively as
possible,

in order to avoid the Federals launching a

surprise attack of their own.

But it became daily more

evident that no Union advance from Manassas was contem
plated, and that the center of Johnston's line— four
divisions under Lonstreet, Hill, Early, and D. R. Jones— was
by far the most secure portion.
Accordingly,

Johnston delegated temporary command of

2^The letters from Johnston to Jackson are not in O R ,
but he briefed Davis on his orders in Joseph E. Johnston to
Jefferson Davis, March 26, 1862, in OR, XII (part 3):
p. 838.
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the main body to Longstreet and rode to G. W. Smith's
headquarters at Fredericksburg.

Smith's post was certainly

the most exposed in the Department of Northern Virginia.
Though his six brigades contained twice as many men as
Jackson's Division in the Valley, his location was suscepti
ble to an amphibious flanking movement from several angles.
Union transports could ascend the Rappahannock as far as
Fort Lowry;

and,

if McClellan gained access to York River,

he could place a sizeable force on Smith's supply line.
Combined with what was, at the time, the universally
admitted indefensibility of the city of Fredericksburg from
a frontal assault,
tion.

Smith's men were in a precarious situa

Making matters worse, no direct telegraph line

existed between Fredericksburg and Rapidan Station, which
meant that any emergency communication had to pass through
the hands of the telegraph operators in Richmond; those
operators did not work at night.27
Johnston seems to have arrived in Fredericksburg about
March 30, and remained there until April 5.^8

He and Smith

27joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 4, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 419-420.
28The last indication of Johnston's presence at Rapidan
is A. P. Mason to Jubal A. Early, March 30, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 3):
p. 412.
After that, the orders and correspond
ence indicate that Johnston had left Longstreet in command
there.
See J. E. B. Stuart to James Longstreet, April 2,
1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 4, 1862, in OR,
XI (part 3):
pp. 415-416, 420; Thomas J. Jackson to James
Longstreet,
April 3, 1862, Thomas J. Jackson to James
Longstreet,
April 5, 1862, Thomas J. Jackson to James
Longstreet,
April 5, 1862, in OR, XII (part 3):
pp. 842-
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certainly spent a good deal of time discussing their ideas
of the correct approach to Confederate strategy.

The army

commander conducted several reviews of the troops in order
to bolster morale.29

Yet the entire visit was pervaded by a

sense that Johnston was simply marking time, waiting for Lee
and Davis to decide how to use his army.
Curiously, between March 29 and April 2, Johnston
neither sent any communications to Richmond nor received any
from Lee.

None appear in the Official R e c o r d s , but that is

hardly conclusive evidence;

a great many of Johnston's

letters and telegrams do not appear, therein.

But both of

Johnston's letter and books and his telegraph register are
devoid of any messages to Richmond.
official
Johnston.

Likewise,

Lee's

letter book contains no missives directed to
Neither the files of the War Department nor those

of the Adjutant and Inspector-General reveal any attempt to
converse with the commander of the Department of Northern
Virginia.

The next communication between Lee and Johnston

appears to have been a telegram from Lee, dated April 3,

844; G. Moxley Sorrel to Jubal A. Early, April 3, 1862, G.
Moxley Sorrel to Jubal A. Early, April 3, 1862, G. Moxley
Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 3, 1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to D.
H. Hill, April 3, 1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to Jubal A. Early,
April 4, 1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 4,
1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 5,
1862, in O R ,
LI (part 2):
pp. 527-528; see also Dorsey Pender to Fanny
Pender, April 3, 1862, in Hassler, General to His L a d y , p.
131; Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 65.
29Dorsey Pender to Fanny Pender, April 3,
Hassler, General to His L a d y , p. 131.
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what explains these five days of silence, while

every hour saw more Federal transports disgorge troops onto
the docks at the tip of the Peninsula?
From Johnston's perspective, the answer is relatively
simple:

always economical with words, he often went days

without writing to Richmond if he had no new information.
Lee, confident that Johnston would report any signifi
cant developments,
the Peninsula.

concentrated his attention entirely on

McClellan's deliberate caution in refusing

to advance from Newport News until more than 50,000 troops
had been landed actually kept Lee from figuring out his
intent until early April.

On April 1, he wrote to Holmes in

North Carolina that "while making demonstrations

...

on

the Peninsula against General Magruder, his real object is
to attack Norfolk.

. . ."31

Until April 4, Lee's correspon

dence indicated that he still leaned toward believing
Norfolk to be McClellan's primary target.
and watched,

Unsure,

he waited

delaying the orders which would send a signifi

cant number of troops to reinforce

M a g r u d e r .

32

30The existence of this telegram is inferred from
Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 4, 1862, in O R ,
XI (part 3):
p. 419.
3lRobert E. Lee to Theophilus Holmes, April
OR, IX:
p. 455.

1, 1862, in

32walter H. Taylor to John B. Magruder, April 3, 1862,
Walter H. Taylor to John B. Magruder, April 3, 1862, T. A.
Washington to John B. Magruder, April 3, 1862, Robert E. Lee
to Joseph E. Johnston, April 4, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 418-419, 420; Robert E. Lee to Benjamin Huger, April 3,
1862, in OR, LI (part 2):
p. 528.
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He almost waited too long.

General McClellan himself

arrived at Fortress Monroe on April 2.

Five divisions of

the Army of the Potomac— about 58,000 me n — had preceded him.
On the morning of April 3, two columns of Federal troops
marched toward Yorktown.

Magruder only deployed about

10,000 Confederate soldiers to resist him, and immediately
withdrew his most exposed outposts, and retired into his
lines at Yorktown.33
It was a strong, but not impregnable,

position.

The

Peninsula narrowed there to a width of a little more than
six miles,
River.

two-thirds of which was blocked by the Warwick

The upper end of the river had been improved as an

obstacle by opening several dams and flooding several acres
of farmland.

Heavy cannon at Yorktown, and Gloucester Point

across the river, kept Federal gunboats at bay.

Yorktown

proper was enclosed in a large earthwork, designed more to
protect the batteries erected to blockade the York River
than to hold the town against a frontal assault.

Between

the fort and the flooded area were two partially completed
redoubts connected by a line of hastily dug rifle pits.
Outnumbered nearly six-to-one, with the trenches between the
redoubts and the fort still incomplete, and many of the gun
embrasures at Yorktown gaping empty, Magruder could not have
held the line for more than a day against a determined

33swinton, Campaigns, pp. 100-102; "Reports of Maj.Gen. John B. Magruder, C. S. Army, commanding at Yorktown,
&c.," April 5, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 403-404.
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attack.34
Fortunately, McClellan did not even probe his lines
until April 5.

By that time, Lee had satisfied himself as

to Federal intent and began rushing reinforcements to the
Peninsula.

Cadmus Wilcox's Alabama brigade, one of the two

sent to North Carolina with Holmes; and Raleigh Colston's
Virginia-North Carolina brigade from Norfolk were immediate
ly ordered to the Yorktown

l i n e .

35

Also, on April 3, Lee

telegraphed Johnston to send 10,000 more troops to R ich
mond .36
This order put Johnston back onto the horns of a
dilemma.

On April 2 and 3, the enemy division at Aquia had

begun demonstrating against G. W. Smith's outposts,
ably as a prelude to an assault on

F r e d e r i c k s b u r g .

37

conceiv
The

message from Lee neither confirmed nor abrogated Johnston's
previous grant of discretion with regard to detaching the
troops, and it did nothing to cancel the earlier injunction

34 "Reports of Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, C. S. Army
commanding at Yorktown, &c.," April 5, 1862, in OR, XI (part
1):
pp. 403-404; John B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, April
5, 1862, in Or, XI (part 3):
p. 422; see also OR A t l a s ,
plates XIV-XIX.
35a . G. Dickinson to B. S. Ewell, April 6, 1862, John
B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, April 7, 1862, A. G. Dickinson
to Cadmus Wilcox, April 7, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp.
424-425, 426-427.
36inferred from Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee,
April 4, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 419-420.
37joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 4,
in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 419-420.

1862,
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about the necessity of holding the Rappahannock.

Johnston

decided that his position needed clarification, and he
immediately wired Richmond with the latest reports of enemy
activity around Fredericksburg,
o r d e r s .

38

and requested definitive

In the meantime, he directed Longstreet to

prepare the divisions of Hill, Early, and D. R. Jones for
transfer to Richmond, but only authorized the Georgian to
load Early's Division on the trains without specific
o r d e r s .39
His orders to Longstreet,
promptly.

delivered by courier,

arrived

The telegram to Richmond did not; the office

there had been shut down for the evening.^0

Frustrated,

Johnston dispatched an aide with a letter for Lee on the
morning train to Richmond.

By this time, he also knew that

Jackson had reported the enemy advancing in the Valley,
had called on Longstreet for reinforcements.

and

The question

to which Johnston desperately needed an answer was this:
did the Rappahannock or the Peninsula now have priority in
the eyes of his superiors?

If communications with the

Shenandoah Valley were still the paramount consideration,
38i b i d .
39 q . Moxley Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 4, 1862, in O R ,
XI (part 3):
p. 420; G. Moxley Sorrel to Jubal A. Early,
April 4, 1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 4,
1862, G. Moxley Sorrel to D. H. Hill, April 5, 1862, in O R ,
LI (part 2):
pp. 527-528.
40joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 4, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 419-420.
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Johnston wanted Lee to know that the loss of 10,000 more
troops "will make us too weak to hold this line if pressed
in front and on the left flank at the same time."

Again

Johnston emphasized that this was a decision that needed to
be made in Richmond,

not northern Virginia:

"The President,

however, will always have the means of judging where those
troops are most needed. "4 3Lee's reply represented the first unequivocal order
that Johnston had received in weeks:

"The movement of the

troops from your line must immediately be made to this
place.

Enemy advancing in force from Old Point."42

transfer of troops was immediatly resumed,

The

and Johnston

telegraphed Lee on April 5 with confirmation and, very
likely,

a repeated suggestion that all of his troops, except

a screening force, be employed on the Peninsula.4 ^

Lee

responded by again asking Johnston whether he thought his
own line safe from attack,

apparently ignoring Johnston's

consistent concern over the relative priority of the defense
of northern and eastern Virginia.44

Johnston saw the

situation as one that required the Confederates to risk

41I b i d .
42Robe.rt E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, April 5, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 420.

April

4 ^Inferred from Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee,
6, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3): p. 423.

44Also inferred from Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E.
Lee, April 6, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 423.
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defeat in one area to assure a reasonable chance of victory
in the another.

"The invading army could not be defeated

without.the concentration of the Confederate forces; but
they were always more divided than the much more numerous
army of the enemy," he remarked years later in specific
reference to another campaign,

but the generalization

reflected his thinking on the defense of Richmond as
Lee,

w e l l .

45

it seemed to Johnston, was the m a n in position to

calculate the odds and weigh the risks; it was Lee who
should make the critical decision where to concentrate and
resist the Federals.
As diplomatically as he could, Johnston tried to prod
his friend to a decision.

He reported on April 6 that most

of Sumner's II Corps seemed to have been withdrawn from
Manassas, and that Banks was exerting no pressure on
Jackson.

He pointed out that the trains carried troops to

Richmond so slowly that there remained abundant time for Lee
to consider a full redeployment of his army.

He included a

gentle reminder that the responsibility for such a major
strategic decision had to come from Lee:

"I cannot here

compare the state of affairs in my front with those of
others, and cannot,

therefore, decide understandingly

whether troops are less needed here than elsewhere, which
seems to me to be the question.

He who directs military

4 5The statement was made in reference to the Vicksburg
campaign.
Johnston, N a rrative, p. 221.
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operations from information from every department c a n . " ^
McClellan probed the Yorktown line with two divisions
on April 5.

Magruder fired every gun he could train on the

advancing Yankees,

and paraded his outnumbered soldiers as

ostentatiously as possible, hoping to bluff the Union
commander into believing that he had far more than 11,000
men in his defenses.

His imposture succeeded more effect

ively than he could have dreamed; within two days, McClellan
had come to the conclusion that Yorktown was so "stongly
fortified, armed, and garrisoned, and connected with the
defenses of the Warwick by forts and entrenchments, the
ground in front of which was swept by the guns of Yorktown,"
that the Army of the Potomac would have to take it by siege
rather than assault.47
Magruder, of course, was not privy to his opponent's
decision, and expected hour by hour that McClellan would
punch through his thinly held line.

His correspondence with

Lee revealed nerves strained to the breaking point.

"I have

made my arrangements to fight with my small force," he
informed Lee on April 5, "but without the slightest hope of

46joseph e . Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 6, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 423.
^^McClellan erroneously believed that Johnston and his
army had already arrived in Yorktown by April 7; see George
B. McClellan to Edward M. Stanton, April 7, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 1):
pp. 11-12.
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success."48

He required a minimum of 10,000 more troops to

hold his line.

By the evening of April 6, after two days of

Federal probing, he reported gloomily that "they discovered
a weak point, where numbers must prevail.

. . .

ments come very slowly, and will probably be too

Re-enforce
l a t e . " 4 9

But as the succeeding days passed, McClellan showed no signs
of aggressive intent.

Howell Cobb's brigade from Norfolk

arrived, as did those of Jubal Early, Richard Griffith, and
Robert Rodes from the Department of Northern Virginia.
Newly promoted to Major-General, D. H. Hill appeared and
took over supervision of the Yorktown fortifications,
freeing Magruder to concentrate on the remainder of his
l i n e .

50

Magruder began to recover his composure; by April

8, his letters had ceased to predict calamity.

If he

received enough field guns to secure Mulberry Island on the
Warwick, Magruder informed Lee,
be successfully defended

"and if the Warwick line can

. . . McClellan is defeated, at

least until the iron-clad vessels of the enemy shall be in

48j0 hn B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, April 5, 1862,
O R , XI (part 3): p. 422.

in

49john B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, April 6, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 3): p. 425.
50john B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, April 6, 1862,
Henry Bryan to Cadmus Wilcox, April 7, 1862, John B.
Magruder to Gabriel Rains, April 8, 1862, Henry Bryan to
Lafayette M c L a w s , April 8, 1862, John B. Magruder to George
W. Randolph, April 11, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 425,
426-427, 432-433, 436.
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such numbers as to make forts u s e l e s s . " ^
But Magruder's days as an independent commander were
numbered.

Davis, Lee, and George Wythe Randolph— Benjamin's

replacement as Secretary of W a r — all agreed that the
concentration of Confederate forces on the Peninsula
required a more senior and perhaps less mercurial commander.
Lee directed Joseph Johnston on April 8 to report to
Richmond, bringing with him all the troops from the Depart
ment of Northern Virginia except for a force to mask the
m a n e u v e r .

52

Fourteen days had passed since the idea of

transferring Johnston's army to oppose McClellan had first
been proposed.

During this time, there had been no aggres

sive enemy movement of any consequence in northern Virginia,
while there had been a continuous Federal build-up on the
Peninsula.

Instead of decisively reinforcing Magruder to

withstand the Army of the Potomac, the Confederate high
command had preferred to augment him in driblets:
regiment here, a brigade there.

a

What saved the Confederates

was not Lee's "provisional reconcentration,"

for that came

far too late to be effective, but the timidity of the
Federal commander.

Had McClellan been able to nerve himself

for an attack even as late as April 7, he would probably
have crashed through the Yorktown line, captured or dis-

51john B. Magruder to Robert E. Lee, April 10,
OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 435-436.

1862, in

52walter H. Taylor to J. H. Claiborne, April 8, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 430; Johnston, Na r r a t i v e , p. 110.
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persed the Army of the Peninsula, and begun his march on
Richmond.
By the time he received the latest instructions from
Lee, Johnston had only two divisions left that could be
deployed to the capital,

those of Smith and Longstreet, plus

Stuart's Cavalry Brigade and Pendleton's Reserve Artillery.
Given discretion when called upon to send off earlier
detachments,

he had purposely withheld his most trusted

subordinates and their troops,

so that wherever he might be

eventually deployed he would have them at hand.
instructed each to move his unit to Richmond,
well as rail, in order to save

t i m e .

Now he

by foot as

53

Meanwhile, Johnston spent a day or two arranging the
forces which would maintain at least the crust of a defense
in northern Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley.

There was

no question of weakening Jackson's three brigades in the
Valley; although recruits and soldiers returning from their
reenlistment furloughs had raised his strength to about
8,500, his division was still not much more than a corps of
o b s e r v a t i o n .

54

The same applied to Ewell's Division—

composed of roughly 7,5 00 men in the three brigades— on the

53Johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 110; Longstreet, Manassas to
A p p o m a t t o x , p. 66.
54Tanner,

Stonewall in the V a l l e y , p.

152.
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middle

R a p p a h a n n o c k .

55

Brigadier-General Charles W. Field

remained at Fredericksburg with about 2,3 00 men when the
other five brigades of G. W. Smith's Division retired,
leaving only about 18,000 infantry between that city and the
Valley.56

it was obviously not a sufficient number of

troops to contest a full-scale invasion.
Yet Johnston did not plan for these three officers to
conduct an entirely passive defense.

What he had observed

of Federal movements in northern Virginia convinced him that
there was no coordinated plan of attack among the various
Union commanders.

Though,

in the aggregate, much stronger

than his own divisions, the Yankees often marched and
countermarched in such haphazard fashion that on more than
one occasion it might have been theoretically possible to
concentrate equal or possibly superior Confederate numbers
against a single Federal unit.57

Such a strategy was risky,

but if it worked it promised to confuse and delay any Union
advance much more effectively than could 18,000 infantry
waiting passively in their rifle pits,

strung out over more

55jubal A. Early, "Strength of Ewell's Division in the
Campaign of 1862— Field Returns," Southern Historical
Society P a p e r s , Vol. VIII (1880):
pp. 302-303.
56charles w. Field to Robert E. Lee, April 20, 1862, in
OR, XII (part 2):
p. 434.
57such had been the case when Johnston suggested that
while he was in Federicksburg, Longstreet might detach two
or more brigades to quickly reinforce Jackson for an attack.
See Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis, March 26, 1862,
in OR, XII (part 3):
p. 838; see also Johnston, Nar r a t i v e ,
p. 110.
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th an 200 miles.

Accordingly, Johnston instructed Jackson to retreat
toward Swift Run Gap if the Federals approached,

so that he

would then be close enough to Ewell's position to call on
that division for reinforcements and attack.

He ordered

Ewell to be ready to march to Jackson's assistance, and to
reconnoiter the roads leading from the Rapahannock to the
Shenandoah.

In the meantime, Johnston also authorized Ewell

to make any local attacks on isolated Union forces in his
own front that he thought might be successful.

Johnston

knew that this sort of defense required that his subordi
nates have the maximum amount of latitude to make their own
decisions without wasting the time to request permission for
every proposed movement.

"The question of attacking the

enemy in front of you is one which must be decided on the
ground," he told Ewell.

"It would be well to drive him

away; you would be freer to aid Jackson,
perhaps,

a diversion in his favor."

and it might make,

Again he emphasized

that each division commander was free to make his own
tactical decisions within the overall framework in which he
had left him to work:

in committing to an offensive move

"you have to consider relative forces, the enemy's position,
and the facilities for crossing the river.
favorable,

If these are

counted with our confidence in the superiority of

our troops--if you feel confident after considering these
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things, attack."58

Accurate intelligence was essential to

the success of an attack and would determine the ability to
retain central Virginia and the middle Shenandoah Valley, as
well as the survival of his two outnumbered divisions.

For

this reason, Johnston left more than half of his cavalry and
some of his finest outpost commanders in northern Virgin
ia. 59
Johnston had probably received his orders from Lee
sometime in the evening of April 8.

Organizing the transfer

of two divisions and the cavalry brigade, and arranging the
defense of Jackson, Ewell, and Field, took him about two
days.

He arrived in Richmond either late on April

11 or

^ T h o m a s j. Jackson to Richard S. Ewell, April 14,
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Richard S. Ewell, April 17,
1862, in OR, XII (part 3):
pp. 848, 852.
^ S t u a r t took with him to the Peninsula the 1st
Virginia Cavalry, the 4th Virginia Cavalry, and the Jeff.
Davis (Mississippi) Legion; the Hampton (South Carolina)
Legion cavalry accompanied G. W. Smith's Division.
Remain
ing in northern Virginia were the 7th Virginia Cavalry
(Colonel Turner Ashby) in the Valley, about 1,000 strong;
the 2nd Virginia Cavalry (Lieutenant-Colonel and then
Colonel Thomas T. Munford) and the 6th Virginia Cavalry
(Colonel Thomas S. Flournoy) with Ewell's Division, about
900 strong in total; and the 9th Virginia Cavalry (Lieuten
ant-Colonel and then Colonel W. H. F. Lee) with Field's
Brigade, probably about 400-500 strong.
Thus, Johnston left
approximately 2,300 cavalrymen in northern Virginia— or
about 1,000 more than he took with him to Yorktown.
See
Tanner, Stonewall in the V a l l e y , p. 152; Jubal A. Early,
"Strength of Ewell's Division in the Campaign of 1862--Field
Returns," Southern Historical Society Pa p e r s , Vol. VIII
(1880):
pp. 302-303; "Organization of the Army of Northern
Virginia, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, on the
Peninsula, about April 30, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3):
p.
484.
Charles W. Field to Robert E. Lee, April 20, 1862, in
OR, XII (part 1):
p. 434.
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early April

12.60

Davis, Randolph, and Lee brought him up

to date on McClellan's inactivity, and strength of Magruder
and Huger.

Magruder's newfound confidence in his ability to

hold his lines was stressed,

and Huger's pessimism concern

ing his defenses at Norfolk was discounted.

The ability of

the Virginia to keep the James River closed to Federal trans
ports was highlighted.

The President then informed Johnston

that his command would be extended over the Peninsula and
Norfolk, where a concerted attempt to resist or even defeat
the Army of the Potomac would be

m a d e .

61

Johnston may have been skeptical; none of the informa
tion possessed by his superiors had been gathered first
hand.

Davis had never been to the Peninsula.

Lee had helped

plan Magruder's second line of defenses at Williamsburg,

and

had been the one who suggested the flooding of the Warwick
River; but, he had not set foot on the Peninsula since the
summer of 1861.

Randolph had served as Magruder's Chief of

Artillery before his appointment to the War Office, but even
his observations would have been weeks out of date; he could
not have known,

for instance, how near to completion were

the dedoubts connecting Yorktown to the inundations at the

60johnston, Narrative, p. 110.
61-That the strength of Magruder's line and the capabil
ities of the Virginia were stressed is inferred from
previous statements by the principals on the ironclad's
potential (see preceding chapter) and their subsequent
positions at the meeting on April 14 (see following chap
ter); see also, Davis, Rise and F a l l , II:
p. 86.
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head of the Warwick.
from Richmond,

With Yorktown less than a day's travel

it seemed to Johnston somewhat risky to make

major strategic judgments without any officer more senior
than Magruder or Huger having personally examined the ground.
Davis concurred,

and proposed that since Longstreet's and

Smith's Divisions were still a day or two from the capital,
Johnston should use the time to conduct an inspection of his
expanded department before making any final decisions about
the placement of his troops;
The following morning,

Johnston quickly agreed.62
Johnston rode the Richmond and

York River Railroad to White House, and from there took one
of the contract steamers ferrying troops and supplies down
the river.

Brigadier-General Whiting, who had arrived in

Richmond that morning,

accompanied him, both as a close

friend and as an engineering officer.63

Probably about

midmorning, the two arrived on the dock at Yorktown
No.

2).

(see Map

The river at that point was only about a mile wide,

and Johnston could have seen the Confederate batteries on
Gloucester Point on the north shore through the mist.

The

Federal gunboats swarming just out of range at the river's
mouth must have seemed much closer.64
ft^I b i d .
63johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 111.
64por indications of just how close the Federal
were willing to approach the Yorktown fortifications
early April, see J. Missroon to George B. McClellan,
6, 1862, J. Missroon to L. M. Goldsborough, April 9,
in N O R , VII:
pp. 208, 209-210, 212-213.

gunboats
during
April
1862,
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The fortification around Yorktown consisted of an earth
work seven to ten feet high,

fifteen to twenty feet deep,

and fronted by a ditch that averaged ten feet deep.

In many

places, Magruder's engineers had followed the outlines of
General Cornwallis's 1781 ramparts, which resulted in a fort
that hugged the perimeter of the town.

The work had been

originally designed to protect the water batteries commanding
the river and hold the town against a siege, not to block
the Peninsula to an enemy marching west.

As a result, Johnston

and Whiting noted several peculiarities that diminished the
fortifications' ability to withstand McClellan's advance.
As many of the land batteries faced away from the Federals
as toward them.

Virtually all of the heaviest rifled cannon

had been emplaced to cover the river, and could not be brought
to bear on the Union army.

The walls of the fort that directly

confronted McClellan were actually the weakest:
five feet narrower than those in the rear.

three-to-

Few of the batter

ies or the traversing trenches back to the powder magazines
had overhead cover.

Most of the bombproof shelters that

should have kept the gun crews safe when McClellan's artillery
opened up were

u n f i n i s h e d .

65

These deficiencies Johnston and Whiting could see for

6 ^"Reports of John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief
Engineer Army of the Potomac, of operations during the
siege," in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 316, 317, 337; OR A t l a s ,
plates XIV, XV, XIX; D. H. Hill to George W. Randolph, April
13, 1862, D. H. Hill to George W. Randolph, April 15, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 439, 441-442.
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themselves.

It remained for D. H. Hill to present his command

er with more depressing news.

He pointed out that labor in

the protective works around the batteries proceeded so slowly
because his men did not have tents, and sleeping on the open
ground in a period of heavy rains had rendered many of them
too ill to work.

Besides, there were not enough sand bags

on hand to build up protective walls around the open embra
sures.

He had only sixty-five rounds per gun, and just

sixteen rounds each for his best rifled pieces.

With so

little ammunition he could neither respond to the harassment
of the gunboats nor prevent McClellan's men from digging
siege parallels.

liven if he had sufficient ammunition, Hill

told Johnston bitterly,
much.

it would not have improved matters

The rifled cannon produced at the Tredegar Iron Works

were so undependable that they were equally as likely to
explode and

kill their own crews as to harm the

enemy.

Standing upon the parapet of his works, Hill delivered the
coup de grace with a gesture toward the enemy lines.

About

800 yards in front of the wall lay a band of trees that
broke his gunners' line of sight, behind which the Yankees
could hide and constuct their own batteries.

He had known

about those

trees since he had been at Yorktown

in 1861, but

no axes had

ever come from Richmond to cut them

d o w n .

66

66j. Thomas Goode to George W. Randolph, April 12,
1862, D. H. Hill to George W. Randolph, April 13, 1862, D.
H. Hill to George W. Randolph, April 15, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 3):
pp. 438, 439, 441-442; Dew, Ironmaker, pp. 179-180.
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Johnston listened to most of Hill's information in
silence.

When the North Carolinian had completed his list

of the position's inadequacies, Johnston asked him how long
he felt he could hold his post after McClellan opened fire.
"About two days," Hill said.
Johnston looked surprised, and replied,

"I supposed

about two hours."67
What did Hill think should be done then?

D. H. Hill

was never slow to express his opinions, and it is certain
that he told Johnston exactly what he wrote to the Secretary
of War the following day.

"Would it not be better to let

our railroads in North Carolina be cut, our cities in South
Carolina and Georgia captured, and have the whole Southern
army thrown here and crush McClellan?"

The policy of shifting

brigades and divisions piecemeal from threatened point to
threatened point angered him:

"By attempting to hold so

many points we have been beaten in detail,
all that we have been trying to hold."

and are losing

While the Confederates

could not match the weight of Union ordnance,
dence in Southern e l a n .
trust to the bayonet.

Hill had confi

"We must fight on the field and

If we had 100,000 men here we could

march out of the trenches and capture McClellan,
had a swift-footed

h o r s e .

unless he

"68

6”7d . H. Hill to Joseph E. Johnston, May 25, 1885,

in R M H .

68 d . H. Hill to George W. Randolph, April 15, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 3):
pp. 441-442; see also D. H. Hill to Joseph
E. Johnston, May 25, 1885, in RMH.
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Much of what Hill said appealed to Johnston--he had
long been an advocate of concentrating a large Confederate
army even if doing so risked capture of the areas stripped
of troops.

Yet the question he had to ask himself was where

to employ it?

He did not yet know if there was a place,

anywhere along Magruder's line,

from which he might profita

bly take the offensive.
After instructing Hill to begin moving some of his
heavy guns from the water batteries to where they could bear
on the Union Army, Johnston left to examine the remainder of
the defenses.69

Four hundred yards of trenches,

covered by abatis,

fairly well

extended south from the front corner of

the Yorktown works.

While adequate as an extension of the

main work, this row of rifle pits suffered from two major
defects.

The row dead-ended in a swamp, rather than connecting

with the entrenchments around Magruder's secondary redoubts
between Yorktown and the Warwick River.

As a result,

infantry

stationed there could neither reinforce the positions to
their right nor be quickly withdrawn if threatened with
overwhelming numbers.
a drainage system;

The second deficiency was the lack of

soldiers standing guard or fighting from

those trenches would have to do so in water that varied from

69 d . h . Hill to George W. Randolph, April 15,
O R / XI (part 3):
pp. 441-442.

1862,
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ankle- to knee-deep.70
Carefully picking their way across the boggy ground
that separated those trenches from the lesser redoubts--an
open,

if swampy, expanse about 300 yards wide--Johnston and

Whiting arrived at the larger of the two subordinate fortifi
cations, Fort Magruder.

This redoubt had front walls as

high and thick as those at Yorktown,

and mounted three heavy

cannon which could fire toward the Union lines.
however,

Unfortunately,

it had been originally designed to confront an

enemy approaching from the south and not the east.

Thus,

as

the two generals stood within the fort, they could easily
see at least one hill within McClellan's lines from which
cannon could rain shells directly down into the gun empl a c e 
ments ."71
The second redoubt was about 300 yards farther south.
It was smaller and unnamed.

Its square shape provided adequate

protection for its gun crews, but the same Yankee-occupied
hill overlooked it as well as Fort Magruder.

The cannon in

this work were not long-range guns, but only smoothbore
field pieces.

They would be absolutely useless until faced

70"Reports of John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief
Engineer Army of the Potomac, of operations during the
siege," in OR,
XI (part 3): pp. 316, 317; OR A t l a s , plates
XIV, XV, XIX; Edward P.
Alexander, "Sketch of Longstreet's
Division, Yorktown and Williamsburg," Southern Historical
Society Pa p e r s , Vol. X (1882):
p. 36.
"Reports of John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief
Engineer Army of the Potomac, of operations during the
siege," in OR,
XI (part 3): pp. 316, 317;
K. T. Douglas to
Gabriel Rains,
April 8, 1862, in
OR, XI (part
3):
p. 432.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

230

with a direct assault by the Union infantry.72
The trenches that extended from Fort Magruder to the smaller
redoubt were extensive and somewhat better drained than
those immediately around Yorktown.

Their layout seemed

haphazard, almost as if they had been dug by troops inter
ested in protecting their own camps rather than laid out by
engineers seeking to establish effective lines of fire.

The

entire system spanned about 800 yards of the front, but did
not join the works at Yorktown on the left or the Warwick
defenses on the right.73
Only a broken line of rifle pits,

crowned with varying

heights of parapets and filled to varying depths with water,
connected the redoubts to Magruder's next defensive point at
Wynn's Mill.

This did not appear that dangerous from a

defensive point of view, because the two generals could see
that the area in front of these irregular entrenchments had
been flooded by closing the Warwick River dams.
less, the question remained:

Nonethe

how quickly could a brigade be

moved laterally from the redoubts across nearly 3,000 yards
of broken ground to support Wynn's Mill in case of an emer-

72ibid.
73"Reports of John G. Barnard, U. S. Army, Chief
Engineer Army of the Potomac, of operations during the
siege," in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 316, 317; OR A t l a s , plates
XIV, XV, XIX.
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g en cy ?7 4

At Wynn's Mill, Johnston met Brigadier-General Jubal
Early, who had assumed command of that part of the line a
few days ago.

After his own initial inspection of the York-

town-Warwick defenses, Early had predicted to Magruder that
the line "must be inevitably broken,

sooner or later, and in

that event our whole force gobbled up."

He preferred an

immediate retreat to the Chickahominy River.

Showing Johnston

and Whiting around his sector, which consisted of nothing
more than rifle pits and hastily dug-in field batteries,
Early attempted to press this idea on his commander.

But

Johnston had seen too much already, and had grown increasingly
taciturn:

"he did not seem disposed to discuss the matter,

and I desisted."75
It is questionable whether Johnston and Whiting travelled
any farther down the Warwick than Wynn's Mill.

It is also

not certain just when Magruder joined his new commander;
had not been informed of Johnston's visit in advance.

he

Magruder

did not attempt to hide or rationalize the deficiencies of
his line, for he had never claimed it to be anything more
than a hasty expedient occupied as a last resort.

Eventually,

thinking perhaps of Hill's plan to gather an army of 100,000
74 r . q . Lowe, "Magruder's Defense of the Peninsula,"
Confederate V e t e r a n , Vol. VIII, No. 3 (March 1900):
p. 105;
OR A t l a s , plates XIV, XV, XIX.
75jubal Early to Jefferson Davis, September 22, 1877,
in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, vol. VIII:
p . 3.
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men and seize McClellan, Johnston asked him just how an army
on this line could ever attack the Federals,

since Magruder

himself had flooded the only likely lines of approach to the
enemy's p o s i t i o n s ? ^
The question would have astounded Magruder, who had
never intended the line for anything other than a hasty
defense.

His suggestion to be reinforced by Johnston's army

to conduct an offensive had been made three weeks earlier on
March 21, at a time when McClellan's forces had not advanced
beyond Big Bethel.

Since being invested at Yorktown, he had

given up any idea of attacking the enemy.

Of 31,500 men,

once he subtracted the garrisons at Yorktown, Gloucester
Point, Williamsburg,

Jamestown Island, and Mulberry Island,

he was left with barely 23,000 soldiers to hold a line seven
teen miles long.

Far from planning to attack McClellan,

his

most recent strategic suggestion to Richmond had been to
rapidly evacuate Norfolk and the entire Peninsula except for
a small garrison at Yorktown, and to combine his and Huger's
armies with Johnston's for a counterinvasion across the
Potomac.

Nor did Magruder have any illusions about the

dangerous position of his army once McClellan managed to
open either the York or James Rivers; he lived with the
threat of a flotilla of gunboats and transports steaming up

^ I n f e r r e d from "Report of Joseph E. Johnston, C. S.
Army, commanding Department of Northern Virginia, of
operations from April 15, to May 19," in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 275.
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one or the other to land Federal divisions in his
Johnston had seen enough.

r e a r . 7 7

He had intended to tour

Magruder's second line of works at Williamsburg,

then cross

the James, examine the Virginia personally, and inspect the
harbor defenses of Norfolk.78

The information provided by

Magruder and Hill, combined with the evidence before his own
eyes, convinced him, however, that while Magruder had performed
a miracle of improvisation, no rational general would commit
an army to defend such a place.
there were at grave risk.

The 31,500 men already

A week later Johnston put on

paper what he must have been thinking on April 14:
but McClellan could have hesitated to attack.

"No one

The defensive

line is far better for him than for u s . "79
As he boarded the steamer for the return trip to Richmond,
Johnston realized that he faced an even larger problem at
the capital.

His superiors all believed that Yorktown was

defensible, and were resolved to send his entire army into a
cul de s a c .

How was he to convince them that such a course

represented sheer lunacy?

77john B. Magruder to George W. Randolph, April 4,
1862, John B. Magruder to George W. Randolph, April 11,
1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 422, 436.

II:

78j0 hnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 110; Davis, Rise and F a l 1 ,
p. 86.

79joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 22, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 455.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter Seven
Decision in Richmond (II)

A week before Joseph Johnston left Richmond on his
inspection tour of the Peninsula, Albert Sidney Johnston had
attempted to redeem his own reputation and Confederate
fortunes in the west with a surprise attack on Major-General
Ulysses S. Grant's army at Shiloh, Tennessee.
two months,

For nearly

since the surrender of Fort Donelson,

Johnston

had been retreating before the Federal gunboats that roamed
freely down the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers,

and

avoiding contact with the Yankee armies that followed in
their wake.

Nashville and Columbus had been evacuated.

Desperately,

Johnston and his new lieutenant, General P. G.

T. Beauregard,

struggled to assemble an army to resist the

Union offensive.

Slowly, they gathered together the

remnants of their demoralized garrisons,

to which were added

thousands of troops that Jefferson Davis stripped the
coastal fortifications to provide.

One brigade came at the

cost of uncovering New Orleans, another left Pensacola
defenseless,
coast.

a third thinned Southern lines on the Georgia

In early April,

Albert Sidney Johnston:

fate finally seemed to smile on
Grant's army had encamped without

entrenchments on the banks of the Tennessee River,

separated

by a long day's march from the nearest supporting column.
234
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"I hope you will be able to close with the enemy before
his two columns unite," Davis telegraphed his friend on
April 5.

"I anticipate victory."1

And Johnston,

after

several days of trying to forge a motley collection of
garrison troops and nearly untrained recruits into something
that resembled

an army, tried to inspire his men

he hoped would

be a prophetic line:

our horses in the Tennessee Ri v e r . "2

with what

"Tonight we will

water

On the morning of

April 6, 1862, he sent his divisions into what became the
largest and bloodiest battle yet fought on American soil.
The next message that Jefferson Davis received was a wire
from Beauregard on the evening of April 6:
attacked the enemy

"We this morning

. . . and after a severe battle of ten

hours, thanks be to the Almighty, gained a complete victo
ry."

Beauregard signed himself "General, Commanding,"

for

his telegram also included the news that "General A. S.
Johnston

. . .

fell gallantly leading his troops

thickest of the fight."3

But

into the

Beauregard's assurance of

^Jefferson Davis to Albert Sidney Johnston, April 5,
1862, in OR, X (part 2):
p. 394.
The best accounts of the
maneuvering and concentration prior to the battle are found
in Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee (Wilmington, NC:
Broadfoot, 1987, reprint of 1952 edition), pp. 99-121;
Thomas L. Connelly, Army of the Heartland, The Army of
Tennessee, 1861-1862
(Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State
University Press, 1967), pp. 126-157; James Lee McDonough,
Shiloh— In Hell Before Night (Knoxville, TN:
University of
Tennessee Press, 1977), pp. 3-26.
^Quoted, in McDonough, S h i l o h , p. 84.
3p. G. T. Beauregard to Jefferson Davis, April 6, 1862,
in OR,
(part 1):
p. 384.
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victory faded quickly.

Within a few days, having withdrawn

to Corinth, he claimed only a partial defeat of the Union
Army, admitting that "next day,

finding Buell's forces

arriving on the field to re-enforce Grant,
. . . "4

I withdrew.

Ominous rumors began to reach Richmond that

Beauregard himself had canceled the orders for one last
charge at dusk which might have completely annihilated
Grant's force.

By April 9, he was telling General Cooper

that he expected the enemy to attack him "with overwhelming
force," predicting the loss of "the Mississippi Valley and
probably our cause,"

if

he were not immediately

r e i n f o r c e d . ^

The argument that Beauregard made for receiving massive
reinforcements paralleled almost exactly the one which
Joseph Johnston would present on his return to Richmond.
Beauregard reasoned that "we could even afford to lose for a
while Charleston and Savannah for the purpose of defeating
Buell's army, which would not only insure us the valley of
the Mississippi,

but our

i n d e p e n d e n c e . "

6

Implicit in Beauregard's letter--at least from Davis's
point of vie w — was a criticism that the President remained
unwilling to make tough choices,

to take the chance of

losing in one region to secure victory in another.

Had they

4p. G. T. Beauregard to Samuel Jones, April 10,
in OR, X (part 2):
p. 407.
5p. G. T. Beauregard to Samuel Cooper, April
in OR, X (part 1):
p. 403.

10,

1862,

1862,

6 i b i d .
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been on better terms, Davis might have asked the Louisiana
general whether he realized that just to give him the chance
to defeat Grant,

the President had already risked Fort

Pulaski, New Orleans,

and Pensacola?

Granted, by April 14

Davis did not know for sure that those places would fall,
one after the other, during the next month, but he certainly
knew that such was a likely consequence of having fought,
let alone having failed to win, at Shiloh.

Henceforth, the

President would be a great deal more careful before he
authorized another massive redeployment of troops on the
basis of a general's confidence in victory.

Davis had

already bet once on the man he considered the Confederacy's
greatest general, and lost.
Joseph Johnston, of course,
the President's mind.

lacked this insight into

Having rushed back from the Peninsu

la, he confronted Davis the moment the President entered his
office.

He immediately launched into a criticism of

Magruder's dispositions,

concluding that "although they were

the most judicious that that officer could have adopted when
he devised them, they would not enable us to defeat McClel
lan.

. . ."7

The best that could be achieved was to delay

the Army of the Potomac for a few weeks.

Eventually though,

Johnston argued with uncharacteristic loquacity, McClellan's
heavier guns would dismount the Confederate cannon, and
"that being done, we could not prevent him from turning our

^Johnston, Nar r a t i v e , pp. 112-113.
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position, by transporting his army up the river and landing
in our rear, or by going on to Richmond and taking posses
sion there."®
Obviously,

said Johnston, an alternative plan must be

instituted, and on the trip back up the York River he had
devised one.

It was a combination of his own inclinations

with ideas borrowed both from Magruder and Hill, and he
proposed it with every certainty that it represented an
original and irrefutable strategic vision:
Instead of only delaying the Federal Army in
its approach, I proposed that it should be
encountered in front of Richmond by one quite as
numerous, formed by uniting there all the avail
able forces of the Confederacy in North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Geor g i a , with those at
Norfolk, on the Peninsula, and then near Richmond,
including Smith's and Longstreet's divisions,
which had arrived.
The great army thus formed,
surprising that of the United States by an attack
when it was expecting to besiege Richmond, would
be almost certain to win; and the enemy, defeated
a hundred miles from Fort Monroe, their place of
refuge, could scarcely escape destruction.
Such a
victory would decide not only the campaign, but
the w a r ! ! ! ] [emphasis added].9
It never occurred to Johnston that not only was his concept
not original, but the President had already tried it once in
another theater of the war.

The fact that Beauregard had

also suggested it during the past week probably only served
to make Davis even more cautious.
Yet Johnston had brought firsthand information from the

®I b i d ., p . 113.
9Ibid.
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Peninsula that could not be discounted.

If he was correct,

and McClellan's eventual penetration of Magruder's line was
a foregone conclusion,
to be considered.

then the implications of the fact had

Could Norfolk be held without Yorktown?

If both were lost, what would be the fate of the V i r ginia?
On what line could the Federal advance be resisted if the
Union Navy controlled the York and James Rivers?

Tactfully,

Davis told Johnston "that the question was so important that
he would hear it fully discussed before making his dec i 
sion," suggesting that the General return at 11:00 A. M. to
meet with him as well as Secretary Randolph and General
L e e . 10

Feeling himself somewhat outnumbered, Johnston asked

if he could invite Generals Smith and Longstreet to join the
conference.

Davis a g r e e d . H

It took Johnston most of the time before the meeting to
track down his two division commanders.

Longstreet,

he

probably found in his camps; Smith, he finally located at
the Spottswood Hotel only half an hour before the appointed
time.

There, his second-in-command had nearly collapsed

from the exertions of the previous few days and his chronic
nervous malady.

Smith told Johnston that he felt entirely

too ill to attend such an important conference.
Johnston was insistent,

But

and rapidly acquainted the K e n 

tuckian with the dangers inherent in allowing the remainder

10I b i d ., p. 114.
11-Davis, Rise and F a l l , II:

pp.

86-87.
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of the army to be deployed to Yorktown.
Johnston's arguments,

Convinced by

Smith said that he would attend.

An

inveterate writer of memoranda, the General rose from his
sickbed to put Johnston's position on paper.
The six men gathered first in the President's office,
but later adjourned for dinner and reconvened at Davis's
house,

a site selected because the continuation of the

meeting there was unlikely to be noticed or disturbed.13
Davis allowed Johnston, as the person whose concerns had
required the conference,

to speak first.

Johnston was

uncomfortable speaking in front of groups— even when he knew
everyone present,

he often had trouble finding the right

words— so he began by handing the President Smith's memoran
dum.^

The paper called attention to the deficiencies of

Magruder's defenses,

and proposed essentially the same plan

that Johnston had earlier given the President, except that
Smith's version specified that a concentrated army at
Richmond should also include Confederate troops from the
Shenandoah Valley.

This strategy formed the centerpiece of

l^This account is taken from a report of a conversation
that Smith had in 1863 with Johnston's older brother.
Beverly R. Johnston to Joseph E. Johnston, September 14,
1867, in R M H .
13johnston, Narrative, p. 115.
14johnson, J o h n s t o n , p. 313; Gustavus W. Smith,
Confederate War Papers; Fairfax Court House, New Orleans,
Seven Pines, Richmond and North Carolina (New York:
Atlantic, 1884), p. 41.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

241

the debate that followed.16
Both Smith and Longstreet had some preference for an
alternative which involved using the army thus formed for a
counterinvasion across the Potomac, but neither man actually
mentioned this option.16
their chief.
any line.

When they spoke, they supported

But neither man contributed very much along

Longstreet, due to his deafness, had a difficult

time following the conversation.
his mouth,

The first time he did open

to speculate on just how long McClellan might

delay the opening of his siege batteries, Davis cut him off
abruptly.
recalled,

"From the hasty interruption," the Georgian
"I concluded that my opinion had only been asked

through polite recognition of my presence,

not that it was

16Smith later claimed that his memorandum had called
for a counter invasion across the Potomac, and that this
option received considerable attention.
But the bulk of the
evidence points to this as being a postwar addition to the
record.
Not only did neither Johnston nor Davis, nor
Longstreet recall any such discussion, but in several
discussions with Beverly Johnston during the war, Smith
failed to mention any such plan.
As Beverly Johnston wrote
to Joseph in 1868:
"Nothing was said by him expressing or
hinting at any other idea as being proposed or suggested by
him.
I am perfectly confident that I could not have
forgotten so daring and eccentric a scheme as he says (in
the passage you quote) he presented to the council."
See
Smith, Confederate War P a p e r s , pp. 41-42; Davis, Rise and
F a l 1 , II:
p. 87; Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 66;
Johnston, N a rrative, p. 114; Beverly Johnston to Joseph E.
Johnston, September 14, 1867, Beverly Johnston to Joseph E.
Johnston, February 23, 1868, Beverly Johnston to Joseph E.
Johnston, February 23, 1868, in RMH.
16It is assumed here that Smith may well have favored
such an action but not actually have mentioned it.
Smith,
Confederate War P a p e r s , pp. 41-42; Longstreet, Manassas to
Appom a t t o x , p. 66.
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wanted, and said no

m o r e .

"17

G. W. Smith had been active in the hour immediately
after his memorandum had been read, speaking more to the
wisdom of a Confederate concentration than to conditions on
the Peninsula, which he had not seen.
eventually grew more spirited,

But as the discussion

Smith's stamina waned.

became pale and ceased speaking.

He

At length he felt so faint

that he had to ask Davis if he might lie down on a couch in
the adjoining room.

Within a few minutes, he fell asleep,

and did not rouse until the very end of the meeting, when
all the key decisions had already been

m a d e .

18

The lack of participation by his two subordinates left
Johnston, as he had feared, arguing his case alone.
Longstreet's silence, he could understand and forgive.

The

Georgian was never talkative at the best of times, and the
depression caused by the death of his family still hung over
him.

Besides, Johnston had never really included him among

the circle of his intimates with whom he discussed strategy
and politics.l^

As far as military opinions went, Johnston

l^Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 66; Davis,
Rise and F a l l , II: p. 87.
l^Beverly Johnston to Joseph E. Johnston, September 14,
1867, Joseph E. Johnston to [Gustavus W. Smith], January 6,
1868, Beverly
Johnston to Joseph E. Johnston, February 23,
1868, Beverly Johnston to Joseph
E. Johnston, February 23,
1868, in R M H ;Joseph E. Johnston
to Gustavus W. Smith,
January 21, 1868, in JJWM.
l^Longstreet himself admitted that "It was the first
time that I had been called to such august presence, to
deliberate on momentous matters. . . ."; see Longstreet,
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would probably have preferred to bring Whiting to the
meeting,

both because he had also seen Magruder's line and

was one of the army's most respected military engineers.
But Johnston knew that Whiting was still persona non grata
with the President for his refusal to accept command of a
brigade of Mississippians in December.20
assessment was correct:

Longstreet's

he had been brought to the meeting

more because the solidity of his physical presence would
even the odds than due to any intellectual contribution he
was expected to make.
On the other hand, Smith's withdrawal angered Johnston.
The Kentuckian had secured his commission on the strength of
Johnston's recommendation,

and had always been privy to the

most secret counsels of the army.
Van Dorn and Beauregard,
confidante.

Now,

After the transfers of

Smith became Johnston's primary

"on the most important occasion of the

kind in my life," Johnston had almost been forced to beg his
second-in-command to attend.21

in his urgency, Johnston

perhaps underestimated the extent of his subordinate's
illness,

and interpreted Smith's later silence as reticence,

his departure from the room as desertion.

Rumors floating

around the upper levels of the army during the next week

Manassas to Appomattox, p. 66.
20see the references to that feud in Chapter Four.
21joseph E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith, January 21,
1868, in JJWM.
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confirmed just how upset Johnston had been:

it was reputed

that he told Whiting not long after the meeting adjourned
that if Smith had not fallen asleep, the army would never
have been sent to

Y o r k t o w n . ^ 2

For his part, Jefferson Davis did not take an active
role in the discussion either.

He had convened the group to

explore the consequences of Johnston's revelations about
Confederate weakness on the Peninsula.

While immediate

reaction to Johnston's strategy was negative, he wanted to
consider the General's arguments thoroughly.

He respected

Johnston's opinions even when he did not agree with them,
and if he had to decide against the General he wanted
Johnston to believe that his ideas had received a fair
hearing.

Circumstantial evidence suggests, however,

that

Davis did not come to the meeting with his mind already made
up.

Johnston's proposal did not differ in theory from the

strategy that the President himself had initiated prior to
Shiloh; he remained willing to risk territory if he could be
convinced that the potential gains were commensurate with
the probable losses.

He saw his proper part as the ultimate

22johnston denied the rumor after the war, but in
language that was singularly unconvincing:
"You say that I
told G e n l . Whiting that if you had not gone to sleep the
army would not have been sent to that position (of Yorkt o w n ).
I cannot pretend to remember what I may have said in
casual conversation at that time.
But such an opinion seems
to me now so unreasonable that I cannot imagine that it was
ever entertained by me.
I hope, therefore--indeed think
that Genl. Whiting must have misunderstood me."
See Joseph
E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith, January 21, 1868, in JJWM.
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decision-maker, not as an active

p a r t i c i p a n t .

23

This left the debate to Johnston, Randolph, and Lee.
Randolph,

like Longstreet,

came to the conference still

relatively new to such critical policy deliberations.
gaunt,

The

forty-four-year-old Virginian, however, had a

personal assurance that Longstreet lacked.

In a society

where family ties assisted access to power and augmented
personal credibility, Randolph's pedigree was as good,
not better,

than that of anyone else in the room.

if

Johnston

and Lee might be descended from Revolutionary War heroes and
Virginia politicians, but the Secretary of War was the
grandson of Thomas Jefferson.

Though participation in such

a meeting was still a novelty,

unlike Longstreet, Randolph

never doubted his right to be there.24
The Secretary of War brought with him three particular
pieces of personal expertise that had bearing on the
questions at hand.

He was the only man in the room with any

significant naval experience, having served six years at sea
before his nineteenth birthday, and an additional two in
land assignments before ill health forced him to resign his

23johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 115.
24Rembert Patrick suggested that Randolph's appointment
owed more to his family name than any personal stature.
But
Thomas Bragg was clearly impressed by the new secretary.
See Patrick, Jefferson Davis and his C a b i n e t , p. 122; J. B.
Jones, Rebel War Clerk's D i a r y , I:
p. 117; H. J. Eckenrode,
The Randolphs, the Story of a Virginia Family (New York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1946), pp. 257-258; entry of March 24, 1862,
Bragg diary, p. 192.
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midshipman's commission.

He qualified,

in general, as an

artillery expert, having raised the Richmond Howitzers,
in specific,

and,

as being knowledgeable about Magruder's guns,

having been the Chief of Artillery for the Army of the
Peninsula until mid-February.

Finally, along with Lee, he

was thoroughly acquainted with the disorganization of the
army caused by the Bounty and Furlough Act, and the tricky,
behind-the-scenes negotiations underway to write the
Confederacy's first conscription a ct.25
Naturally reserved in his demeanor, Randolph,

like

Smith, also suffered from a chronic illness— in his case
pulmonary tuberculosis.

The disease had necessitated his

resignation from field service, and active debate would have
tired him almost as quickly as it did the Kentuckian.
would have measured his responses,

He

conserved his energy,

and

attempted to contribute to the conversation as dispassion
ately as possible.26
Thus, the meeting included three men--Longstreet,
Smith, and Davis— who said very little for differing
reasons; and Randolph, who participated,

but did so in a

2 5Though both Patrick and Freeman gave Randolph
negligible credit for the passage of the conscription act,
historian Archer Jones has presented a very convincing case
that Randolph was instrumental in its adoption.
See
Patrick, Jefferson Davis and his C a b i n e t , p. 124; Freemen,
R. E. L e e , II:
pp. 28-29; Archer Jones, Confederate
Strategy from Shiloh to Vicksburg (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 1961), pp. 42-49; Sifakis,
Who was W h o , pp. 530-531.
26sifakis, Who was W h o , pp. 530-531.
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restrained and intellectual manner,

leaving the brunt of the

disagreement between Joseph Johnston and Robert E. Lee.

G.

W. Smith remembered that the debate became, even before he
left,

"very heated."27

yet Johnston and Lee were not only

old friends since their cadet days at West Point, but men of
great emotional restraint,

at least in public display.

What

explains a meeting at which, with the fate of their country
at stake,

tempers flared, and neither man was willing to

budge an inch from his position?
First,

it must be understood that their relationship of

nearly forty years contained as many elements of rivalry as
camaraderie.

Tension and competitiveness had existed

between the Johnstons and the Lees since their fathers' day.
Peter Johnston and Henry Lee had fought together in the
Revolution, but in the decades after their paths had
diverged.

Johnston became a Republican, Lee a Federalist;

in the General Assembly they argued opposing views on the
Alien and Sedition Acts.

Both men were politically success-

ful--Peter Johnston becoming a circuit court judge, Henry
Lee attaining the governor's chair.

But their two families

represented one of the basic political divisions within
Virginia.
elite,

The Lees came from the old Tidewater tobacco

connected by blood and marriage to the Byrds,

Randolphs,

and Carters.

The Johnstons hailed from the

rougher southwestern portion of the state, and their ties

27smith, Confederate War Papers, p. 42.
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were to a newer, more widespread breed of Southern aristo
crats:

not only the Floyds of Abingdon, but the Breckin-

ridges of Kentucky and the Prestons of South Carolina, as
well.

In the middle decades of the Nineteenth Century, the

political and financial fortunes of families like the
Johnstons were on the rise, those of the Arlington-Tidewater
clans to which the Lees belonged in

d e c l i n e .

28

When Joseph Johnston first met Robert E. Lee at the
United States Military Academy, the two did not become
instant best friends.

Academic attrition among the other

Virginians in their class, however,
together.

slowly brought them

Their personalities seemed agreeably m a t c h e d . ^ 9

Both were serious about their studies, although Johnston
concerned himself, perhaps, a fraction less with his grades
to the exclusion of all else than did Lee.
slipped off to go ice-skating,

He occasionally

infrequently visited the

infamous Benny Havens tavern, and was rumored to have
embroiled himself in at least one fist-fight over the charms

2 8Lewis Preston Summers, History of Southwest Virginia,
1746-1786, Washington County, 1777-1870 (Richmond:
J. L.
Hill, 1903), pp. 768-769; Edgar Erskine Hume, Peter Johns
ton, Junior, Virginia Soldier and Jurist (Charlottesville,
VA:
Historical Publishing Co., 1935), pp. 7-10; Armistead
Churchill Gordon, "Peter Johnston," Dictionary of American
Biography (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955 e d i 
tion), V:
pp. 147-148; Connelly and Jones, Politics of
C o m m a n d , pp. 54-60.
29Freeman, R. E. L e e , I:

p. 74.
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of a barmaid.30
Yet the seeds of a life-long friendship were certainly
sown.

It was Lee who comforted Johnston when he received

the news that his mother had died.

Years later, Johnston

recalled Cadet Lee as "full of sympathy and kindness, genial
and fond of gay conversation,

and even of fun, that made him

the most agreeable of companions.

. . ."31

years after receiving their commissions,

in the first few

the young lieuten

ants were often stationed together, and their friendship
deepened.

It was Lee, again, who laughed at Johnston's

romantic escapades, and it was also Lee who crossed a
battlefield in Mexico to bring personally to Johnston the
news that his nephew Preston had been killed.

For the rest

of his life, Joseph Johnston always remembered that when his
friend broke the news, Lee had tears in his

e y e s .

32

They were both young officers on the rise in an
essentially peacetime army where promotion was so slow that
it sometimes involved waiting for a senior officer to die of
old age so that everyone below could step up.

In the race

for advancement, a basic difference emerged between the

3 0James A. Bethune to Robert Morton Hughes, February
25, 1910, George B. Johnston to Robert Morton Hughes,
December 12, 1912, Robert Morton Hughes to Gamaliel Brad
ford, December 16, 1912, in R M H ; Fleming, "Jefferson Davis
at West Point," p. 266.
3lQuoted in Govan and Livingood, A Different V a l o r , p.
14.
32QUOted in Ibid., p. 20.
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personalities of the two Virginians.

Lee had aspirations to

higher rank, but overt ambition drove Johnston almost
relentlessly.

He resigned from the army in 1837, he told

his brother Beverly,

"principally because,

from the rules of

our Service, of promotion by regiments, many of my juniors
who had the luck to be assigned to regiments in which
promotion was less slow than in that to which I belonged had
got before me.

. . ."33

Johnston accepted a new commission

when the Corps of Topographical Engineers was formed,
promising better chances for promotion, only after being
assured that his break in service would not be counted
against his seniority.34
Johnston never saw rising in rank as anything but a

33joseph E. Johnston to Beverly Johnston, June 13,
1837, in JJWM; his regiment, the 4th Artillery, had been
nicknamed the "Immortal Fourth," by junior officers waiting
for their superannuated superiors to die.
See Edward M.
Coffman, The Old Army, A Portrait of the American Army in
Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New York:
Oxford University Press,
1985), p. 49.
34Govan and Livingood assert that "although gratified
by his promotion to first lieutenant in July 1836, Johnston
felt that with the end of the war he should resign. . . .
In September, though, hostilities again broke out in Flori
da, and he immediately volunteered his services."
But
Johnston's correspondence and discussions with his brothers,
Edward and Beverly, made it clear that the issue was promo
tion.
It is also no coincidence that Johnston resigned in
the midst of the three years prior to the Civil War that saw
more resignations due to frustration over promotion than at
any other time, and that, like may others, he could only be
tempted back by the formation of the Corps of Topographical
Engineers and a guarantee that he would not lose his previ
ous seniority.
Govan and Livingood, Different V a l o r , p. 16;
Joseph E. Johnston to Beverly Johnston, June 13, 1837, in
JJWM; Edward Johnston to John Warfield Johnston, January 2,
1848, in R M H ; Coffman, Old A r m y , pp. 52, 56.
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contest,

for there were too many junior officers and too few

senior positions.

A series of letters he wrote to his

nephew while Preston was a Cadet are particularly revealing
of this facet of Johnston's personality.

"Determine to beat

your competitors & you will never fail to do it," he
admonished the younger man.

"Endeavor

. . . to be foremost

remember that such efforts are never thrown away; for
t h o ' your competitor should be before you, the benefits of
your very exertions in the contest will be felt thro'
l

i

f

e

.

At another point,

he advised Preston to avoid some

of the mistakes he had made:

"in selecting your regt. or

corps you must consider which is worth m o s t — agreeable
present position,

in a staff corps, or better promotion in

the infantry, rifles, or arty.
r i f l e s .

"36

Promotion,

I am inclined to the

Joseph Johnston admitted to his

brother Edward in 1851, was "a thing I desire more than any
man in the a rmy."3 7
He pursued it with a vengeance.

Johnston assiduously

cultivated the good opinion of any senior officer who might
help him advance his cause,

from Brigadier-General William

35joseph E. Johnston to J. Preston Johnston, August 31,
1839; the original is in JJWM; a slightly edited version
appears in Robert Morton Hughes, "Some Letters from the
Papers of General Joseph E. Johnston," William and Mary
Q u a r t e r l y , 2nd Series, Vol. XI, No. 4 (October 1931):
p. 320.

1843,

36joseph E. Johnston to J. Preston Johnston, May 25,
in JJWM.

1851,

37joseph E. Johnston to Edward Johnston,
in JJWM.

January 6,
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J. Worth to Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott.

In the

Mexican War, Johnston accepted the lieutenant-colonelcy of a
temporary regiment in the hopes that his two-rank promotion
might eventually become permanent.38

His rank expired with

the regiment, but Johnston carried on an eight-year fight
with the War Department and three successive Secretaries of
War to gain legal recognition for a brevet promotion based
on his temporary

r a n k .

39

Twice he applied directly for

commissions in newly forming regiments, and in 1860 Johnston
transferred from the cavalry to staff duty to receive a
promotion to brigadier-general as Quartermaster-General of
the A r m y .^ 0
"No other officer of the United States Army of equal
rank, that of brigadier-general,

relinquished his position

38joseph E. Johnston to J. Preston Johnston, November
27, 1842, in JJWM; Govan and Livingood, Different V a l o r , pp.
16-25; K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846-1848 (New York:
Macmillan, 1974), p. 276.
39joseph E. Johnston to Edward Johnston, January 6,
1851, undated opinions of Secretary of War John B. Floyd and
Adjutant General Samuel Cooper, in JJWM; Samuel Cooper to
Jefferson Davis, July 13, 1855, endorsement of Joseph E.
Johnston to Jefferson Davis, July 11, 1855, in S W-MS, M-567,
Reel 581; abstracted in Haskell Monroe Jr., James T.
McIntosh, Linda Lasswell Crist, et a l ., ed., The Papers of
Jefferson Davis (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State Univer
sity Press, 1985), V:
pp. 440-441.
40The first time was in January, 1851, when there was a
rumor that two new regiments would soon be formed.
That did
not happen, but four new regiments were created in March,
1855.
See Joseph E. Johnston to Edward Johnston, January 6,
1851, in JJWM; Joseph E. Johnston to Samuel Cooper, February
24, 1855, in the Joseph E. Johnston papers, Duke University,
Durham, North Carolina.
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in it to join the Southern Confederacy," he proclaimed in
his Nar r a t i v e .41

This distinction was important to Joseph

Johnston because his two major rivals for advancement
throughout his career had been Robert E. Lee and Albert
Sidney Johnston.

Lee had placed ahead of Johnston at West

Point, outranked him as a captain on entering Mexico, and
had been placed by then-Secretary of War Jefferson Davis one
notch above him in the corps of cavalry when it was organ
ized in 1855.

The other Johnston had been a colonel of

volunteers in Mexico when Joseph was a temporary lieutenantcolo n e l , had also ranked above him in the cavalry, and had
received a brevet promotion to Brigadier-General in 1858 for
commanding the Utah Exped i t i o n .42
Thus the matter of relative seniority between the three
was a critical issue to Johnston, explaining his angry
reaction to Jefferson Davis's decision to rank him behind
the other two among the generals of the Confederate Army.
Now, still unconvinced of the legality of that ranking,
Johnston found himself once again in a position where Lee
was his superior.

Friends or not, Johnston may have

resented Lee's seniority.
For the most part, Lee had always managed to be
detached and philosophical about Johnston's passion for

41johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 10.
42/Qfred P. James, "Joseph E. Johnston, Storm Center of
the Confederacy," Mississippi Valley Historical Re v i e w , Vol.
XIV, No. 3 (December 1927):
p. 345.
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advancement— but he could afford to be, since he had almost
always remained just one step ahead of his friend until
Johnston's appointment as Quartermaster General.

His 1846

comment on Johnston's maneuvering to gain a staff post is
typical of Lee's attitude about the issue:

"Joe Johnston is

playing A [ d ] j [u t a n t ]t Gen'l in Florida to his heart's
content.

His plan is good, he is working for promotion.

hope he will

succeed."43

I

But in 1860, when Johnston, not

Lee, received the promotion from lieutenant-colonel to
brigadier-general, Lee did not manage to remain quite so
detached.

He did write his old friend a letter of hearty

congratulations,

opening with "My dear General:

I am

delighted at accosting you by your present title, and feel
my heart exult within me at your high position."44

Three

months earlier, however, his heart had not exulted so
strenuously when he wrote his son Custis of Johnston that
"in proportion to his services he has been advanced beyond
anyone in the army and has thrown more discredit than ever
on the system of favoritism and making brevets."45
Even though both Virginia and the Confederacy had

^ R o b e r t E. Lee to John Mackay, February 3 , 1846,
quoted in Freeman, R. E. L e e , I:
p. 411.
44Robert
E. Lee to
in JJWM; also
quoted in
V a l o r , pp. 24-25.

Joseph E. Johnston, July 30, 1860,
Govan and Livingood, Different

^Robert
e . Lee to
G. W.C. Lee, April 16, 1860, quoted
in J. William
Jones, Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee,
Soldier and Man (New York:
Neale, 1906), p. 114.
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promoted him atop Johnston again, from Lee's perspective his
old friend had, so far, enjoyed a much better war.
point,

To this

the war for Lee had been primarily a desk job; his

only true field service in western Virginia had brought him
nothing but public criticism and personal frustration.
Johnston shared the laurels for winning at Manassas,

and had

spent the intervening months in command of the South's
largest and best equipped field army.

Lee's own military

secretary, Armistead Long, admitted years later that "at
this time General J. E. Johnston bore the highest reputation
in the Confederacy,

since by his manoeuvring

[sic] with

Patterson in the Valley, his splendid success at Manassas,
and his masterly retreat from Centreville he had acquired a
world-wide renown."^®

Though outranking his friend and

invested with the position of commanding general, Lee saw
Johnston as having the two things that he desired in war:
reputation and a field command.
These were the tensions, submerged behind the masks of
friendship and professional courtesy, that existed between
the two Virginia generals on April

14, 1862.

Each man would

have denied that his objectivity or his decisions could be
swayed by such personal resentments,

and each undoubtedly

would have thought he was telling the truth.

But each man

also eventually discovered that the stress of conducting a

46 a . L. Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee
M. Stoddart & Co., 1886), p. 151.

(New York:
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war at long odds could produce extreme emotional responses
in him, decades of professional soldiering,

notwithstanding.

The chances of judgment being affected were increased when
those tensions underlay profound intellectual disagreements.
Four questions dominated the dispute, and a fifth
critical one never seems to have been asked by anyone at the
meeting.
Peninsula?

Could Norfolk be held if McClellan gained the
How long could the Yorktown-Warwick line be

maintained against the Federals?

Did the loss of that line

necessarily equate with the loss of the entire Peninsula and
a retreat to the environs of Richmond?

Was the concentra

tion of troops from Georgia and the Carolinas which Johnston
proposed desirable or even possible?

The unasked question

was whether or not there was any possible compromise between
the strategic
"I don't

stances of Johnston and Lee?
think there was any difference of

opinion as

to the necessity of evacuating Norfolk if the Peninsula was
evacuated," Randolph testified before a Congressional
committee ten months later.47

Even with the Virginia

blocking direct approaches to the
had to do was

harbor, all that McClellan

march far enough up the Peninsula

to reach a

point on the James River at which the channels were too
shallow for the ironclad to operate effectively.

A pontoon

bridge thrown across the river would then allow him to land
^ T e s t i m o n y of George W. Randolph, February 5, 1863,
"Investigation of the Navy Department," NOR Series 2 (part
4):
p. 716.
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on Huger's supply,

link up with Burnside's force in North

Carolina, and completely isolate the Norfolk garrison.48
Retaining Norfolk--or more precisely the Gosport Naval
Yard— was a key strategic question for the Confederates.
Randolph, representing the interests of the navy, pointed
out that its capture would entail the loss of "our best if
not our only opportunity to construct in any short time
gunboats for coastwise and harbor defense."49
overestimate the importance of the facility.

ue did not
Nearly 1,200

heavy guns had been seized there in the first days of the
war, providing the scaffolding upon which most of the
Confederacy's coastal defenses had been erected;
hundred still remained, protecting the harbor.50

several
Removing

them quickly would be no more practical than saving Whi t 
ing's cannon on the Potomac had been.
But even irreplaceable heavy ordnance was secondary to
the significance of the Gosport Navy Yard.

Even though the

last Union garrison had attempted to burn it to the water's
edge, the shipyard was the best facility of its kind
available to the South.

The conversion of the Merrimac into

48I bi d ., pp. 716-717; Robert E. Lee to Stephen Mallory,
April 8, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 429-430.
4^Davis, Rise and F a l l , II:

p. 87.

50Wii liam H. Parker, Recollections of a Naval Officer,
1841-1865 (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883), p.
247; "Report of the armament of batteries around Norfolk,
October 29, 1861," in N O R , VI:
pp. 740-741; Stephen Mallory
to Jefferson Davis, July 18, 1861, in N O R , Series 2 II:
p.
77.
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the Virginia had been its most heralded project so far, but
not its only one.

Workers had begun construction in March

on the Richmond, a second ironclad designed along the same
lines as her predecessor.51

The presence of two such

vessels in Hampton Roads would secure the mouth of the James
River beyond any doubt.

During 1861, the navy yard had also

partly armored the converted merchant steamer Patrick Henry
which, with her ten guns, was the second most powerful
Confederate warship operating in the James River.52

Two

scuttled sailing sloops of war, the Plymouth and the
Germantown, had been raised and converted into floating
batteries, each mounting twenty-two heavy
but agile wooden gunboats,

g u n s .

53

Two small

christened the Hampton and the

Nansemond, had been completed in the first months of 1862;
two more were under construction, and Naval Secretary
Mallory envisioned a fleet of the pesky little vessels with
which to harass Federal

b l o c k a d e r s .

54

Not only the ships

currently under construction would be lost if Norfolk fell,
but the capability to produce many more would also be
sacrificed.
Johnston, who had cut his inspection trip short before

51"Statistical Data of Confederate Ships," in N O R ,
Series II (part 2);
p. 265.
52i b i d ., p. 262.
53i b i d ., pp. 254,

263.

54i b i d ., pp. 255,

261.
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visiting Norfolk,

found himself hard-pressed to refute any

of these arguments.

Had he travelled to the port, an

interview with General Huger would have provided him with a
counterargument.
be disputed,

Norfolk's strategic importance could not

but McClellan's army on the Peninsula hardly

represented the only threat to its safety.

In mid-February

the "mosquito fleet" of gunboats protecting Elizabeth City,
North Carolina, had been destroyed by the Federal vessels
attached to Burnside's expedition.

Elizabeth City guarded

the southern entrance to the Dismal Swamp Canal, a waterway
which could be traversed by light-draft gunboats all the way
to Suffolk.

Although the Union troops had then turned their

attention farther south to New Berne, the right flank to
Huger's position lay wide open.

Only a thin screen of

wretchedly armed Confederates stood between Burnside and the
one railroad connecting Norfolk to the rest of Virginia.
Even if the Peninsula could be held indefinitely, Johnston
could have argued, that alone would not guarantee the long
term safety of Norfolk.55

But he did not know that, and so

Randolph's point stood unassailed.
But Johnston scored heavily in return on the question
of Yorktown's ultimate defensibility.

He admitted that,

although Magruder's line could not stand a heavy bombard-

m . Goldsborough to Gideon Welles, February 10,
1862, in N O R , VI:
pp. 604-605; OR A t l a s , plates CXXXVII,
CXXXVIII; Benjamin Huger to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 474.
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ment,

it could probably hold out against a frontal assault

by McClellan's army, even if his 31,500 men received no
further

r e i n f o r c e m e n t s

.56

However, he maintained that the

cautious Federal commander would never order such an attack;
if he had ever had such an inclination, McClellan would have
tried to force the line weeks ago when Magruder could field
fewer than 10,000 soldiers to oppose him.

Johnston probably

used words very similar to those which he wrote to Lee two
weeks later:

"It is plain that General McClellan will

adhere to the system adopted by him last summer, and depend
for success upon artillery and engineering.

We can compete

with him in neither."57
The argument made sense to everyone.

Randolph recalled

that there was unanimity of opinion "that if the enemy
assaulted our army at the Warwick River line we should
defeat them.

..."

Johnston also successfully convinced

them— possibly with Randolph's help— that if "they made
regular approaches

. . . and took advantage of their great

superiority of heavy artillery, the probability would be
that one flank, or both, of the army would be uncovered.
. . ."

Randolph concluded that "thus the enemy, ascending

York and James Rivers in transports,

56johnston,

could turn the flank of

"Manassas to Seven Pines," B & L , II:

p. 209.

57joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 30, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 477.
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the army and compel it to retreat."58
Sensing his advantage, Johnston pressed two more points
which he thought argued effectively against deploying any
more troops into the Peninsula.

First, he portrayed the

climate as being so unhealthy that many of Magruder's men
had already become too ill to be of any use; should Smith's
and Longstreet's Divisions be sent there, a similar d eple
tion of their strength could be expected.59

Even if this

did not occur, the increased number of troops to support on
the Peninsula could bring the Confederacy no material
benefit.

The two divisions would not give Johnston numbers

close enough to McClellan's to justify an attack on the open
field, and Magruder's flooding had insured that no matter
how numerous an army was transferred to the Peninsula,

it

could not reach the Army of the Potomac to attack it . 60
This indictment of the policy of damming and flooding
the Warwick River probably stung Lee, who had at the least
approved it, and may actually have been the first to suggest

^ T e s t i m o n y of George W. Randolph, February 5, 1863,
"Investigation of the Navy Department," NOR, Series 2 (part
4):
pp. 716-717.
59john B. Magruder to Samuel Cooper, May 3, 1862,
O R , XI (part 3):
pp. 408-411.

in

60"Report of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army,
commanding Department of Northern Virginia, of operations
from April 15 to May 19," May 19, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 275.
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it.61

Instead of responding directly to Johnston's asser

tion that the Yorktown line was inevitably untenable, he
raised a new objection.

The loss of that line did not

necessarily mean the loss of the entire Peninsula.

Davis

remembered that Lee "insisted that the Peninsula offered
great advantages to a smaller force in resisting a numeri
cally superior

a s s a i l a n t . " 6 2

Specifically, Lee argued that where the Peninsula
narrowed to four miles wide at Williamsburg,

and then along

the banks of the Chickahominy River, there were secondary
positions from which Johnston's army might delay the enemy
or even inflict defeat upon him.

He recalled that the

previous year he had devised the plans for a continuous line
of works at Williamsburg from which to rally against the
Federals.

This line should be much easier to hold than the

Yorktown line.

Magruder had several times reported progress

in constructing the fortifications.

Cannon in place on

Jamestown Island could probably blockade the James River.63
If that line had to be evacuated,

the few bridges over

the Chickahominy and the tangled swamps around its banks

6lFreeman, R. E. L e e , II:
p. 18; Robert E. Lee to John
B. Magruder, March 26, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 399.
62oavis, Rise and F a l l , II:

p. 87.

63Alfred Rives to Judah P. Benjamin, March 12, 1862,
Robert E. Lee to John B. Magruder, March 15, 1862, in OR,
IX:
pp. 61-62, 68; Robert E. Lee to John B. Magruder, March
26, 1862, Robert E. Lee to John B. Magruder, April 9, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 398-399, 433-434; Catesby Ap R.
Jones to S. Barron, May 5, 1861, in N O R , VI:
p. 699.
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would provide Johnston yet another chance to confront
McClellan from a favorable position.

Forced to fight for

one or more of the crossings, the Army of the Potomac would
have a difficult time bringing its superior numbers to bear,
and the marshy ground would not be favorable to heavy
artillery.

Lee apparently envisioned a protracted fight

before the Yankees could force the river.

The Federals

could be deterred from any attempt to land behind Johnston's
line by burning all the wharves on the York and the James,
and by making "such display of force in front of the
landings which the enemy may approach as will retard their
advance from the rivers to the interior of the country.

."64
The image of a deliberate,

step-by-step retreat, with

the possibility of inflicting a series of sharp repulses--or
even a major defeat--on the Union Army appealed to the
President.

This was especially true because of what he knew

of the state of Richmond's defenses;
prepared to stand a siege.

the city was in no way

Excavation had not begun on four

of the eighteen batteries in the ring of fortifications
around the capital, and those which had been constructed did
not inspire confidence.

Most of the powder magazines

contained two or three feet of standing water, and large
tracts of woods obscured the field of fire from many of the

6^Robert E. Lee to John B. Magruder, March 26, 1862,
Robert E. Lee to John B. Magruder, April 9, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 3):
pp. 398-399, 433-434.
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batteries.

Yet these were not even the worst defects of the

positions.

Colonel Charles Dimmock, Chief of Ordnance for

the State of Virginia, had reported at the end of February
that the Batteries had been sited too near the city:

"so

near can the enemy come that the city can be shelled and
burned before our works are captured.

..."

Of course,

Dimmock admitted that his question was somewhat academic,
since only twenty-five of the 218 cannon needed to arm the
batteries had been mounted.

Dimmock, like Lee, felt that

"the line of defense should be near the banks of the
Chickahominy.

. . ."65

Again the brevity of Johnston's tour of the Peninsula
prevented him from countering Lee's arguments.

He did not

know that the line of fortifications at Williamsburg had not
been completed to Lee's specifications.

Instead, they had

been modified into a series of detached forts without Lee's
knowledge or consent.

Alfred Rives, Chief of the Confeder

ate Engineer Bureau, had supervised this change,
recognized that they were fatally flawed.

and even he

"I would take

occasion here to condemn, as a general system,

small de

tached redoubts, although you might infer from what you see
near Williamsburg that I am in favor of them," Rives told

65Robert Tansill to John H. Winder, February 27, 1862,
Charles Dimmock to the Speaker of the Virginia House of
Delegates, February 28, 1862, Alfred Rives to Judah P.
Benjamin, March 12, 1862, in OR, IX:
pp. 45-48, 61-62; John
H. Winder to Samuel Cooper, February 28, 1862, in LR-AIGO,
M-4 74, Reel 52; John H. Winder to Samuel Cooper, February
28, 1862, in LR-SW, M-437, Reel 76.
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Magruder's Chief Engineer on March 20.

"I was, when they

were commenced, completely inexperienced.

...

I now know

and have known for some months past that the system is most
defective, making a line equally strong it is true, but
equally weak at the same time."66

Nor did Johnston know

that the James River was more than a mile and a half wide at
Jamestown Island, and that it was questionable whether the
thirteen poorly entrenched guns there could keep the river
closed.

Beyond the island, the next and only point below

Richmond from which the James River could be effectively
blocked was Drewry's Bluff, a point at which construction of
entrenched batteries had barely been begun.67
No one in the room really knew much about just how
practical it would be to defend behind the Chickahominy
River.

The necessity of sending out most of the Engineer

Bureau's officers either to Johnston or Magruder had delayed
a survey of the river.

Even Lee, who advocated the river as

a third line of defense, did not know the condition or even
the number of bridges spanning the stream.

Most of the

arguments seem to have been made by examining a blue line on
^ A l f r e d Rives to Henry T. Douglas, March 20, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 3):
pp. 388-389; undated manuscript for speech
by Benjamin Stoddert Ewell before the Magruder-Ewell Camp,
United Confederate Veterans, in Benjamin Stoddert Ewell
papers, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia.
^ A l f r e d Rives to Judah P. Benjamin, March 12, 1862, in
O R , IX:
pp. 61-62; Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May
1, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 8, 1862,
in OR, IX, (part 3):
pp. 485, 500-501.
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some m a p . 6 8
Yet even such a cursory examination should have
revealed that a Union Army that drew its supplies from the
York River rather than the James could sidestep uncomforta
bly close to Richmond without ever contesting the river
crossings.

This would force Johnston to keep more than

twenty miles of the winding river under observation— a line
significantly longer than Magruder's at Yorktown.
the Chickahominy,
been erected,

But on

no entrenchments or batteries had ever

and the river itself was navigable to Federal

gunboats more than a dozen miles inland.69

Nor did any

Confederate batteries exist to keep the Union Navy from
landing troops west of the river's mouth.
climate around the swamps was,

Finally, the

if possible, even more

malarial than that in the vicinity of Y o r ktown.^0
Johnston's shock at seeing the condition of the
Yorktown-Warwick River defenses, and the understandable
urgency he felt in returning to explain their defects to the
President,

had again deprived him of vital details.

Lee's

contentions about the practicality of defending the Peninsu
la, even after Magruder's line was evacuated, won the day in
the mind of Jefferson Davis.

At this point in the debate

^^Nichols, Confederate Engineers, p. 84.

VII:

69w. Smith to L. M. Goldsborough, May 29,
p. 435.

1862, in N O R ,

^^Alfred Rives to Judah P. Benjamin, March 12, 1862,
O R , IX:
pp. 61-62; Davis, Rise and F a l l , II:
p. 103.
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then, Lee was far ahead on points.

The ultimate fall of

Yorktown had been the only point he had conceded.

Against

this, he had successfully argued that its defense should be
protracted as long as possible to preserve Norfolk, and that
the remainder of the Peninsula was defensible.

Now he

proceeded to attack Johnston's suggestion to bring troops
from the Carolinas and Georgia to Virginia.
The numbers themselves seem to support Johnston.

His

two divisions in Richmond, plus Magruder's army, totaled in
excess of 55,000 men.

Even discounting the cavalry screen

and Field's tiny command, Jackson and Ewell could contribute
16,000

infantry.

Despite reinforcing the Peninsula,

still retained 12,000 troops at Norfolk.

Huger

In the Department

of North Carolina there were 20,000 Confederate soldiers,
and another 2 9,000 in the Department of South Carolina and
Georgia.

Most of these troop strengths had been under

reported by their commanders, and more regiments were in the
process of organization.

With at least 8 3,000 men already

present in the Old Dominion,

Johnston presented a convincing

numerical argument that by reducing the coastal defenses to
minimal garrisons at Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah,
the Confederacy could raise his numbers to parity with the
Army of the Potomac, which was accurately believed to have
between 1 0 0,0 00 to 120,000 soldiers. 71

7lFor the argument that such numbers were usually
understated, see the section on the numbers of Johnston's
army on the Peninsula in the next chapter.
See "Abstract
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But there were practical objections to Johnston's plan,
and Lee made the most of each one.

He objected to Johns

ton's premise that risking the loss of Charleston and
Savannah against the chance to defeat McClellan was an
acceptable gamble.

The Atlantic ports currently represented

the major pipeline through which the South was receiving
weapons from abroad.^2

These weapons were particularly

critical at just that moment because most of the new
regiments in Confederate camps of instruction had none.

Lee

was well aware that he could not yet arm all the troops that
had volunteered for the war within the last mo n t h . ^3
Yet if losing Charleston and Savannah represented a
fair trade for McClellan's army in purely military terms,
the same was not true in a political sense.

As Jefferson

Davis was well aware, the ardor of most governors and many
Confederate soldiers was limited to the defense of their
home states.

Governors had already grudgingly resisted

every transfer of troops from their coasts, and regiments
serving far from home continually petitioned the government

from return of Department of South Carolina and Georgia,
M a j . Gen. John C. Pemberton, commanding, for March 1862," in
O R , VI:
p. 422; "Abstract from the return of the Department
of Norfolk, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger, commanding, for
January, 1862," "Abstract from statement of the troops
serving in the Department of North Carolina, commanded by
Maj. Gen. T. H. Holmes, April 19, 1862, in OR, IX:
pp. 38,
459 .
72pavis, Rise and F a l l , II:

p. 87.

73judah P. Benjamin to Jefferson Davis, March 12, 1862,
in OR, Series 4, I:
pp. 987-988.
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to send them back.

With the army undergoing the reorganiza

tion of all the one-year troops, Lee, Randolph, and Davis
all feared that thousands of soldiers would allow their
enlistments to expire if they felt that the government had
no commitment to protecting their homes while they served
e l s e w h e r e .?4
Severe logistical problems also existed.

Just how

rapidly the rickety network of Confederate railroads could
deliver tens of thousands of soldiers to Virginia was more
than questionable,
critical.

and the inability to do so might well be

If the massive redeployment Johnston suggested—

unprecedented in scale even by the pre-Shiloh concentration
--were set in motion,
could spell disaster.

a slow performance by the railroads
A moment of vulnerability would exist

while the troops were in transit.

During this time, neither

the Atlantic ports nor Johnston's army would be at full
strength;

if the trains rolled too slowly, this moment of

weakness might stretch out for several weeks.

A coordinated

Federal attack on Charleston and Savannah simultaneous with
a penetration of Magruder's line might rapidly end the war,
it was true--but with a Confederate surrender.
Celerity of motion, even willing cooperation, was
something that everyone in the room knew the railroads could
not be depended upon to provide.

It is unlikely that Davis

^^Davis, Rise and F a l l , II:
p. 87; Patrick, Jefferson
Davis and his C a b i n e t , p. 124; Freeman, R. E. L e e , II:
pp.
28-29; Archer Jones, Confederate S t r a t e g y , pp. 42-49.
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or Lee could have resisted the urge to point out to Johnston
that he had blamed all the difficulties in his withdrawal
from northern Virginia on the railroads.75

The type of

maneuver that Johnston had proposed would require a far
greater level of coordination between a minimum of six
different railroad companies.76

How did Johnston expect

this to be accomplished?
The General's answer would have been the response that
any number of Confederate officers made at various critical
points in the war:

government control of the rails.

This

was a proposition to which Davis and Randolph were not
hostile;

but the Confederate Congress disagreed.

the President,

Even as

the Secretary, and the four generals met, the

House Committee on Military Affairs was in the process of
first emasculating and then killing a bill to provide for
emergency military control of the railroads.

In just three

days, Augustus R. Wright of Georgia and Thomas J. Foster of
Alabama would successfully attack any such idea as "subver
sive of, and in direct contravention to, the great and
fundamental principle of State sovereignty."

Even had he

agreed with Johnston, Davis did not possess the power
necessary to implement his

p l a n .

77

75jO S eph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis,
1862, in OR, V:
p. 1083.

February 28,

76j3lack, Railroads, inset map.
77j b i d ., p. 98.
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Again,

there were counterarguments to most of these

objections, but Johnston did not--in fact could not--have
known them..

Confederate intelligence on the coast was so

bad that the conferees did not know that their army in the
Carolinas and Georgia substantially outnumbered the Union
forces there.

Holmes deployed 20,000 men in North Carolina;

Burnside opposed him with 14,000.

Pemberton reported 29,000

"Present for Duty" along the lower coast, while Federal
Major-General David Hunter listed only 17,000 soldiers in
the same
knew.

c a t e g o r y .

7®

Johnston was more correct than he

By attempting to defend everything, the Confederacy

had dispersed a larger number of men so widely that the
Union Navy could almost always deliver enough Yankees to any
given point to guarantee local superiority.

Careful

concentration at critical points would have allowed the
Southern army to defend the coastline with no more than the
number of troops the Federals were using to attack it.

This

would have freed at least 18,000 men to reinforce Virginia,
which could have given Johnston more than 100,000 men,

the

minimum number he needed to confront McClellan on the open
field.79

78pavid Hunter to Edward M. Stanton, April 3, 1862, in
O R , VI:
p. 263; "Abstract from return of the Department of
North Carolina, Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside commanding, for
April, 1862," in OR, IX:
p. 381.
79This assumes a reduction in North Carolina from
20.000 to 12,000 troops, and along the lower coast from
29.000 to 19,000 men.
Neither diminution of troops would
have rendered the Confederates incapable of defending the
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Removing just over one third of the soldiers on the
coasts would have been politically touchy, but not impossi
ble for the Davis administration.

The transportation

objections to concentration could have been overcome by
using a concept that General Braxton Bragg would prove to be
effective in a few months:

that of operating the railroad

as if it were a strategic pipeline,

shuttling a few troops

from each garrison a few miles north to "bump" the next
garrison farther along the route.

Confederate experience in

moving troops in this manner suggests that 18,000 troops
could have been brought to Virginia in less than three weeks
without unduly exposing any critical point on the coast.®^
As concerned the question of reorganization,

Johnston

could have argued the fact that he intended to use those
troops for an offensive;

thus offsetting any decline in

morale resulting from a partial evacuation of the coast.

An

opportunity to strike a blow at the invading Federals had to
be more satisfying to the minds of Confederate soldiers than
merely sitting and waiting for the fearsome gunboats to
a p p e a r .81
Johnston, however,

could make most of these contentions

in theory, only, without citing specific details.

He did

major ports.
8C>Hattaway and Jones, How the North W o n , p. 218.
81joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 30,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 477.

1862,
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not know the realities of Confederate and Union troop
strengths on the coast--he had only the assertions of Lee
and Randolph that the Yankees deployed far more men.

He had

never been thoroughly informed of the extent of the scarcity
of weapons.

Nor had he researched the technical details of

actually moving thousands of Confederate soldiers to
Virginia.

Lee, on the other hand,

seemed to possess every

answer necessary to support his case, and those answers,
even if incorrect,

stood unchallenged by the end of the

evening.
By midnight,

in Davis's mind, the debate had narrowed

down to a choice between two radically different options.
Johnston proposed an almost immediate withdrawal from the
Peninsula,

Norfolk,

and much of the coast,

luring McClellan

inland where he could be assaulted by an army of at least
equal,

if not superior, numbers.

Lee advocated committing

as many troops as were currently available— Johnston's two
divisions--to reinforce McClellan's advance inch by inch,
preserving Norfolk for as long as possible, and hoping that
an opportunity to strike a blow might present itself even to
an outnumbered army.

Johnston's plan required immediate

massive risks, offering an eventual chance for a strategic
victory.

Lee's plan deferred the risks,

in the hopes that

time might provide a better solution.
To Davis,
few months,

leery of repeating the mistakes of the past

Johnston's proposal entailed an unacceptable
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level of risk.

He finally announced his decision:

follow Lee's

line of reasoning. Johnston's army

committed to

the defense of the Peninsula.82

Before examining Johnston's reaction to
declaration,

he would

would be

the President's

it is important to realize that the chief

failure of all of Davis's advisors was in allowing the
question to be narrowed down to two mutually exclusive
choices.

The Confederacy's two senior field generals had an

obligation,

in a council call for the purpose of determining

grand strategy, to lay out for their chief executive all the
possible solutions to the problem facing him.

But Johnston

and Lee became so enmeshed in their own arguments that they
did not present their president with a full range of
options. . A third, possibly very much sounder,

strategy for

defending Richmond existed.
Assuming the correctness of Johnston's view that
Magruder, with 31,500 men, could hold out just as long at
Yorktown against McClellan as could Johnston with an army of
55,000, the question actually boiled down to the most
effective use that could be made of the 23,500 men in
Smith's and Longstreet's Divisions,

Stuart's Cavalry

Brigade, and the fifty-six guns of Pendleton's Artillery
Reserve.

Sending them to the Peninsula was one option, but

so was retaining them in Richmond as the nucleus of J ohns
ton's Grand A r m e e .

Even discarding the more or less

82oavis, Rise and F a l l , II:

p. 87.
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>

fantastical schemes of Smith and Longstreet to join Jackson
and Ewell to cross the Potomac, there was another option.
The remainder of Johnston's army could have been kept
in the immediate Richmond area to facilitate the very
delaying strategy which Lee advocated.

Those 23,500 men

represented a labor force capable of completing the Richmond
defenses, and erecting the vital batteries at Drewry's
Bluff.

Obstructions and delaying positions could have been

prepared at the Chickahominy bridges.

White House and

Eltham's Landing on the upper York River and those below
Harrison's Landing on the James could have been strongly
enough garrisoned to discourage Federal landing even after
the Yorktown-Warwick line crumbled.

His flanks secure,

Magruder could have dropped back from Yorktown to Williams
burg where, despite the shortcomings of the fortifications,
he would have been able to stall McClellan on a line not
seventeen but four miles long.
In many ways,

such a plan would have satisfied the

wishes of both Lee and Johnston.

Two divisions holding the

retired flanks of the Peninsula would have maximized the
time to be gained in a delaying action, and would have
materially increased the chances of successfully combatting
the enemy at the Chickahominy.

The time gained,

if it was

as much as two or three months, would mean more riflemuskets produced in the factories and landed in the ports,
leading to a substantial reinforcement of Johnston's army.
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If he could not have met the Army of the Potomac with exact
numerical parity, he could certainly have fielded 85,00090,000 men--no worse disadvantage than he had faced at
M

a

n

a

s

s

a

s

.

Furthermore, his army would have the advantage

of awaiting the Yankees behind a third or fourth successive
defensive line, the final one of which would necessarily
have drawn McClellan away from his naval support.
But while such a plan might well have been workable,

it

could never arise while Johnston and Lee discussed the
problem as adversaries, because it would have required each
man to compromise on at least one of his most dearly held
strategic precepts.

Johnston would have had to accepted an

operational concept that seemed at odds with his own belief
in the need to concentrate the Confederacy's outnumbered
troops.

While maneuvering with detached--even isolated—

columns never bothered Lee, he always advised meeting the
enemy as far forward as practical with as many troops as
possible.

Keeping better than two divisions in the Richmond

area violated his natural urge to close with the Federals
and strike a blow.

The two men could only have arrived at

such a plan in a spirit of collaboration,

a feeling sadly

lacking between good friends that night.
Jefferson Davis, choosing from the plate set before
him, decided to follow the arguments and instinct of Robert
E. Lee.

He told Johnston that the next morning the General

8 3Livermore, Numbers and L o s s e s , p. 77.
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should start his army for the Peninsula.

The President

acknowledged years later that he had known that Joseph
Johnston "did not agree with this decision," but that "he
did not ask to be relieved," which Davis evidently inter
preted as Johnston's acquiescence to his

v e r d i c t . 84

Johnston's own postwar comment in the Narrative has often
been cited as evidence that he secretly planned to disobey
Davis's orders and pursue his own strategy of withdrawal
without reference to the wishes of the government:

"The

belief that events on the Peninsula would soon compel the
Confederate government to adopt my method of opposing the
Federal army, reconciled me somewhat to the necessity of
obeying the President's

Douglas Southall Freeman

order."85

contended that this ex post facto "comment curiously and not
creditably revealed the man," while Clifford Dowdey took it
as evidence that "when Johnston left the meeting to return
to Yorktown, he had no intention of obeying the intent of
the o r d e r . "88
It cannot be inferred from his later statement that
Johnston engaged in willful deception of the government,
unless he kept this view to himself;
that fact is Johnston's own words.

84pavis, Rise and F a l l , II:

the only evidence of
The published phrasing

p. 88.

85johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 116.
86p reeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I:
D a y s , p. 55.

p. 151; Dowdey,
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is ambiguous, and does not conclusively settle the question
of whether the General voiced this opinion— this prediction,
actually--or whether he left the meeting in a taciturn,
sulky mood.

The original draft of Johnston's memoirs is,

however, much more definitive.
instruction, Johnston wrote,

Upon receiving Davis's

"I replied that nothing

reconciled me to obedience to this order but confidence that
the cautious character of the Federal General would permit
me to extricate my troops, after their flank was uncovered
by the destruction of Yorktown.

[emphasis

a

d

d

e

d

]

He had

not been at all reticent about arguing his case with
vehemence for several hours;

there was no reason for him to

stop giving the President his opinions just because he had
lost the debate.
Discouraged but determined to follow his orders and buy
as much time as he could and still save the army from a trap
of his own government's creation, Johnston and Longstreet
left the room.

In the parlor, Johnston roused the uncon

scious Smith and informed him of the outcome of the discus
sion.®^
tions,

There was quiet talk of the next day's prepara
and the three men departed to begin their campaign.

B^praft of Nar r a t i v e , p. 18, in Box 28, Folder 3, in
R M H ; see also Joseph E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith,
January 21, 1868, in JJWM.
®®Beverly Johnston to Joseph E. Johnston, September 14,
1867, Beverly Johnston to Joseph E. Johnston, February 23,
1868, Beverly Johnston to Joseph E. Johnston, February 23,
1868, in RMH*.
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Chapter Eight
Isolated on the Peninsula

A year earlier in Charleston Harbor, Major Robert
Anderson had formally surrendered Fort Sumter.

The next

week Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers,
Virginia seceded.

and

Tents arose on the fringes of Richmond as

General Lee struggled to organize the state's volunteers.
In a short time, regiments from the rest of the Confederacy
began to arrive,
South Carolina,
Sumter.

some of the earliest being the 1st and 2nd
"veterans" of the bombardment of Fort

A crowd gathered at the railroad station to meet

them; and, as Richmonder Sally Putnam recalled,

"they bore

the appearance of guests at a holiday festival, rather than
the stern features of the soldier."

Hundreds of the city's

citizens flocked to their camps to hear the story of all the
war there had thus far been:

"The evening dress-parade

attracted admiring crowds of ladies, to whom every soldier
seemed a hero."-*By April 15,

1862, however, both the city and the

soldiers knew a great deal more about war.

When Thomas

Bragg looked out his window at the troops marching through
Richmond to the Peninsula,

he thought that they appeared

Iputnam, R i c h m o n d , p. 29.
279
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"rough but hardy
and trim."

. . . very muddy & . . . anything but neat

The horses pulling field pieces and caissons

down Broad Street he thought "much reduced in flesh and all
looked woebegone.

. . ."2

These were not the polished young

dandies who had marched so gaily off to battle a year ago;
these were gaunt men who had spent a winter under c a n v a s ,
subsisting on short rations, and pulling guard duty in the
mud.

Some of them were veterans in the true sense now,

having seen combat at Manassas, Ball's Bluff, Dranesville,
or a dozen other nameless skirmishes.
In most cases, the trip to Richmond had not been easy
or even safe.

The train conveying Colonel John B. Gordon's

6th Alabama suffered a head-on collision with a locomotive
returning up the same track.

"Nearly every car on the

densely packed train," Gordon remembered,
and torn into pieces;

"was telescoped

and men, knapsacks, arms, and shivered

seats were hurled to the front and piled in horrid mass
against the crushed timbers and ironwork."

Several soldiers

died in the wreck, and dozens more were seriously

w o u n d e d . ^

But even walking to Richmond did not guarantee a safe trip.
The Hampton

(South Carolina) Legion marched to the capital

from Fredericksburg through rain, hail, and sleet.

In

makeshift shanties of poles and pine brush, the men in

pp.

^Entries of April
201-202, 205.

York:

6, 1862, April 8, 1862, Bragg diary,

3John B. Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), p. 52.

(New
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Captain James Conner's company slept wet and shivering cold,
their blankets lagging behind on supply wagons.

Fires would

only reluctantly ignite to cook their biscuits or their
bacon.

Conner sourly describes the latter as having just

"one streak of lean and five inches of fat."

Of sixteen new

recruits his company had received in the previous month,
Conner reported that three died of exposure on the march.^
But wet and bedraggled as Johnston's regiments were, to
the citizens of the city they represented the army that
would hold McClellan at bay.
masse to welcome them.

So Richmonders turned out en

Bands played, women waved handker

chiefs from second-floor windows,
with families,

and the streets were lined

friends, and well-wishers.

The day broke

bright and clear for a change; and, soon after dawn,

the

streets filled with the sound of the tramping feet of
Longstreet's Division.
the Rapidan;

They had walked from Centreville to

and, when the call came to pull back to

Richmond, Longstreet's men marched, while other troops took
the trains.

Sarcastically, the soldiers dubbed themselves

"Longstreet's Walking Division," and opined that if Jeffer
son Davis ever planned for them to reinforce New Orleans, he
would probably tell them to w alk.5
They made a show of their passage through Richmond,

^Moffett, C o n n e r , p. 88.
^Putnam, R i c h m o n d , pp. 119-120; Foote, Civil W a r , I:
p. 403.
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nonetheless.

At the division's head rode its phlegmatic

commander, James Longstreet, whose mule-like stamina allowed
his appearance to belie the fact that,
previous evening,

since the meeting the

he could not have gotten any sleep.

Most

of the band music was lost on the nearly deaf Georgian, but
his staff cantered about on their best mounts,
hats and saluted the crowds.

raised their

Behind them came the infantry,

in columns of half-companies "with music, banners, mounted
officers, artillery,

etc.," one soldier recalled.6

"Sol

diers left the ranks to grasp the hands of friends in
passing," wrote one Richmonder,
refreshment,
tions.

"to receive some grateful

a small bouquet, or a whispered congratula

Ten thousand troops took a long time to march past

a given point,

and the cheering went on for hours before the

last Confederate soldier passed down to the wharf at
Rocketts to board the boats for Yorktown.

Some were

heartened by the turn-out; others barely noticed.

A private

in Brigadier-General George Pickett's Virginia brigade
ignored all the demonstrations and "sadly gazed at the shop
windows where loaf-bread, and clean clothing, and books,

and

other needed articles so tantalized my eyes, and empty
p ock e t s ."8
^Putnam,
R i c h m o n d , pp. 119-120; J. G. de Roulhac
Hamilton, The Papers of Randolph Abbot Shotwell (Raleigh,
NC:
North Carolina Historical Commission, 1929), I:
p. 175.
^Putnam, R i c h m o n d , p. 119-120.
^Hamilton, S h o t w e l l , I:

p.

176.
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"Jeb" Stuart's cavalry paralleled Longstreet's Divi
sion, flowing down the side-streets to equally enthusiastic
applause.

"They swept through our streets on that beautiful

morning, with their horses in good order, their own spirits
buoyant and cheerfull

[sic], many of them wearing in their

caps bouquets of the golden daffodils of early spring," said
Sally

Putnam.9

Stuart camped his brigade just outside the

city limits, and allowed his men one last night on the town
before trotting toward Yorktown.10
But for all the showmanship and pageantry of the horse
soldiers, Longstreet's Assistant Adjutant-General, Moxley
Sorrel, believed that the finest spectacle of the day had
been staged by Brigadier-General Robert Toombs.
politician than general, Toombs led his troops

Always more
"past the

crowds at Spottswood Hotel, with childlike delight."

His

brigade was composed of one Virginia and four Georgia
regiments.

Toombs "put himself at the head of one regiment

and moved it out of sight amid hurrahs, then galloping back
he brought on another,

ready himself for cheers, until the

brigade was down the street.

. .

But the procession through the Richmond streets was to
be the last moment of glory for some time to come.

Gustavus

W. Smith's Division, which had marched directly to White

^Putnam, R i c h m o n d , p. 120.
lOThomas, Bold Drag o o n , p. 103.
11-Sorrel, Recol lections, p. 59.
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House on the York River,

boarded a motley collection of

schooners and small steamers for the trip to Yorktown.
Longstreet's men crowded on flatboats at Rocketts, which
lurched slowly down the James River toward Jamestown.
Conditions on the boats were horrible:

there was no food,

no water, no provision for sanitation, and,
no place either covered or ventilated to

in most cases,

s l e e p .

12

Briga

dier-General Joseph Kershaw's South Carolinians found
themselves forced, on an earlier trip, to rotate between the
holds of their small sailboats and the deck:
choice between freezing or

s u f f o c a t i n g .

12

it was a

Pickett's men

used the hours that the tug pulling their flatboat needed to
clear the obstructions at Drewry's Bluff in order to cut
tethers to keep sleeping soldiers from being washed over
board. 14

it was a miserable experience for the infantry,

and the cavalry and artillery saw little more comfort as
they trooped down the muddy roads that crossed the Chickaho m i n y .
Nor did

the conditions that Johnston's men found around

Yorktown make up for the poor conditions

on the trip.

The

l^River transportation was strained to the breaking
point in the transfer of Johnston's army to the Peninsula.
On the James River, for example, even packing the men and
their baggage in as tightly as possible, the QuartermasterGeneral could only send about 4,000 troops down the river at
one time.
See Larkin Smith to Walter H. Taylor, March 26,
1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 400.
l^Dickert, Kershaw's B r i g a d e , p. 93.
l^Hamilton,

Shotwel1 , I:

p. 177.
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trenches in the lines were flooded, the ground for the camps
boggy, the rain unceasing,

the food bad, and the Federal

artillery and sharpshooters annoying--sometimes fatally
s o .

15

Soldiers assigned to the redoubts or the rifle pits

spent their days digging in deeper, often in direct sight of
the enemy.

Pickett's men erected one earthwork only by the

expedient of posting a lookout to shout,

"Lie down!," when

he saw the smoke issue from the mouths of far-off Yankee
c a n n o n .

15

Kershaw's troops scoured the area for scraps of

wood to maintain bonfires around the clock.

During the day,

soldiers not on duty huddled around them; at night they
competed for sleeping positions near the flames.17

Chief of

Ordnance E. P. Alexander echoed the sentiments of most
Confederate soldiers when he claimed that "in the whole
course of the war there was little service as trying as that
in the Yorktown lines."18
Joseph Johnston did not immediately accompany his
soldiers to Yorktown on April 15.

Instead, he spent the day

working out administrative details with Lee and Cooper.
had two major worries:

He

the forces left in northern Virgin-

l^Alexander, "Sketch," p. 36; Joel Cook, The Siege of
Richmond:
A Narrative of the Military Operations of MajorGeneral George B. McClellan during May and June, 1862
(Philadelphia:
G. W. Childs, 1862), pp. 144-145.
l^Hamilton,

Shotwel1 , I:

pp. 180-181.

l^Dickert, Kershaw's Brig a d e , p. 95.
l^Edward P. Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confeder
ate (New York:
n. p., 1907), p. 64.
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ia, and his wagon trains.
Johnston's primary concern about Jackson, Ewell, and
Field was not that they might be overwhelmed,

for he

believed each of the Confederate columns to be much more
mobile than the Yankees who opposed them.

He worried,

the most part, about any coordinated actions.
department commander on the Peninsula,

for

With the

the time lag for

correspondence between Johnston and Jackson could easily
exceed a week.

Johnston reiterated to Ewell that all

questions of attack and retreat "must be decided on the
ground"— in the time necessary for letters and telegrams to
find him, precious opportunities might be lost.19
He instructed Jackson and Ewell to forward their
correspondence to him through Cooper's

o f f i c e .

20

This was

proper military procedure in the strictest sense, but it is
difficult to escape the suspicion that Johnston may have
preferred to keep internal departmental
hands.

The April

letters out of Lee's

14 meeting marked a low point in the

friendship of the two men.

Not only did Johnston know that

Lee differed from him on strategy,

he may have suspected

that the other Virginian planned to use his power as
Commanding General to put some of them into practice while
Johnston was isolated on the Peninsula.

1862,

19joseph E. Johnston to Richard S. Ewell, April
in OR~, XII (part 3):
p. 852.

17,

20ibid.
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The question of the Department of Northern Virginia's
wagon trains was one of disposition and security.

While the

Confederates held the James and York Rivers, sufficient,
not overly ample,

if

supplies could reach Yorktown by water,

saving the necessity of committing the rickety wagons and
worn-out horses to the muddy Tidewater roads and malarial
atmosphere.

In the event of a retreat, however, the threat

of Federal gunboats prowling up the rivers would close that
route of supply.

Within a few days Johnston's army would

need to be met by wagon trains of food and ammunition,

or

else disaster might result.
The solution to this problem was to keep Johnston's
wagons in Richmond,

loaded and ready to meet the army with

only a few hours' notice.

But hundreds of wagons could not

be left in the capital without a guard.

Eventually,

the

decision was reached that, until Johnston called for them,
the wagon trains would become the security responsibility of
Brigadier-General John H. Winder, Provost-Marshal of
Richmond, and commander of the newly expanded Department of
Henrico.21
Johnston was pleased to be relieved of the necessity of
guarding the wagons, but hardly happy about the status of
Winder's department.

The Department of Henrico had been

established in December,

1861, to put Richmond under

2lRobert E. Lee to John H. Winder, April 27, 18G2,
Lee Letterbook.
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military control.

Winder, a Marylander, was willing to

suffer personal unpopularity to ride herd on Union pris
oners, guard various military facilities, discipline
soldiers on furlough, and smell out anti-Confederate
conspiracies.

He never had enough men assigned to him to do

more than a minimally adequate job, and his enemies periodi
cally accused him of favoritism, terrorism, and even
treason.

But Winder, with Jefferson Davis's full support,

persevered at his task.22
On March 26, Davis and Lee extended Winder's authority
to include Petersburg and all the territory within ten miles
of both cities.

Ostensibly,

the President and Commanding

General made this decision in order to organize better the
rail transfer points that would also have to be used to
shift troops in an emergency.

It would also place responsi

bility for the completion of the Richmond fortifications and
the batteries at Drewry's and Chaffin's Bluffs in the hands
of a single

o f f i c e r .

23

From Johnston's perspective,

however, this left a dangerous pocket of someone else's
authority at the central point between all the wings of his
widespread army.

Messages,

troops, and supplies all had to

22oeneral Orders No. 8, Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office, March 1, 1862, in N O R , Series 2, III:
pp. 122123; Robert G. Cleland, "Jefferson Davis and the Confederate
Cabinet," Southwestern Historical Q u a rterly, Vol. XIX, No. 3
(January 1916):
p. 216.
23special Orders No. 69, Adjutant and InspectorGeneral 's Office, March 26, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
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pass back and forth through a bottleneck that he did not
control; Johnston could not even send his own provost
marshals into the city to round up stragglers.2 4

Johnston

protested this state of affairs, but Davis and Lee refused
to give him authority over Winder.25
Disheartened at this outcome, Johnston boarded a
steamer on York River the morning of April 17, and arrived
at Yorktown again that evening,
inspection tour.

just four days after his

The next morning he officially assumed

command of the army.26
McClellan had been uncharacteristically aggressive in
the past few days.

On April 16, concerned that Confederate

batteries at Dam No. 1 could harass the construction of some
of his siege batteries, the Union commander ordered Briga
dier-General William F. "Baldy" Smith to "reconnoiter" the
Rebel position.

Smith moved up a Vermont brigade, with a

pair of field batteries,

and opened fired across the creek

separating the two lines.

The Confederate counterfire,

from

a single cannon, was silenced in about an hour, with the
crew driven from their gun.

Smith ordered the 3rd Vermont,

along with several companies of the 4th, to wade the creek

24 a . P. Hill to Samuel Cooper, April 27, 1862, L R - A I G O ,
M-474, Reel 24; Robert E. Lee to John H. Winder, May 3,
1862, in Lee Letterbook.
25inferred from the tone of Joseph E. Johnston to
Robert E. Lee, May 8, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 499.
26General Orders No. 1, Department of Northern Virgin
ia, April 18, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 448.
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and probe the now-quiet rifle pits in front of his posi
tion .27
The ease with which the Confederate artillery had been
quieted encouraged McClellan, who had ridden to Smith's
headquarters sometime after the beginning of the action.
told Smith to move up his other two brigades.

He

If circum

stances permitted, he should attempt to take and hold the
dam, not just examine it.28
The only forces from the Army of the Peninsula which
had actually been in the trenches to oppose the Federal
probe were a single six-pounder from a Georgia battery and a
company of pickets from the 15th North Carolina of Briga
dier-General Howell Cobb's brigade.

The rest of the

Confederate outwork was filled with "Quaker g uns"— blackened
logs between wagon wheels— and most of the North Carolinians
were several hundred yards to the rear, draining and
improving their camps.

Colonel Robert McKinney,

a Virginia

Military Institute graduate, ordered his men to arms as soon
as word came back that the enemy had crossed the
McKinney did not wait for reinforcements,

c r e e k .

29

a proper

27"Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army,
commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, of engagement at
Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys," April 17, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 1):
p . 364.
28i b i d ., April 18, 1862, p. 365.
29"Report of Lieut. Col. Ross R. Ihrie, Fifteenth North
Carolina Infantry, of the engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's
Mill)," April 19, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 421-422.
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military but personally fatal decision.

He could see more

Yankees gathering across the water, and would have known
that if he did not clear the Vermonters out of his rifle
pits quickly, Smith's Division would soon wade the creek in
force.

McKinney double-timed his Tarheels toward the enemy,

who opened fire as soon as the North Carolinians came into
range.

Out in front of his men, the Colonel

lined them up

to return fire, and the two sides traded volleys until a
Federal minie ball caught McKinney in the forehead and
killed him instantly.

Though his lieutenant-colonel

later

denied it, the 15th North Carolina fell back in some
confusion amid cries from the ranks that it had been ordered
to retreat.30
But McKinney's prompt response had brought other
Confederate units to the field.
Cobb's brigade,

A second regiment from

the 16th Georgia; and two companies of a

third, the 2nd Louisiana, rushed without orders to the sound
of the firing, where they met the 7th and 8th Georgia of
Brigadier-General D. R. Jones's brigade marching up from the
other direction.

These regiments joined the rallied 15th

North Carolina to form a force the size of a brigade,

3Ql b i d ., p. 422; but see "Report of Brig. Gen. Howell
Cobb, C. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade, Second Divi
sion, of engagement at Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill)," April 22,
1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 417.
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probably numbering over 2,000 m e n . 31
Less than half an hour had passed since the 3rd Vermont
had first occupied the rifle pits, and the regiment's
position was growing precarious.
appear to be moving up as ordered,

Reinforcements did not
and, after the first

skirmish with the North Carolinians, Colonel Breed N. Hyde
discovered that few of his men had any dry ammunition left.
He dispatched a runner to Smith's headquarters with this
information, and settled in to hold the rifle pits as long
as he could.32
No Confederate general had yet arrived to coordinate
the activities of the North Carolinians,

Georgians,

and

Louisianians who had converged at the point of attack.
Precious minutes ticked by, until Colonel George T. A n d e r 
son, commander of the 11th Georgia and senior field officer
of Jones's brigade,

rode up and assumed command.

Quickly,

he deployed the troops into line, and gave the order to fix
bayonets.

Unlike McKinney, he did not intend to halt and

31i bid.; if these regiments were no stronger than they
were two weeks later, then they probably numbered:
15th North Carolina:
532 effectives
16th Georgia:
488 effectives
2nd Louisiana
(2cos.)
156 effectives
7th Georgia
611 effectives
8th Georgia:_______________ 251 effectives
Total:
2,028 effectives
See "Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, com
manded by General Joseph E. Johnston, on the Peninsula,
about April 30, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3): p. 480.
32"Report of Col. Breed N. Hyde, Third Vermont Infan
try, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys," April
17, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 375.
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return the fire of the Vermonters; he would accept initial
casualties in order to close with his superior numbers and
regain the trenches before any more Yankees could cross the
c r e e k .

33

Colonel Hyde,

finding himself greatly outnumbered,

and having received neither reinforcements nor dry powder,
shouted for a retreat,
wounded,
the

d a m .

losing about ninety-five men killed,

or captured, before he got his regiment back across
34

Both sides concentrated more troops on opposite sides
of the creek throughout the afternoon, waiting expectantly
for the action to

r e s u m e .

what he came to learn:

35

But McClellan had found out

the Confederates had little artil

lery capable of impeding his build-up,
to any

p r o b e s .

had made

36

but reacted quickly

M a g r u d e r , who believed that the Federals

"a serious effort to break through," turned in to

Johnston the next day another pessimistic report on the

3 3 "Report of Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb, C. S. Army,
commanding Second Brigade, Second Division, of engagement at
Dam No. 1 (Lee's Mill)," April 22, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 417.
3 4 "Report of Col. Breed N. Hyde, Third Vermont Infan
try, of engagement at Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys," April
17, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 375.
35"Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Smith, U. S. Army,
commanding Second Division, Fourth Corps, of engagement at
Lee's Mill, or Burnt Chimneys," April 17, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 1):
p . 364.
3 6 " M cClellan's Report

(I)," in OR, XI

(part 1):

p.
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strength of his lines.37
Johnston had earlier seen the rifle pits as the weakest
links in Magruder's extended line.

The unwelcome news that

the enemy was also aware of this deficiency caused him to
examine carefully his options for defending his positions.
Counting detached forces at Gloucester Point, Williamsburg,
and Jamestown Island, Johnston's army contained twenty-four
brigades of infantry, one of cavalry, and two battalions of
reserve artillery--at least 70,000 men "present for

d u t y .

"38

37"Reports of Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, C. S. Army,
commanding at Yorktown, &c.," May 3, 1862, in OR, XI (part
1):
p. 406.
38Tne only relatively complete return for Johnston's
army on the Peninsula is "Organization of the Army of
Northern Virginia, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston,
on the Peninsula, about April 30, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 479-484.
This lists Johnston's army as having 55,633
"effectives," and is the figure usually accepted for the
army at Yorktown.
It is defective, however, in several
respects which render it far too low.
First, it does not
include any numbers for the 3rd Virginia Cavalry or the
Reserve Artillery.
Second, being "effective" returns, as
the Confederates figured them, this represented only the
enlisted men actually available for the battle line, and
excluded the officers and detailed men normally carried
under the heading "present for duty."
"Present for duty"
gives a much more accurate estimation of the army's
strength, and a consistent one by which to measure Johns
ton's strength relative to McClellan, who did not use the
term "effectives" in his returns.
Finally, these figures do
not allow for the fact that the memorandum was compiled
about April 30, 1862, or two weeks after the balance of
Johnston's army had arrived at Yorktown.
Hundreds, if not
thousands, of men had been returned to the Richmond hospi
tals or had wandered off in the interim.
In order to reconstruct Johnston's actual strength on
the Peninsula, it is necessary to account in some way for
each of these factors.
The strength of the 3rd Virginia
Cavalry can be determined from Magruder's April 23, 1862
return, which gives it, and two other independent companies
of cavalry 923 enlisted men.
Jennings Wise used the average
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The army roster contained four major-generals:

Smith,

Longstreet, Magruder, and D. H. Hill, each of whom Johnston

strength of Johnston's other field batteries to calculate
that there were 1,050 enlisted men in the Reserve Artillery.
Thomas Livermore argued quite convincingly that the "effect
ive" force of Confederate units represented between 85%
(cavalry) and 93% (infantry and artillery) of the enlisted
men "present for duty."
Thus 54,344 "effective" infantry
and artillery equate with 58,434 enlisted men "present for
duty."
Likewise, 2,221 "effective" cavalry equate with
2,613 enlisted men "present for duty," giving a total
enlisted strength of 61,047 men.
Allowing the lowest
percentage that Livermore cites for officers in the Confed
erate army (6.5%), these men were probably accompanied by
3,968 officers, for a total "present for duty" strength on
April 30, 1862, of 65,015.
But this still does not account for two weeks of
debilitating sickness and desertions.
What percentage
should be assigned to that?
From Magruder's report on April
23, only two units--the heavy artillery battalion and the
artillery from M c L a w s ' division— can be determined with
relative certainty to have the same composition as they had
a week later.
The heavy artillerymen suffered a 10% decline
in strength, the field gunners, who presumably saw more
service in the trenches, lost 20% of their numbers.
The
lower of the two would correlate closely with the rate of
illness and absence in the Department of Northern Virginia
during the winter, and seems therefore an acceptable
percentage.
Taking the lower figure, 10%, as a working
figure, this means that Johnston had 72,239 officers and men
"present for duty"
when he assumed command.
Obviously the figure is an approximation, and each of
the precise calculations could be challenged, but the
methodology is that which is most widely accepted, and
indicates that Johnston's army on the Peninsula was, in
fact, much stronger than has heretofore been suggested.
See "Abstract from Memorandum Return of the Right Wing,
Army of the Peninsula, M a j . Gen. John B. Magruder command
ing, for April 23, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 460; Wise,
Long A r m , p. 186; Livermore, Numbers and L o s s e s , pp. 67-70;
Robert E. Lee to Abraham C. Myers, April 29, 1862, Robert E.
Lee to Samuel P. Moore, April 29, 1862, Robert E. Lee to
John H. Winder, May 3, 1862, in "Lee Letterbook; Returns of
the Department of Northern Virginia, October, November, and
December, 18 61, in JJWM.
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assigned to command a division of six brigades.^9

That he

thought such divisions overly large is evidenced by the fact
that he allowed his four subordinates to sub-divide their
own commands, and requested the promotion of W. H.. C.
Whiting.

40

Johnston moved to improve the overall quality of

his brigade commanders, recommending promotion for Colonel
Wade Hampton, permitting the elderly S. R. Anderson to
resign, and campaigning to avoid the assignment of politi
cian-general Henry A. Wise to the army.41
He decided to leave Hill in command of the Yorktown
fortifications,

because the North Carolinian was familiar

with the strengths and weaknesses of the positions,

and

because he had already begun to implement Johnston's orders
to move a substantial number of heavy cannon from the river
to the land side of the

fort.

ton was dispatched to assist

42

chief of Artillery Pendle

h i m .

43

Johnston limited

^General
Orders No. 1, Department of Northern Virgin
ia, April 18, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 448.

40joseph E. Johnston to George W. Randolph, April
1862, in W. H. C. Whiting, Compiled Service Record.

20,

4lLouis T. Wigfall to Joseph E. Johnston, May [April]
21, 1862, in JJWM; S. R. Anderson to Samuel Cooper,. March 5,
1862, S. R. Anderson to Jefferson Davis, March 8, 1862, in
LR-A I G O , M-474, Reel 3; Theopnilus H. Holmes, March 6, 1862,
in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 23; Warner, Generals in G r a y , p. 10;
Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 28, 1862, in O R ,
XI (part 3):
p . 471 .
42 d . H. Hill to George W. Randolph, April
OR, XI (part 3):
p. 442.
43Lee, M e m o i r s , pp.

15,

1862,

180-181.
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Magruder's command to the far right side of the l i n e overlooking the Warwick River all the way to the James.

He

assigned Longstreet the center segment; and G. W. Smith the
rese r v e .^4
Moving Magruder, who had designed the entire defensive
system, to the least critical point in the line appears to
have been a tacit editorial comment by Johnston on "Prince
John's" initial conduct of operations.

Despite having

commanded on the Peninsula for nearly a year, and having
held this line for several weeks, Magruder had allowed much
necessary work to remain undone.
facing York River.

He retained too many guns

The critical rifle pits in the center of

the line had never been connected,

improved, or drained.

No

telegraph lines had been run behind his front, and even
locally no provisions seemed to have been made for comman
ders to react to a Federal attack.

McClellan's probe of

April 16, had it not been met by troops instinctively
marching to the sound of the guns,

and the initiative of two

colonels, might well have shattered the key point in the
Yorktown line.

"Labor enough has been expended here to make

a very strong position," Johnston advised Lee on April

22,

"but it has been wretchedly misapplied by the young engineer
officers."45

^General

ia, April 18,

He did not need to mention who had supervised

orders No. 1, Department of Northern Virgin
1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 448.

45joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 22,
in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 455-456.

1862,
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the engineers.
The methodical Longstreet received the assignment to
shore up the middle of the line.

Unlike Magruder, who had

often halted labor on his fortifications when he could not
find slaves to impress, the Georgian put his own troops to
work.

Shacks and other buildings behind the lines were

dismantled, not to be fed into bonfires, but to plank over
the muddy bottoms of the

trenches.

46

His regiments worked

in relays connecting and extending the rifle pits, and
erecting small redoubts every few hundred feet along the
line.

The rear walls of the two detached redoubts were

filled in with a combination of earth,
of

cotton.

47

sand bags, and bales

Longstreet's men already knew how to w a l k —

now he taught them to dig.
The six brigades of G. W. Smith's Division remained in
reserve throughout the entire period of the army's stay in
the trenches.

The fact that his troops never had to rotate

into the water-logged front lines caused some resentment
among the rest of the soldiers of Johnston's army, but the
deployment represented sound military logic.
Johnston's most trusted subordinate,

Smith was

the man he wanted

46 q . Moxley Sorrel to A. P. Hill, April 20,
O R , LI (part 2):
p. 543.

1862,

in

47pavid F. Riggs, 7th Virginia Infantry (Lynchburg, VA:
H. E. Howard, 1982), p.
22; Robert T. Bell, 11th Virginia
Infantry (Lynchburg, VA:
H. E. Howard, 1985), p. 19;
Hamilton, Shotwell, I:
pp. 180-181; Alexander, "Sketch," p.
36; Alexander, Military M e m o i r s , p. 64.
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instantly available to protect the army's flanks if McClel
lan's gunboats succeeded in opening either the James or York
Rivers.

Kept in their camps about a mile to the rear of the

main line, Smith's brigades could be ready to march hours
sooner than regiments which would have to be relieved in the
trenches first.

True, Johnston could have rotated the

troops, brigade by brigade, to give the rest of his men more
respite from disagreeable duty.
might have improved morale,

But while such an action

it could also have left him with

the fragments of two or more divisions as his reserve,

not a

single concentrated force of 10,000-15,000 men accustomed to
working together.

As usual, Johnston's dispositions were

governed by military necessity; if he had a failing it was
that he never saw a need to explain to anyone else that
which he believed to be patently

o b v i o u s .

48

Under ordinary circumstances, the perceived disparity
in duties assigned might have passed with minor discontent.
But during the months of March, April,

and May,

situation inside every Confederate army,
ton's, was hardly ordinary.

1862, the

including Johns

In a desperate attempt to keep

Southern brigades from melting away when the enlistments of

4®There is also evidence that Johnston himself was a
little distant from the problem of the living and working
conditions of the troops in the trenches.
On April 25 he
wrote to D. H. Hill:
"Do I understand you to say that your
men already require relief?
I suppose not, as there had
[been] no occasion yet for fatiguing service."
Joseph E.
Johnston to D. H. Hill, April 25, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
p . 46 4.
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the one-year regiments expired, the Confederate Congress had
passed legislation requiring those units to reorganize for
three years, but granting each company, battery, battalion,
and regiment the right to re-elect its

officers.^9

It was a most peculiar exercise in democracy:

men who

could not vote for their own Senators, or even in some cases
for President,

had demanded and won the right to select by

popular vote the officers who would lead them into battle.
For years after the war, veterans recalled the elections
with reactions that ranged from wry humor to thinly veiled
disgust.

In the 18th Mississippi, Captains A. G. Brown

Governor and Senator) and O. R. Singleton
both standing for higher office,
reorganize immediately they would

(ex-

(ex-Congressman),

"told us that if we would
'wager their heads to

brass pins the war would end in sixty

d a y s . '"50

An orderly

sergeant campaigning for election to lieutenant in the 1st
Virginia Cavalry performed the morning roll call while the
men of his company lay in their bedrolls.

He promised them

that if they elected him he could get the company reorgan
ized as artillery and sent on detached service to more
favorable

climes.

51

"it was a comical sight," wrote a

49patrick, Jefferson Davis and his C a b i n e t , p. 124;
Freeman, R. E. L e e , II:
pp. 28-29; Jones, Confederate
St r ategy, pp. 42-49.
50w. Gart Johnson, "The Barksdale-Humphrey Brigade,"
Confederate V e t e r a n , April 1894 supplemental issue, p. 25.
51]3lackford, War Y e a r s , pp. 62-63.
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member of the Richmond Howitzers,
army

"to see the officers of an

'elected' by the people in ranks," but Colonel John

Brockenbrough of the 40th Virginia found nothing humorous in
the situation:

"we find worthless,

intriguing, politicians,

and those who have been defeated in company elections,
taking advantage of all these conflicting bills and unsatis
factory constructions

. . . using bribery,

a great deal of

flash plausibility, and arguments which any worthless
demagogue is capable of m a k i n g . "52
But the situation was hardly amusing to Joseph Johnston
or his generals.
pline,

The elections seriously disrupted disci

and consumed his senior officers' time supervising

contests or puzzling out the finer points of byzantine
Confederate election laws.

More detrimental yet, the

upheaval cost the army the service of hundreds of experi
enced officers in the midst of an active campaign, men often
replaced by ciphers, demagogues, and aspirants with true
potential but no training.
No statistical study has ever quantified the precise
effect of the elections on either the Department of Northern
Virginia or the Southern forces as a whole, but rough
approximations can be made.

Over half of the army on the

Peninsula was affected by the reorganization:

fifty of

52carleton McCarthy, Richmond Howitzers in the War,
Four Years Campaigning with the Army of Northern Virginia,
By a Member of the Company (Richmond:
n. p., 1891), p. 55;
John M. Brockenbrough to Theophilus Holmes, March 21, 1862,
in OR, XII (part 3):
pp. 832-833.
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eighty-eight and one-half infantry regiments, three of four
cavalry regiments,
batteries.53

and probably twenty of thirty-eight field

This represented roughly 35,600 officers and

men, with about 2,175 officers forced to fight for reelection.^
K. Krick,

Spot samples, and research by historian Robert

suggest that about thirty-seven percent of the

company officers and nearly fifty-three percent of the field
officers were defeated,

sending home more than 800 experi-

53T h ese numbers result from a comparison of "Organiza
tion of the Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by General
Joseph E. Johnston, on the Peninsula, about April 30, 1862,"
in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 479-484, with "Statement of the
number of troops now in the service enlisted for the war and
of the States from which they have volunteered," December
13, 1861, in OR, Series 4, I:
pp. 788-790.
The artillery
batteries are not broken out in the second document, and
have been assigned the same percentage as the infantry,
which does not seem unlikely, since many of them were
Virginia companies, which had to reorganize almost without
exception.
The following regiments were therefore affected
by the reorganization (with battalions and regiments split
between war companies and twelve-month companies counted as
half a regiment):
Gracie's Battalion, 4, 5 (1/2), 6, 26
Alabama; Arkansas Battalion; 2 Florida, 7 Georgia; 1
Kentucky; 2 Louisiana; 2, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18 Mississippi;
13, 14, 15, 16, 22, 23 North Carolina; Hampton Legion, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 South Carolina; 1, 7, 14 Tennessee, 1 (1/2)
Texas; Noland's Battalion, 1, 1 Cavalry, 3, 3 Cavalry, 4
Cavalry, 7, 8, 11, 17, 18, 19, 24, 26, 28, 32, 46, 47, 49
Virginia.
In the other components of the Department of
Northern Virginia the percentage of units affected was even
higher.
In Jackson's and Ewell's Divisions, twenty-three of
thirty-two regiments had to reorganize; in Huger's Division,
eleven of twelve; and among the units gathered around
Fredericksburg, eleven out of twenty-one.
In total, at
least ninety-eight out of 152 1/2 infantry and cavalry
regiments, or more than sixty-two percent, underwent the
throes of reorganization.
^ T a k e n from the April 30 "effective" strengths,
allowing for officers by using Livermore's multiplier of 6.5?
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enced officers during March, April, and M a y . 55

Certainly

some of the defeated candidates had been overage, political
appointees, or deadwood better pruned from the army rosters,
but dozens,

if not hundreds, of competent men lost their

positions.

Among the able officers who left the army as a

result of the elections were West Pointers Benjamin Stoddert
Ewell, Robert Johnston, William E.
Murray,

"Grumble" Jones, Edward

Stephen Dodson Ramseur, Beverly Robertson,

and

Armistead Rust; along with Virginia Military Institute
graduates Charles Crump and Charles Lightfoot.56

Most of

these men eventually returned to the army in other capaci
ties, but for the moment they were as lost to Johnston as if

55rphe figure of 37% of company officers is from Robert
K. Krick, 30th Virginia Infantry (Lynchburg, VA:
H. E.
Howard, 1983), p. 13, and is confirmed by spot-checking
other entries in the H. E. Howard regimental series.
Krick's biographical dictionary— Robert K. Krick, Lee 's
Colonels, A Biographical Register of the Field Officers of
the Army of Northern V i r g i n i a , 2nd edition (Dayton, OH:
Morningside, 1984)--makes it possible to determine the
number, of field officers ousted with some precision.
Eliminating Gracie's Alabama Battalion, Noland's Virginia
Battalion, and the 1st Kentucky, which Krick does not cover,
eighty field officers lost their positions out of 152
required to stand the elections.
56Ramseur did not leave the army because he had lost an
election, but because he had won one.
He had been serving
as the captain of the Ellis (North Carolina) Light Artil
lery, when he learned of his election to the colonelcy of
the 49th North Carolina, and left the army to go back to his
home state and finish the regiment's training.
See Gary W.
Gallagher, Stephen Dodson Ramseur, Lee's Gallant General
(Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press,
1985), p. 37; the other cases are drawn from Krick or
Warner; see Krick, Lee's Colon e l s , pp. 90-31, 114-115, 181,
205, 245-246, 283-284; Warner, Generals in G r a y , pp. 167,
260.
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Federal bullets had struck them in combat.
It would be difficult to overstate the confusion caused
by the elections.

Several units,

like Dreux's Louisiana

Battalion and the 9th South Carolina,

simply ceased to exist

when their companies attached to other regiments.57

The 4th

South Carolina lost so many men that it was barely saved by
the expedient of reorganizing it as a battalion rather than
a regiment.58

Enough regiments to fill two brigades,

petitioned Johnston directly for discharge; he dutifully
transmitted their request to the Secretary of
Meanwhile,

W a r .

59

aspiring officers probed for every favorable

technicality in the poorly written rules, and drove their
brigadiers to distraction trying to adjudicate their claims.
Captain David G. Houston of Company D, 11th Virginia,
asserted that because his company had reorganized several
days earlier than the remainder of the regiment, he was now,
by law, the senior captain of the regiment, and due for an
automatic promotion to a vacant majority.

When Brigadier-

General A. P. Hill forwarded this contention to Richmond,
Adjutant-General Cooper ruled that Houston was correct:

S^Krick, Lee"s C o l o n e l s , p. 48;
R. G. Lowe, "The Dreux
Battalion," Confederate V e t e r a n , Vol. V, No. 2 (February
1897):
p. 55.
^^Krick, Lee's C o l onels, p. 452; Thomas G. Rhett to
James Longstreet, April 27, 1862, Thomas G. Rhett to James
Longstreet, April 28, 1862, in L S - A N V A .
59j0 seph E. Johnston to George W. Randolph, April 28,
1862, Joseph E. Johnston to George W. Randolph, April 29,
1862, in LR-SW, M-618, Reel 9.
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"Officers take rank from the date of their election.

It was

the intention of the law to give this advantage to companies
first

organized

."60

Later, this precedent was seized by

Captain Reuben Cleary of the 7th Virginia— another of Hill's
regiments— to claim likewise an open majority.

The War

Department upheld his right to the post, even though the
company which elected him had

d i s b a n d e d ! 61

But Hill's were among the more simple problems facing
Confederate officers during the reorganization.
Virginia,

stationed at Norfolk, Company C held a disputed

election for the captaincy.
abstained,

In the 9th

Ten of the seventy-seven men

leaving one candidate with thirty-five votes,

other with thirty-two.

the

But thirty-five votes, Major Mark

Hardin pointed out, was only a majority of the sixty-seven
men who actually voted, not of the entire company.
the election stand?

Should

An anonymous endorsement from Cooper's

office ratified the election.62

Colonel Wade Hampton faced

an even knottier problem in his brigade with the 16th North
Carolina, whose Company D entered the election season with
141 men.

On April 22, Hampton presented Secretary Randolph

with the following conundrum:

"Seventy four men of Company

6C>David G. Houston Jr. to Samuel Cooper, May 24,
in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 25.

1862,

6lRobert Cleary to W. T. Patton, June 10, 1862,
A I G O , M-474, Reel 29.

in LR-

62Mark Hardin to Samuel Cooper, March 25,
A I G O , M-474, Reel 24.

in LR-

1862,
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D 16 NC regt. re-enlisted & chose their officers under the
bounty act leaving sixty-seven men in old company which is
now Company D.
residue?"

What disposition shall be made of the

He needed a quick answer, because the election--

in whichever company the War Department decided really was
Company D--was scheduled for the following day.
plaintively, he closed the telegram:

Almost

"Do answer."

There is

no indication in the files that anyone ever did . 63
The situation was even more muddled in regiments like
the 1st Texas and the 5th Alabama, both of which had been so
hastily assembled in the fall of 1861 that each contained
five companies enlisted for one year and five that had
signed on for three.

"Does the 11th section of the Act of

Congress require a new election of officers if the war
companies and field officer," queried Brigadier-General
Early, whose brigade included the Alabamians,
election of officers of the 12 months

"or merely an

c o m p a n i e s ? "64

there is no reply extant; by mid-April,

Again,

1862, it seemed as

if the Secretary of War and the Adjutant-General had quietly
given up, and decided to ratify whatever the senior officer
in the field decided fit the rules.
The confusion was not confined to the infantry.
Colonel Pendleton's effort to achieve consistent calibers in

63wade Hampton to George W. Randolph, April 22, 1862,
in L R - S W , M - 618, Reel 9.
64jubal Early to George W. Randolph, April 21, 1862, in
LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 13.
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each company, not only resulted in the constant transfer of
guns between different batteries, but left the gunners with
perplexing electoral questions, as well.

The Jeff Davis

(Alabama) Artillery had originally boasted eight cannon, but
had been reduced by transfer to six.

The problem was that

the War Department had authorized the overstrength battery
several additional lieutenants.

Did their commissions

expire with the loss of their guns?

Nobody,

including the

Secretary of War, seemed to be certain.65
Competition in the cavalry was even more keen than in
the infantry or artillery.

Of the seven Virginia regiments

required to undergo reorganization,

five voted out their

colonels, all of whom had been professional soldiers before
the war.

This included the colonels of all three of

Stuart's regiments on the Peninsula. 66

Jubal Early pro

tested that "the bad effects of the election system has
. . . been shown in the case of a Virginia Cavalry Regiment
[the 3rd],

in which,

in my opinion by a mistaken

[exception]

of the law, the election of field officers was held by the
men, and the Colonel, an efficient officer from the old
army, was beaten."67

But following its system of ratifying

65<rhere is no endorsement on the letter and no reply in
the letterbooks.
Jubal Early to George W. Randolph, April
21, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 17.
6£>Krick,

G r a y , pp.

167,

Lee's C o l o n e l s , p. 181; Warner, Generals in
260.

67jubal Early to George W. Randolph, April 21, 1862, in
LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 13.
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almost any outcome that did not result in the dissolution of
the regiment in question, the War Department declined to
overturn the election.
Johnston,

like Lee and almost every other profession

ally educated officer in the army, viewed the elections with
quiet apprehension.

Even in his memoirs, he remained mostly

silent on the subject, noting only that the law "had the
effect of weakening the army.
other differences,

. . ."68

But despite their

it is nearly certain that Johnston

wholeheartedly agreed with the position stated by Lee,
several months earlier:
The best troops are ineffectual without good
officers.
Our volunteers, more than any other, require
officers whom they can respect and trust.
The best men
for that position should be selected, and it is impor
tant to consider how it can be effected.
It would be
safe to trust men of the intelligence and character of
our volunteers to elect their officers, could they at
the time of the election realize their dependent condi
tion in the day of battle.
But this they cannot do,
and I have known them in the hour of danger to repudi
ate and disown officers of their choice and beg for
others.
Is it right then, for a State to throw upon
its citizens a responsibility which they do not feel
and cannot properly exercise?®®
Yet regardless of his personal feelings, Johnston could
do little to ameliorate the ill effects of the elections.
He prevented disgruntled soldiers from simply leaving the
army when they thought their legal enlistments had expired,
employing Stuart's cavalry to round them up and return them

68johnston,

N a rrative, p. 90.

^ R o b e r t E. Lee to A. G. Magrath, December 29, 1861, in
OR, VI:
p. 350.
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to the ranks.70

He punctually forwarded the questions of

his commanders to the appropriate departments in Richmond
and enforced the ensuing decisions.

He sanctioned the

creation of boards of examination, which would hopefully
remove the most blatant incompetents before they could do
severe harm to their own m e n . 71

Beyond these measures,

there was little for the army commander to do but keep
himself firmly focused on the military problem at hand:
resisting McClellan.
There were certainly enough other issues at hand with
which Johnston had to d e a l , for at least one of which
nothing in his entire military career had prepared him.
assuming command of the Peninsula and Norfolk,
acquired a navy.

In

he had also

The Virginia and the other vessels under

construction at Gosport were not really his concern.

The

talented if temperamental Flag-Officer, Josiah Tattnall, had
assumed command of the ironclad, whose mission was fairly
simple:

to cruise in the vicinity of Hampton Roads as often

and as ostentatiously as possible.

The Richmond and the

other incomplete craft remained under the control of Captain
Sidney Smith Lee, the commandant of the navy yard.

But the

remainder of the James River Squadron had been ordered out
of Hampton Roads and up the James to support the far right

70Thomas G. Rhett to J. E. B. Stuart, April
in LS-A N V A .

24, 1862,

71-Lewis Armistead to Samuel Cooper, May 24, 1862,
LR-A I G O , M - 4 7 4 , Reel 3.
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of the Yorktown

l i n e .

72

Compared to the massive flotilla with which Admiral
Goldsborough supported the Army of the Potomac, Commander
John R. Tucker's five vessels seemed almost inconsequential.
Only the partially armored Patrick H e n r y , mounting ten guns,
could be considered a threat to anything other than an
undefended transport.

Her sister ship, the Jamestown,

sported no armor at all, and carried but two cannon, which
left her no more powerful than the smaller T e a z e r , which
also carried two guns.

The Raleigh and the Beaufort

belonged to Mallory's envisioned fleet of pesky little
gunboats— converted tugs which, although light of draft and
m a n u everable, were essentially impotent,

having only a

single rifled field piece placed in each

b o w .

73

informed the Secretary of the Navy on April 21:

as Tattnall
"I can not

prevent the enemy's gunboats or light draft transports from
entering and ascending the James River, or their army
crossing it, except so far as the force of steamers I have
placed in the river may prevent it.
remarked gloomily,

"On this, however," he

"I have little reliance, as the enemy at

any time can send a force so superior as to compel them to

72Entry of April 5, 1862, Bragg diary, p. 201; Stephen
Mallory to Josiah Tattnall, March 21, 1862, Stephen Mallory
to Sidney Smith Lee, March 24, 1862, Josiah Tattnall, April
20, 1862, in NOR, VII:
pp. 748, 749, 768.
73"Report of Flag-Officer Buchanan, C. S. Navy," March
27, 1862, in OR, IX:
p. 8; Stephen Mallory to Jefferson
Davis, July 18, 1861, in N O R , Series 2, II:
p. 77.
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retire upon the river behind our forts."7 4
Helpless or not against the Federal Navy, Johnston did
not realize that, until it actually

was overwhelmed,

Tucker's squadron could provide him

with intelligence

concerning operations on McClellan's left flank.
vessels could also inhibit,

The five

if not prevent, any crossing of

the lower Warwick River by unsupported Yankee infantry.
Aside from that, Johnston instructed Tucker that "it would
be well for your boats to do the enemy harm whenever they
can."

He also included the caution

that "it is hardly worth

while to fire, however, merely to annoy them."
most trusted subordinates,

As with his

Johnston left the final decision

up to the man in the field— or in this case, in the w a t e r —
"You in the neighborhood can always judge when it is worth
while to open

f i r e .

"75

His trust proved to be well placed.

A fifty-year-old

Virginian, with thirty-five years experience afloat,
including duty in the Mexican War, Tucker was cool under
fire, meticulous about details,-and a talented tactical
improvisor.

Within a week of his first assignment to

Johnston's command, the General praised Tucker's abilities
to Tattnall:

"I am much pleased with his intelligence and

74josiah Tattnall to Stephen Mallory, April 21, 1862,
in NOR, VII:
pp. 769-770.
75joseph E. Johnston to John R. Tucker, April 28, 1862,
in N O R , VII:
pp. 775-776.
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Both Johnston and the Confederate authorities in

Richmond would soon find even more reasons to appreciate his
imagination and nerve.
The normal details of army administration consumed much
of the rest of Johnston's time.

He ordered the few decent

roads through Williamsburg kept clear of miscellaneous wagon
traffic in order to ensure that they would be open if
Smith's Division had to move out quickly.77

Likewise, he

insisted that the Engineer Bureau inspect and,
repair the major bridges over the

Chickahominy

if necessary,
.78

Johnston

also had telegraph lines strung along the length of the
army's

r e a r .

79

He badgered both the Secretary of War,

requesting better cannon; and General Lee, asking him to
inspect hospital accommodations for his sick men in Rich
mond, and to push General Winder to sweep the city for
soldiers absent without leave.80

76sifakis, Who was W h o , p. 662; Joseph E. Johnston to
Josiah Tattnall, April 28, 1862, in N O R , Series 2, II:
p.
633 .
77Thomas G. Rhett to Benjamin S. Ewell, April 21, 1862,
in LS-ANVA.
78joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 22, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 456.
^ i n d i c a t e d in T. G. Hunt to John R. Tucker, April 27,
1862, in NOR, VII:
p. 775.
SOjoseph E. Johnston to George W. Randolph, April 25,
1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 27; Robert E. Lee to Samuel P.
Moore, April 29, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Abraham C. Myers,
April 29, 1862, Robert E. Lee to John H. Winder, May 3,
1862, in Lee Letterbook.
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For a man normally economical with words,

the army

commander almost barraged his superiors with updates and
requests:

during his sixteen-day tenure at Yorktown,

Johnston wrote Lee or Randolph at least fourteen times, and
quite possibly

m o r e . 81

He also attempted to maintain

contact with his other subordinates.

Several telegraphic

messages and letters, some delivered by staff officers
authorized to expand on their content, arrived at Norfolk
for General Huger, Flag-Officer Tatnall,

and Captain

L

e

e

.

8 2

Messages requiring Generals Jackson and Ewell to communicate
through Cooper's office in Richmond had been dispatched
before Johnston left the capital; Field received similar
instructions during the following

w

e

e

k

.

83

But despite his

8 lThis covers the number of letters preserved in OR and
L S - A N V A , those found so far in LR-AIGO and L R - S W , as well as
those alluded to in OR and Lee Letterbook, but not actually
found.
The list certainly omits many telegrams and dozens
of endorsements on correspondence by his juniors, but as it
stands now, letters or telegrams from Johnston to Lee or
Randolph can be listed for the following dates (an asterisk
indicates that the letter in question is mentioned but has
not been found:
Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April
20*, April 22 (two letters), April 24, April 27, April 28,
April 29, April 30, May 1*; Joseph E. Johnston to George W.
Randolph, April 20, April 24, April 25, April 28 (two letters).
82joseph E. Johnston to Benjamin Huger, April 27, 1862,
Benjamin Huger to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862, Robert E.
Lee to Benjamin Huger, April 29, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 469-470, 474-475; Joseph E. Johnston to Josiah Tattnall,
April 28, 1862, Joseph E. Johnston to Josiah Tattnall, May
1, 1862, Testimony of Sidney Smith Lee, January 31, 1863,
Investigation of Navy Department, in N O R , Series 2, II:
pp.
633-634.
83Thomas G. Rhett to Charles W. Field, April 24, 1862,
in LS-ANVA.
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best efforts, Johnston soon found himself receiving less and
less information from the rest of Virginia.

By April 26, he

would certainly have agreed with Colonel Dorsey Pender of
the 6th North Carolina, who wrote his wife:

"We are about

as near cut off from all communication with the world as we
could well be.

Our mail all seems to come by chance and I

have not yet been able to find out from what post office it
c a m e ."84
But in Johnston's case, the culprit was not the
Confederate Post Office— it was his superiors in Richmond,
specifically Generals Cooper
ally) and Lee.

(though probably unintention

Though Johnston had left instructions for

his mail from Jackson,

Ewell, and Field to be forwarded to

him through the Adjutant-General's Office, Cooper sent them
all,

instead, to Lee.

Neither the originals nor copies were

ever posted to Johnston who, unknowingly, found himself
forced to rely upon letters from Lee,

letters that subtly

distorted not only the situation among Johnston's subordi
nates, but also his own role in directing

them.

84oorsey Pender to Fanny Pender, April 26,
Hassler, General to his L a d y , p. 137.

85

That Lee

1862,

in

85while a few of the letters in the OR show endorse
ments of Lee forwarding them to Johnston, most of the
letters were never forwarded to Johnston, and several, when
they were copied for OR, had their endorsements omitted.
See Richard S. Ewell to Samuel Cooper, May 9, 1862, in LRA I G O , M-474, Reel 17, for an example of a letter forwarded
by Cooper to Lee and not Johnston.
Compare the version of
Richard S. Ewell to Robert E. Lee on May 14, 1862, in O R ,
XII (part 3):
p. 890, with the version in L R - A I G O , M-474,
Reel 17, which contains an endorsement forwarding it for the
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had the authority to intercept Johnston's correspondence and
issue orders directly to his subordinates was indisputable;
it was, however, his methods that were questionable.
Many historians have assumed that Johnston simply
neglected his detached subordinates,

leaving a command

vacuum into which Lee, Jefferson Davis's "Military Advisor,"
quietly inserted himself, guiding by suggestion in order to
avoid rumpling Johnston's sensibilities.

Clifford Dowdey

entitled his chapter on the subject "Lee plays at Machiavelli," and Douglas Southall Freeman asserted, without sources,
that President Davis had instructed a reluctant Lee to
intercept Johnston's correspondence and "supervise the
movements of these two officers as long as Johnston was at a
distance from

R ichmond"^

Robert G. Tanner,

in Stonewall in

the V a l l e y , characterized Lee's intervention as being
conducted "with great skill and little

a u t h o r i t y . "87

But as has already been demonstrated,

Lee's position as

Commanding General was far less than nominal.

And he seems

information of Cooper, but not sending it to Johnston.
That
this process did not begin after Johnston's withdrawal from
Yorktown is evident from an examination of A. Blanchard to
Samuel Cooper, April 28, 1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 6.
Blanchard commanded a brigade in the Department of Norfolk,
and was, therefore, Johnston's subordinate, but the'letter
was forwarded to Lee instead.
See also arguments on
communications from Ewell and Jackson for the rest of this
chapter.
S^Dowdey,
p. 131.
^Tanner,

Seven D a y s , p. 63; Freeman, R . E . L e e , II:

Stonewall

in the V a l l e y , p. 156.
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to have hardly blinked at asserting his authority.

Two

letters from Ewell to Cooper, dated April 20 and intended
for Johnston,

announced that Jackson had called him from his

post on the Rapidan toward the Shenandoah because the
Federals were advancing.

Johnston never saw the letters,

which were diverted to Lee, who answered them most authori
tatively:

"If it is practicable to strike a speedy blow at

General Banks and drive him back it will tend to relieve the
pressure on Fredericksburg. "8*3
The same day, Lee mailed a letter to Jackson, advising
him that "if you can use General Ewell's division in an
attack on General Banks, and to drive him back, it will
prove a great relief to the pressure on Fredericksburg.
. . ."

If this was impracticable, Lee strongly suggested

that Jackson return Ewell to supporting distance of Field's
brigade south of the Rappahannock.

Most importantly, Lee

essentially cut Johnston out of the line of communication by
telling Jackson to "please communicate with me on this
subject.

[emphasis added]"89

Nor did Lee inform Johnston,

in a letter to the

department commander on the same day, that he had written to
both of Johnston's subordinates.

Besides ignoring his own

SSRichard S. Ewell to Samuel Cooper, April 20, 1862,
Richard S. Ewell to Samuel Cooper, April 20, 1862, Robert E.
Lee to Richard S. Ewell, April 21, 1862, in OR, XII (part
3):
pp. 857-859.
E. Lee to Thomas J. Jackson, April 21,
(part 3):
pp. 859-860.

8 9 R o b e r t

in OR, XII

1862,
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correspondence with Jackson and Ewell, Lee did not advise
Johnston that Field had abandoned Fredericksburg, and that
he, standing on his authority as Commanding General,

had

sent the young brigadier-general explicit orders that were a
far cry from the deferential suggestions of a military
adviser.

"I desire that you shall do everything in your

power to prevent the enemy from advancing from Fredericks
burg," Lee instructed Field on April

19, continuing:

"You

will use every exertion to ascertain the strength and
movements of the enemy and keep me informed of the same.
You will also communicate with General Ewell.

..."

These

were positive directives, directives of which Lee did not
advise Johnston.90
Lee did not even inform Johnston until April 23— six
days after the fact--that the Confederates no longer held
Fredericksburg.

He vaguely detailed the reinforcements

being dispatched to Field's position, but in such a way that
Johnston could not have estimated their numbers, even though
Lee had an accurate count of the soldiers being sent north.
Nor did he advise Johnston whether or not either of the
brigade commanders, Maxcy Gregg or Joseph R. Anderson,
ranked Field, and would, therefore, take over his command.
In the same pair of letters, Lee finally informed Johnston
that Jackson had called Ewell into the Valley, but omitted

90Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, April 21, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 452; Robert E. Lee to Charles W.
Field, April 19, 1862, in OR, XII (part 1):
p. 433.
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the date on which Jackson had done so, and continued to
ignore his own correspondence with the two generals.91
Lee 's actions in regard to the Fredericksburg front
became even more misleading on April

Brigadier-General

26.

Joseph R. Anderson did indeed outrank Field, and received
his formal instructions from Lee when he passed through
Richmond from North Carolina.

"You will proceed with your

brigade to the vicinity of Fredericksburg," Lee told
Anderson,

"where Brig.

C. W. Field is now with the troops

which have preceded you, and assume command of the opera
tions of our army in that quarter, being the senior general
officer."

No mention was made by Lee that Field had been

subordinate to Johnston,

nor that Anderson's command was a

district in someone else's department.

The appointment to

command having been made, Lee continued with detailed
strategic orders:

"If it be impossible to drive the enemy

from his present position,

I desire you to lose no effort to

keep him confined to the smallest possible

margin."92

Anderson obviously considered himself the commander of

91-Lee did not give Johnston the numbers of either
Gregg's or Anderson's brigades, both of which he would have
had at least a rough idea from departmental returns in
Cooper's office.
The strength of the regiments sent from
Richmond he knew exactly, because he had the muster rolls.
See Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, April 23, 1862,
Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, April 23, 1862, in OR,
XI (part 3):
pp. 458-459; Robert E. Lee to Samuel Cooper,
April 24, 1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 30.
92Robert E. Lee to Joseph R. Anderson, April 25, 1862,
in OR, XII (part 3):
p. 867.
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one of the Confederacy's many small independent armies,
answerable only to the Commanding General.

Lee neither

corrected him when he styled his division the "Army of the
Rappahannock," nor ever informed him that Johnston was his
official superior.93

Johnston did not receive news of

Anderson's assumption of command until May 8, when Lee
responded to a direct question.

On the other hand, Lee

informed both Jackson and Ewell of Anderson's appointment in
advance,

and ordered all three generals to communicate with

each other.9 4
Lee's methods plainly discomfited both Jackson and
Ewell.

Jackson pointed out to him on April 23 that the

options that they had been discussing "would be departing
from General Johnston's instructions.
later, Jackson,

. . ."95

Three days

still uneasy about the lack of any word from

his official superior, queried Ewell:
reports to General Johnston?

"Do you make regular

The General directed me to

send communications for him to you.

Please acknowledge

receipt of the accompanying one and let me know to what

93joseph R. Anderson to Robert E Lee, April 29, 1862,
in OR, XII (part 3):
p. 873; See also J. R. Anderson Order
B o o k , Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.
94Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 8, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 3):
pp. 500-501; Robert E. Lee to Thomas J.
Jackson, April 25, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Richard S. Ewell,
April 25, 1862, in OR, XII (part 3):
pp. 865-866.
95Robert E. Lee to Thomas J. Jackson, April
in OR, XII (part 3):
p. 863.

23, 1862,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

320

point you send it."®®
Jackson's April 26 letter to Johnston did not survive
to be included in either the Official Records or the files
of the Adjutant and Inspector-General's office.

But its

timing suggests that Jackson, who had always kept Johnston
carefully apprised of his movement, probably explained that
he intended,

on Lee's orders, to leave Ewell's Division to

observe Banks while he united with Brigadier-General Edward
Johnson west of Staunton, to attack the Federals debouching
from the mountains of western Virginia.

As aggressive as he

was, it would have been in character for Jackson to tell his
superior that he intended to use the discretion granted him
to pursue his plan unless he was overruled within a few
d

a

y

s

.

Four days later, having received no response,

Jackson began the deceptive maneuvering which inaugurated
the later-famous "Valley Campaign."

It is impossible to

determine whether or not Johnston would have sanctioned
Jackson's offensive, because he never received the letter.
Lee's disregard for the formal command structure also
distressed Ewell.

"Dick" Ewell's personality was such that

his performance depended upon the receipt of explicit

9®Thomas J. Jackson to Richard S. Ewell, April 26,
1862, in OR, XII (part 3):
p. 868.
®7jackson had, for instance, always kept Johnston wellinformed during his Romney campaign in the previous winter.
Nor would the content have been much different than in
Thomas J. Jackson to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862, in O R ,
XII (part 3):
p. 872; Tanner, Stonewall in the V a l l e y , pp.
161-162 .
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orders; ambiguity, or even an excess of personal discretion,
unnerved him . 9 8

And nobody,

during April, May, and June,

1862, ever seemed to want to explain to him where he was to
march, why he was headed there, or who was in charge.

He

confided in one of his brigade commanders that "he never saw
one of Jackson's couriers approach without expecting an
order to assault the north p ole."99

Lee's letters suited

him little better; on April 26 he complained to the Command
ing General that "I have the honor tc state that I don't
clearly understand your letter of the 2 5th.

..."

This was

followed by an extract and a series of detailed questions
aimed at pinning down Lee's intent.100

Lee responded

briefly on April 27 that the information had been more
intended for Jackson than Ewell, and that Ewell had been
informed almost as an afterthought.101

Three days later,

still disgruntled by the fact that he could not determine
just who was in control of operations, Ewell shot back to
Lee a rejoinder:
I beg leave to say that it seems important to
me that the whole line, including the forces south
of Fredericksburg (Generals Field and Anderson),
should be under one general, authorized to combine
them against any point deemed advisable.
This

98preeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I:

pp.

350-352.

99yay lor, D estruction, p. 36.
lOORichard S. Ewell to Robert E. Lee, April 26, 1862,
in OR, XII (part 3):
p. 867.
lOlRobert E. Lee to Richard S. Ewell, April
in OR, XII (part 3):
p. 869.

27,

1862,
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does not seem to be the case at present, and the
enemy are exhausting the country at free
c

o

s

t

.

-*-02

Johnston's continued ignorance of this, however,
two significant questions.
in the dark?

raises

First, why did Lee keep Johnston

Second, what efforts did or should Johnston

have made to find out what was occurring in northern
Virginia?
There is no evidence extant to support Freeman's
contention that Jefferson Davis ordered Lee to take over
coordination of the movements of Johnston's detached
subordinates.

Nor did there need to be such a directive—

the correspondence of Jackson, Ewell, Anderson, and Field
all reveal the fact that each officer took Lee's title of
"Commanding General" quite seriously, and assumed that he
could legally issue them orders.

But if he had legal

authority to command Johnston's subordinates, why did Lee
not openly advise Johnston that he was doing so?
The correspondence between Johnston and Lee suggests a
possible answer.

Johnston had always been reluctant to

commit his army to the Peninsula, and when Lee had written
on April 21 that it might be necessary to detach units from
Johnston's army to reinforce Field in order to protect the
Fredericksburg line, Johnston had reacted very negatively:
"I think it anything but expedient to divide these forces."
Further,

said Johnston on April 22:

102Richard S. Ewell to Robert E. Lee, April 30,
in OR, XII (part 3):
p. 876.

1862,
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Should McDowell advance upon the capital,
which is certainly probable, the only course for
us, in my opinion, is . . . to assemble near
Richmond as many troops as possible, those from
Norfolk, North Carolina, and South Carolina to be
joined by this army, then to endeavor to fight the
enemy before all his forces are united.
To detach
troops from this position would be ruin to those
l e f t . 1 0 3

This reaction caused Lee to tread very lightly around
the subject of a threat from Fredericksburg, primarily
because his own preferred strategy involved holding the
Peninsula as long as possible.

This would also have given

Lee cause to believe that Johnston would respond negatively
to any suggestion that Jackson and Ewell might actually
march their divisions farther away from Richmond for any
reason.
But even allowing for the fact that Lee controlled much
of Johnston's access to information about other fronts, why
was there not a greater effort by Johnston to communicate
directly with his own subordinates?

Did his preoccupation

with McClellan's army and growing siege train make him
"lose touch" with the rest of his department, as Freeman
believed?
The question of timing is critically important to
resolving this issue.

Johnston had last written to Jackson

and Ewell on April 17, before leaving Richmond.

Letters

travelling from Richmond to the Rappahannock, Johnston knew

103jO seph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 22, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 456.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

324

from his own experience,
for delivery.

usually required two or three days

A letter forwarded through Ewell to Jackson

would take at least another day to reach the commander in
the Shenandoah.

Assuming that Jackson responded on the same

day he received the letter, a minimum of three days could be
expected in its return trip to the capital.
arriving at Yorktown,

Soon after

Johnston discovered that the mail

between Richmond and the Peninsula normally spent the better
part of two additional days in transit.

Therefore, even

under the best of circumstances, Johnston would not have
expected any reply from Jackson until April 24 or 25.

A

single missed connection or significant delay somewhere in
the postal chain could have reasonably extended this period
by two days; Johnston should not have had any cause to be
anxious until after April 27.104
But by that time, Johnston had already received Lee's
letter of April 23, which seemed to update him on the
positions of his subordinates.

Jackson, he inferred

incorrectly, had ordered Ewell toward the Valley on April
21, pursuant to Johnston's original orders to try to engage
Banks near Swift Run Gap.

Given the fact that it should

take Ewell at least two days to join Jackson, and that Lee
had "heard nothing

. . .

of the junction of Jackson and

Ewell," Johnston had no real reason to expect either of his

104iphese times are derived from a study of the trans
mittal and reception dates of earlier correspondence.
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commanders to write until some sort of action commenced.'*-^
Even if a battle took place immediately upon Ewell's
reinforcement of Jackson— which Johnston believed would
happen about April 24 or April

25— then a letter from

Jackson could not reasonably be expected until April
April 30.

29 or

The only problem with this series of assumptions

was that it rested upon the mistaken belief that Jackson had
ordered Ewell to march on April 21, when he had,
done so on April 17.

in fact,

Had he known that events were progres

sing so rapidly in the Valley,

it is unlikely Johnston would

have remained so sanguine about the lack of correspondence.
Only by the last few days of April would Johnston have
begun to realize that something was dreadfully amiss with
his lines of communication to his subordinates.
nately,

Unfortu

it was just then that another event occurred which

rightfully rivetted the army commander's eyes to the Yankee
army directly in front of him:

McClellan's siege artillery

opened fire.

lO^Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, April 23, 1862,
in OR, XI, (part 3):
pp. 458-459.
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Chapter Nine
The Retreat from Yorktown

The Farinholt House stood on a bluff overlooking
Wormley's Creek, roughly 4,200 yards south of Yorktown.

It

was a large, colonial-style frame house with four white
pillars on the front porch, chimneys at either end, and
third-floor dormer windows.

From the roof, an observer with

a telescope could see over the ramparts protecting Yorktown,
discern details of the water battery, and even watch the
unloading of the schooners that glided down the upper York
River to provide Johnston's army with provisions and
ammunition.

It had been a key observation point for

McClellan's engineers and artillery officers throughout the
siege.
Shortly after noon, on Wednesday, April

30, 1862, the

roof would have been packed with far more men than usual.
Battery No. 1— often informally known as the "Farinholt
Battery"— was scheduled to open fire on the Confederates at
2:00 P. M.2

Brigadier-General William F. Barry, Chief of

Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, would

1-Davis, Image of W a r , II:

have been there,

p. 45.

2 "Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army,
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac,
of the siege," May
5, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 345.
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as well as Colonel Robert 0. Tyler, organizer of the 1st
Connecticut Heavy Artillery and commander of McClellan's
siege train.

Other officers from the 1st Connecticut,

serving at batteries still incomplete, might have slipped
away to watch the effect of the first heavy shells to drop
into Yorktown, and beside them might well have been officers
from the 5th New York.

The New Yorkers had a special

interest in the guns in Battery No.

1:

they had hauled them

off the ships across paths so muddy that the monstrous
cannon sunk in to their axles.

Then they had dug them out

and manhandled them at the direction of the artillerymen
into the battery they helped to excavate.3
McClellan himself,

Possibly

attended by his retinue of staff officers

and foreign military observers, climbed onto the roof to
watch what he hoped was the systematic destruction of
Johnston's fortifications.
Major Elisha F. Kellogg, also from the 1st Connecticut
Artillery, did not have such a good view of Yorktown, even
though what he saw counted most of all.

Kellogg commanded

Battery No. 1, and thus he was down inside the carefully dug
traverses, calculating trajectories for his guns.

His

battery boasted five 100-pound Parrotts and one monster 200pounder.

The smaller guns weighed 9,700 pounds, and

required ten pounds of powder to throw a shell as far as
6,800 yards; the larger one weighed 16,500 pounds,

and

•^I bid. , p. 348 .
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lobbed its projectiles 8,000 yards on a charge of sixteen
pounds.

The shells themselves weighed between seventy and

175 pounds.

To hit the wharves or the batteries at Yorktown

was well within their capability, but called for careful
ranging; missed shots were significant because the big guns
took nearly an hour to reload.4
Kellogg's targets that Wednesday afternoon were the
Yorktown wharves, where detailed soldiers struggled to
unload half a dozen supply vessels.

As the first shells

plunged in, D. H. Hill's soldiers fled the docks in confu
sion, and the skippers of the schooners cast off and sailed
behind Gloucester Point,

a position which had, heretofore,

represented safe haven from Yankee shells.

But not today.

Kellogg's 200-pound Parrott slowly pivoted and the gunners
cranked it almost up to its thirty-five degree maximum
elevation.

They loaded a shell, and sent it crashing down

among the anchored vessels some 6,200 yards up the river.5
Hill fired back.

His men could sight Battery No.

1

quite easily, but McClellan's engineers had measured very
carefully.

An 8-inch Columbiad smoothbore was the largest

piece that the Confederates could bring to bear, and the

4I b i d ., p. 339, 345-346; Coggins, Arms and E q u i p m e n t ,
p. 86; David G. Martin, "Civil War Artillery," Strategy &
T a c t i c s , No. 81 (July-August 1980):
pp. 18-19.
^"Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army,
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, of the siege," May
5, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 345; Martin, "Artillery,"
p. 18 .
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Yankee guns had been dug in just on the fringes of its most
extreme range.

Hill's gunners got close enough to rattle

the teeth of the New Englanders inside the battery, but not
close enough to hurt them; General Barry reported several
days later:

"The enemy's fire was well directed, but the

protection afforded by the battery effective,

and their fire

caused us no casualties."^
Lowering the barrels of two of the 100-pounders
slightly, Kellogg's men returned the favor.

They could only

fire once for every three times the Confederates did, but
the greater range and shell weight of the Parrott rifles
soon told; Hill's gun was quickly silenced.

The firing

continued throughout the afternoon and evening, thirty-nine
heavy shells in all landing inside Hill's
The cannonade ceased with darkness.

perimeter.?

Gunnery with such

heavy weapons in the mid-nineteenth century still required
much direct sighting for accuracy,
waste shells.

and McClellan hated to

Dense fog the next morning provided the

Confederates something of a reprieve.

Since no one could

see where the shells were landing, Kellogg was ordered to
limit himself to one shot an hour in the direction of the
wharves, simply to discourage the unloading of

supplies.^

Slbid.

^"Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army,
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, of the siege," May
5, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 345-346.
^Ibi d ., p. 346.
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But Johnston knew that the fog could not last forever,
and his own observers confirmed that other heavy batteries
across the Warwick were only days away from opening fire, as
well.

Nothing in his own artillery park could seriously

harm McClellan's batteries as they demolished his own
positions piece by piece.

In a classic siege, this would

have been the moment for a sally against the enemy guns, but
the inundations of the river to his front made this impossi
ble.
Johnston had dreaded this moment.

The day before

Battery No. 1 opened fire, he had written to Lee that
"should the attack upon Yorktown be made earnestly, we
cannot prevent its fall; nor can it hold out more than a few
hours."

He believed that McClellan would combine his

bombardment with a rush up the James River by Federal
ironclads which,

unlike the V i r g i n i a , had shallow enough

drafts to follow the main channels.

This "would enable him

to reach Richmond three days before these troops,
out at the same time.

Should such a move be made,

setting
the fall

of Richmond would be inevitable, unless we anticipate it."9
Anticipation meant withdrawal:
more or less, can signify little,

"As two or three days,

I think it best for the

safety of the capital to do it now, to put the army in
position to defend Richmond."

Yet he intended to move

^Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 29,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 473.

1862,
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deliberately,

"as soon as can be done conveniently,

looking

to the condition of the roads and the time necessary for the
corresponding movement from Norfolk."

And, perhaps remem

bering Davis's earlier disavowal of approving his withdrawal
from Manassas, Johnston made sure that Lee understood the
intent of his communication:
movement,

"As this is an important

I think it necessary that the intention to make it

be reported to the G o v e r n m e n t ."10
The opening of Battery No. 1 forced Johnston's hand
much more quickly than even he had expected.

If the

Federals could deny him the Yorktown docks, then the army
became almost completely dependent on the trickle of
supplies which could be landed at Jamestown Island.
Further, he was faced with the prospect that this one
battery could, within days, dismount all the Confederate
cannon in the Yorktown water battery, and across the river
at Gloucester Point.

He called his senior officers at

Longstreet's headquarters on May 1:
Magruder, Hill, Stuart, Pendleton,

Smith, Longstreet,
and Alexander.

Not one

of them believed that the Yorktown line could or should be
held longer than another forty-eight h o u r s . H

Johnston had

already ordered Huger to prepare Norfolk for evacuation;

now

he told his subordinates that the withdrawal would occur on
the evening of May 2, and telegraphed Jefferson Davis to the

IQl b i d .
HEarly,

War M e m o i r s , p. 165.
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same effect.12
Though aware that "the wretched condition of the roads
may cause us heavy losses of materials on the march,"
Johnston determined to avoid leaving anything behind for
McClellan that could be hauled

a w a y .

13

a s

in northern

Virginia, this did not include his heavy artillery which,
besides being nearly immobile, would have to cover the
retirement of his divisions.

He ordered Alexander to ship

to Richmond all the extra ammunition and ordnance stores in
depot beginning April

30

.

Pendleton's artillery was

assigned the best of several poor roads, and scheduled to
march several hours ahead of the main

b o d y .

15

He ordered

Colonel Fitzhugh Lee's 1st Virginia Cavalry to precede the
army to the vicinity of Eltham's Landing and West Point,

in

order that the army would be immediately alerted to the
expected Federal amphibious landing once Yorktown and

12joseph E. Johnston to Benjamin Huger, April 27, 1862;
the telegram to Davis has not been preserved, but may be
inferred from Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, May 1,
1862; see also Joseph E. Johnston to D. H. Hill, May 1,
1862, all in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 469-470, 484-485.
13joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 473.
P. Alexander to Edwin Taliaferro, April 30, 1862,
in Beverly Randolph Wellford papers, Virginia Historical
Society, Richmond, Virginia.
l^Lee, M e m o i r s , p. 183.
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Gloucester were evacuated.-*-6
A Federal landing on the banks of the York River to his
rear was Johnston's greatest concern.

He believed that the

Virginia could hold Admiral Goldsborough's flotilla at bay
on the James, at least for a few days.-^

But even though he

had ordered the batteries at Gloucester Point to be manned
for several hours after the retreat of the bulk of the army,
he harbored few illusions that this would keep the Federals
from ascending the York River.-*-®

So he took what few

precautionary measures he could.

He ordered the supply

vessels on the York River sailed upstream to critical points
and sunk in the river as obstructions;

fifty-three schooners

were thus scuttled as Yorktown fell.19

The railroad bridge

over the York River

near West Point was burned, as were the

docks at key points

along the river.2 ®

But Johnston

knew

that such measures could at best delay, not prevent, an
amphibious descent on his rear; he could count on having to

1®H. B. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of MajorGeneral J. E. B. Stuart (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1885),
pp. 47-48.
e. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862,
(part 3):
p. 473.

•^Joseph

in OR, XI

l®Joseph E. Johnston to D. H. Hill, May 2, 1862, in JJWM.
l^Naval History Division, Civil War Naval Chronology,
VI:
pp. 331-333; Thomas S. Phelps to William Smith, May 5,
1862, in NOR, VII:
p. 313.
20Wil liam Smith to L. M. Goldsborough, May 5, 1862, T.
H. Patterson to William Smith, May 4, 1862, William Smith to
L. M. Goldsborough, May 12, 1862, in N O R , VII:
pp. 310-311,
316.
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fight McClellan's troops with part of his army before the
rest had even cleared the vicinity of Williamsburg.
Johnston wanted G. W. Smith's Division available to
oppose any Federal landing on the York River.

The troops

were the freshest in the army, and among Smith's brigade
commanders were Whiting and Hampton, two men whom he trusted
implicitly.

So he arranged that, once the army passed

through Williamsburg, Smith's Division would be in the lead.
Whiting's three brigades were scheduled to be among the
first troops to march away from Yorktown on May 2.21

Re

also gave Smith control of the 1st Virginia Cavalry, as well
as Magruder's Division, and part of the Reserve Artillery as
soon as those units cleared

W i l l i a m s b u r g .

22

w i t h half the

army available to him, Smith should be able, Johnston hoped,
to contain,

if not repulse, a Yankee landing, while Johnston

supervised the rear guard and the evacuation of the army's
guns and supplies.
The pounding of heavy shells from battery No.
in earnest on the morning of May 2:

1 resumed

Kellogg's men dropped

sixty rounds on the Yorktown docks and the water battery;
Hill's 8-inch Columbiad burst returning the

XI

f i r e .

23

21joseph E. Johnston to D. H. Kill, May 1, 1862,
(part 3 ): p. 486.

How

in O R ,

22gmith, Confederate War Papers, pp. 45-48.
23''Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army,
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, of the siege," May
5, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 347.
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many more days could the Yorktown fortifications withstand
the shells of the Parrott guns?

How long before more of

McClellan's heavy artillery commenced battering the other
sections of his line?

Once the other Union batteries

opened, the Confederate withdrawal could potentially become
a bloody disaster.

Johnston's timetable was tight--much

tighter than the one attempted in northern Virginia— because
no movements near the front could be attempted until
nightfall,

lest they be observed.

The orders for the

retreat were carefully drawn and circulated to all the
division commanders on the morning of May 2.24
Delays and confusion among the trains of Longstreet's
and Magruder's Divisions forced Johnston to postpone the
movement for twenty-four hours.

It was a tense day:

the

1st Connecticut Artillery poured another thirty-four rounds
into Hill's fortifications at Yorktown, which now had no
guns capable of reaching Battery No.

1 with return fire.

Meanwhile, General Barry reported to McClellan that the next
morning the ten 13-inch seacoast mortars of Battery No.
four more in Battery No.
Battery No.

4,

11, five 10-inch siege mortars in

12, six 30-pound Parrotts in Battery No.

three 100-pound Parrotts in Battery No.
ready to open fire at dawn on May 4.

13, and

14 would all be

Major Charles S.

Wainwright of the 1st New York Light Artillery, who had

24Qeneral Orders no. — , Department of Northern
Virginia, May 2, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 489-490;
also the copy in LS-ANVA for distribution notes.
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dropped by Barry's headquarters,

confided to his diary that

evening that "it will be a splendid sight when all our guns
and mortars open, especially if the rebs reply lively; one
worth half a lifetime to see.

. . ."25

Johnston had only

hours left before the conflagration began.
A heavy rain started to fall in the evening of May 3,
as the first brigades slipped quietly out of their rifle
pits.26

it was a decidedly mixed blessing, for while it

would disguise the movement to some extent, the downpour
ruined the roads over which the army had to t r a v e l .
Alexander wrote:

"I recall that night's march as particu

larly disagreeable.

The whole soil of that section seemed

to have no bottom and no supporting

power."27

The soil had

been so soaked with the rain of previous weeks that the
water could not even sink in; a private in Pickett's Brigade
remembered that "the clay and sand of the roads was now
worked into a liquid mortar, which overspread their entire
surface, hiding the deep holes cut by heavy gun wheels,
until man or beast discovered them by stumbling therein."28

25»Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army,
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, of the siege," May
5, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 347-348; Allan Nevins,
e d . , A Diary of Battle, the Personal Journals of Colonel
Charles S. Wainwright, 1861-1865 (New York:
Harcourt,
Brace, and World, 1962), p. 44.
26smith, Confederate War Pap e r s , p. 46.
27Alexander, Military M e m o i r s , p. 66.
^Hamilton,

S h o t w e l l , pp. 199-200.
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The columns waded and struggled along at a pace that never
exceeded one mile an hour, and that with exhausting effort.
"The roads," said Alexander,

"were but long strings of guns,

wagons, and ambulances, mixed in with infantry,
and cavalry,
river of mud.

artillery,

splashing and bogging through the darkness in a
. . ."29

At best, Johnston knew that his men might make seven or
eight miles by sunrise.

It was barely enough to give him a

head start on the Federals,

and even that was threatened by

the constant stalling of wagons, caissons,
mud.

and guns in the

Horses sank up to their bellies and wagons to their

axles.

Each time this happened, ropes had to be tied to the

floundering teams and their wagons, and the already jaded
horses of other wagons brought back to assist in their
rescue.

Often this was not enough, and the infantry and

gunners swarmed into the mud to manhandle wheels loose from
the m i r e . 30

Johnston himself dived into the muck to help

pry loose a 12-pounder of Snowden's

(Georgia) Battery.31

Some of the horses drowned, while others had their hearts
simply give out.

Wagons were abandoned and guns spiked.

One private wrote later,

"sometimes I caught myself stumb-

29Aiexander, Military Memoirs, p. 66.
30stiles, Four Y e a r s , p. 83; Edgar Warfield, A Confed
erate Soldier's Memoirs (Richmond:
Masonic Home Press,
1936), p. 84; Hamilton, Shotwell, pp. 199-200.

II:

31 f . Y. Dabney,
pp. 275-276.

"General Johnston to the Rescue," B & L ,
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ling over a dead horse and sometimes upon a half-living
m a n . "32

Yet,

somehow, the army kept moving,

if only at a

snail's pace, even though everyone was as tired as Colonel
Pender, who told his wife,

"I have seldom been more sleepy,

hungry or tired than I am just

n o w .

"33

The army kept moving, but many individual soldiers did
not.

The backbreaking work,

combined with lack of sleep and

the absence of rations for two days, caused many of Johns
ton's troops to collapse in an apathetic stupor.

D. H. Hill

counted more than 1,500 stragglers along his route of march
through Williamsburg, and told his wife,

"there are thou

sands also scattered over the country engaged in plunder
ing."

When Hill attempted to encourage or intimidate them

into rejoining the ranks,

"some answered by my entreaties

with

curses, some with

'I don't care if the Yankees do take

me.

I am starving to death and freezing with cold. '"34

Well aware of the condition of his troops, Johnston knew
that he could only retreat so far before he halted to give
the men a rest.

If not molested by Federal pursuit, he

intended to halt between the Pamunkey and Chickahominy

32Hamilton, Shotwell, p. 200; Stiles, Four Y e a r s , p. 83.
33oorsey Pender to Fanny Pender, May 8 , 1862,
Hassler, General to His L a d y , p. 140.

in

34p. H. Hill to "My Dear Wife," May 11, 1862, in D.
Hill papers, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg,
Virginia.
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Rivers, and there await McClellan.35
But that depended on just how long McClellan would
remain in front of empty entrenchments, and how determined
his pursuit would be.

As most of the infantry evacuated the

fort at Yorktown, Hill's cannoneers inaugurated their
heaviest bombardment of the Yankee lines during the entire
siege, firing off their stocks of powder and shot as if
there were no tomorrow, because there was not; o n e .

By

midnight, or soon thereafter, the fire begati to slacken, as
the gunners spiked their pieces one by one, and laid powder
trails into their magazines.

Major Bryan Grimes of the 4th

North Carolina commanded the last few companies of the
infantry rear guard, which picked its way back from the
picket line around 4:00 A. M.

Grimes had to balance the

speed necessary to clear the town before the fuses burned
down against the need to avoid "torpedoes [that] had been
planted on all the roads and streets leading into Yorktown.
."36
The torpedoes— mostly 10-pounder shells rigged with
pressure fuses and buried as mines— were the work of

35smith, Confederate War P a p e r s , p. 48.
36"Report of Brig. Gen. Charles D. Jameson, U. S. Army,
as General of the Trenches, May 3-4, with indorsement," May
4, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 398; Pulaski C o w p e r , ed.,
Extracts of Letters of Major-General Bryan Grimes to his
Wife, written while in Active Service in the Army of
Northern Virginia, together with some personal recollections
of the war written by him after its close, etc. (Raleigh,
NC:
Alfred Williams, 1884), p. 12.
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Brigadier-General Gabriel J. Rains.

Enraged by Federal

shelling of New Berne, North Carolina,

his hometown, Rains

considered land mines a fair response.

Almost everyone

else— from Johnston to McClellan— disagreed, but after the
fact, for Rains had never informed his superiors of his
intentions.

Despite the fact that Johnston would later

disown the tactic, Rains' explosives killed enough unwary
Union soldiers to slow down the Federal penetration of
Y o r k t o w n .37
For
infantry

several hours after sunrise on May 4, as Johnston's
and artillery struggled up muddy roads, Stuart's

depleted cavalry brigade was the only force actually facing
the Army of the Potomac.

Having detached the 1st Virginia

Cavalry to cover Eltham's Landing,

Stuart was left with only

1,500 sabers to slow down the pursuit.

He deployed Lieuten-

ant-Colonel William Wickham and the 4th Virginia Cavalry, as
well as part of Colonel Thomas F. Goode's 3rd Virginia
Cavalry, to cover the Williamsburg road.

A few miles south

of Wickham and Goode, on the Telegraph Road, Stuart himself
took charge of the Jeff. Davis
several companies of the Wise

(Mississippi) Legion and
(Virginia) Legion.

There was

37"Reports of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army,
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, of the siege,"
August 25, 1862, "Report of Col. Jesse A. Gove, Twentysecond Massachusetts Infantry, of occupation of Yorktown,
May 4," May 4, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 349-350, 399400; G. Moxley Sorrel to Gabriel J. Rains, May 11, 1862, A.
P.
Mason to D. H. Hill, May 12, 1862, Gabriel J. Rains to D.
H.
Hill, May 14, 1862, in OR (part 3):
pp. 509-510, 511,
516-517.
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little or no communication between the two wings of Stuart's
Brigade,

because the heavily wooded country "was exceedingly

unfavorable for cavalry
Stuart was careful

operations.

. . ."38

throughout the morning to keep

Johnston informed of the advance of Federal cavalry on the
Telegraph Road under Brigadier-Generals George Stoneman and
William H. Emory.

What

left flank, Wickham and

he did not know was that,

on

his

Goode were being pushed back

steadily, until the blue-clad horsemen had actually gotten
between Stuart and Johnston.

This he only found out when a

courier returned with the news that he could not thread his
way through Union lines with a message for the army command
er.

Resourceful in every extremity,

farther south,

Stuart trotted his men

and detoured around the enemy by way of the

beaches near Jamestown.39
Johnston,

however, did not know that Stuart was

extricating himself.

About noon, he realized that the

courier was overdue.

This was at roughly the same time the

1st and 4th Virginia Cavalry found themselves pushed back to
the outskirts of Williamsburg.
terrain,

In the densely forested

there was no way to be certain that there was not a

division of infantry on the heels of the Federal cavalry.
So assuming the worst, at 1:00 P. M . , Johnston himself rode

38"Report of Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, commanding
Cavalry Brigade," May 13, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 444.
39i b i d .; Thomas, Bold D r a g o o n , pp. 104-105.
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to the rearmost unit in the line of march, Brigadier-General
Paul J. S e m m e s ' Georgia-Kentucky Brigade, and ordered it
into the forts around Williamsburg.40

About an hour later,

Johnston located Brigadier-General Lafayette McLaws, who
commanded part of Magruder's Division.

He instructed him to

send another brigade back to support Semmes, and to go
himself to supervise the line.41
McLaws,

a Georgian who had graduated from West Point in

Longstreet's class, picked the South Carolina brigade of
lawyer-turned-soldier Joseph B. Kershaw for the assignment.
Both arrived at Semmes' position about 3:00 P. M.

McLaws

was vaguely aware that the fortifications in front of
Williamsburg were centered on a large earthwork--Fort
Magruder— with minor works extending toward the rivers north
and south at intervals of several hundred yards.

Semmes had

already occupied some of the redoubts to the right of the
road, but neither he nor McLaws knew the exact location of
all the forts.

Fortunately,

Colonel Benjamin S. Ewell of

the 3 2nd Virginia was at hand.

Ewell had commanded the post

of Williamsburg for months, and was thoroughly familiar with
the terrain.

He quickly guided Kershaw's Brigade into the

40"RepOrts of Brig. Gen. Paul J. Semmes, C. S. Army,
commanding brigade," May 17, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p.
445.
4 1 "Report of Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, C. S. Army,
commanding division," May 16, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp.
441-442.
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correct positions.^2
Yet even before the Confederates had deployed their
second brigade, Stoneman's advance guard arrived.

The

Federal cavalry, apparently unaware that it was probing a
line now held by infantry,
reported,
men,

rode forward so boldly, McLaws

that "at first they were supposed to be our own

so close were they and so confident in their advance.

. . ."

He soon realized his error, as Union horse artillery

opened up in support of the horsemen.
Colonel J. Lucius Davis,

About this time,

commanding the Wise Legion cavalry,

and the first of Stuart's detachment to rejoin the army,
arrived on the scene.

McLaws ordered counter-battery fire

against the Union artillery and a charge by Davis's men on
the suddenly confused Federal cavalry.

The charge routed

the bluecoats with little loss to either side, and Kershaw's
men finished occupying the forts along the road.

No more

probes were made against McLaws' positions for the rest of

42"Report of Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, C. S. Army,
commanding division," May 16, 1862, "Report of General
Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Department of
Northern Virginia, of operations from April 15 to May 19,
May 19, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 275, 441-442.
The
information about Ewell conducting McLaws' troops into the
line is from interlineal notes by Benjamin S. Ewell in the
original of Johnston's report, which is in JJWM.
Ewell
habitually wrote notes inside Johnston's reports when he
served on the General's staff later in the war; see Joseph
E. Johnston to Benjamin S. Ewell, October 12, 1868, in
Benjamin S. Ewell papers, College of William and Mary,
Williamsburg, Virginia.
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the afternoon.43
Johnston, who had been looking over McLaw's shoulder
during the skirmish, knew that the Federal infantry could
be, at best, a few hours behind the cavalry.

When he

thought of the condition of the roads and the torturous
progress of his army, he realized that he probably could not
escape without fighting to slow down the pursuit.

Inade

quate as Magruder's line of redoubts may have been,

it

represented the only prepared fortification between Yorktown
and Richmond,

and he knew that he should make use of it.

At

sunset, he ordered McLaws to pull out his brigades, and to
be replaced by two from Longstreet's Division.44

if he

could get the army marching at the crack of dawn, he might
yet elude McClellan without combat;

if not, the action would

be supervised by one of his most trusted subordinates.

This

arrangement evidently calmed any fears Johnston had that
night, for he treated two of his staff officers to an
impromptu, bare-chested display of saber-handling before
retiring for the evening.45
Longstreet sent back Brigadier-General Richard H.

4 3"Report of Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, C. S. Army,
commanding division," May 16, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp.
441-442; Thomas, Bold Drag o o n , p. 105.
44johnston actually ordered Longstreet to send one
brigade, but, thinking his brigades too small, the Georgian
dispatched two.
Johnston, Nar r a t i v e , p. 120; Longstreet,
Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x , p. 72.
45Gallagher, F i g hting, pp. 49, 80-81.
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Anderson's South Carolinians and Colonel Roger Pryor's mixed
brigade of Alabamians, Virginians,
Anderson,

and Louisianians.

a South Carolinian himself, and a classmate of

McLaws and Longstreet at West Point, met McLaws just after
dark.

The Georgian had already withdrawn his men from the

line of redoubts in preparation to resume his march.

Heavy

rain was falling again.46
In the cold, wet darkness, the South Carolinian made an
error of judgment that the next day would threaten the
safety of Johnston's retreat.

Richard Anderson, who had

been followed by suspicions of alcoholism throughout his
Regular Army career, was a talented tactician and a brave
leader of troops in battle, but he was not a man who paid a
great deal of attention to detail.
admitted Moxley Sorrel.
[were] excellent,

"He was indolent,"

"His capacity and intelligence

but it was hard to get him to use

That night, he took the easiest course.

t h e m .

"47

Expecting that his

men would be pulled out soon after sunrise, he occupied the
forts to the right of the road, but only two of the redoubts
on the left.

He did not send out scouts to find out how far

the line extended;

if he had done so, he would have d i s 

covered that there were at least four more fortifications
around the boggy ground bordering the road to Allen's Wharf.
If seized by the Federals, possession of these works would

^^Longstreet, Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x , pp. 72-73.
47sorrel, R e c o llections, p. 128.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

346

allow them to enfilade Fort Magruder

(see Map

3

). 48

Neither Longstreet nor Johnston knew that this had
happened.

The division commander, having delegated the rear

guard to Anderson,

spent the night preparing his trains and

the rest of his troops to move.

He did authorize Anderson

to call in other brigades from the division for reinforce
ments,

if pressed,

but did not check on his subordinate's

deployment or personally examine the line of redoubts until
several hours after dawn.

In fact, Longstreet did not even

arrive on the field until a few minutes after

n o o n .

49

Anderson, his two brigades now reinforced by the
brigades of A. P. Hill, George Pickett,

and Raleigh Colston

--the remainder of Longstreet's Division--had been fighting
Brigadier-General Joseph Hooker's 2nd Division,
of the Army of the Potomac,

since sunrise.

III Corps,

"Being in

pursuit of a retreating army," Hooker wrote five days later,
"I deemed it my duty to lose no time in making disposition
of my forces to attack, regardless of their number and
position.

. . .

By doing so my division,

capture the army before me,

if it did not

would at least hold them, in

48Longstreet, Manassas to Appom a t t o x , pp. 72-73;
Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I:
pp. 177-178; "Report of Maj.
Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Second Corps,
with congratulatory order from General Joseph E. Johnston,
C. S. Army," May 16, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 564-565.
49Longstreet, Manassas to A ppomattox, p. 72; "Report of
Maj.
Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Second
Corps, with congratulatory order from General Joseph E.
Johnston, C. S. Army," May 16, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p p . 5 64-5 65 .
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order that others
Bruce Catton,

m i g h t . " 5 0

"Hooker," observed historian

"was an army politician and a devious man

. . . but as a fighter he was direct and straightforward.
. . ."51

without waiting to reconnoiter the strength of the

Confederate defenses or to acquire authorization from his
corps commander, Hooker waded in, attacking the fortifica
tions which Anderson had already garrisoned.52

He drove in

the Conference skirmishers, but foundered against Fort
Magruder, and began probing farther down Anderson's right
flank.53
This only succeeded in attracting the attention of
Confederate reinforcements.

Discounting his own brigade,

which held Fort Magruder and the two redoubts on the far
left, and Colston's, which was still marching up, by 10:00
A. M. Anderson had four brigades, numbering about 8,000 men,
available for a counterattack.

He also had Longstreet's

pe r m i s s i o n .54

50"Report of Brig. Gen. Joseph Hooker, U. S. Army,
commanding Second Division," May 10, 1862, in OR, XI (part
1):
p. 465.
51-Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army
Doubleday, 1951), p. 266.

(Garden City, NY:

52jyiark Grimsley, "Rear Guard at Williamsburg,11 Civil
War Times Illustrated, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (May 1985):
pp. 1213.
5 3 "Report of Brig. Gen. R. H. Anderson, commanding
Second Brigade," May 10, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 580.
54 "Report of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army,
commanding Second Corps, with congratulatory order from
General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army," May 16, 1862, in
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Anderson left Fort Magruder to assume personal command
of the attack, which was quite successful, despite being
launched piecemeal.

Wilcox advanced first, against Hooker's

left, and became involved in a confusing fight in dense
woods.

Soon realizing that he was engaging a brigade

against a division, Wilcox sent for assistance.

Since he

did not know that Anderson was riding to that part of the
field to take command, he dispatched couriers directly to
Pryor and A. P. Hill for support.

Pryor, in the absence of

orders from Anderson, and still under obligation to hold two
of the redoubts, could only reinforce Wilcox's attack with
two of his three regiments.

Hill, who had never received

adequate orders from anybody, did not know exactly who was
in command or what he should do.

Consequently, he sent a

courier to find Longstreet and waited.

About half an hour

later, Anderson arrived at his headquarters and ordered him
to support Wilcox.

Pickett's men, meanwhile, waited behind

Fort Magruder until Anderson remembered to call them forward
still later in the morning.55

O R , XI

(part 1):

with Anderson busy bringing

pp. 564-565.

^ " R e p o r t of Brig. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill, C. S. Army,
commanding First Brigade, Second Division," May 10, 1862,
"Report of Brig. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, C. S. Army,
commanding Second Brigade," May 10, 1862, "Report of Brig.
Gen. George E. Pickett, C. S. Army, commanding Third
Brigade," May --, 1862, "Report of Brigadier-General Roger
A. Pryor, C. S. Army, commanding Brigade," May 10, 1862,
"Report of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. S. Army, command
ing Brigade," May 25, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 576,
580-581, 584-585, 587-588, 591.
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up reinforcements,

no one effectively assumed command of

anything larger than a brigade for several hours.
The consequences of such disorganization could have
been disastrous,

for there were probably 40,000 Federal

troops within an hour's march of Hooker's now-beleaguered
division.

That morning, however, there was no one in

effective command of the Union Army, either.
back in Yorktown,

McClellan was

loading Brigadier-General William Frank

lin's division on transports for an amphibious landing
farther up the York River.

The senior Federal officer at

Williamsburg was the commander of the II Corps, MajorGeneral Edwin Vose Sumner, who sat in his headquarters at
the nearby Adams House,

"slightly befuddled."

Because

Sumner ranked the IV Corps commander, Major-General Erasmus
Keyes, he could do nothing, despite having two divisions-William F. Smith's and Darius Couch's— nearby.

Hooker's own

commander, Major-General Samuel P. Heintzleman of the III
Corps, had been delayed,
sion. 56

Neither army,

coordinate a battle.

bringing forward his other d ivi

it seemed, had yet learned how to
It was a perfect example of what the

Prince de Joinville ruefully characterized as "the American
system of

'every man for himself.'

. . ."57

Numbers and Rebel enthusiasm seemed to be prevailing in
the chaotic melee.

56Grimsley,

After several hours of confused battle,

"Rear Guard," p. 27.

57de Joinville, Army of the P o t o m a c , p. 52.
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Hill's 1st Virginia finally supplied the weight that forced
Hooker's line back several hundred yards, capturing a
battery of eight guns that the Yankees had time neither to
spike nor to withdraw.58

yet though the decision to the

right of Fort Magruder went to the Confederates,
too disorganized to profit by it.

they were

The regiments involved in

the fighting had become intermingled and difficult to
maneuver.

Most of the soldiers were low on ammunition, and

the brigade commanders soon discovered that the reserve
ammunition trains were heading in the other direction as
rapidly as possible.

A. P. Hill could not round up either

enough horses to haul off all his captured guns or axes to
destroy their carriages.59
Meanwhile, the attention of the senior officers of both
armies had turned to the opposite flank, toward the redoubts
north of Fort Magruder which Anderson had failed to occupy.
Brigadier-General William F. Smith finally prevailed on
Sumner to let him attempt a flanking maneuver.

Sumner

agreed to let Smith send a brigade to probe the Confederate
left.

Smith selected Brigadier-General Winfield Scott

Hancock to command the troops, and quietly expanded both
Hancock's strength and mission when the two were out of

5 8 "Report of Brig. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill, C. S. Army,
commanding First Brigade, Second Division," May 10, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 1):
p. 577.
59i b i d ., pp. 577-578; Longstreet, Manassas to Appomat
t o x , pp. 74-77.
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Sumner's earshot.

Smith gave Hancock two additional regi

ments from an adjoining brigade, plus a battery of a rtil
lery.

He then, Hancock reported,

"authorized me to advance

farther if I thought advantage could be obtained, and if I
required them to send to him for re-enforcements."60
Hancock started at 11:00 A. M.; by noon his force had
already outflanked Port Magruder, taken two of the ungar
risoned redoubts, and was advancing toward one held by
Anderson's men.

Smith,

sensing a decisive breakthrough,

promised to order forward another four regiments and an
additional battery.

From his position, Hancock's artillery

could actually bombard Fort Magruder from the
decisively reinforced,

r e a r .

61

if

the attack could possibly succeed in

cutting off Longstreet's entire division.
Shortly after 12:00 P. M., with Anderson's attention
completely absorbed in the battle with Hooker on the right,
and Hancock creeping up on the left, Longstreet finally rode
back to the field.

In his official report, the Georgian

contended that he did so because "it became evident that the
trains would not be out of my way before night, and that I
could,

therefore, make battle without delaying the movement

of the army."

He asserted that he arrived on the field in

time to see "the successful issue of the first grand

60"Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S.
Army, commanding First Brigade," May 11, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 1):p . 535.
6 1 I b i d ., pp. 535-537.
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assault" by Anderson's four brigades, which he complimented
as having been "well arranged.

..."

It was the victory

over Hooker's division, Longstreet claimed, that caused him
to seek reinforcements:

"The advanced positions so extended

my lines that I found it necessary to bring other forces
upon the field."62
Neither Longstreet's own memoirs,

nor the reports of

his own subordinates bear out this account.
attack was hardly well-organized,

Anderson's

nor was there any indica

tion in any of the b r i g a d i e r s ' reports that Longstreet made
it to their part of the field that early.

The division

commander admitted in his memoirs that it was "the swelling
noise of battle," from which he "concluded that it would be
well to ride to the front.

..."

When Hancock's artillery

opened from several hundred yards in his rear, he quickly
became aware that "viewing the ground on the left,
it not so well protected as Anderson conceived.

62"Report of
commanding Second
General Joseph E.
O R , XI (part 1):

I thought

. . . "63

Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army,
Corps, with congratulatory order from
Johnston, C. S. Army," May 16, 1862, in
pp. 564-565.

^ T h e question of when Hancock's artillery opened fire
is critical to understanding how concerned Longstreet would
have been about his left flank.
It has usually been assumed
that the Federals did not begin firing until late in the
afternoon, when Early's Brigade had already been deployed on
the left.
Hancock says that he took the first unoccupied
redoubt about noon, and fired his first shots with his guns
while advancing on the second.
This would have placed the
action probably between noon and 1:00 P. M.
Micah Jenkins,
left in command at Fort Magruder mentions Hancock opening on
the rear of Fort Magruder between 3:00 and 4:00 P. M . , but
does not specifically rule out earlier fire from that
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Even this was quite an understatement.

With more than

two-thirds of his division engaged with Hooker, and the rest
tied down holding the remaining redoubts, Longstreet
suddenly realized that he had no troops of his own available
to deal with Hancock.

He sent an aide galloping back up the

Williamsburg Road with orders for D. H. Hill's Division to
march back to support him.

Longstreet sent this order

directly to Hill because the North Carolinian had been
subordinated to him during the retreat.

For whatever

reasons, either haste or embarrassment at having been caught
in the flank, Longstreet did not send any messages to
J o h nston.64

direction.
If, as Johnston later suggested, the Confeder
ates did not even know that Hancock had gotten into their
left and rear, there is little to explain Longstreet's
examination of the ground to his left on first arriving on
the field (while an active battle was in progress on the
right) nor his deployment of the bulk of Hill's Division on
the left.
See Longstreet, Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x , p. 74;
"Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S. Army,
commanding First Brigade," May 11, 1862, "Report of Col. M.
Jenkins, Palmetto Sharpshooters, commanding brigade," -- — ,
1862, "Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division,
of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, "Report
of Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, commanding brigade," June 9,
1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 536-537, 580, 602-603, 606607; Johnston, N a r rative, pp. 124-125.
^ L o n g s t r e e t claimed in his memoirs that he first sent
for a single brigade from Hill's Division, but Hill's report
makes it clear that his entire division was ordered back.
That Johnston had not received any messages from Longstreet
is inferred from Longstreet's memoirs and report, and
Johnston's own report, none of which mention sending any
dispatches to his commander.
In his report, Johnston only
said that he returned to the area of Fort Magruder after
hearing Hill's Division ordered back, and the timing of his
arrival supports this.
In his own memoirs, Johnston claimed
that "at noon the fighting was reported by Longstreet and
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The first brigade of Hill's Division to arrive was that
of Jubal Early, at about 3:30 P. M.

Along with his four

regiments and company of artillery, Early had in tow Colonel
George T. Ward's detachment,

consisting of the 2nd Florida

and the 2nd Mississippi Battalions.65

That Early's troops

were the first to arrive added to Longstreet's unease at the
situation,

for he neither liked nor trusted the Virginia

brigadier.
Longstreet was heading toward Anderson's battle as
Early marched up, probably to find out if he could detach
some of those regiments to safeguard his left flank.

What

he found instead was that most of the regiments in the four

Stuart to be so sharp, that D. H. Hill's division, which had
marched several miles, was ordered back to Williamsburg, and
I returned myself; for at ten o'clock, when the action had
lasted more than four hours, there seemed to be so little
vigor in the enemy's conduct, that I became convinced that
it was a mere demonstration, intended to delay our march
. . . and had ridden forward to join the leading troops."
But by 10:00 A. M. no one was making any reports from which
Johnston could have concluded this, and read literally,
Johnston's paragraph only implies but does not emphatically
state that he had received messages from Longstreet and
Stuart.
See "Report of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S.
Army, commanding Department of Northern Virginia, of
operations from April 15 to May 19," May 19, 1862, "Report
of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Second
Corps, with congratulatory order from General Joseph E.
Johnston, C. S. Army," May 16, 1862, "Report of Maj. Gen. D.
H. Hill, commanding division, of operations April 6 to May
8 ," January 11, 1863, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 275, 564565, 602; Longstreet, Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x , p. 74;
Johnston, Narrative, p. 120.
65"Report 0 f Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division,
of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, "Report
of Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, commanding brigade," June 9,
1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 602-603, 606-607.
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brigades were nearly out of ammunition.

Since he could not

replenish their cartridge boxes from the retreating ordnance
trains, Longstreet was forced to commit more troops to hold
the ground gained on his right, even though his left was in
danger.

Colston's Brigade, which had arrived a few minutes

before Early and Ward's detachment, was ordered to report to
Anderson.
He reluctantly left Early in charge of the left of the
line.

"I proceeded as near as practicable to the position

designated by General Longstreet on the left and rear of
Fort Magruder" Early reported,

"and formed my regiments in

line of battle on the crest of a ridge in a wheat field,

and

near a barn and some houses, with a woods some 200 or 300
yards in front.

..."

In that position,

"we were not in

view of any body of the enemy, though we were soon informed
by the firing from a battery in or beyond the woods toward
Fort Magruder that a portion of the enemy were in our
f r o n t . "66
The battery firing at Early's men from beyond the woods
was Company E, 1st New York Light Artillery, which had been
attached to Hancock's force.

Unable to grasp the opportu

nity that Hancock's advance against the unoccupied redoubts
had given him, and believing that he was about to face
another major Confederate attack, Sumner overruled Smith,

6 6 "Report of Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, commanding
brigade," June 9, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 606-607.
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and refused to allow him to reinforce Hancock.

Hancock sent

one of his own aides to explain the importance of his
position and to plead for more troops, but Sumner remained
adamant.

All that had been left for Hancock to do, since

his augmented brigade was too small to risk a further
advance on its own, was to open fire with his field artil
lery, in hopes of diverting the attention of some of the
Rebels from the other side of the line.

The gambit was far

more successful than he ever could have expected.67
Somehow,

Jubal Early came to the conclusion that a lone

Federal battery had located itself on the Confederate flank,
and he decided that several Yankee cannon had situated
themselves in just the right place for him to capture
them.68

Hill and the remaining brigades of his division had

marched up by this time, and Early brought the idea to his

67"Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S.
Army, commanding First Brigade," May 11, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 1):
p. 535; Grimsley, "Rear Guard," p. 28.
68Early denied in his report that this was his idea,
attributing it instead to D. H. Kill.
But Hill, Longstreet,
and Johnston all agreed— though their accounts did differ on
other particulars— that the original idea to capture the
battery was Early's.
See "Report of General Joseph E.
Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Department of Northern
Virginia, of operations from April 15 to May 19," May 19,
1862, "Report of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army,
commanding Second Corps, with congratulatory order from
General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army," May 16, 1862,
"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division of
operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, "Report of
Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, commanding brigade," June 9,
1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 275, 564-565, 602, 607;
Longstreet, Manassas to Appom a t t o x , p. 78; Johnston,
Narrative, p. 121.
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superior.

What he did not tell the North Carolinian--and

what Hill forgot to ask--was that he had done no reconnais
sance to ascertain that the Federal battery was indeed
unsupported.

In fact, Early still did not know exactly

where it was when he proposed the attack.69
several weeks in Yorktown,

After spending

impotently unable to strike back

at enemy artillery, Hill was quickly caught up in Early's
enthusiasm, and set out to find Longstreet to get permission
to launch the attack.
It was at this point that Johnston himself finally
showed up.

He had been urging the rest of the army up the

road all morning and afternoon, more concerned with a
possible landing on the York River than about the Federals
immediately to his rear.70

When he realized that a second

division had become embroiled east of Williamsburg, the army
commander spurred his horse in search of Longstreet and a
report on the battle.

Johnston, Longstreet, and Hill all

converged somewhere in the rear of Fort Magruder.
Longstreet was feeling more confident by this time.
With Colston's and Ward's regiments in line, supported by
the reorganizing brigades that had made Anderson's attack,
he felt that his right flank was secure, at least for the
rest of the day.

Hill reported that the brigades of Jubal

Early, Winfield Scott Featherston,

Gabriel Rains, and Robert

G^Grimsley,

"Rear Guard," p. 29.

70johnston,

Narrative, p.

120.
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Rodes were now emplaced on the left.

Thus, even if the

redoubts on the far end of the line were in enemy hands,
Longstreet's Division no longer seemed to be in danger of
being cut o f f . 71

Always unwilling to admit that events ever

got out of his control, Longstreet told Johnston that the
battle had thus far proceeded exactly as he had planned it:
a successful,

limited rear guard action to discourage

purs u i t .72
Hill's proposal then, came at what seemed an opportune
moment.

Success in the form of eight captured guns had

already been achieved on the right.

Why not attempt the

same on the left, especially as the Yankees there now
appeared to have no idea what a potentially commanding
position they held?

Johnston deferred to Longstreet's

opinion, and the Georgian was willing to sanction the
attack--with one condition.

He did not have faith in Early

7 1 "Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division,
of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, in OR, XI
(part 1):
pp. 602-603.
72rphe tenor of Longstreet's report may be inferred from
Johnston's comments on the Georgian's conduct of the battle.
"I rode upon the field, but found myself compelled to be a
mere spectator, for General Longstreet's clear head and
brave heart left me no apology for interference," Johnston
wrote in his official report.
He rewrote himself a much
larger part in the N a rrative, but one which was not com
pletely borne out by contemporary reports.
See also
Longstreet's account in his memoirs, which played down the
threat of Hancock on the Confederate left.
"Report of
General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Depart
ment of Northern Virginia, of operations from April 15 to
May 19," May 19, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 275; Johns
ton, N a r r a t i v e , pp. 122-125; Longstreet, Manassas to
Appomattox, p. 77.
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to carry out the assault competently;

later he claimed to

have announced to the other generals that "the brigade you
propose to use is not in safe hands."

He consented to the

movement only if Hill directed it personally.

Hill a-

g r e e d .73
With remarkable candor, Hill admitted the next year
that "neither Longstreet nor myself knew the precise
location of the battery,
the ground."

and both were entirely ignorant of

Despite this, the two "agreed in the general

plan of getting in rear of the battery by passing through
the woods to the left of its supposed position."

Though he

"could not distinctly locate the battery by the sound,"
Hill split Early's Brigade into two detachments and,
commanding one of them himself, marched the 5th and 23rd
North Carolina, and the 24th and 38th Virginia,
woods in search of enemy

g u n s .

into the

74

The ill-considered venture reaped exactly the kind of
harvest which, in hindsight, might have been expected.
Early's regiments came out of the woods one at a time, not
facing, but flanked by, the New York guns which were
supported by five regiments of Federal infantry.

Neither

Hill nor Early could regain any semblance of control over
his regiment.

Early went down with a wound trying to lead

7 3Longstreet, Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x , p. 78.
74"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division,
of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, in OR, XI
(part 1):
p. 603.
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the 24th Virginia and the 5th North Carolina in a desperate
charge against Hancock's line.
trying, without success,
to support him.

Hill remained in the woods

to organize the other two regiments

The 24th Virginia took 190 casualties, the

5th North Carolina more than 30 0.

Watching the Tarheels

mowed down, Hill always remembered that "the regiment was
shot down like beeves, the yankees cheering and laughing as
they fired at the poor fellows."75
Ironically, the only circumstance that saved Early's
men from even higher casualties was the fact that Hancock
thought the Confederate regiments lost in the woods were
about to envelop his own flank.

He initially intended to

charge and capture the entire 5th North Carolina:
The whole line advanced cheering, and on
arriving . . . delivered two volleys, doing great
execution.
The order was then given to charge
down the slope, and with reiterated cheers the
whole command advanced in line of battle.
A few
of the leading spirits of the enemy were bayo
neted; the remainder then broke and fled.
The
want of protection in my rear, and expecting an
assault from that quarter every moment, I ordered
a halt at the floor of the slope, and delivered a
terrible fire along the whole line, expending 15
to 20 rounds.
The plunging fire from the redoubt,
the direct fire from the right, and the oblique
fire from the left were so destructive that after
it had been ordered to cease and the smoke arose
it seemed that no man had left the ground unhurt

75"Report Df Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division,
of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, "Report
of Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, commanding brigade," June 9,
1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 602-603, 606-607; Freeman,
Lee's Lieutenants, I:
pp. 182-189; Grimsley, "Rear Guard,"
pp. 29-30.
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who had advanced within 500 yards of our

l i n e .

76

Satisfied that the battle was well in hand, Johnston
had ridden off the field prior to Early's debacle,
Longstreet to close operations.

leaving

Longstreet claimed that

"this mishap could have been remedied by an extreme flank
movement and complete victory won; but

...

we were not in

a condition to increase our responsibilities, and a great
delay might have endangered other operations of the
D. H. Hill agreed, but for different reasons:

a r m y .

"77

"the turning

of the Yankee position was still deemed practicable,

but I

soon found that the confusion was so great, arising mainly
from the want of drill and discipline,
further advance was abandoned."

that all idea of

Since Hill's Division still

had three fresh brigades, he was designated to take over
rear guard responsibilities for the following

day.

78

The Battle of Williamsburg had cost the Army of the
Potomac 2,233 casualties, while Johnston's army lost 1,70379
Johnston and his subordinates asserted that they had won a

76"Report of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, U. S.
Army, commanding First Brigade," May 11, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 1):
p. 540.
77"Report of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, commanding
Second Corps, with congratulatory order from General Joseph
E. Johnston, C. S. Army," May 16, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 565-566.
78"Rep0rt of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, commanding division,
of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11, 1863, in OR, XI
(part 1):
p. 604 .
79Livermore, Numbers and L o s s e s , pp. 80-81.
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victory because they had held the field at the end of the
day, had captured eight guns and several hundred prisoners,
and because the Federals did not contest the army's w i t h 
drawal the next

m o r n i n g .

80

Both Johnston and Longstreet

were in high spirits that evening.

They spent the night

together at the Bowden House, several miles west of W i l 
liamsburg.

Johnston described the battle as merely a

"pretty severe skirmish," and laughed off the lady of the
house who "said she had no room for retreating Generals."81
Yet had Johnston taken the time to evaluate the
engagement critically,
ing facts.

he would have learned some disquiet

Longstreet,

in whom he reposed great confidence,

had allowed five of his six brigades to become committed to
combat before he had even reached the field,

leaving himself

with few reserves and a left flank hanging in the air.

Hill

had shown himself to be aggressive to the point of rashness.
Elections and service in the Yorktown trenches had taken
their toll on drill and discipline;

regiments from both

divisions became entangled with each other and the woods
around them.

In fact, Confederate success at Williamsburg

was more a matter of Union miscues than anything that
Johnston, Longstreet,

or Hill did right.

^ J o h n s t o n , N a r r a t i v e , pp. 124-125;
Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x , p. 79.

Longstreet,

^ T e s t i m o n y of Lemuel J. Bowden, March 13 , 1863, J C C W ,
I:
p. 583; undated notes for a speech by Benjamin S. Ewell
before the Magruder-Ewel1 Camp, United Confederate Veterans,
Benjamin Stoddert Ewell papers, College of William and Mary.
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Johnston had four reasons for not evaluating the
performance of his army at Williamsburg.

The first reason

was victory— claiming to have won the battle, he hardly had
much to stimulate him to seek out shortcomings.

Longstreet

was quick to reinforce this idea, effusively praising his
subordinates, and recommending promotions for Anderson,
Hill, and Pr y o r . 82
Secondly, Johnston's style of supervision on the
battlefield,

it turned out, was not nearly as close as his

supervision of administrative matters.

Both on May 4 and 5,

the army commander had felt comfortable delegating the
entire responsibility for tactics on the field to a subordinate--first M c L a w s , then Longstreet.

On May 5 in particu

lar, Johnston had not bothered to be present until many
hours after the battle had begun, and accepted the judgments
of Longstreet and Hill uncritically.

Thus he did not know

the details of the blunders which had marked the conduct of
the battle.

Was his behavior anomalous, caused by excessive

concern about amphibious landings and the slow progress of
the trains, or was it to be a consistent characteristic of
Joseph Johnston as an army commander?

There was no one

nearby to ask the question.

82Longstreet had an ulterior motive in these requests.
He wanted Anderson and Hill promoted to command divisions of
three brigades each under a permanently established army
corps that he would c o n t r o l . See James Longstreet to Samuel
Cooper, May 9, 1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 30; Robert E.
Lee to James Longstreet, May 28, 1862, in Lee Letterbook.
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Even had Johnston been motivated to examine the army's
performance more closely, he would have had difficulty in
doing so, at least for several days.

Most of the brigadiers

were tied up immediately in moving their exhausted commands
through the torrential rain;
written before May 10.

few reports of the battle were

Early did not complete his until

June, and D. H. Hill's was not submitted until January of
the following year.

When Johnston wrote his official

account of the battle, he had primarily Longstreet's
account, which Freeman correctly labeled "casual, almost
complacent," upon which to base his own narrative.83
The final reason that Johnston turned his attention
away from Williamsburg was probably the most influential.
While he and Longstreet celebrated that night, an aide
arrived at the Bowden House with unwelcome news.
worst fear had been realized:

Johnston's

Federal transports had

reached the mouth of the Pamunkey River, between his army
and Richmond.84
Union gunboats, as Johnston predicted, had wasted no
time ascending the York River after the Confederates
evacuated Yorktown.

Lee wrote Johnston on May 5, even as

Longstreet and Hill struggled with the Yankees outside
Williamsburg, that gunboats had been spotted at the mouth of

83preeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I:

I:

p. 189.

^ T e s t i m o n y of Lemuel J. Bowden, March 13, 1863, J C C W ,
pp. 583-584.
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the Pamunkey

R i v e r .

85

When that letter reached Johnston,

probably on May 6, it confirmed what his cavalry pickets had
already discovered:
clear.

his line of communication was no longer

But the question of McClellan's intentions remained.

Was the main weight of his pursuit following overland,

as

the battle at Williamburg seemed to indicate; or, had those
Federal attacks been designed purely to delay Johnston long
enough to envelop and isolate his army?
The commander on the spot was G. W. Smith, whose
division reached Barnamsville early on May 6.

With the

remainder of the army strung out all the way back to
Williamsburg,

it was Smith's responsibility to determine the

Yankee's intent.

That evening, Smith and Whiting rode to

Fitzhugh Lee's forward cavalry pickets in the woods above
Eltham's Landing, where they had a clear view of the
disembarking Federals.

Blue-clad soldiers,

in at least

division strength, had already landed.86
The troops were the regiments of Brigadier-General
William B. Franklin's division, the first of four divisions
that McClellan planned to advance by water to cut off

^ R o b e r t e . Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 5, 1862, in
Lee L etterbook. This letter does appear in OR, but was
incorrectly dated March 5, 1862, and therefore published in
the wrong volume.
See OR, V:
p. 1090.
8 6 "Report of Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith, C. S. Army,
commanding Reserve," May 12, 1862, "Report of Brig. Gen.
William H. C. Whiting, commanding First Division," May 8,
1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 627, 629; Smith, Confederate
War P a p e r s , p. 47.
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Johnston's retreat.

Fortunately for the Confederates,

a

shortage of transports forced McClellan to ship the div i 
sions up the York River sequentially rather than simultane
ously.®^

Even more fortuitously, the lead division was

commanded by the least aggressive of the four Union gener
als .®®
Though he began landing troops at 3:00 P. M. on May 6,
Franklin was oppressed by "my ignorance of the topography of
the place of landing, and the fact that the enemy's cavalry
and infantry were seen in the woods surrounding the plain
upon which we landed as soon as the landing began.
As a result of his apprehension,

..."

the division commander sent

out no scouts of his own, and concentrated instead on
"extraordinary precautions
an attack."®®

. . .

to prevent the success of

Thus he had no idea that the Confederate

pickets he saw from the plain were virtually the only force
available to oppose him during the first few hours after his
land i n g .
Such was not long to remain the case, however.

Smith

had immediately ordered up Whiting's three brigades from
Barnamsville, though his object was not initially the attack

87"McClellan's Report

(1)," in OR, XI

(part 1):

p. 23.

®®The others were Fitz-John Porter, Israel B. Richard
son, and John Sedgewick, all of whom would later earn
reputations for more combativeness than Franklin; see I b i d .
®9"Reports of Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S.
Army, commanding division," May 17, 1862, in OR, V:
p. 615.
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that Franklin supposed.

The Kentuckian hoped that the

absence of any appreciable force to his front would lure
Franklin into striking inland, away from the artillery
support provided by his gunboats, and allowing Whiting to
engage him at advantage.90

When it became obvious on the

morning of May 7 that the Yankees were entrenching and not
moving forward, Smith had to change his plans; he ordered
Whiting to attack Franklin's right flank and drive it back
close enough to the river for his own artillery to fire on
the g u nboats.91
Whiting selected Brigadier-General John Bell Hood's
brigade to lead the attack.

Though it also contained the

18th Georgia during the Peninsular Campaign, Hood's command
earned its fame as the "Texas Brigade."
was the baptism of fire for the 1st,
well as Hood's first battle.

Eltham's Landing

4th, and 5th Texas, as

It was not much of a battle.

The action was little more than a skirmish between
Hood's brigade, supported by a single battery,
Brigadier-General John Newton,

and that of

likewise four regiments

attended by one company of artillery.

Between 9:00 and

11:00 A. M., Hood drove in Newton's skirmishers, and the two
lines traded vollies in the woods for another three or four

90smith, Confederate War P a p e r s , p. 47.
91"Report of Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith, C. S. Army,
commanding Reserve," May 12, 1862, "Report of Brig. Gen.
William H. C. Whiting, commanding First Division," May 8,
1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 627, 629.
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hours, while Hood's artillerymen determined that they could
not hit the gunboats from an extended range, after which
Hood was ordered to withdraw.

He had taken thirty-seven

casualties and inflicted 186, a tactical victory to be sure,
but hardly a devastating defeat for Franklin's division,
which was reinforced by the first brigade of Sedgwick's
division that afternoon.92
Victory or defeat is often as much the commander's
perception as it is reality.

Within another twelve to

twenty-four hours, approximately 25,000 Union soldiers had
been concentrated near Eltham's, more than enough to engage
Johnston and attempt to delay his retreat.9 3
the senior division commander,

g ut Franklin,

credited reports from Newton

that he had been attacked by a full division,

supported by

20,000 additional troops, and wrote McClellan's Chief of
Staff,

"I congratulate myself that we have maintained our

few supporting troops were engaged on both sides,
beyond the two brigades--the 5th Maine and 1st New Jersey
for the Federals and Hampton's Legion and two regiments of
Anderson's Tennessee brigade for the Confederates— but these
units had little to do with the actual contest.
"Reports of
Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S. Army, commanding
division," May 17, 1862, "Report of Brig. Gen. John Newton,
U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade," May 8, 1862, "Report
of Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith, C. S. Army, commanding
Reserve," May 12, 1862, "Report of Brig. Gen. John B. Hood,
C. S. Army, commanding First Brigade," May 7, 1862 in OR, V:
pp. 615-617, 623-625, 627, 631-632; McMurry, H o o d , pp. 3839; Hood, Advance and R e t r e a t , pp. 21-22.
93oerived from "Abstract from return of the Army of the
Potomac, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, command
ing, for May 20, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 184.
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position."94

He soon convinced McClellan that Johnston

already had 80,000 to 120,000 men in the area, and cautious
ly awaited the arrival of the main body of the Army of the
Potomac, while Johnston's weary legions plodded unmolested
past his position.95
Johnston himself breathed a sigh of relief when he
halted his divisions near Baltimore Cross Roads on May 10.
He had originally desired to halt at New Kent Court House,
six miles farther east, but the distance from the Richmond
and York River Railroad, his line of supply, had forced the
army to keep movi n g . 96

To Johnston's weary and bedraggled

soldiers, the halt represented the first chance for a hot
meal and sleep in several days.

Many of them,

like D. H.

Hill, were too exhausted to do more than collapse;

"I slept

nearly all day yesterday," Hill wrote to his wife on May 11,
"just lying on the ground.

. . ."97

Johnston could finally afford to rest his army because
he had reached the position in which he intended to await

^ " R e p o r t s of Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin, U. S.
Army, commanding division," May 7, 1862, "Report of Brig.
Gen. John Newton, U. S. Army, commanding Third Brigade," May
8 , 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 614, 625.

g. McClellan to Edwin M. Stanton (received May
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 151.

9f>George

8 , 1862),

96joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 8, 1862,
Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 9, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 3):
pp. 499-500, 502-503.
9 .
H. Hill to "My Dear Wife," May 11, 1862,
Hill papers, College of William and Mary.

in D. H.
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McClellan and give battle.98

The area had many advantages

for a smaller army, fighting on the defensive.

Johnston's

left flank rested on the Pamunkey River which, though
navigable, was narrow enough to be blockaded by field
artillery.

His right was anchored by the Chickahominy,

above the head of navigation, but below all the bridges
which McClellan could have used for a rapid crossing.

The

Richmond and York River Railroad ran directly behind the
Confederate lines, providing for relative ease of supply.
Finally, the terrain between the two rivers was heavily
wooded?

limited visibility would help to offset the Federal

superiority in a r t i l l e r y . "

The only apparent weakness of

the position was that it could be flanked by a waterborne
advance up the James River, though this could not seriously
endanger Johnston's army as long as the fortifications at
Drewry's Bluff held out.
As he waited for the Army of the Potomac to arrive,
Johnston now found the time to resume normal communications
with the authorities in Richmond.

He had not, as Freeman

and other critics have asserted, ceased to keep his superi
ors informed of his movements between the withdrawal from
Yorktown and the skirmish at Eltham's Landing.

The

published correspondence in the Official Records does

"Smith,

Confederate War Papers, p. 48.

" OR A t l a s , Plate XIX (1).
lOOpreeman, R. E. L e e , II:

pp.

43-44.
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portray Johnston as silent between May 1 and May 7, but this
is misleading.

Numerous notes and endorsements signed by

Johnston concerning routine administrative matters appear in
the records of the Adjutant and Inspector-General.

Espe

cially significant are the endorsements by Johnston on two
letters by Longstreet to Cooper, dated May 7 and May 9,
which indicate that he filed a preliminary report on the
battles at Williamsburg.101

Though this document has not

been found, its existence is further suggested by Johnston's
immediate reports of the much smaller engagement at Eltham's
Landing.102

Contextual evidence in Lee's letterbook also

indicates that Johnston wrote him on May 6, with reference
to provisions for the

a r m y .

103

iphe longest period during

which Johnston remained incommunicado definitely did not
exceed four days

(May 2-5) and may well have been short

er. 104

lOljames Longstreet to Samuel Cooper, May 7, 1862,
James Longstreet to Samuel Cooper, May 9, 1862, in L R - A I G O ,
M-474, Reel 30.
102joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 8, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 3):
pp. 499-500; Joseph E. Johnston to Robert
E. Lee, May 7, 1862, in OR, LI (part 2):
pp. 552-553.
103Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 7, 1862,
Robert E. Lee to Lucius B. Northrop, May 7, 1862, in Lee
L e tterbook.
1^4Johnston announced his intention to evacuate
Yorktown to Lee on May 1 (not preserved, but mentioned by
Lee the following d a y ) . He evidently attempted to communi
cate his plan to delay the withdrawal by one day on May 2 or
3, but discovered that the Williamsburg telegraph office had
been broken up.
If Johnston then attempted to post a letter
on the same subject to Richmond, is has been lost.
During
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Johnston notified Lee on May 7 that he could not
provision the army near West Point, but indicated that
Federal naval power concerned him more.

"The sight of the

iron-clad boats makes me apprehensive for Richmond, too, so
I move on in two columns, one by the New Kent Road under
Major-General Smith,

the other by that of the Chickahominy

under Major-General L o n g s t r e e t . 0 5

By the next day, when a

brief halt at New Kent Court House left him time for
reflection, Johnston realized that events in his front had
distracted his attention from the remainder of his command.
He received three letters from Lee which had, unfortunately,
been signed for the general by Walter Taylor.

This particu-

May 3-5, the retreat from Yorktown and the two engagements
in front of Williamsburg, Johnston apparently found no time
to write, but by May 7 his endorsement on Longstreet's
letter indicates that he had already filed his Williamsburg
report, as does the context of his May 7 letter to Lee.
This was probably a different letter from his May 6 letter
to Lee concerning provisions, which had been posted twelve
miles west of Williamsburg, and would have been written
either on the evening of May 5 or the morning of May 6.
Thus, a tentative reconstruction of Johnston's correspond
ence during the withdrawal period looks like this:
May 1: Johnston to
Lee (mentioned by Lee)
May 3: Johnston to
Lee (telegram that could not be
sent; inferred from Johnston to D. H. Hill, May 3)
May 3:
Johnston to Lee (conjectural; letter sent in'
place of telegram?)
May 5 or 6: Johnston to Lee or Cooper (inferred from
endorsements on Longstreet's letters)
May 6: Johnston to
Lee (mentioned in Lee Letterbook)
See Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 2, 1862, Joseph
E. Johnston to D. H. Hill, May 3, 1862, John B. Magruder to
George W. Randolph, May 6, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp.
488, 491, 496.
105joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 7, 1862,
O R , LI (part 2): pp. 552-553.
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larly upset Johnston because one of the letters gave him
specific orders concerning his wagon trains, and another
countermanded a portion of his orders to Huger for the
transfer of certain troops from the south side of the James.
None of the letters provided him with any intelligence
concerning affairs in the Valley,

central Virginia, or

around Fredericksburg.106
"My authority does not extend beyond the troops
immediately around me," Johnston complained.

"I request

therefore to be relieved of a merely nominal geographical
command.

The service will gain thereby unity of command,

which is essential in war."-*-^

Clifford Dowdey misconstrued

this paragraph as a "Threatening gesture of

'resignation'"

which "revealed an infantilism in Johnston's relations with
the war o f f i c e r s ."108

gut the remainder of Johnston's

letter, and Lee's response, makes it clear that he was only
asking— albeit quite brusquely— to either have his orders to
Huger obeyed or to have the Department of Norfolk removed
from the Department of Northern Virginia.

Intemperate

language aside, Johnston had a reasonable case against the
lO^Only one 0 f these letters is printed in OR— Robert
E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 7, 1862, in OR, XI (part
3):
p. 497.
A second is in the Lee Letterbook. The third
has not been found, but it may be inferred from Johnston's
response that it did not provide information on the activi
ties of Jackson, Ewell, or Anderson.
107joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 8, 1862,
OR, XI (part 3):
p. 499.
108Dc>wdey, Seven D a y s , p.

66.
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Richmond authorities.

Without ever informing him, they had

delayed Huger's withdrawal from Norfolk, ordered a brigade
from his command to central Virginia, and changed the
objective of his eventual retreat from Richmond to Peters
burg. 109

while each of these actions may have been defensi

ble in terms of the overall strategic situation,

ignoring

Johnston's authority over Huger was a serious infraction
against proper military procedure.
That Johnston did not intend to relinquish command of
the Department of Northern Virginia was made clear in his
next paragraph:

"I have had in the Peninsula no means of

obtaining direct information from the other departments of
my command nor has the Government furnished it."

He was

especially worried about the forces south of Fredericksburg:
"I wish to place them so that they may not be cut off by an
army landing at West Point. " H O
This letter sparked a confusing exchange of letters
between the two generals that lasted for nearly a week, and
can only be satisfactorily explained if one assumes,

as Lee

finally did, that some of the correspondence miscarried and
arrived out of order.

The exchange centered around the

lO^Qeorge W. Randolph to Benjamin Huger, May 3,
Robert E. Lee to Benjamin Huger, May 7, 1862, Robert
to Joseph E. Johnston, May 7, 1862, Robert E. Lee to
Benjamin Huger, May 8, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Joseph
Johnston, May 8, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 490,
499, 500-501.

1862,
E. Lee
E.
497,

H O j o s e p h E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 8, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 3):
pp. 499-500.
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question that had been deferred but not settled weeks
earlier in Richmond:

by what strategy should the Federal

offensive be countered?

Subsidiary issues included the

control and positioning of Anderson's division near Freder
icksburg and the proper thrust of operations in the Valley.
The tone of the letters became steadily more antagonistic—
particularly on Johnston's part— which ironically disguised
the fact that, by mid-May, both Johnston and Lee had drawn a
good deal closer in terms of their view on proper conduct of
opera t i o n s .
Lee attempted to mollify Johnston on May 8, by assuring
him,

"I consider your authority to extend over the troops on

both sides of the James River.

. . ."

But he also cooly

denied having become Johnston's only conduit of information
from the outlying districts.

"I do not recollect your

having requested information relating to the other depart
ments of your command to be forwarded by any other means
than the usual course of the mails, and supposed the
commanders were in direct correspondence with you. " H I

This

sentence ignored exactly such a request, made on April

22,

which had alerted Lee to the fact that Johnston had no
direct communication with either Jackson or Ewell, and
expected to depend on Lee to forward i n f o r m a t i o n . H 2

The

H l R o b e r t E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 8, 1862,
OR, XI (part 3):
p. 500.
I H j o s e p h E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 22,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 455.
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letter also slid quietly by the fact that only in this
letter did Lee tell Johnston that J. R. Anderson was in
command below the Rappahannock,

that Jackson had marched to

attack the Pederals west of Staunton, or that a brigade from
Huger's department had been ordered to central Virginia.
Nor did Lee explain that he himself had been the authority
by which all these movements had been

m

a

d

e

.

^

13

By May 10, based on the intelligence provided by Lee,
Johnston had the following picture of events in Virginia.
On the Federal side, McClellan was cautiously advancing up
the Peninsula with something more than 100,000 men.

From

Fredericksburg, Major-General Irvin McDowell's corps,
estimated accurately as containing nearly 40,000 soldiers,
was threatening to march s o u t h . H 4

Banks, who had last been

reported to Johnston as having 34,000 troops, was apparently
leaving the Valley to unite with M c D o w e l l . H 5

Thus, the

strategic picture that confronted Johnston was one of at
least 175,000 Yankees converging on Richmond from the north
and east.

e

O R , XI

(part 3):

. x,ee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 8, 1862,
pp. 500-501.

in

H ^ R o b e r t E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 10, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 505.
ll^The last intelligence from Jackson to Johnston on
Bank's strength came on March 27, and was, though Johnston
had no way of knowing it, quite out of date by May 10.
See
Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 8, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 3):
p. 501; Thomas J. Jackson to Joseph E. Johnston,
March 27, 1862, in OR, XII (part 3):
pp. 840-841.
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How were the Confederates disposed to receive them?
Jackson had led a division of 8,000 off into the mountains
away from the main theater of war.

Ewell's Division,

numbering 8,500 men, was positioned in Swift Run Gap,
ostensibly outnumbered by four-to-one.
was located at Gordonsville,

At least one brigade

observing nothing.

Anderson's

12.000 soldiers south of Fredericksburg faced more than
three times their own numbers.

Huger's Division had

concentrated at Petersburg, where no enemy forces seemed to
be.

In front of McClellan, Johnston now mustered only about

50.000 men, in an army reduced by battle casualties and
strag g l i n g .116

So, even though the Confederates deployed

over 90,000 troops across the Old Dominion, and still held a
central position with interior lines, they had spread their
forces too thin to hope for a victory without concentrating
somewhere.
Not knowing that Lee and Jackson had been considering
the question since late April, Johnston saw three possible
strategies for foiling the Federal offensive.

United,

the

forces of Jackson, Ewell, Branch, and Edward Johnson
(stationed at Monterey) might be able to attack Banks in the
Valley, prevent Banks from reinforcing McDowell, and allow
Jackson to march about 20,000 men to reinforce Anderson.
This would allow the force below Fredericksburg to meet

e
(part 3):

-^Joseph

O R , XI

Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 9, 1862,
p. 503.
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McDowell's corps on equal terms, removing the specter of a
combination of the two Federal columns in eastern Virginia.
Johnston dispatched orders to Jackson and Ewell on May 13 to
pursue this course.
If Jackson's force could not detain Banks in the
Valley, then Johnston believed the proper course was to have
him march directly "to join either the army near Fredericks
burg, commanded by Brig. Gen. J. R. Anderson, or this
one."H8

jf Huger were brought to Richmond at the same

time, this would create a situation in which Johnston would
be able to deploy his 90,000 men in one army between enemy
wings of roughly 75,000 and 100,000,
miles.

separated by forty

He could then maneuver to engage either McDowell or

McClellan in succession, with relative parity of numbers.
The third option available to the Confederates was a
simple concentration of all available troops to defend
Richmond,

including brigades from North Carolina and points

farther south.

"If the President will direct the concentra

tion of all the troops of North Carolina and Eastern
Virginia," Johnston told Lee on May 10,
hold Middle Virginia at least.

"we may be able to

If we permit ourselves to be

driven beyond Richmond we lose the means of maintaining this
army."

He concluded with a contention that only "a concen-

H ^ J o s e p h £, Johnston to Richard S. Ewell, May 13,
1862, in OR (part 3):
p. 888.
118Ibid.
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tration of all our available forces may enable us to fight
successfully.

"

This has traditionally been cited as

Johnston's preferred strategy, but a close reading of his
correspondence from May 8 to May 13 suggests that he
advocated it as much from frustration as preference.120
Either of Johnston's other strategic choices depended
upon a single variable that he had not yet been able to
master:

the control of the detachments of his army at long

distances.

How could he expect to control the operations of

as many as six separate columns when he could not even
reliably communicate with five of them?
of your movements and progress,

"I must be informed

that your instructions may

be modified as circumstances change," Johnston told Ewell on
May

13

.-*-21

gy this time, the sentence had almost a plain

tive ring to it, for since May 8 Johnston had been unable to
reach Huger or

A

n

d

e

r

s

o

n

.

122

jp must have seemed to Johnston

that the only way he would ever be able to exert his
authority over his widely spread divisions would be to
gather them all in one place, where he could depend for

H ^ J o s e p h e . Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 10, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 506.
120por the traditional interpretation of Johnston's
intention to concentrate, see Freeman, Lee's Li e u t e n a n t s , I:
p. 202.
121joseph E. Johnston to Richard S. Ewell, May 13,
1862, in OR (part 3):
p. 888.
122joseph e . Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 10,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 506.

1862,
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success on the fighting qualities of his soldiers and not
have to rely on a nonfunctional command system to orches
trate intricate maneuvers.
Though Lee, like Johnston, never outlined his strategy
for the defense of Richmond in a single sentence or par a 
graph, a sampling of his letters indicates that his inten
tions were now far less at odds with those of Johnston than
they had been a month earlier.

He suggested to Jackson on

May 8 that at least Ewell's Division should pursue Banks out
of the Valley, attacking him en route if possible, and
eventually joining Anderson's force.123

on May 14, Lee was

contemplating almost exactly the same strategy for Valley
operations that Johnston had ordered the day before,
authorizing Walter Taylor to write to Jackson that "if you
can form a junction with General Ewell with your combined
forces you should be able to drive Banks from the Val
ley . "124
Lee was also in agreement with Johnston that the 12,000
Confederates near Fredericksburg should be united with
Johnston's main army for the purpose of striking either
McDowell or McClellan.

He advised Johnston on May 10 that

even President Davis now held the "view that operations of
its

[Johnston's army] several divisions might be combined to

123j}0kert e . Lee to Thomas J. Jackson, May 8, 1862,
OR, XII (part 3):
pp. 883-884.

in

1^4Walter H. Taylor to Thomas J. Jackson, May 14, 1862,
in OR, XII (part 3):
p. 889.
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attack the enemy, who seemed to have exposed himself and his
line of communication,

and to prevent any movement that

might threaten your rear."125

on May 11, for the first

time, Lee directed J. R. Anderson to "conform all your
movements to the direction of General Johnston. "126
next day Lee asked Johnston,

"toward what point in the

vicinity or Richmond do you desire them [outlying troops] to
concentrate?"

The letter specified only Anderson's force,

but also implied that Lee now understood that Johnston might
need to draw in the divisions of Jackson and Ewell.127

Lee

had even apparently accepted Johnston's premise that more
troops must be drawn from the coast to reinforce Johnston's
army.

In the last month, he had transferred Maxcey Gregg's

Brigade from South Carolina,

and those of Anderson and L.

O'Bryan Branch from North Carolina.
Carolina Governor,
Pemberton,

Now he wrote the North

Henry Clark, and Major-General John C.

commanding Lee's old Department of South Carolina

and Georgia, that more brigades would have to be released to
V i r ginia.128

125Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 10, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 505.
126R0 bert E. Lee to John R. Anderson, May 11, 1862,
O R , XI (part 3):
p. 887.

in

127R0 bert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 12, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 511.
128walter H. Taylor to John C. Pemberton, May 12, 1862,
Robert E. Lee to Henry T. Clark, May 13, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 3):
pp. 512-513.
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Thus, when Davis and Lee rode out unannounced to
Johnston's headquarters on May 14, there was more concord
among the senior members of the Confederate command struc
ture than had existed for m o n t h s .129

Davis contended in his

memoirs that the conversation was "so inconclusive" that he
and Lee were "unable to draw from it any more definite
purpose than that the policy was to improve his position as
far as practicable, and wait for the enemy to leave his
gunboats,

so that the opportunity might be offered to meet

him on land."130

But the contemporary record reveals that

the President's memory had become colored with the passage
of two decades.

It is doubtful that any discussion of

operations would have excluded Johnston's instructions to
Jackson and Ewell, posted the previous day.

With respect to

Johnston's appreciation of the fact that McClellan would
eventually have to leave his naval support to advance either
129preernan suggested that the date of the Davis-Lee
visit to Johnston's army cannot be fixed with absolute
certainty on May 14, but all available circumstantial
evidence supports that date.
Lee addressed a letter to
Johnston on May 13 that responded to one hand-carried to
Richmond by A. H. Cole; had he been visiting Johnston that
afternoon, he would have had no reason to write the letter.
All of Lee's May 14 correspondence was actually written and
signed by Walter Taylor, and on the morning of May 15 Taylor
placed Lee at Drewry's Bluff.
See Freeman, Lee's Lieu t e n 
ants , I:
p. 210; Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May
13, 1862, Walter H. Taylor to Joseph E. Johnston, May 15,
1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 512-513, 518; Walter H.
Taylor to Thomas J. Jackson, May 14, 1862, in OR, XII (part
3):
p. 889; Walter H. Taylor to [J. B. Walton], May 14,
1862, in OR, LI (part 2):
p. 556.
130Da v iSf Rise and F a l l , II:

pp. 101-102.
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north or south of the C h i c kahominy, Lee acknowledged on May
17 that "I think there can be little doubt as to the
correctness of your views.

. . ."131

Davis himself informed

Johnston the same day that "if the enemy proceed as hereto
fore indicated, your position and policy, as you stated it
in our last interview,
tion.

. . ."132

asserted,

seems to me to require no modifica

The President, Johnston later correctly

left with "no cause to complain" about the

conference,

"especially as he suggested nothing better."133

Whatever fragile harmony had been established among the
three men soon disappeared,

for the next day everyone's

calculations were upset again.

The much dreaded Federal

ironclads had finally arrived at Drewry's Bluff.

l^lRobert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 17, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 523.
132je fferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, May 17, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 524.
133j0hnston,

"Manassas to Seven Pines," B & L , II:
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Chapter Ten
Defending Richmond

While the army retreated toward the Chickahominy,
critical events were also transpiring on the James River.
When he determined to evacuate Yorktown, Joseph Johnston had
also dispatched orders to Commander Tucker's James River
Squadron.

Initially, while the Virginia still closed the

mouth of the James to the Union Navy, Tucker was instructed
to transport what he could save of the heavy guns at
Jamestown Island back to Richmond.

But eventually, Johnston

knew, the Virginia would either have to be scuttled,
lightened to run upriver, or undertake a final, suicidal
dash into Hampton Roads to try to sell herself as dearly as
possible among the Federal transports at anchor there.
that happened,

When

Tucker and his command were to "continue to

observe and control the upper James River as long as
practicable,

in order to prevent the enemy from crossing and

attempting to cut off our forces retiring from Norfolk.
It was an incredibly tall order:

against Tucker's five

vessels— only one of which was partially armored— mounting
just sixteen guns, Admiral Goldsborough would send Commander
John Rodgers with nine vessels— including the ironclads

Ijoseph E. Johnston to John R. Tucker, May 2, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 3):
pp. 488-489.
385
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Monitor and Galena— boasting forty-five cannon, five of
which were the monstrous 100-pound siege rifles.2

"When

hard pressed," Johnston advised Tucker on May 2, "you will
retire upon Richmond.
But after completing one trip hauling the artillery and
ordnance stores from Jamestown Island to Richmond, Tucker
received new orders, this time from Secretary of the Navy
Stephen Mallory.

McClellan's troops held Yorktown, and

Longstreet was fighting his rear guard action in front of
Williamsburg; the Confederates on the Peninsula were in full
retreat.

Yet Mallory's orders read:

"Proceed to navy yard,

Norfolk, with Patrick Henry and Jamestown and await o r 
ders .
The operation could only be attempted at night, because
it involved running past the heavy batteries at Newport News
and avoiding detection by the Federal ships prowling Hampton
Roads.

As silently as possible, drifting more than steam

ing, Tucker steered the two vessels under the Yankee guns

^See L. M. Goldsborough to Gideon Welles, May 21, 1862,
in N O R , VII:
p. 406.
The Federal vessels were the Monitor
(two guns), the Galena (six guns), the Wachusett (10 guns),
the E. A. Stevens (one gun), the Aroostook (three guns), the
Port Royal (eight guns), the Maratanza (six guns), the
Mahaska (six guns), and the Dragon (two guns); for detailed
descriptions, see N O R , Series 2, II:
pp. 39, 62, 90, 132,
134, 148, 182, 215, 235.
^Joseph E. Johnston to John R. Tucker, May 2, 1862,
O R , XI (part 3):
pp. 488-489.

in

^Quoted in J. N. Barney to John R. Tucker, May 4, 1862,
in NOR, VII:
p. 784.
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and picked his way around the obstructions in the Elizabeth
River on the night of May 5.^
What Tucker found in Norfolk was chaos.

Major-General

Benjamin Huger's Department of Norfolk had always been a
source of problems for the War Department.

The army and

navy constantly quarreled over spheres of authority,

a

disagreement still unsettled after the subordination of the
naval forces in the department to Johnston in mid-April.^
The original commandant of Gosport Navy Yard had been
replaced in March, primarily because of a perceived lack of
energy in meeting construction

d e a d l i n e s .

^

Huger himself

had survived calls for his resignation by his own officers,
members of Congress, and even the Vice-President, who
labeled him "inefficient--indeed [an] imbecile.

..."

President Davis had sustained him, not from any great
confidence, but for lack of any better candidates to replace
him.

When the subject came up in a March cabinet meeting,

with members calling for Huger to be superseded, Davis
responded that "it was easy to say so, but the question was

5john R. Tucker to Stephen R. Mallory, May 8, 1862,
N O R , VII:
p. 786.
^Benjamin Huger to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 3):
p. 474; Josiah Tattnall to Stephen R.
Mallory, April 29, 1862, in NOR, VII:
p. 776.
^Stephen R. Mallory to F. Forrest, March 19, 1862,
Stephen Mallory to F. Forrest, March 20, 1862, Stephen R.
Mallory to Sidney Smith Lee, March 24, 1862, in N O R , VII:
pp. 747-749.
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where to get one to take his place."®

Benjamin, Randolph,

and Lee all found it necessary constantly to send Huger
detailed orders to accomplish even the simplest of tasks.®
When Johnston directed Huger on April 28 to "be
prepared for a prompt movement, and if compelled to move, as
little public property as possible should be left for the
enemy," the fifty-seven-year-old South Carolinian panicked.
He wrote back to Lee, not Johnston, that he could not remove
or damage his guns, destroy his ammunition, relinquish any
outlying parts of his garrison, or assist in the destruction
of property in the navy yard.

"It seems to me the best I

can do is to be prepared to repel promptly any attack and
defend the position as long as I can."-*-®

As the time for

the withdrawal from Yorktown grew closer,

Johnston sent more

detailed orders to Huger, Tattnall, and Sidney Smith Lee.
The orders were hand-carried by Colonel Lay, who was

^Entries of March 4, 1862, March 7, 1862, Bragg diary,
pp. 171, 175; see also Jefferson Davis to Benjamin Huger,
February 26, 1862, in OR, IX: p. 45.
®Judah P. Benjamin to Benjamin Huger, March 5, 1862
(two letters), Judah P. Benjamin to Benjamin Huger, March
15, 1862, in OR, IX:
pp. 55-56, 68; Robert E. Lee to
Benjamin Huger, March 18, 1862, Walter H. Taylor to Benjamin
Huger, March 29, 1862, Walter H. Taylor to Benjamin Huger,
March 31, 1862, George W. Randolph to Benjamin Huger, April
1, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Benjamin Huger, April 7, 1862, in
OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 384-385, 411, 412-413, 414, 425-426;
see also George W. Randolph to T. M. R. Talcott, April 4,
1862, in Talcott Family papers, Virginia Historical Society,
Richmond, Virginia.
l®Benjamin Huger to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862
letters), in OR, XI (part 3): pp. 474, 682.
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empowered to explain more fully his commander's inten
tions.

When word of Johnston's instructions reached

Richmond,

Davis ordered Secretaries Mallory and Randolph to

Norfolk to delay the evacuation long enough to ship out such
supplies as could be saved and destroy those that could
not.12
Thus occurred the confused situation in Norfolk on the
night of May 5, when Commander Tucker quietly passed the
obstructions near Craney Island.

Two cabinet secretaries

were personally supervising the shipment of supplies.12
Flag Officer Tattnall was trying to convince them that the
Virginia could not possibly execute his orders to "protect
Norfolk as well as James River, and if possible prevent the
enemy from ascending it."

At the same time, he was desper

ately attempting to find a pilot who could navigate the
ironclad upriver if her draft was lightened.14
was dismantling the navy yard,

Captain Lee

and General Huger,

by all

U R o b e r t E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston,
May 2, 1862, in
OR, XI (part 3):
p. 488; Joseph E. Johnston to John R.
Tucker, May 2, 1862, in NOR, VII:
p. 782.
12'restimony of George W. Randolph before the Confeder
ate States Congress Naval Committee, February 5, 1863, in
N O R , Series 2, I: pp. 716-717.

l^ibia.
^ T e s t i m o n y of Josiah Tattnall at his court-martial,
July 19, 1862, in NOR, VII:
p. 796.
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reports, was hardly capable of doing anything.15
He discovered that Tucker's two steamers had been
ordered to Norfolk to attempt to haul off the Richmond
ordnance supplies and as many gunboats as possible before
Gosport fell back into Yankee hands.
Norfolk had been difficult,

If sneaking into

steaming back upriver with

several other vessels in tow was even more dangerous.
Tucker did not hesitate; the next night he re-entered
Hampton Roads.

The Patrick Henry towed the unfinished

ironclad and a partially completed gunboat.

The Jamestown

had in tow another gunboat and the brig loaded down with the
cannon and ammunition for the R i c hmond.

The two gunboats,

recalled Lieutenant Commander William H. Parker of the
Beaufort, "had sawmill engines, and when they got underweigh
[sic] there was such a wheezing and blowing that one would
have supposed all hands had suddenly been attacked with the
asthma or heaves."

Miraculously,

"they ran by the batteries

at Newport News however without waking the sentinels up."
The following morning, May 7, while Hood and Newton traded
volley at Eltham's Landing, Tucker handed the vessels over
to his smaller ships to be conveyed to Richmond, and

15wc>od, "First Fight," B & L , I: p. 709; testimony of
George W. Randolph before the Confederate States Congress
Naval Committee, February 5, 1863, in N O R , Series 2, I:
pp.
716-717; testimony of Josiah Tattnall at his court-martial,
July 19, 1862, in N O R , VII:
p. 797.
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stationed himself to run the gauntlet again that night.1^
By the night of May 7, however, the Federals had more
securely closed Hampton Roads; and Tucker's vessels were
spotted and forced to retreat soon after midnight.
The next morning, Tucker watched impotently as the
G alena, the Port R o y a l , and the Aroostook, having themselves
bypassed the V i r g i n i a , pounded the Confederate battery at
Day's Bluff into submission.17

The Federal gunboats, Tucker

wrote from his vantage point upriver,
hour."

"silenced it in one

As he retreated slowly ahead of the Yankee vessels,

Tucker warned Commander Ebenezer Farrand, commanding at
Drewry's Bluff, that "the iron vessel the

'Galena' is one of

them and can ascend the river to Richmond if she desires.
feel anxious for the fate of Richmond.

I

. . ."18

But Fort Huger, sitting atop Harden's Bluff with
thirteen guns,

several of which were rifled, proved too well

entrenched to be silenced.

Under orders from Admiral

Goldsborough to ascend the James as rapidly as possible "to
harass the retreat of the rebels wherever they can be
reached," Commander Rodgers decided to bypass the second

l^william H. Parker, Recollections of a Naval Officer,
1841-1865 (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883), p.
278; John R. Tucker to Stephen R. Mallory, May 8, 1862, in
N O R , VII:
p. 786.
l^i b i d .
ISjohn R. Tucker to Ebenezer Farrand, May 8, 1862, in
Charles T. Mason papers, Virginia Historical Society,
Richmond, Virginia.
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f or t . T h e

Galena capitalized upon her relative invulnera

bility to the battery's ordnance, passing and repassing the
Confederate position seven times to draw fire and distract
attention from the two wooden vessels.

Rodgers hoped that

he could then quickly engage Tucker's squadron, guaranteeing
Federal control of the lower James.
had moved the channel markers,

But the Confederates

and managed to decoy the

Galena into a sandbar near Hog Island.
with sand and water,

Her pipes filled

choking the engines so effectively that

she remained aground for thirty-six hours.

Rodgers realized

that without the ironclad the Port Royal and the Aroostook
alone could not force the river against Tucker's five
vessels, so he settled in to await repairs and reinforce
ments. 20

While his engineers pumped out the G a l e n a 's fouled

plumbing, the Confederates finished the evacuation of
Norfolk and, on May 10, a disconsolate Flag-Officer Tattnall
ordered the destruction of the V i r g i n i a .21
So far, Confederate operations on the James River had
bought precious time to improve the fortifications at
Drewry's Bluff.

Rodgers did not move up the river from Hog

Island until the evening of May 12, more than a week after

19l . M. Goldsborough to John R. Rodgers, May 7, 1862,
in NOR, VII:
p. 327.
20john Rodgers to L. M. Goldsborough, May 9, 1862, John
Rodgers to L. M. Goldsborough, May 11, 1862, in N O R , VII:
pp. 328-329.
^ T e s t i m o n y of Josiah Tattnall at his court-martial,
July 19, 1862, in NOR, VII:
p. 797.
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Johnston's army had left the trenches at Yorktown.22

The

time would not have been half so critical had Joseph
Johnston's suspicions not been well founded:

despite having

had nearly eight weeks available to perfect the fortifica
tions at Drewry's Bluff, the Richmond authorities had
allowed the work to proceed in a desultory and haphazard
manner.

Even as Commander Rodgers weighed anchor,

it was

questionable whether or not enough guns had been planted
there to resist his passage.
Captain Augustus H. Drewry's Southside Heavy Artillery
(Company C, 2nd Virginia Artillery)
overage volunteers in January,
his company's first position,

1862.

had been organized from
Drewry believed that

in Battery Nineteen on the

turnpike between Richmond and Drewry's Bluff,

"was unimpor

tant, and that we would likely be called to field duty,

for

which I did not think my men were well suited.

He

. . .23

requested an interview with General Lee in early March,

and

sold the Commanding General on the idea of erecting a
battery on the James River below Richmond.

Already

conscious of the long-term weakness of Norfolk, Lee quickly
agreed, sending Major Alfred Rives and Lieutenant Charles T.

22j0 hn Rodgers to L. M. Goldsborough, May 12,
N O R , VII:
p. 345.

1862,

in

23Quoted in William Izard Clopton, "New Light on the
Great Drewry's Bluff Fight," Southern Historical Society
Papers, Vol. XXXIV (1906):
p. 83; see also A. H. Drewry,
"Drewry's Bluff Fight," Southern Historical Society P a p e r s ,
Vol. XXIX (1901):
pp. 284-285.
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Mason of the Engineer Bureau down the river with Drewry to
select a suitable location.

The three men settled on the

bluffs on Drewry's own farm, which bore his family name.
The James River narrowed enough there to be obstructed, and
the cliffs were high enough to allow for plunging fire into
enemy vessels below.

The Southside Artillery marched to its

new post on March 17.24
Improving Drewry's Bluff,

like the rest of the defenses

of Richmond, turned out be a low priority for Confederate
authorities.

The Tredegar Iron Works provided the iron

bolts and shoes for the pilings to reduce the channel in the
river, but only as a secondary effort.25

Lee did not get

around to requesting cannon for the battery until early
A p r i l .

26

Drewry could requisition neither wagons and teams,

nor supplementary labor; he quickly concluded that the
government had no real interest in his project and set his
men to building cabins for themselves instead of digging
firing positions.

There was a brief flicker of activity in

mid-April when three guns, an additional company of artil
lery, and the commander of the 2nd Virginia Artillery,
Colonel Robert Tansill,
time.

all showed up at about the same

But Tansill and the extra company were soon ordered

24ibid.
25Dew, Ironmaker, p. 182.

XI

26Robert E. Lee to Josiah Gorgas, April 4, 1862, in O R ,
(part 3):
p. 421.
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away to Fredericksburg, and Drewry recalled that after that
"the work went on pretty much after the order of a private
enterprise until a short while before Norfolk was evacuated.
"27
By the time Johnston began to speak of withdrawing from
Yorktown, Lee and Naval Secretary Mallory began to take
renewed interest in the project.

Starting in late April,

one or both would usually ride out to the bluffs to check
the progress of the

w o r k .

28

But it was not until early May

and the urgency caused by Johnston's withdrawal from
Yorktown that Drewry's Bluff was granted any sort of
priority.

It was almost too late.

On May 2, Lee ordered a company of "sappers and miners"
to augment Drewry's company.29

The day that the Federal

gunboats reduced Fort Huger, May 8, Secretary Mallory
ordered Commander Farrand to take a detail of beached seamen
to the position and take command of the works.3 0

The next

day he ordered the crews of the James River Squadron to the

27clopton,

"New Light," pp. 83-84.

28joseph T. Durkin, Stephen R. Mallory, Confederate
Naval Chief (Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina
Press, 1954), p. 194; Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston,
April 30, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 10,
1862, Walter H. Taylor to Joseph E. Johnston, May 15, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 476, 505, 518.
29Robert E. Lee to Samuel Cooper, May 2, 1862, in LRA I G O , M-474, Reel 30.
30stephen R. Mallory to Ebenezer Farrand, May 8, 1862,
in N O R , Series 2, I:
pp. 635-636.
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bluff to emplace cannon from the Jamestown and the Patrick
H e n r y .31

On May 11, as Commander Rodgers' crew struggled to

complete the repairs on the Galena and free her from the Hog
Island sandbar, Lee ordered six more companies of heavy
artillery to Chaffin's Bluff,
original position,

just across the river from the

to begin digging in a new battery.32

i>he

following morning, Mallory dispatched Lieutenant Catesby ap
R. Jones and the crew of the scuttled Virginia
engineering officers)

(minus only

to the same location, followed a day

or two later by Captain John D. Simms and two companies of
Confederate M a r ines.33

a

company of the Washington

(Louisi

ana) Artillery was also transferred to Chaffin's Bluff on
May 13.34

While Lee and Davis conferred with Johnston on

May 14, Secretary Randolph ordered Huger--now in Petersburg
--to send Brigadier-General William A. Mahone's Virginia
Brigade to the bluffs to support the artillery,

in case

transports carrying infantry followed the Yankee gunboats.35
By May 15, nearly 1,800 sailors and soldiers gathered
at Drewry's and Chaffin's Bluffs, and General Mahone was

31scharf, History of the Confederate States N a v y , p. 711.
32These six companies constituted 668 men.
W. H. Fry
to Samuel Cooper, May 14, 1862, in LR-A I G O , M-474, Reel 18.
33stephen R. Mallory to Catesby ap R. Jones, May 12,
1862, in N O R , VII:
p. 799; S c h a r f , History of the Confeder
ate States N a v y , p. 717.

LI

34Robert E. Lee to J. B. Walton, May 13, 1862,
(part 2):
p . 555.

in O R ,

35scharf, History of the Confederate States N a v y , p. 717.
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marching up with nearly 4,000 more.36

Twelve guns had been

placed in hastily dug embrasures; the heaviest were a 10inch Columbiad and a 9-inch Dahlgren

R i f l e .

37

After the

Patrick Henry and the smaller gunboats had passed upriver,
the Jamestown was sunk in the channel to completely close it
to anything but boats with the lightest of drafts.38
In material terms there were enough men and guns and
obstructions at Drewry's and Chaffin's Bluffs to keep
Rodgers' squadron from threatening Richmond.
no one really in command.

But there was

Farrand had been superseded by

Sidney Smith Lee, who only arrived on the morning of May
15.39

gu t Mahone was also coming to take command, while

36orewry's company, the company of sappers and miners,
and the company from the Washington Artillery probably
numbered something less than 300 men.
The six companies of
heavy artillery added 668 more (see note 32 above), and the
muster rolls of the V i r g i n i a , the Patrick Henry and the
Jamestown numbered over 700 men, to which should be added at
least another 150 men for the two companies of marines and
Farrand's original work party.
For the muster rolls of the
three vessels, see N O R , Series 2, I: pp. 289-290, 299-301,
308-311; for the closest estimate of Mahone's Brigade, see
"Abstract from return of the Department of Norfolk, M a j .
Gen. Benjamin Huger, commanding, for January, 1862," in O R ,
IX:
p. 38.
37scharf, History of the Confederate States N a v y , p.
711; Clopton, "New Light," p. 88; Drewry, "Drewry's Bluff
Fight," pp. 285-286.
38Midshipman D. M. Lee, brother of Fitzhugh Lee and
nephew of Robert E. Lee, was one of the crewmen of the
Jamestown who bored the holes in her hull to sink her.
See
Robert Wright, "Sinking of the Jamestown," Southern Histori
cal Society Pa p e r s , Vol. XXIX (1901):
pp. 372.
39scharf, History of the Confederate States N a v y , p.
717.
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Captain Drewry and the other army officers studiously
ignored Commander Tucker, who had taken effective control of
the navy work parties.

It was almost as if the army and

navy were preparing to fight two separate battles.
General Johnston only discovered the true nature of the
confusion at Drewry's Bluff on May 15, when Federal iron
clads had already tested the strength of the position.

On

May 13, from his headquarters near Baltimore Crossroads,
sent three staff officers to the Richmond area.

he

Major A. H.

Cole went to evaluate the logistical situation near the
capital; Major Walter H. Stevens, an engineering officer,
and Major Jasper Whiting, Smith's Assistant AdjutantGeneral, made the trip to examine the terrain of the upper
Chickahominy and the preparations made to defend Drewry's
Bluff.

The responses from Stevens and Whiting were immedi

ate and depressing:
May 14,

"There is nothing," reported Stevens on

"to prevent their [the Federals']

landing at City

Point or above, up to Drewry's Bluff, in force."

From

Drewry's Bluff itself, Major Whiting wrote on the same day:
"Stevens and I have done all we could to stir up the
imbeciles.

It is perfectly discouraging to see how abso

lutely nothing has been done."

He followed this the next

morning with an even more gloomy assessment:
It won't do to trust these people in any way.
We can't get anything done. . . .
If not too
late, a good brigade under an energetic officer
might perhaps save the city.
A few more vessels
sunk; a gun or two well placed, with bomb-proofs;
some sharpshooters intelligently located— all with
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strong field artillery and infantry supports, and
some one in charge--might give us, or somebody
else, time to do something above.
Everything now
is at odds and ends; everybody frightened; and
everybody looking out for his own affairs.
I have
never been so much ashamed of our people before.
[emphasis in original]40
By the time Johnston read this report, the artillerymen
at Drewry's Bluff had fought their first disjointed action.
While President Davis, General Lee, and his brother, Captain
Lee, all watched, the G a l e n a , now reinforced by both the
Monitor and the Na u g a t u c k , steamed toward the obstructions
in the river.

Commander Rodgers, believing from past

experience that his ironclads were invulnerable to Confeder
ate fire, planned to remove the pilings in the river and
then bypass the batteries.41
No one on the Confederate side coordinated the defense.
Two separate parties of sharpshooters, one under Marine
Captain Simms, the other led by Lt. John Taylor Wood of the
V i r g i n i a , harassed R o d g e r s ' working parties from the banks
of the James, apparently without any reference to each
other.42

The army batteries fought under Captain Drewry's

command; the navy guns were directed by Commander Farrand,
Commander Tucker, and Lt. Jones.
particular concentration of fire.

Nobody ordered any
Instead, the cannoneers

40a 11 quoted in Smith, Confederate War Pa p e r s , pp. 48-49.
41john Rodgers to L. M. Goldsborough, May 16, 1862,
N O R , VII:
pp. 357-358.

in

42gcharf, History of the Confederate States N a v y , pp.
716-717.
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simply blazed away at whatever targets they could hit.43
The battle opened at 7:45 A. M. on May 15 and lasted
just over three hours.

The Monitor approached within 400

yards of the obstructions in the river, where it sat despite
the fire of the batteries on the bluffs, prevented by the
sharpshooters from sending out working parties.

The

Naugatuck, shrugging off the rebel shells, retired only
after the 100-pounder in its bow burst.

Standing 600 yards

out from the bluffs, however, the Galena finally showed
that, under the right conditions,
against ironclads.

land batteries could stand

Plunging fire from the Columbiad and the

Dahlgren Rifle struck her forty-three times.

Contrary to

earlier opinion, Rodgers admitted the next day, the Galena
"is not shot-proof; balls came through, and many men were
killed with fragments of her own iron."

At 11:05 A. M . ,

Rodgers signaled his vessels to retreat.

Yet he had not

been convinced that the fortifications could not be taken;
with infantry support to clear the banks of the river, he
still thought that his ironclads could eventually steam past
them to the Confederate capital.
Admiral Goldsborough,

At any rate, he wrote to

"on James River an army can be landed

within 10 miles of Richmond on either

b a n k . " 4 4

4 3 i b i d .; Clopton, "New Light," pp. 88-89; Drewry,
"Drewry's Bluff Fight," pp. 285-286.
44john Rodgers to L. M. Goldsborough, May 16, 1862, L.
H. Newman to John Rodgers, May 16, 1862, Ebenezer Farrand to
Stephen R. Mallory, May 15, 1862, in N O R , VII:
pp. 357-358,
359-360, 369-370.
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That was the thought that had haunted Johnston since
late April, and had kept reappearing in his correspondence
over the past two we e k s . 45
fear was to be realized.

Now it seemed that his worst
Major Stevens reported on May 14

that "the danger is on the south side of James River."46
Unaware that Randolph had done so, Johnston immediately
"wrote to General Huger
good riflemen

...

gunboats near the

. . . desiring him to send a body of

to shoot the crews of the enemy's
'obstruction' in James River.

..."

He

also urged Lee to have any deployable forces in the Depart
ment of Henrico "placed near the battery.

. . ."47

jqo

sooner than he had posted those letters, Johnston began
receiving even more disturbing news from Drewry's Bluff.
First came the warning from Major Whiting,

and then,

Walter Taylor, the first notice of the battle.

from

"The report

given me by Captain Zimmer, who is connected with the
Ordnance Department,

and who was present," Taylor wrote,

"is

to the effect that the fire of the enemy was very bad.
. . ."48

L ee sent him a more restrained report later in the

45joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 29, 1862,
Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 8, 1862, Joseph E.
Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 9, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 473, 499-500, 503-504.
46Quoted in Smith, Confederate War P a p e r s , p. 48.
47joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May 15, 1862, in
Beverly Randolph Wellford papers, Virginia Historical
Society, Richmond, Virginia.
48walter Taylor to Joseph E. Johnston, May 15, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 3):
p. 518.
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day, which emphasized that "only the two iron boats engaged.
No one exposed and no chance for sharpshooters.
landing."49

No signs of

But Lee admitted to Huger that he expected

McClellan to "avail himself of the river as far up as
possible.

He may come beyond City Point.

. . ."50

This settled the matter for Johnston; he could not
afford to wait north of the Chickahominy while the Federals
possessed the ability to land in his rear and approach
Richmond before he could react, especially when Lee informed
him that "there is no force in this city" which could be
rushed to oppose a landing.51
Longstreet.

He called in Smith and

The failure of the government, he told them, to

finish the fortifications at Drewry's Bluff invalidated the
premise under which they had been deployed to give battle
between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy; the army could
not afford to become engaged with a superior force without
secure flanks.
river:

Johnston ordered a withdrawal behind the

Longstreet would move his own division to Drewry's

Bluff and take over responsibility for the defense there,
while Smith assumed responsibility for defending the

49Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 15, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 3):
p. 519.
SORobert

XI

(part 3) :

E. Lee to Benjamin Huger, May 16, 1862,
p. 520 .

5lRobert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 16,
OR, XI (part 3):
p. 520.

in O R ,

1862,
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crossings of the upper Chickahominy.52
Johnston promptly advised Lee of his apprehensions,
intention to move, and his general plan of action.

his

He

believed that McClellan would try to shift his base from the
York to the James, which would require the Federal commander
to order his troops across the Chickahominy.

If so, there

would come a moment of vulnerability for the larger Yankee
army, when it would be split in two sections by the river,
and the smaller Confederate army might engage one portion of
it with parity or numerical superiority if it could maneuver
swiftly enough.53
Both Lee and Davis accepted this strategy as valid,
despite contentions to the contrary made by the President
much later.

Lee admitted that work at Drewry's Bluff was

"progressing, but not satisfactorily."

The heavy guns were

"well posted, but not as perfectly protected as designed,
for want of time."

He hoped that Johnston, when he retired

52james Longstreet to D. H. Hill, May 16, 1862, in O R ,
XI (part 3):
pp. 521-522; Longstreet, Manassas to Appomat
t o x , pp. 81-82; Smith, Confederate War Pa p e r s , p. 49.
53johnston's second May 15 letter has not been found,
but its substance can easily be inferred from Robert E. Lee
to Joseph E. Johnston, May 16, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Joseph
E. Johnston, May 17, 1862, and Jefferson Davis to Joseph E.
Johnston, May 17, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 521, 523524.
Lee's remark that "I have supposed that if your army
took a position so near this city its right would rest in
that vicinity [Drewry's Bluff]," implies that Johnston had
advised him of the position he intended to take near
Richmond.
Lee's second letter agrees with Johnston that
McClellan would probably try to cross the Chickahominy, and
the Davis letter reiterates the same point.
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nearer Richmond, would rest the flank of his army there on
the James to assist with the labor and protect the batter
ies. 54

"it is fair for us to conclude," Lee continued in

another letter,

"that his operations in front of Yorktown

will be re-enacted in front of the obstructions on James
River,

unless you can prevent it."

As for Johnston's plan

to strike McClellan when the Army of the Potomac moved
toward the James, Lee wrote:

.

"Should his course to James

River be below the mouth of the Chickahominy this will be
difficult, but should his march be across the Chickahominy
his passage between that river and the James may furnish you
the o p p o r t u n i t y . " ^
Davis agreed with his generals.

On May 17, he sent an

aide, Colonel G. W. C. Lee, to report to Johnston on the
state of the defenses at Drewry's
that Colonel Lee hand-carried,

B l u f f . ^6

In the letter

the President told the

^ R o b e r t E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 16, 1862, in
OR, XI (part 3):
p. 521.
55Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 17, 1862,
O R , XI (part 3):
p. 523.

in

56Davis implied in his memoirs that he had sent Lee
primarily to confer upon strategy, rather than as a courier
instructed to present and receive information.
This
interpretation strains the wording in Davis's letter to the
breaking point.
He also stated that Johnston did not ever
inform either Colonel Lee or himself as to an intention to
cross the Chickahominy.
Not only, however, had Johnston
already informed Lee of the impending move, he had already
begun it when Colonel Lee arrived, and in fact received
Davis's aide on the near bank of the river.
See Davis, Rise
and F a l l , II:
p. 103; Johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines,"
p. 207; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, May 17, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
pp.
523-524.
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General that if McClellan continued to advance with York
River as his base, then meeting the Federals between the
Pamunkey and the Chickahominy was still a good plan.

"But

if, as reported here, he should change direction, and,
leaving his boats on the Pamunkey, would cross the Peninsula
to join those

[boats] on the James River, the opportunity

desired by you to meet him on the land will then be afford
ed."

Like Lee, Davis suspected that the cautious "Little

Napoleon" would sidestep down the east bank of the river
until he came into contact with the Federal fleet on the
James:

"This diminishes the space within which his march

will be exposed to your attack, unless he should cross the
Chickahominy, which we can hardly h ope."57

As late as May

17, the views of Johnston, Lee, and Davis were still in
harmony with each other.
Events in the Shenandoah Valley had not ceased while
Yankee ironclads pounded the Rebel batteries at Drewry's
Bluff.

Following his victory at McDowell, Jackson headed

back for the Valley to unite with Ewell and attack Banks--a
project endorsed by both Johnston and Lee.

But Banks had

split his forces in such a way as to confound the orders
sent by the two Confederate generals.

One division of 7,000

men, under Brigadier-General James Shields, was marching out
of the Valley to reinforce General McDowell at Fredericks-

Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, May 17,
(part 3):
pp. 523-524.

S^Jefferson

in OR, XI

1862,
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burg.

The remainder of Banks' army had retreated to

Strasburg--whether to fortify a position or to transfer
troops by the Manassas Gap Railroad was not certain.

Lee,

who believed that Banks' ultimate objective was indeed to
leave the Valley,
and Ewell.

still favored an attack on him by Jackson

"Whatever movement you make against Banks do it

speedily, and if successful drive him back toward the
Potomac, and create the impression, as far as practicable,
that you design threatening that line," Lee instructed
Jackson.

But he also reminded "Stonewall"

"not, in any

demonstration you may make in that direction,

[to]

lose

sight of the fact that it may become necessary for you to
come to the support of General Johnston, and hold yourself
in readiness to do so if required."58
Johnston was far less certain that the bulk of Banks'
forces were intended to quit the Valley.
Strasburg,

To retreat to

entrench, and essentially take himself out of the

war would not, based on previous performance, be out of
character for the political general from Massachusetts.

"If

Banks is fortifying near Strasburg the attack would be too
hazardous," Johnston advised Ewell on May 17.
event we must leave him in his works."

"In such an

Instead, Johnston

proposed that Jackson and Ewell unite and strike Shields'
detached division as it marched toward Fredericksburg,

^ R o b e r t E. Lee to Thomas J. Jackson, May 16,
OR, XII (part 3):
pp. 892-893.

then

1862,
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for Ewell "to move on, while General Jackson should keep
Banks away from McDowell."

The letter concluded with

several sentences that have remained the source of contro
versy for well over a century:
We want troops here; none, therefore, must keep away,
unless employing a greatly superior force of the enemy.
In your march communicate with Brigadier-General
Anderson, near Fredericksburg; he may require your
assistance.
My general idea is to gather here all the
troops who do not keep away from McClellan's greatly
superior forces.
General Branch is ordered to Hanover
Court-House. . . . After reading this send it to
General Jackson, for whom it is intended as well as for
y o u r s e l f .59
Douglas Southall Freeman contended that "Johnston could
hardly have given more dangerous orders," which sprang from
his "conservatism and his
of Richmond.

..."

concern for his own

army in front

He portrayed Lee, on the other hand, as

following a natural "inclination

...

to take the lesser

risks for the sake of the greater gain that would follow a
defeat of

B a n k s . "60

Clifford Dowdey quoted only the portion

of Johnston's letter that said "we want troops here; none,
therefore, must be kept away unless employing a greatly
superior force of the enemy," and asserted that Johnston had
posted the order,
Valley.

..."

"knowing nothing of the conditions in the

Later,

Dowdey condemned Johnston for issuing

"sporadic orders" which "had been contradictory,

sometimes

discretionary and sometimes arbitrary, with a day-to-day

59joseph E. Johnston
in OR, XII (part 3):
pp.
^Freeman,

R.

to Richard S. Ewell, May
896-897.

E. L e e , II:

17, 1862,

pp. 55-56.
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type of thinking that could not direct subordinates with a
singleness of purpose."61

Also citing only a portion of

Johnston's orders, Robert G. Tanner accused Johnston of
trying to enforce upon Jackson "his fundamental strategic
preference for massing strength by giving up territory and
fighting only when there was nowhere else to retreat and no
other friendly forces to muster."
Tanner,

His letter, opined

"abandoned everything the Valley Army had striven

for since the evacuation of Winc h e s t e r ."62
These criticisms share the central assumption that
Johnston preferred a simplistic strategy of concentration of
forces at Richmond, and that he was unable to relate
operations elsewhere to those of his own army.

Such a case

could be made if Johnston were shown to have advocated a
purely passive course in the Valley and central Virginia,
and to have subordinated all other designs to the strength
ening of his own army.

Yet this was far from true.

Johnston's suggestion of a combined attack by Jackson
and Ewell on Shields' division had been overlooked as a
viable strategic option by his contemporaries and historians
as well, because the attack upon Banks and Jackson's raid
down the Valley turned out to be such signal successes
Map No. 4).

(see

Yet an attack on the lone Federal division had

much to recommend it.

Jackson and Ewell would have fought

61-Dowdey, The Seven D a y s , pp. 74-75.
^Tanner,

Stonewall

in the V a l l e y , p. 199.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

409

*VUl43;

/

m

n

/

v /

t
■
'W-JiouJELU

m

-*v<

i

R»S £ou£r

i
I

i
jir

»£j'i 5TflTi*iJ

* anch
^V^itbunto»»

Me»H

■%]|^?

5TR0TeG ic OPTIONS ~SHeNANDOfiH VALLEY f cSHTKfiL M t t N M ' t ' t o O - n t t f , /g g 'z.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

410

at favorable odds against an enemy caught on the march.
Success would not only have prevented either Shields or
Banks from reinforcing McDowell, but would have placed the
Army of the Valley roughly at Thoroughfare Gap, threatening
at once Banks' rear, McDowell's rear, and Washington.63

it

was a position that would have allowed as aggressive a
commander as Jackson to create fully as much panic north of
the Potomac as his actual dash toward Harper's Ferry.

Even

had Johnston chosen, upon a defeat of Shields, to pursue the
most conservative of choices--to return Jackson to the
Valley, where he would now meet Banks with relatively even
numbers, while Ewell cooperated with Anderson against
M c D owell— the victory would have borne substantial strategic
fruit.

McDowell, with 30,000 men and orders that included

the protection of the capital, would have faced an uncom
fortable situation at best.

To his front would have been

Anderson's 12,000 men, with 4,000 more under Branch in easy
supporting distance at Hanover Court House.

In his rear,

between his main body and the capital, would have been Ewell
with 6,000-8,000 troops.

At the very least, Johnston's

proposed maneuver would have prevented him from marching
south and blithely brushing past Anderson with better than

63vincent J. Esposito, ed., The West Point Atlas of
American Wars (New York:
Praeger, 1959), I: map 51.
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two-to-one

o d d s .

64

But Johnston,

as well as Lee and Jackson,

could read a

map, and had plenty of reasons to realize that communication
lags could make what appeared to be a good plan in Richmond
one that was seriously out-of-date in Staunton.

He had,

after all, been the one who originally ordered Jackson and
Ewell to work together and decide tactical questions on
their own.

So the very next day, May 18, before he could

possibly have received the famous protest from Jackson which
begged to be allowed to attack Banks, Johnston dispatched
two more letters to the Valley District.

In the first,

Johnston reiterated that the mission of Jackson's army was
to keep Banks' forces from uniting with McDowell.

If he was

too late to successfully attack Banks, then he must pursue
the course that led east of the Valley.

But Johnston

emphasized that he had full confidence in Jackson and Ewell
themselves to choose whichever option held greater promise;
he would not attempt to dictate a rigid course of action
from the suburbs of Richmond.

In the second letter, the

army commander was even more explicit:

"The whole question

is, whether or not General Jackson and yourself are too late
to attack Banks.

If so the march eastward should be made.

64por evidence that such a plan can be inferred from
existing documents, see Joseph R. Anderson to Richard S.
Ewell, May 17, 1862, in which Anderson, who was now in
contact with Johnston, suggests something very similar, in
OR, XII (part 3):
p. 896.
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If not

(supposing your strength sufficient)

Did Johnston,

then attack."65

like Lee, anticipate Jackson following up the

attack with an exploitation toward the Potomac?

On May 18

it is difficult to say, for though he had already advocated
threatening that line in April
terms),

(albeit in quite different

Johnston did not actually authorize Jackson to

strike north rather than e ast.66

But at least by May 27

there was no question in Johnston's mind that Jackson should
continue to pursue the most aggressive course possible:
you can threaten Baltimore and Washington, do so.
produce an important diversion.

. . .

"If

It may

Your movements

depend, of course, upon the strength remaining in your
neighborhood.

Upon that depends the practicability of your

advancing to the Potomac and crossing it.
hostile force to prevent either."67

I know of no

jf Johnston and Lee

sometimes differed on the exact operations to be pursued in
the Valley and central Virginia, they never disagreed on the
m ethods— striking exposed Federal forces as opportunity

65Quoted in Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I:

p. 371n.

66The suggestion for crossing the Potomac came in
Joseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, April 30, 1862, in O R ,
XI (part 3):
p. 477.
There Johnston suggested that the
Confederates should "take the offensive, collect all the
troops we have in the East and cross the Potomac with them.
. . .” Admittedly, the letter was in a much different
context than the Valley campaign, but it does suggest that
Johnston had begun to think about the advantages of dis
tracting the enemy with a march north.

1862,

67joseph E. Johnston to Thomas J. Jackson, May 27,
in Douglas, Stonewal1 , p. 72.
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allowed— or the objective.

In point of fact, when Johnston

wrote "we want troops here; none, therefore, must keep away,
unless employing a greatly superior force of the enemy," he
captured in a single sentence the essence of both men's
strategy in May,

1862.

Federal operations over the next several days sustained
the strategic insights of Johnston and Lee.

McClellan said

later that after Drewry's Bluff "the question now arose as
to the line of operations to be followed:

that of the James

on one hand, and, on the other, the line from White House as
a base, crossing the upper Chickahominy."

He personally

preferred the James, because he thought it would give him an
invulnerable supply line and because advancing on Richmond
would be easier from the south.

But the condition under

which the Federal government was willing to reinforce him
with McDowell's corps was that McDowell would join the Army
of the Potomac by marching rather than by boat.

Thus,

reasoned President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton,
McDowell could still continue to safeguard Washington,
pushing Anderson before him.

by

McClellan was ordered to

supply McDowell's corps from White House and to keep one
wing extended north of the Chickahominy to meet him . 68
Unwisely, the Federal commander attempted simultaneously to
prepare to change his base to the James and spread his right

II:

68ceorge B. McClellan,
pp. 173-174.

"The Peninsular Campaign," B & L ,
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flank north to receive McDowell.

He ordered the first

troops across Bottom's Bridge on May 20, and within five
days had divided his army into two unequal parts, precisely
as the Confederates had wished but hardly dared to hope.
The III and IV Corps were south of the Chickahominy, while
the II, V, and, VI Corps remained on the north

b a n k .

69

But McClellan still had not crossed the Chickahominy on
May 18 or 19 when Jefferson Davis rode again to Johnston's
headquarters, this time without General Lee.
usual,

He was, as

interested in knowing exactly what course Johnston

intended to pursue, and just how close he intended to bring
his troops to Richmond.70

Johnston explained that he had

pulled his lines in very close to the city in order to
assure a good water supply, ease of provision,

and to put

his troops into place to work on improving the battery at

6 9 "McClellan's Report (1)," in OR, XI
25-26; Swinton, C a m p a i g n s , p. 129.

(part 1):

pp.

70pavis's later contention, that he was surprised to
find the army on the south bank of the Chickahominy and that
the topic of why Johnston had crossed the river dominated
the conversation, was even dismissed by Freeman, who
charitably credited the President with confusing his dates.
The only support for that account came from the gossipy and
undependable memoirs of Postmaster-General John Reagan, who
claimed to have accompanied the President that day, and to
have seen a "look of surprise" sweep over his face, reveal
ing "a trace of pain."
The actual topics of discussion can
be inferred from Reagan, however, when read in conjunction
with later accounts by Johnston and Robert E. Lee to Joseph
E. Johnston, May 18, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 526.
See
Davis, Rise and F a l l , II:
pp. 103-104; Freeman, Lee's
Lieutenants, I: p. 210n; John H. Reagan, Memoirs, with
Special Reference to Secession and the Civil War (New York:
n. p., 1906), pp. 138-139; Johnston, "Manassas to Seven
P i n e s ," p . 208.
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Drewry's Bluff and the Richmond defenses.71

He could not,

however, have satisfied the President's curiosity about
forthcoming operations, since McClellan had not yet revealed
whether he would cross the Chickahominy.
But by May 21 there was no question that the Federal
commander intended to accept the bait.
south of the river reached Richmond,

Word of the Yankees

and almost immediately

Davis had Lee write Johnston for details:

"The President

desires to know the number of troops around Richmond, how
they are posted,

and the organization of tfne "divisions and

brigades; also the programme of operations which you
propose."

Acknowledging that "your plan of operations,

dependent upon circumstances perhaps yet to be developed,
may not be so easily explained, nor may it be prudent to
commit it to paper," Lee suggested that Johnston visit
Richmond and communicate it in

person.

72

Johnston immedi

ately replied with a memorandum showing the approximate
strength of each of his brigades, and the next day posted
one letter and had another hand-carried to Lee by Major
Whiting.

Unfortunately,

seems to have survived.

neither of these communications
It is not possible to tell by Lee's

responses whether or not Johnston addressed any questions of

71johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines," B & L , II:
p.
208; Reagan, M e m o i r s , p. 139; Longstreet, Manassas to
Appomattox, p. 82; Lee, Pendleton, p. 184.
^ R o b e r t E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 21, 1862,
O R , XI (part 3):
p. 530.
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s t r a t e g y .73

His concern for the safety
not allow Davis time to

of the

capital, however, did

sit and wait for a reply.

On the

morning of May 22, before Johnston's answers— if indeed his
letters answered Lee's inquiries--could have reached him,
Davis again rode out to the army at Mechanicsville,

this

time with Lee alongside.

He found neither Johnston nor a

situation calculated to

instill in him

confidence in his

army commander:

General Stuart

and General Cobb," he

"I saw

wrote Johnston on his return,
but as neither of them communicated to me any plan
of operations, or appeared to know what troops
were in front as we approached, I suppose neither
of them could have been commanding in chief at
that locality.
My conclusion was, that if, as
reported to be probable, General Franklin, with a
division, was in that vicinity, he might easily
have advanced over the turnpike toward if not to
Richmond.
He was upset enough with this appearance to order Lee back
to the army on May 23, for a more thorough discussion of
Johnston's

p

l

a

n

By chance,

s

.

74

Davis had ridden into the consequences of a

73Johnston himself admitted that the return was
approximate--to the low side--and a superficial examination
reveals that the numbers must have been taken directly from
his return of effectives on April 30, before the Battle of
Williamsburg; see "Strength of the several brigades of the
Army of Northern Virginia near Richmond, as shown by General
Johnston's memorandum of May 21, 1862."
That Johnston wrote
twice to Lee on May 22 can be determined from Robert E. Lee
to Joseph E. Johnston, May 22, 1862 (two letters), in OR, XI
(part 3):
pp. 530-534.
74jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, May 23,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 536.

1862,
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dispute between Major-Generals Smith and Magruder.

Magru

der, who had rejoined the army after a brief illness, was
irritated by the arrangement that subordinated his troops-temporarily, he contended--to Smith.

As a result, every

time Smith ordered regiments here or there, Magruder
cooperated grudgingly,

if at all.

On May 22 and 23, their

relationship had deteriorated to the point that, when Smith
ordered two regiments from M c L a w s ' Brigade to hold Mechanicsville, Magruder refused and insisted on using two
regiments from Brigadier-General D. R. Jones" Brigade.
Magruder 's motivation seems to have come from a desire to be
contentious, rather than from any sound military reason.
The two Major-Generals also issued a series of conflicting
orders to the cavalry commanders in the are a — not just
Stuart, but also Colonels Fitzhugh Lee and Beverly H.
Robertson.

The result was confusion around Mechanicsville

at the most inopportune of moments.

Not only were the

Yankees threatening to advance with at least a division, but
Davis was present to witness a part of the army at loose
e n d s .

75

Johnston settled the internal dispute within a few

days, but Davis's visit had definitely hurt his credibility

75"Report of Col. Beverly H.
Cavalry," May 24, 1862, in OR, XI
John B. Magruder to Thomas Rhett,
Magruder to Samuel W. Melton, May
O R , XI (part 3): pp. 537-539.

Robertson, Fourth Virginia
(part 1):
pp. 663-664;
May 23, 1862, John B.
23, 1862 (two letters), in
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with the Chief Executive.76
Possibly sensitive to the President's criticism,
Johnston was a good deal more communicative than usual when
Lee arrived at his headquarters on May 23.

He definitely

intended to strike one of the wings of the Army of the
Potomac, but had not yet decided which.

Johnston himself

seems to have consistently favored attacking south of the
river, in the vicinity of Seven Pines.77

But three consid

erations made him lean on May 23 toward hitting the Federals
on the north bank,
Mechanicsville.

in the vicinity of Beaver Dam Creek and

First and foremost was the necessity for

keeping McClellan and McDowell separated; an attack at Seven
Pines might only have the effect of driving them together.
Also in favor of a northern attack was the fact that the
ground had already been thoroughly reconnoitered by Majors
Stevens and Whiting a week earlier.78

Finally, Longstreet,

in whose tactical judgment Johnston was inclined to have
greater and greater confidence, had conducted a "careful
study of the works and armaments at Drury's

[sic] Bluff,"

76Johnston resolved the situation by an almost cosmetic
expedient, "elevating" Magruder on May 28 to command of the
"Centre" wing of the army, which nominally made him the
equal of Smith and Longstreet.
But in fact Magruder still
only commanded six brigades, divided formally into two
"divisions," while each of the other wing commanders
controlled eleven or twelve brigades.
See Smith, The Battle
of Seven P i n e s , p. 8.
77johnston, N a rrati ve, p. 130; Smith, The Battle of
Seven P i n e s , p. 12.
78smith, Confederate War Pa p e r s , pp. 48-49.
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and "ventured the suggestion that we recross the Chickahom
iny at Mechanicsville and stand behind Beaver Dam Creek.
. . ."79

Johnston planned to wait a few more days, to find

out just how much distance McClellan would voluntarily put
between the sundered halves of his army, but he knew that he
could not afford to delay too long.

He told Lee that he

intended to strike somewhere— probably but not definitely
north of the river— by May 29.^0
Lee evidently made two responses to Johnston's plan.
First, he reiterated his suggestion that Johnston visit
Richmond and communicate his strategy to the President
directly.

This Johnston did on May 24.81

in addition, Lee

gave Johnston the welcome news that he would try, between
then and the time of Johnston's attack, to reinforce the
army with whatever troops could be scraped up in the
Richmond area.

Specifically,

there were at least seven

batteries of field artillery around the capital, which could

79Longstreet, Manassas to A ppomattox, p. 82.
80i>hat Johnston planned to attack by May 2 9 and that he
favored an assault north of the river can be determined from
Davis's memoirs, although, as G. W. Smith later pointed out,
Davis apparently confused the elements of several different
plans.
Far more likely is that Johnston was still waiting
for the Federals to make themselves more vulnerable in one
locale or the other.
See Davis, Rise and F a l l , II:
pp.
120-121; Smith, The Battle of Seven P i n e s , pp. 10-11.
81-Freeman, apparently misreading Davis's memoirs and
letter to Johnston on May 23, incorrectly places this visit
by Lee on May 26.
See Joseph E. Johnston to James Long
street, May 24, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 541-542; see
also Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I:
p. 213.
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be used to augment Pendleton's Artillery Reserve.82

The 4th

Virginia Heavy Artillery Regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel
Nicholas C. Harris's heavy artillery battalion where both
assigned as infantry to Johnston's

a r m y .

83

Likewise,

Johnston was to receive Brigadier-General Henry A. Wise's
brigade,

still in the process of rebuilding from its defeat

at Roanoke Island.

Aside from a complete regiment of

cavalry, Wise's brigade had roughly the strength of two
infantry regiments.84

But most significantly, Lee promised

Johnston that he would try to stretch troops from Holmes's
Department of North Carolina to cover Petersburg, releasing
the bulk of Huger's Division for the

o f f e n s i v e .

85

The strategic situation began to change more and more
rapidly after McClellan crossed the Chickahominy.

On May

23, Jackson had initiated his attack on Banks by gobbling up
a detached regiment at Front Royal, and swung around the
Federal commander's left flank.

By May 25, Banks was in

full flight and Jackson's brigades entered Winchester;
within four days they had reached Harper's Ferry and the

82There may have been as many as nine— the statements
of A. L. Long and Pendleton disagree.
See A. L. Long to
John H. Winder, May 23, 1862, in OR, XI, (part 3):
p. 539;
Lee, Pendleton, p. 185.
83special Orders No. 118, Adjutant and InspectorGeneral 's Office, May 23, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 540.
8^Henry A. Wise to D. H. Hill, May 24, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 3):
p . 542.
85Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 27, 1862,
O R , XI (part 3):
p. 552.
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banks of the Potomac.86

it was not, however, the defeat of

Banks that most affected events around Richmond.
raid had a much more profound consequence:

Jackson's

at 5:00 P. M. on

May 24, in a vain attempt to cut off the Confederate
divisions in the lower Valley,

President Lincoln ordered

McDowell's corps to change front.

Instead of marching south

to link up with the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln instructed
McDowell to head west in pursuit of Jackson.
moment," observed Robert G. Tanner,

"At that

"the Valley Army won its

Valley Campaign."87
This shift was not immediately evident in Richmond,
because all eyes were rooted firmly on McClellan.

The same

day that Lincoln authorized the diversion of McDowell,
Brigadier-General Erasmus Keyes advanced units of his IV
Corps into the village of Seven Pines, and McClellan's
cavalry finally pushed into Mechanicsville.88

Other Federal

horsemen probed the swampland between Bottom's Bridge and
the James on May 25 and 26, and Branch's position at Hanover
Court House on May 26.89

. ^ D o u g l a s ,

S^Tanner,

stonewal 1 , pp.

58-74.

Stonewall in the V a l l e y , p. 239.

88"Report of Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, U. S. Army
commanding Fourth Corps, of operations May 24," May 24,
1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 668-669; Johnston,
N arra
tive , p. 130.
89"Report of Lieut. Frank C. Davis, Third Pennsylvania
Cavalry," May 26, 1862, "Report of Lieut. Col. William N.
Grier, First U. S. Cavalry," May 26, 1862, in OR, XI (part
1):
pp. 675-677.
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Johnston had begun pulling Anderson and Branch closer
to the Chickahominy as early as May 23.

Anderson sent the

45th Georgia to Ashland Station on May 23, and issued four
days' rations to the rest of his troo p s . 90

Johnston

instructed Branch the same day to reconnoiter positions
nearer to the Chickahominy

(and the main body of the a r m y ) ,

and advised him that "in a few days General J. R. Anderson
will probably be near

y o u . "91

The following morning,

Anderson issued marching orders to his regiments,
ing in the exhortation:

culminat

"This Army after having waited long

for an opportunity to meet the enemy who has sheltered
himself behind the town of Fredericksburg and the river, now
moves in pursuance of orders from higher authority to unite
in the great battle on the issue of which depends the fate
of the capital of our Country."92

Johnston told Branch to

expect Anderson by May 27.9 3
Anderson was late, almost disastrously so for Branch.
Brigadier-General Fitz John Porter's V Corps,

supported by

Brigadier-General William H. Emory's Cavalry Reserve— better

90special Orders No. 26, Army of the Rappahannock, May
23, 1862, Joseph R. Anderson Order Book, Virginia Historical
Society.

1862,

91joseph E. Johnston to L. O'Brien Branch,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 537.

May 23,

92oeneral Orders No.
13, Army of the Rappahannock, May
24, 1862, J. R. Anderson Order Book, Virginia Historical
Society.

1862,

93joseph E. Johnston to L. O'Brien Branch, May 25,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 543.
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than 16,000 troops--hit Branch's six regiments at noon on
May

2

7.94

Branch held his position near Slash Church for

several hours, until he determined that he was heavily
outnumbered and that he had recovered all of his detached
units.

Then, after suffering several hundred casualties, he

withdrew in good order toward Johnston's
day his bloodied brigade,

l i n e s .

95

That same

along with Anderson' command, was

consolidated into a new division under just-promoted MajorGeneral A. P. Hill.96
Still without reliable intelligence concerning M c 
Dowell 's movements,

Johnston reached an erroneous but

understandable conclusion when Porter brushed Branch out of
Hanover Court House.

McClellan was extending his flank

because he expected McDowell to march south within hours.
This assumption was buttressed in Johnston's mind by an
equally incorrect report on May 2 7 from Anderson that
represented the Federals in Fredericksburg as having
commenced their march to Richmond.

"We must get ready to

94"Abstract from return of the Army of the Potomac,
M a j . Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding, for
May 20, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 184.
95Branch reported 243 casualties, excluding those in
the 28th North Carolina and the 4th Virginia Cavalry.
Porter claimed to have found 200 dead and taken more than
700 prisoners.
For a discussion of this discrepancy, see
Freeman, Lee's L ieutenan ts, I: p. 220n.
96Robert E. Lee to Samuel Cooper, May 25, 1862, in LRA I G O , M-474, Reel 25; Robert E. Lee to James Longstreet, May
28, 1862, in Lee Letterbook; Jefferson Davis to Joseph E.
Johnston, May 26, 1862, A. P. Hill to L. O'Brien Branch, May
27, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 546-547, 554.
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fight," Johnston told G. W. Smith, and summoned his senior
generals to

c o n f e r e n c e .

97

The moment of combat seemed to have been forced upon
the Confederate army, but McClellan's dispositions invited
attack.

Three of his corps had been arrayed in a ten-mile

line running southeast along the northern

bank of the

Chickahominy from Beaver Dam Creek to the

Lower Bridge.

Though Beaver Dam Creek was a formidable obstacle,

if it

could be breached quickly the opportunity

existed to roll up

the Federal corps in succession.

corps south of the

The two

river were separated from each other by nearly five miles,
and would have to march several miles to reinforce the
troops to the north.
Johnston proposed that his army would slide suddenly to
the left and that G. W. Smith would lead eleven brigades-his own division under Whiting, D. R. Jones's Division, and
A. P. Hill's Division— across the Chickahominy above
Mechanicsville, assault Beaver Dam Creek, and drive down the
river.

The remainder of Magruder's "wing" would hold the

Chickahominy.

D. H. Hill would be posted in front of

Keyes's IV Corps on the Williamsburg Road,

to pin him in

position, while Longstreet would move northeast of Richmond
to Nine Mile Road, available as a reserve on either flank of

97smith, The Battle of Seven P i n e s , pp.

12-13.
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the

a r m y .

98

Despite being forced into an offensive, Johnston's
spirits were high.

D. H. Hill told one of his brigadiers

that "I saw Genls. Johnston & Smith this afternoon.

They

think that tomorrow will be a great day in our history."99
It was the same day that Johnston learned that Jackson had
routed Banks at Winchester, and optimistically suggested
that the Army of the Valley might attempt to cross the
P o t o m a c . H e advised Lee that a battle probably would be
fought on May 29, that he had ordered Huger to Drewry's
Bluff to replace Longstreet,

and requested that Holmes's

Division be brought to Richmond.101
The same day, President Davis and one of his aides,
Colonel William Browne

(formerly the acting Secretary of

State), visited Johnston at his headquarters.

Johnston was

out riding his lines when the President called, and a
courier was dispatched to find him.

The General sent back a

98johnston mistakenly recalled that Huger's Division
and not that of D. R. Jones would be brought to reinforce
Smith's attack.
Otherwise, the accounts of Johnston, Smith,
and Longstreet are remarkably consistent to this point.
See
Johnston, N a r r a t i v e , p. 131; Smith, The Battle of Seven
Pines, p. 15, Longstreet, Manassas to Appom a t t o x , p. 85.
99 d . h . Hill to Winfield Scott Featherston, May 27,
1862, D. H. Hill letter, Virginia Historical Society,
Richmond, Virginia.
lOOjoseph E.
1862, in Douglas,

Johnston to Thomas J. Jackson,
Stonewal1 , p. 72.

lOljoseph E. Johnston to Robert E. Lee, May
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 555.

May 27,

28, 1862,
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polite note requesting that Davis return later in the
afternoon, when he would have the time to acquaint the Chief
Executive with his plans.

Davis was then informed that an

attack would take place on May 29.102
But when the President rode out of the capital on May
29 expecting to witness a battle, he found consternation and
confusion that recalled his May 22 visit to the front.

As

had been the case a week earlier, Brigadier-General Howell
Cobb had little idea what were the army commander's plans—
nor did Brigadier-General Hood.

He could find neither

Johnston, nor G. W. Smith who was supposed to be conducting
the attack.

Only Longstreet was where Davis thought he

would be, and the massive Georgian was "walking to and fro
in an impatient,

it might be said fretful, manner."103

Longstreet was incensed because, when it came to the
point of contact, Smith had balked at attacking.

Smith

claimed that "I reported to General Johnston that I was
satisfied the three divisions could carry the works at
Beaver Dam Creek by open assault in front; but that it would
be a bloody business.

. .

"

He did not think that

1 0 2 ^ 0 record of the conference has survived, though the
fact that it happened is established by Joseph E. Johnston
to William Browne, May 27, 1862, in Jefferson Davis papers,
Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois.
It may be
inferred that Davis was informed of the proposed date of the
attack from the fact that he rode out again on May 29, for
which his erroneous chronology of the last half of May in
his memoirs fails to account satisfactorily.
See Davis,
Rise and F a l l , II:
p. 121.

103pa v iSf Rise and F a l 1 , II:

p. 121.
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ordering a wide flanking inarch by A. P. Hill's Division was
practical,

suggesting as an alternative the rather fantastic

idea that Jackson's divisions--then somewhere north of
Winchester— be marched back to eastern Virginia for such a
p u r p o s e .

104

Rumors circulated that Smith had once again

fallen ill with his mysterious neurological malady.

The

President returned to Richmond, his confidence in Johnston
eroded once

a g a i n .

105

That evening the General called together his subordin
ates once more:

Smith, Longstreet, Magruder,

and Stuart.

He announced that Stuart's outposts to the north now
reported that McDowell had turned back, which meant that
there was no longer a pressing necessity for the attack.
This satisfied Smith, who continued to express a negative
opinion of the original plan.

Longstreet,

supported by

Magruder and Stuart, demurred,

believing that the concept of

rolling up McClellan's right wing "was made stronger by the
change of direction of McDowell's column, and should," in
Longstreet's words,

"suggest more prompt and vigorous

action."106
According to Longstreet's recollection,

the council of

104gmith, The Battle of Seven P i n e s , p. 14.
105oa v iS/ Rise and F a l l , II:

p. 121.

1 06curiously, the postwar accounts of both Smith and
Longstreet agree fairly closely regarding the conference to
this point.
See Longstreet, Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x , pp. 8586; Smith, The Battle of Seven P i n e s , p. 15.
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war continued for several hours, until, at last, Johnston
grew disgusted and walked away.

His fighting blood aroused

by the prospect of action, Longstreet followed and suggested
again the turning movement that Smith felt so impractical.
With McClellan's inherent caution, there was little chance
that the Federal commander would strike any detached
Confederate divisions before they landed on his own flank.
"General Johnston replied that he was aware of all that, but
found that he had selected the wrong officer for the work,"
Longstreet asserted in his memoirs, adding that "this ended
the talk.

. . ."107

Longstreet's account is somewhat suspect, as his
memoirs were originally started as a refutation to charges
made by Smith after the

w a r .

108

But Johnston's opinion of

Smith might well have already begun to decline by the
evening of May 29, 1862.
forced him to alter plans.

Several times Smith's health had
The Kentuckian quarreled with

other generals, and twice within the past week Smith had
caused Johnston to look less than capable in the President's
eyes.

And what had Smith done so far to justify Johnston's

earlier high regard?

The only action to his credit was the

skirmish at Eltham's Landing, an engagement that, Johnston
would have recalled, was directed entirely by Smith's

lO^Longstreet, Manassas to Appomattox, p. 86.
108james Longstreet to Osmun Latrobe, February 10,
1886, in Osmun Latrobe papers, Virginia Historical Society,
Richmond, Virginia.
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subordinates.

Longstreet,

by contrast, had a fighting record that

began at Manassas and had been extended by victory--at least
in his own and Johnston's eyes— at Williamsburg.

Now it was

Longstreet who argued for the aggressive course.

More and

more during May,

1862, Johnston came to depend on Longstreet

rather than Smith.

He had always preferred striking

McClellan's two isolated corps south of the river;
in Johnston's mind,
benefit.

suddenly

such an operation would have an extra

Longstreet, not Smith, would be conducting the

attack.109

109jQ h n s t o n , Nar r a t i v e , p. 130.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter Eleven
Seven Pines

Rain threatened Richmond again on May 30, 1862, but the
ominous grey thunderheads seemed only slightly closer than
the Yankee army.

After the repulse of the ironclads at

Drewry's Bluff, there had been a momentary rise in the
city's morale.

The Richmond Examiner opined that "when the

history of this war is reviewed,

it will be found that the

chief service the enemy has gotten from his gunboats had
been to frighten bad officers and worse troops into surren
dering positions which they might have continued to hold."^Then had come the news of Jackson's success at Winchester,
and the hope that his dash toward the Potomac might force
the recall of the Army of the Potomac to defend Washington.
But by that overcast Friday the citizens of Richmond knew
that no such reprieve was in their future.

McClellan inched

ever closer; and, if he were to be driven away, it would be
by Johnston's outnumbered army, fighting from the outskirts
of Richmond.
Hundreds,

if not thousands, fled the city.

The cabinet

debated where to locate the next line of defense if Johnston

1Richmond Examiner, May 19, 1862,

p. 2.
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had to relinquish the city.2

Secretary Randolph ordered the

City Council to conduct experiments to find the quickest and
safest method of destroying tons of tobacco stored in R i c h 
mond warehouses,
hands.3

in order to prevent its falling into enemy

The specters of Nashville, New Orleans, Memphis,

and Norfolk hung over the city.
Yet there was a distinct difference between the feeling
that gripped Richmond and the terror which had clutched at
the hearts of the inhabitants of other Southern cities.
"After the Confederate command's decision to evacuate their
city without a fight, the people of Nashville had been
panic-stricken," wrote historian Walter T. Durham.

"Citizens

shared mixed emotions about the defense of the city.

Cer

tainly most wanted to be shielded from the Union Army;
however,

few wanted to be protected at the expense of the

destruction of Nashville.

The prevailing desire was to stop

2The only record extant of the cabinet meeting in which
this topic was discussed is that of John H. Reagan, who
painted the picture of an emotional Robert E. Lee declaring
that "Richmond must not be given up. . . ." Even ignoring
the fact that Lee knew that Johnston had no intention of
giving up the capital and that such an outburst would have
been totally out of character for Lee, it should be suffi
cient to note that the anecdote is sandwiched between two
others of doubtful credibility.
Without any supporting
evidence, Reagan's description of the scene is best relegated
to the status of colorful apocrypha.
Reagan, M e m o i r s , p. 139.
3Manarin, Richmond at W a r , pp. 176-177.
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the Yank e e s — but not in the streets of the

c i t y . " ^

In New

Orleans, when Flag-Officer David G. Farragut's fleet had run
the batteries and Major-General Mansfield Lovell's troops
had withdrawn from the city,

the mayor announced to the City

Council that "it would be proper to say that the withdrawal
of troops rendering resistance impossible,

no obstruction

could be offered to the occupation of the place by the
enemy.

. . ."5

The citizens of Memphis watched from the

banks of the Mississippi as their River Defense Fleet was
destroyed,

and then surrendered their city without further

resistance.6

Norfolk had also surrendered without a fight,

once the army and navy left town.
In Richmond the prevailing attitude was equally pessi
mistic, but the gloom was underlain with a grim determina
tion,

in President Davis's words,

honored capital of Virginia,
Government,

"that the ancient and

now the seat of the Confederate

shall not fall into the hands of the enemy.

Many say rather let it be a heap of r u b b i s h . "7

Already

Governor John Letcher and Mayor Joseph Mayo had declared

^Walter T. Durham, Nashville, The Occupied City, The
First Eighteen Months, February 16, 1862, to June 30, 1863
(Nashville:
Tennessee Historical Society, 1985), pp. 1, 14.
^Marion A. Baker, "Farragut's Demands for the Surrender
of New Orleans," B & L , II:
p. 95.
^Samuel Carter III, The Final Fortress:
The Campaign
for Vicksburg, 1862-1863 (New York:
St. Martin's Press,
1980), pp. 51-52.
^Jefferson Davis to Joseph E. Johnston, May 17, 1862,
OR, XI (part 3):
p. 524.
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their determination to defend the city regardless of what
the Confederacy did.

Letcher visited Johnston's army on May

30, to spread his resolve to the Virginia regiments within
its divisions.®

The Mayor repeatedly stirred crowds by

declaring that "rather than

. . . surrender the city founded

by his own ancestors, he would resign the office of the
mayoralty,

and though bending under the approach of three

score years and ten, he would shoulder the musket himself in
defense of the capital."

"Some of the most wealthy of our

population," recalled Sally Putnam,

"declared they would

fire their own beautiful residences,
ering up the city to our foes.

in preference to deliv

. . .

The ultimate fate of Richmond, however,
Joseph Johnston's army.

still lay with

When that army had halted between

the Pamunkey and Chickahominy Rivers,
retreat had taken its toll.

it was plain that the

"The army is very much demoral

ized," D. H. Hill told his wife.

"Some five thousand threw

away their guns and fled to Richmond to avoid a battle.
There were other reasons for leaving the ranks besides
cowardice.

No rations had been issued since Williamsburg,

reducing the Richmond Howitzers to stealing feed corn from
their own starving horses.

®Boney,

Even General officers roamed the

John Letc h e r , p. 163.

^Putnam, R i c h m o n d , p. 131.
H. Hill to "My Dear Wife," May 11, 1862,
Hill papers, College of William and Mary.

in D. H.
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countryside foraging:

Brigadier-General Richard Griffith

rode into the artillerymen's camp one night to beg an ear of
corn for himself and several for his horse.11

Well-drilled

soldiers might have been held in the ranks by veteran offi
cers, but Hill pointed out that "the reorganization of the
army at Yorktown, under the elective system, had thrown out
of service many of our best officers.

. . . nl2

Once again,

Joseph Johnston found himself faced with an army on the
verge of melting away.
Once again Johnston took immediate steps to improve the
morale and efficiency of that army.

With Lee, he coordinated

the delivery of rations and the return of the army's wagon
trains.1^

Armed with reports from his regimental and brigade

commanders, Johnston finally managed to convince the Richmond
authorities to allow his own provost marshals into the city
to recover his absentees.1^

The army commander also began a

11Stiles, Four Y e a r s , pp. 85-86.
12 "Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command
ing division, of operations April 6 to May 9," January 11,
1863, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 605.
^ R o b e r t E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 7, 1862,
Robert E. Lee to Abraham C. Myers, May 7, 1862, Robert E. Lee
to Lucius B. Northrop, May 7, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Abraham
C. Myers, May 8, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Lucius B. Northrop,
May 8, 1862, in Lee Letterbook; Robert E. Lee to Joseph E.
Johnston, May 13, 1862, A. H. Cole to Joseph E. Johnston, May
13, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 512-513.
^ W a l t e r Taylor to John H. Winder, May 14, 1862, in Lee
L e tterbook; George T. Anderson to George W. Randolph, May 16,
1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 3; John B. Gordon to George W.
Randolph, May 13, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 21; A. P.
Hill to Samuel Cooper, May 13, 1862, A. P. Hill to Samuel
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thorough reorganization of both the artillery and cavalry
serving under him, a reorganization that was to greatly
strengthen those branches throughout the summer and fall.-*-^
Between May 13 and May 30, Johnston's efforts, combined
with those of Lee to reinforce him, caused the army to
bounce back in terms of fighting spirit, organization, and
numbers.

Longstreet, who had never ceased his own efforts

to buttress morale, wrote that when his men "have their
bellies full, also their cartridge boxes," then "I don't
fear McClellan or anyone in Yankeedom."

By the end of May

he felt that his troops "were never so resolved" to fight as
they were then; they "even asserted that they would dig
bayous,

to reach the enemy's trenches, if not allowed some

other means of getting to h i m . "16

The Artillery Reserve had

Cooper, May 22, 1862, in LR-A I G O , M-474, Reel 24.
15johnston inaugurated the practice of consolidating
understrength batteries, and, from contextual evidence, seems
to have envisioned separate artillery battalions supporting
each division.
His calls for the independent companies of
cavalry around the state to be gathered together into regi
ments led the Confederate authorities, during May, June, and
July, 1862, to issue orders creating the 5th, 10th, 12th, and
13th Virginia Cavalry Regiments, and the 14th, 15th, and
17th Virginia Cavalry Battalions.
See Lee, Pendleton, p.
185; Wise, Long A r m , pp. 186-187; D. H. Hill to John Trapier,
May 28, 1862, in LR-AIGO, M-474, Reel 25; Joseph E. Johnston
to Robert E. Lee, May 14, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Benjamin
Huger, May 16, 1862, Special Orders No. 120, Department of
Northern Virginia, May 28, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp.
515, 519, 558.
16james Longstreet to Gustavus W. Smith, May 8, 1862, in
Smith, Confederate War P a p e r s , p. 145; James Longstreet to
Jefferson Davis, September 2, 1887, in Rowland, Jefferson
Davis Constitutionalist, IX:
pp. 594-595.
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been increased from fifty-six to nearly ninety guns; the
Cavalry Brigade enlarged by the addition of several regi
ments. 17

With the addition of Huger's and A. P. Hill's

Divisions,

by May 31 Johnston's army attained the greatest

strength it had yet known:
present for duty.

nearly 88,000 officers and men

Counting the brigades of Brigadier-General

Roswell S. Ripley and John G. Walker, both of which were
approaching Richmond on May 31, and adding in the garrison
troops in the city itself,

the Confederacy had managed, both

through the administrative efficiency of General Johnston
and a herculean effort to secure reinforcements by General
Lee, to gather more than 97,000 men for the defense of the
c a p i t a l .

IS

on the same day, McClellan reported the Army of

l^Lee, Pendleton, p. 185; A. L. Long to John H. Winder,
May 23, 1862, Special Orders No. 120, Department of Northern
Virginia, May 28, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 539, 558;
Special Orders No. 121, Adjutant and Inspector-General's
Office, May 27, 1862, Special Orders No. 122, Adjutant and
Inspector-General's Office, May 28, 1862, in OR, LI (part
2):
p. 564.
l^This calculation begins with Johnston's May 21 m e m 
orandum.
Deficient as that paper is, it is the only starting
point available for deducing the army's strength prior to
Seven Pines.
As previously mentioned, many of the figures
had been drawn directly from the April 30 return of the
army, before the retreat and before Williamsburg.
So it is
certain that the army had lost several thousand men from
those figures between April 30 and May 21.
But it is also
certain that many of the stragglers returned to the ranks,
and many more were dragooned in Richmond by Johnston's or
Winder's provosts, so the figures for the four divisions,
Pendleton's Artillery Reserve, and the Cavalry Brigade still
offer good approximations of the "effective" strength of the
army on May 21.
This figure is 53,68 8.
But significant reinforcements joined the army during
the next ten days.
Nine artillery batteries left Richmond
to join the army, which, calculated at the average "effec-
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tive" strength of artillery companies at that time, would
have fielded 560 men.
The 4th Virginia Heavy Artillery and
four more companies of heavy artillery were also assigned to
the army as infantry.
The 4tn, with ten companies, had a
strength of 466 men in late June, after the Battle of Seven
Pines; it is not disproportionate to credit the other four
companies with at least 200 men.
Seventeen infantry compan
ies of the Wise Legion also joined the army.
Fifteen of
them reported their strength in late June; adding in the
other two at the same average strength gives an "effective"
number of 942 infantry.
The 3rd Virginia Cavalry, which
numbered at least 300 men, the Wise Legion Cavalry (later
the 10th Virginia), mustering at least 400, and several
other miscellaneous companies of cavalry around Richmond-probably at least 240 men--are not accounted for in Johns
ton's memorandum, which would increase the size of his
cavalry force by 940 "effectives."
Huger's Division at Seven Pines has been estimated
everywhere from 5,008 "effectives" by G. W. Smith and Jeffer
son Davis, to 7,000 by Johnston himself.
A more likely
strength seems to be 6,257, calculated by Thomas Livermore
in his Numbers and L o s s e s . But this excludes four regiments,
the 6th, 16th, 56th, and 57th Virginia, left at Drewry's and
Chaffin's Bluffs.
Allowing these regiments 300 "effectives"
each, that would add 1,200 more troops to Huger's roster.
A. P. Hill's Division has long been underestimated by
almost all authorities, since G. W. Smith placed its numbers
at a ludicrously low 4,000 men.
This is hardly possible,
considering the four brigades and other miscellaneous troops
that composed the division.
Field's Brigade (augmented by
the 9th Virginia Cavalry) reported 2,200 men.
Anderson's
Brigade came to Virginia with 2,87 3 "effectives," and had
seen no combat to reduce its numbers.
Lee had sent more
than 3,00 0 men from Richmond to the Rappahannock in midApril, and Gregg's Brigade, by subtraction in one of Lee's
letters, should be credited at least 2,127 men.
From these
figures should be subtracted about 900 casualties— the
highest estimate--incurrea at Hanover Court House.
All of these figures, however, are for "effectives."
As
noted earlier, in the calculations on the army at Williams
burg, "effective" numbers have to be transformed into "pre
sent for duty," and officers have to be added to the tabula
tion before a meaningful comparison with Federal numbers can
be reached.
Using Livermore's standard percentages for
conversion— 93% for infantry and artillery, 86% for cavalry,
and a 6.5% allowance for officers--the total number of
troops in the Department of Northern Virginia on May 31
totals 87,890.
In Richmond, there were between 2,600 and 4,800 more
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the Potomac as 103,382

s t r o n g .

19

The overwhelming numerical

officers and men.
The lower figure allows 700 for the heavy
artillery, 500 for the militia, 400 for the Tredegar Batta
lion, and 1,000 for the miscellaneous troops.
The higher
number counts the heavy artillery at 1,400, the militia at
1,000, the Tredegar Battalion still at 400, and the m i s c e l 
laneous troops at 2,000.
From contemporary evidence, it is
very difficult to hone thv_se estimates any closer.
Ripley's
Brigade, estimated by Livermore at 2,356 "effectives," and
Walker's, reported in mid-April as having 3,693 "effect
ives," were both approaching Richmond that afternoon.
Fol
lowing the same conversion process for these two brigades,
and adding in the troops at Richmond, this would be an
additional 6,923— even excluding the heavy artillerymen,
marines, and naval troops still at Drewry's Bluff.
This
gives a total number of Confederates— officers and men
"present for duty"--in the vicinity of Richmond as at least
9 4,813 men.
The objection can be made that Johnston certainly could
not use all these men in his field army, that it is only fair
to count the muskets of men actually in the line of battle.
But that is precisely the sort of logic that McClellan
attempted to employ, and which his own superiors and histori
ans have rejected, arguing that for a true interpretation of
his strength all the soldiers even theoretically available
in the area should be counted.
See "Abstract from statement of troops serving in the
Department of North Carolina, commanded by M a j . Gen. T. H.
Holmes, April 19, 1862, in OR, IX:
p. 459; Robert E. Lee to
Joseph E. Johnston, April 23, 1862, Robert E. Lee to Joseph
E. Johnston, May 17, 1862 (two letters), Orders No. --, D.
H. Hill's Division, May 17, 1862, "Strength of the several
brigades of the Army of Northern Virginia near Richmond, as
shown by General Johnston's memorandum of May 21, 1862," A.
L. Long to John H. Winder, May 23, 1862, Special Orders No.
118, Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office, May 23, 1862,
Henry A. Wise to D. H. Hill, May 24, 1862, Special Orders
No. 120, Department of Northern Virginia, May 28, 1862,
Special Orders No. 21, Headquarters, May 30, 1862, "Strength
of the Virginia forces in the Right Wing, Army before R i c h 
mond," June 23, 1862, in OR, XI (part 3):
pp. 458, 523,
525, 530-533, 539, 540, 542, 558, 563, 615; "Reports of
Brig. Gen. Charles W. Field, C. S. Army, with instructions
from General Lee," April 20, 1862, in OR, XII (part 1):
p.
434; Livermore, Numbers and L o s s e s , pp. 81-86, Smith, The
Battle of Seven P i n e s , pp. 172-173; Davis, Rise and F a l l ,
II:
p. 153; Johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines," B & L , II:
pp. 208-209; Sears, M c C l e l l a n , p. 187; Archer Anderson to
Joseph E. Johnston, September 14, 1887, in RMH.
19jyicCle.ilan only reported 98,008 "present for duty," but
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advantage enjoyed by the Yankees in February had been almost
completely neutralized.
Given McClellan's normal caution,

Johnston could have

safely awaited Ripley's and Walker's Brigades before attack
ing.

He could have dropped upon Lee the responsibility for

supporting Drewry's Bluff instead of leaving four of Huger's
regiments there.

To have done either would have been con

sistent with the stereotypical image of him as always p o s t 
poning battle to gather more strength.

But by May 30,

Johnston had finally been presented with the opportunity he
had been seeking— K e y e s ' IV Corps at Seven Pines was separa
ted from the rest of the Federal army by several miles--and
he was not about to delay in striking a moment longer.

"If

nothing prevents we will fall upon the enemy in front of
Major-General

[D. H.] Hill," Johnston told Smith on May 30,

"early in the morning--as early as
Johnston's plan was simple

p r a c t i c a b l e .

(see Map No.

"20

5).

Three

roads extended east from Richmond toward Keyes' position.
Most of D. H. Hill's Division was on the center route, the
Williamsburg Road, which led directly to Seven Pines.

He

was to bring his flanking brigade up from Charles City Road
to the south, and attack toward Seven Pines.

The brigade on

in a spurious bookkeeping maneuver omitted from this total
5,374 officers and men actually present and available to
him.
See "Number of men composing the Army of the Potomac
on the 31st day of May, 1862," in OR, XI (part 3): p. 204.
20joseph E. Johnston to G. W. Smith, May 30, 1862,
OR, XI (part 3):
p. 563.
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Charles City Road would be replaced by Huger's Division,
marching up from Drewry's Bluff.

Huger's first task was to

secure Hill's right flank, but if he found no opposition he
was authorized to attack northeast to support Hill.

Long

street would march his own division down Nine Mile Road,
which first paralleled and then intersected the Williamsburg
Road, running through Fair Oaks Station to Seven Pines, and
attack on Hill's left.

Longstreet was to supervise the

combined movements of these three divisions.

Meanwhile,

part of Magruder's command and A. P. Hill's Division would
defend the upper bridges of the Chickahominy, while Whiting's
and McLaws ' Divisions would be held in reserve either to
support Longstreet or engage any reinforcements McClellan
attempted to send across the river.21
The sequence of events which lead to the development of

2lThis interpretation follows the account of G. W.
Smith, rather than that of Johnston himself or Longstreet,
who maintained in official reports and postwar memoirs that
Longstreet was to support Hill on the Williamsburg Road
rather than to move down Nine Mile Road.
This is accepted
for purposes of establishing Johnston's original intentions
because of Joseph E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith, June 28,
1862 in which Johnston referred to "the misunderstanding
between Longstreet and myself in regard to the direction of
his division," and asked that Smith omit several paragraphs
from his official report.
See G. W. Smith, The Battle of
Seven P i n e s , pp. 19-22; "Report of General Joseph E. Johns
ton, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia, and
resulting correspondence," June 24, 1862, "Reports of M a j .
Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Right Wing,"
June 10, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp. 933-941; Johnston,
N a rrative, pp. 132-133; Longstreet,
Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x ,
pp. 87-88; Johnston, "Manassas to Seven Pines,"
B & L , II:
pp. 211-212; Gustavus W. Smith, "Two Days of Battle at Seven
Pines," B & L , II:
pp. 225-226, 228.
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this plan,

and the methods by which the orders were distribu

ted, are critical to any understanding of what happened on
May 31.

About noon on May 30, D. H. Hill advised Johnston

that Keyes ' entire IV Corps was concentrated near Seven
Pines, and that there were apparently no Federal troops on
the Charles City Road.
him," Hill stated,

"I received a prompt answer from

"saying that, being satisfied by my

report of the presence of the enemy in force in my immediate
front, he had resolved to attack him, and directed me to
serve with Major-General Longstreet and under his orders."22
Longstreet arrived at Johnston's headquarters soon after his
commander had received Hill's intelligence,

and the two

generals began to discuss details of the upcoming attack.23
Not only by choosing Longstreet to command the attack,
but also by failing to call Smith into the conference about
its direction and coordination, Johnston sent a clear signal
just how far the Kentuckian had fallen in his estimation.
There were other signs of Longstreet's rise and Smith's
demise in the eyes of the army commander.

Johnston's plan

broke up Smith's "wing," leaving A. P. Hill on the upper
Chickahominy and bringing Whiting up the Nine Mile Road as a
reserve, with McLaws actually scheduled to be committed to
battle first.

This effectively reduced Smith to a division

22"Report of M a j . Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command
ing division," -- -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 943.
23Longstreet, Manassas to A ppomattox, p. 87.
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commander or a spectator, depending on whether or not he
chose to supersede Whiting.

Johnston obviously did not

intend him to do so, sending Smith a not-so-subtle message
by transmitting movement orders directly to Whiting.24
Whether Johnston now suspected that his nominal second-incommand lacked nerve— as Longstreet would later imply— or
whether he simply feared a physical breakdown at a critical
moment,

is impossible to determine.

In either case, the

effect was the same: Johnston deliberately cut Smith out of
the a t t a c k .
Johnston and Longstreet would have discussed a variety
of options for executing the attack.
area, of course,

Any map of the Richmond

suggested the possibility of attacking

Keyes simultaneously in front and flank by sending one
division down the Williamsburg Road and another down the
Nine Mile Road.

Yet this raised a serious question about

the weight of Hill's frontal assault.

At the moment, Hill

had only three brigades on the Williamsburg Road; BrigadierGeneral Robert Rodes ' Mississippi-Alabama Brigade was sta
tioned on the Charles City Road to protect his right flank.25
Three brigades without reinforcements— fewer than 10,000
me n — alone could hardly be expected to spearhead the crushing
attack Johnston envisioned.

How could the frontal attack be

24joseph E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith, May 30, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 563.
25"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command
ing division," — -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 943.
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strengthened?

Three possible answers suggested themselves.

First,

Huger's Division could be brought up from Drewry's Bluff
along Charles City Road to relieve Rodes to participate in
the attack.
attack,

This would give Hill his full division for the

secure his right flank, and even hold out the p ossi

bility that Huger's three brigades might assist in enveloping
the Federal left.

The advantages of this approach were so

clear that Johnston dispatched orders to Huger that eve n 
ing. 26
But this still left Hill attacking Keyes' front with
only a single division.

A second option for reinforcing his

attack would be to bring some of Longstreet's brigades over
to the Williamsburg Road to support the attack.

If three of

his six brigades marched across to support Hill, then the
balance of forces in the attack would be seven brigades on
the Williamsburg Road

(Hill's Division and half of Long

street 's) and seven on the Nine Mile Road
and the other half of Longstreet's).27

(McLaws' Division

y e t against this

plan there were two objections, one of command coordination
and the other of Longstreet's ambition.

With which column

would Longstreet ride, and how would he coordinate the

26joseph E. Johnston to Benjamin Huger, May 30, 1862,
OR, XI (part 1):
p. 938 .
2^That this option was discussed can be inferred from
Smith, "Two Days," p. 24 2; see also Freeman, L e e ' Lieuten
ants , I:
p. 232n.
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attack on the other road?

If he chose the Williamsburg

Road, the entire left prong of the attack would be left in
the hands of M c L a w s , one of the most junior-major-generals
in the army.

McLaws had just received his commission a week

earlier and had not, with the exception of the skirmish at
Williamsburg on May 4, maneuvered even a single brigade in
combat.28

on the other hand, if Longstreet personally

commanded operations on the Nine Mile Road, there remained a
question of delegating the responsibility for opening the
action entirely to Hill.

In the light of Hill's performance

at Williamsburg, which his critics could well have charac
terized as rash, how safe would it be to leave to him the
command of half the forces involved in the attack?
There was, however, a third possibility.

Hill could be

reinforced on the Williamsburg Road with Longstreet's entire
division.

This would put ten brigades in the main attack

under Longstreet's direct supervision.

The assault of

McLaws' four brigades on the Nine Mile Road would then be
relegated to the status of a supporting attack.

Should

greater weight be needed there, Johnston could always draw
on Whiting's five brigades.

The advantages of this plan,

from an operational perspective, were the added weight to
the attack on the center of the IV Corps' line and Long
street 's personal supervision of the attack.
tage, however,

28warner,

As a disadvan

there was the fact that such a maneuver

Generals in G r a y , pp.

204-205.
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required six of Longstreet's and three of Huger's brigades
to share one constricted stretch of the Williamsburg Road,
upon which both divisions would have to travel until Huger's
men turned off on the Charles City Road.

Without careful

coordination, confusion could delay the opening of the
attack.
When Longstreet left Johnston's headquarters,

the army

commander had decided to follow the simplest of the plans
discussed:

Longstreet would follow the Nine Mile Road, Hill

the Williamsburg Road.

Huger would relieve Rodes ' Brigade,

and, when Rodes reported to Hill, the North Carolinian would
fire a signal gun to start the attack.

The noise was to

alert Longstreet's Division on the Nine Mile Road to begin
its advance.

The sequence of events was to begin as early

as possible after

dawn.

29

With the advantage of hindsight,

it is easy to fault

Johnston's faith in the ability of his army to perform such
a complex maneuver with clockwork efficiency with the divi
sion separated by several miles of dense woodland and murky
swamps.

Yet such convoluted arrangements for opening battles

by an intricate succession of attacks were a regular feature
of Civil War combat.

Lee attempted to start the battles of

Cheat Mountain and Mechanicsville with just such maneuvers.20

2 9 "Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command
ing division," — -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 943.
30preeman, R. E. L e e , I:

p. 562,

II:

pp. 111-112.
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General Braxton Bragg routinely employed complicated echelon
movements to begin battles:
River,

he did so at Perryville, Stone's

and on the second day at Chickamauga.31

Upon his

promotion to command of the Army of Tennessee, John Bell
Hood did the same at Peachtree Creek and the Battle of
A t l a n t a . 32

Nor was faith in their divisions' abilities to

conduct flawlessly in battle maneuvers that would have taxed
their skills on the parade ground a strictly Confederate
delusion.

McClellan at Antietam, Hooker at Chancellorsville,

and George G. Meade at Mine Run provide only three of a
great number of examples of an equal Yankee fascination with
overly complex opening gambits.33
But Johnston committed two far greater mistakes in
planning his battle.

Though he wrote Huger two letters— one

on the evening of May 30 and one very early in the morning
of May 31— he neglected to make clear either the scope of
the battle or the fact that Huger would be responsible for
starting it.

Instead of telling Huger on May 30 that an

attack was planned, Johnston merely informed him that "the
reports of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill give me the impression that
the enemy is in considerable strength in his front.

It

3lGrady McWhiney, Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat,
Volume I:
Field Command (New York:
Columbia University
Press, 1969), pp. 315, 350-352; Horn, Army of Tennessee, p.
260.
3 2jy[cMurry, Hood, pp.

12 7-128,

130-131.

33gears, M c C l e l l a n , pp. 297-299;
271-273, 391.

Swinton, Cam p a i g n s , pp.
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seems to me necessary that we should increase our force
also."

Even when he assigned Huger his post, Johnston did

not specify that an attack by Hill's Division was contem
plated:

"For that object I wish to concentrate the troops

of your division on the Charles City road and concentrate
the troops of Major-General Hill on that to Williamsburg."
After providing Huger with directions, Johnston ended the
letter with the only sentence,

ambiguous as it was, that

even hinted at his plans for attack.

"Be ready,

if an

action should be begun on your left, to fall upon the enemy's
left fla n k . "34

There was no doubt in Johnston's mind that

he intended to attack the next morning;

thirty-five minutes

after he wrote Huger, he sent much more explicit orders to
Smith and Whiting.

"If nothing prevents we will fall upon

the enemy in front of Major-General Hill," he told them.35
Why did he fail to reveal his intentions to Huger?
And why, in the predawn hours of May 31, did Joseph
Johnston suddenly decide to limit Huger's actions even more
strictly?

The following confused note would have found

Huger as he put his brigades into motion:
GENERAL:
I fear that in my note of last evening,
of which there is no copy, I was too positive on
the subject of your attacking the enemy's left
flank.
It will, of course, be necessary for you
to know what force is before you first.
I hope to

34joseph E. Johnston to Benjamin Huger, May 30, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 938.
35joseph E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith, May 30,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 563.
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be able to have that ascertained for you by caval
ry.
As our main force will be on your left, it
will be necessary for your progress to conform at
first to that of General Hill.
If you find no
strong body in your front, it will be well to aid
General Hill; but then a strong reserve should be
retained to cover our right.36
This letter more clearly implied an attack, but disregarded
several points.

Huger was not informed that his relief of

Rodes would signal the beginning of the battle; he was not
even told which brigade he would replace in Hill's division.
Cavalry was to scout the area in front of him, but what
cavalry, and when would it report to him?

Most critically,

the message did not make Huger aware that a major attack by
fourteen brigades had been ordered, or that Longstreet was
in overall command.

Johnston,

it almost seemed, expected

Huger to divine his intentions by telepathy.
Johnston,

anxious over the impending battle, may well

have dashed off the first note without thinking it through.
By the time he dispatched the second letter, he admitted
that he could no longer quite remember what he had written,
and revealed that he had not had a copy entered in his
letterbooks.3 7

it was a failure of both the individual and

of his mediocre s t a f f ; everyone simply assumed that the
correct information had been disseminated, and no one both-

36joseph E. Johnston to Benjamin Huger, May 31,
OR, XI (part 1):
p. 938.

1862,

37Nor does the letter appear in any of the extant
Johnston letterbooks, either at the College of William and
Mary or in the National Archives.
The copy published in OR
was provided by Huger.
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ered to check.
Yet, as Freeman pointed out, Huger's orders,

"while not

models of their kind," could reasonably be expected to put
him in approximately the right place at roughly the correct
hour.

If he commenced his march early enough,

if the roads

were clear and the bridges intact, and if D. H. Hill had
guides awaiting him as instructed,

then Johnston's plan

might not be irrevocably injured.38
But Johnston's second significant miscue on the day
before the battle had the potential for far worse consequen
ces.

He had discussed with Longstreet several variations of

his original plan,

and though he had finally decided on his

original concept, he failed to make sure that his division
commander left the meeting with the same understanding.39
Longstreet returned to his own camps and ordered his briga
diers to issue ammunition, have rations cooked, and prepare
for an early m a r c h . 40

Yet along what route?

As Longstreet pondered the attack, more and more he

^ F r e e m a n , Lee's Lieutenants, I:
p. 228; Joseph E.
Johnston to Benjamin Huger, May 30, 1862, in OR, XI (part
1):
p. 938.
39in addition to G. W. Smith's evidence that Johnston
had decided on deploying Longstreet's Division on the Nine
Mile Road and not the Williamsburg Road, his second letter
to Huger may be cited.
If Johnston had intended Longstreet
to be on the Williamsburg Road, he would not have listed
Hill as commanding the attack.
See Joseph E. Johnston to
Benjamin Huger, May 31, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 938.
4 0"Report of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. S. Army,
commanding brigade," June 12, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p.
986.
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thought of the personal and strategic advantages which would
accrue from sending his division down the Williamsburg Road
and supervising the combined attack of his and Hill's bri
gades.

There could be no question of credit for a victory

if Longstreet commanded both divisions.

Combined with his

defensive success at Williamsburg, an offensive triumph at
Seven Pines would secure his own reputation as the army's
chief fighting general and cement his place as Johnston's
most trusted subordinate.
an ambitious man:

Rationalizations come easily to

unity of command, weight of attack, and

the possible need to restrain the sometimes overly aggressive
Hill would all have offered themselves to the Georgian that
n i g h t .41
But by what authority could he modify the plan upon
which Johnston had settled?

At some point in the night,

Longstreet convinced himself that as commander of the "right
wing" he had been given the assignment to attack the enemy
in front of Hill, and that he and the army commander had

4lLongstreet 's ambitions toward promotion and independ
ent command later in the war have been argued by historians
for years.
It is evident upon reading the barrage of corre
spondence with General Cooper during the three weeks follow
ing May 5, that Longstreet's designs for carving from Johns
ton's army a permanent command which would be larger than a
single division began with the Battle of Williamsburg.
See
James Longstreet to Samuel Cooper, May 7, 1862, James Long
street to Samuel Cooper, May 9, 1862, James Longstreet to
Samuel Cooper, May 27, 1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 30;
James Longstreet to Samuel Cooper, May 12, 1862, in Richard
H. Anderson, Compiled Service Record, National Archives,
Washington, D. C.
It was no slip of the pen that Longstreet
cited himself in all these letters as commanding the "Second
Corps" of the army.
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discussed alternatives for that attack without ever firmly
deciding on one.

It would have been in character for J ohns

ton to have told Longstreet at some point in the discussion
that he depended on him to use his own best judgment in
controlling the attack.

From such an expression of confi

dence, Longstreet could easily have derived the idea that
Johnston had entrusted to him the authority to change plans
as circumstances might dictate.42

without notifying Johns

ton, Longstreet sent a message to Hill informing the other
division commander that his six brigades would march to the
Williamsburg Road in the morning to support the attack.43
The only other possible explanations of Longstreet's
conduct are that either he completely misunderstood Johns
ton's instructions, or he coolly and consciously disobeyed
orders.

Neither seems satisfactory.

As poorly conceived as

was his correspondence with Huger, the idea that, in a
conversation which must have consumed hours, Johnston could
not make clear to Longstreet on which of two roads he wished
his division to march,

stretches plausibility beyond the

has already been shown, this was exactly the sort
of authority that Johnston delegated to detached commanders
such as Jackson and Ewell in the Valley or Whiting along the
Poto m a c .
43nill stated in his report that "I was directed by
General Longstreet to move with my whole division at dawn on
the Williamsburg Road and to lead the attack on the Yankees."
[emphasis added]
That Hill would "lead" the attack on the
Williamsburg Road implies that he had been informed that
there would be other troops following his.
See "Report of
Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, commanding division,"
-- -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): p. 943.
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breaking point.

Nor did Longstreet ever admit that he

altered Johnston's original design.

In both his official

report of the battle and his memoirs, he steadfastly mai n 
tained that his dispositions were precisely those directed
by the army

c o m m a n d e r .

44

The account of the conference with

Johnston and the outline of the plan of attack that Long
street published in his memoirs demonstrate, however, a
striking similarity to those passages in which he depicted
Lee as firmly agreeing to fight only defensive battles
during the Gettysburg

C a m p a i g n .

45

Throughout his career,

the Georgian repeatedly proved that he was quite capable,
upon reflection,

of hearing what he wished to have heard.

Unfortunately,

the army commander had an inkling that such

was the case.

To paraphrase Freeman on Lee and Longstreet

in Pennsylvania,

Johnston never had intended to commit

himself to any changes that Longstreet might introduce to
his plan of battle and he did not know that Longstreet
considered him so pledged.46
In his ignorance that the general to whom he had a s 
signed responsibility for the next day's attack had decided
to change the plan, Johnston found several omens that appar
ently augured for resounding success.

The primary one was

4 4 "Reports of Maj. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army,
commanding Right Wing," June 10, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 939; Longstreet, Manassas to Appo m a t t o x , pp. 87-88.
45i,ongstreet, Manassas to A p pomattox, p. 331.
46preeman, Lee's L ieutenants, III:

p. 50.
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rain— a hard, driving, drenching rain accompanied by pounding
thunder.

The downpour began within hours of the time Johns

ton decided to take the offensive, and raised the prospect
that the Chickahominy would overflow its banks, rendering
communication between the two parts of McClellan's army not
difficult but impossible.47

jt did not occur to him that

the same deluge might also swell the streams to his rear and
slow the approach of Huger's Division or flood the low lying
countryside to such an extent that troop movements would be
hindered.
More news that Johnston considered good came to head
quarters in the person of Colonel Armistead L. Long, Lee's
military secretary, who rode out from Richmond with two
messages from the Commanding General.

First, Long informed

the army commander that Ripley's South Carolina Brigade had
been ordered to report to him when it arrived in Richmond,
probably the next day.48

The other communication that Long

carried with him was a personal message from Lee,

"to tell

47joseph E. Johnston to Gustavus W. Smith, May 30, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 563; Smith, The Battle of Seven
Pines, p. 146; Longstreet, Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x , p. 87.
48i>hat Long brought this news may be inferred from three
facts.
First, Lee did not include it in the letter he sent
later in the day.
Second, the order had just been issued at
headquarters that morning, and it would have been natural for
Long to carry it out with him.
Third, Long and Johnston
eventually got around to discussing reinforcements, at which
point it would have occured to Long to mention Ripley's force
even if he did not bring along a copy of the order.
See
Robert E. Lee to Joseph E. Johnston, May 30, 1862, Special
Orders No. 21, May 30, 1862, Headquarters, in OR, XI (part
3):
pp. 560, 563; Long, Personal M e m o i r s , pp. 158-159.
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him that he would be glad to participate in the battle.

He

had no desire to interfere with his [Johnston's] command,
but simply wished to aid him on the field to the best of his
ability and in any manner in which his services would be of
most v a l u e . "49
Johnston.

The offer both pleased and embarrassed

For two weeks, the two generals had been growing

closer together in their strategic appreciation of the
military situation.

Lee's request to serve under Johnston

was a heartening vote of confidence; but, at the same time,
it was an awkward proposition.

Lee could be relied upon to

keep his word not to interfere, but his presence would raise
a thorny issue of credit if a victory were gained.

Johnston

could scarcely have forgotten that the public awarded B eau
regard the lion's share of the praise for Manassas; would it
be said that Lee had been forced to ride out to Johnston's
army to save Richmond?

To Long, none of this internal

struggle was apparent.

He recorded that "General Johnston

expressed gratification at this message, and the hope that
General Lee would ride out to the field, with the desire
that he would send him all the reinforcements he could."
Johnston then informed Long that the battle would open the
following day, though he did not elaborate on his plans.50

^Long,

personal M e m o i r s , pp. 158-159.

50]3oth Freeman and Dowdey find much in Long's account
for which to castigate Johnston.
Freeman described Long as
returning to Richmond with "a polite but indefinite answer to
his message:
Johnston would be happy to have him ride out to
the field, and, meantime, would Lee send him all the rein-
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Few soldiers and even fewer officers in the divisions
of Longstreet, D. H. Hill, Huger, or Whiting got much sleep
that night; a morning attack required preparations that
consumed the hours of darkness.

Huger, whose men had the

longest distance to travel, was on the march soon after 3:00

forcements he could collect?"
Thus far, Freeman was well
inside the bounds of legitimate if arguable interpretation of
Long's statement, which he cited as his authority for the
sentence.
But in the next pair of sentences— unsupported by
any references— Freeman asserts that "Johnston did not tell
Long, nor did Long learn from any other source, when the
battle for Richmond would open.
Still uncertainty; still
suspense!"
Dowdey went further afield, distorting the entire
exchange:
"To Lee's offer of his services, Johnston answered
civilly enough that Lee would be welcome at headquarters, but
that the only service he could perform would be to send
reinforcements.
For what purpose he did not tell Colonel
L o n g .11 [emphasis added]
Johnston could not have revealed the full details of his
plans, even had he been willing to do so, because when Long
approached him, the army commander had not yet held his
conference with Longstreet to iron out the essentials of the
attack.
This may be inferred by the fact that Long did not
mention Longstreet's presence and Longstreet did not mention
Long.
For Long to have arrived after Longstreet left J ohns
ton's headquarters would have placed the visit into the
early evening, far later than Long's memoirs suggest.
So
Johnston could not have confided specifics of his operation
to Long.
But it again stretches credibility to suggest that
Johnston told Long nothing about his intentions.
Lee already
knew that Johnston planned to attack McClellan, and that he
preferred to strike south of the River.
That Lee knew some
sort of attack was impending is implied by Long's statement
that Lee "would be glad to participate in the battle."
[emphasis added]
It also makes little sense to believe that
Johnston, who wanted Ripley's Brigade and any other rein
forcements he could get, did not tell Lee when he expected
to need them, particularly when the two men had been in daily
contact since the first week of May, and Johnston had always
advised Lee in advance of major movements, from the evacua
tion of Williamsburg to the aborted attack on May 29.
See
Freeman, R. E. L e e , II:
p. 67; Dowdey, The Seven D a y s , p.
86.
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A. M.51

L o n g s t r e e t 's men started toward the Williamsburg

Road prior to 6:30 A. M . 52

On the Williamsburg and Charles

City Roads, D. H. Hill had already roused his own troops,
and awaited the arrival of Huger's lead brigade to relieve
Rodes and allow him to open the attack.53

Whiting, who had

been cast in the role of reserve on the Nine Mile Road,
began his own march at first light.5^
Nor had the sun risen when G. W. Smith met Joseph
Johnston just outside the city limits at his headquarters on
the Nine Mile Road.

Smith's arrival was an event that

Johnston knew must eventually occur,
with pleasure.

but had not anticipated

The previous day, he had essentially removed

the Kentuckian— the man he once described as fit to lead the
army by himself— from the command structure of the army.
Yet since Smith remained legally his second-in-command,
Johnston felt constrained to explain to him the details of
the attack.55
Johnston's evident expectation was that Smith would

53Thomas Pinckney to D. H. Hill, May 31, 1862,
(part 3):
p. 563.

in OR, XI

52"Report of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. S. Army,
commanding brigade," June 12, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p.
986 .
5 3 "Report of Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, C. S. Army,
commanding division," — -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p.
943 .
5/*Smith, The Battle of Seven P i n e s , p. 23.
55Smith, Confederate War P a p e r s , p. 162.
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take the hint of his de facto demotion,
one of two face-saving alternatives.

and avail himself of

Either he would p e r 

sonally resume command of Whiting's Division, or he would
return to the upper Chickahominy and supervise the four
brigades of A. P. Hill's Division guarding the bridges.
he chose to supersede Whiting,

Johnston was willing to allow

him a part, albeit a very small one,

in the battle;

commander could do so without fear, for,
taste for attacking,

If

the army

if Smith lost his

or suffered an attack of his illness,

there was always Whiting there to replace him.

Should Smith

decide to retire to the far left of the army, he would be
out of the way entirely.
But Smith confounded Johnston before the first light
had streaked across the Virginia sky.

Calmly ignoring the

choices that his superior had tacitly laid before him, Smith
told Johnston that he had left A. P. Hill in charge of
observing bridges,

and that he "did not propose relieving

General Whiting of the command of the division;" instead, he
"would accompany it to the designated point, and take w h a t 
ever part circumstances might require of him in the coming
c o n test."5 6
Whiting was scheduled to march down the Nine Mile Road
to the point where it split:

the left fork heading toward

New Bridge, the right to Fair Oaks Station.

Since it was

from this location Johnston intended to oversee the battle,

5 6jbid., pp. 162-163.
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Smith's announcement meant that he planned to remain at
Johnston's shoulder all day.
pleased Johnston,
for Smith.

This was not a prospect that

and he cast about quickly for an assignment

Smith recalls that Johnston decided that if the

Federals "attempted to cross anywhere above New Bridge, he
would place me in command of all our troops on that side,
and that I must repel any attack they might make on Richmond,
whilst the mass of our army was engaged with McClellan's
left

w i n g .

"57

The next news that Johnston received was far more
welcome.

Major-General Theophilus Holmes, whom Johnston had

not seen since he departed to command in North Carolina,
rode up to headquarters, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel
Archer Anderson,

his chief of staff.

Holmes advised Johnston

that he had received definitive orders from the Secretary of
War to reinforce the army in front of Richmond with three of
his brigades--more than 8,000 men.

The leading troops,

3,000 soldiers of Walker's Brigade, would reach Drewry's
Bluff sometime that day, which would allow Johnston to
immediately call up the four regiments which he had been
forced to leave

t h e r e . 58

Not only would there be reinforce

ments available the next day to follow up a successful
battle, but it must have seemed to Johnston that the admini-

57smith, The Battle of Seven P i n e s , p. 23.
58Archer Anderson to Joseph E. Johnston, September 14,
1887, in R M H ; G. W. Randolph to John G. Walker, June 1, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 565.
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stration had finally decided to strip its coastal garrisons
in order to defeat McClellan.
His satisfaction, however, was short-lived.
minutes after Holmes and Anderson had departed,
inquiry from Whiting arrived by courier.

Only
a frustrated

Whiting had at

tempted to start his division down the Nine Mile Road at
daybreak, but found Longstreet's brigades blocking his
march.

Quickly becoming impatient, he directed his complaint

to Smith.

Unfortunately, not knowing the entire battle

plan, Whiting omitted one key detail from his message:

he

did not tell Smith that Longstreet was marching south across
his lines, instead of east down the Nine Mile

Road.

59

Johnston was standing beside Smith when the latter
received the message.

For Johnston,

it was the first notice

that something had gone awry with his plan.

Whiting had

sent his letter after 6:00 A. M. and his courier had consumed
the better part of an hour in finding Johnston and Smith.
The chances for a near-dawn attack were diminishing rapidly.
He directed Smith to send an aide to Longstreet to find out
what had caused the delay.
chosen for the mission.

Lieutenant Robert F. Beckham was

When Beckham asked Smith where

Longstreet's headquarters could be found, Smith referred him
back to the army commander.

Johnston's answer was abrupt:

Longstreet's Division was assigned to the Nine Mile Road,
and General Longstreet,

"in all probability," was at its

59smith, Confederate War P a p e r s , p. 164.
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head.

Beckham was to hurry Longstreet along and reassure

Whiting that Longstreet was to precede

h i m .

60

A tense hour passed before word came back from Beckham.
It was not good news.

He had ridden as far up the Nine Mile

Road as Whiting's Division and could find no sign of the
Georgian or his six brigades.

But, either from an interview

with Whiting, or from his own observations, Beckham realized
what had happened; Longstreet was marching toward the W i l 
liamsburg Road.

On his own initiative, he set off cross

country in search of the missing

d i v i s i o n .

61

Even after the receipt of Beckham's intelligence,
Johnston resisted the idea that Longstreet had ignored his
plan of attack.

Perhaps the troops that had delayed Whiting

were other brigades— in all events, Longstreet should have
marched hours earlier— and the Georgian's division had
passed down the Nine Mile Road in the dark, and was already
east of the position where Johnston and Smith were standing.
The lack of any noise from in front was not conclusive,
because Longstreet would have kept troops in position as
quiet as possible until Hill's attack began.

Having con

vinced himself that Beckham could well be mistaken, Johnston
dispatched one of his own aides east down the Nine Mile
Road, toward the Federal position at Seven Pines.

If Lieu-

60l b i d ., A. P. Mason to W. H. C. Whiting, May 31, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 3):
p. 564; Smith, The Battle of Seven
P i n e s , p . 24.
61smith, The Battle of Seven P i n e s , p. 24.
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tenant J. B. Washington could not find Longstreet on that
part of the road either, the army commander instructed him
to cut across to the Williamsburg Road.
order Longstreet,

There he was to

if he found him, to send at least three

brigades back to the Nine Mile Road if the attack had not
yet o p e n e d . 62
That he would order three of Longstreet's brigades to
countermarch back to the Nine Mile Road when the attack was
already several hours late in opening revealed much about
Johnston's state of mind on May 31.

Either he forgot that

he still had four brigades under McLaws and five under
Whiting available for the left wing of his attack, or he had
become fixed upon the idea of keeping Smith from having an
active role in the battle.

But it is also possible that,

in

the moment of his first offensive battle, Joseph Johnston
proved unable to impose his will upon events.

He had proven

his ability to direct strategy, administer a department,
maneuver his troops,

and supervise

(if loosely) a defensive

battle; but, attacking— turning a plan into reality, despite
the fact that troops took the wrong roads and generals
misunderstood their orders— was a much more strenuous e x e r 
cise.

So far his reactions could be excused as those of a

novice commanding his first attack; but, with his orders to
Lieutenant Washington,

legitimate suspicions about Johnston's

62smith, Confederate War Papers, p.
Battle of Seven P i n e s , p. 25.

169; Smith, The
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capacity to command an attack begin to surface.
Three hours had already passed since Whiting's initial
complaint, when Washington spurred his horse toward Seven
Pines just after 9:00 A. M.
again that day.

No one at headquarters saw him

Washington became so absorbed in looking

for Longstreet's brigades that he completely overshot the
Confederate lines and delivered himself as a prisoner into
the hands of the 100th New York, the regiment picketing the
far right of Brigadier-General Silas Casey's Second Division
of the IV Corps.

Although Washington said nothing of his

mission or the impending attack to his captors, the capture
of an army commander's aide could not help but make the
Yankees suspicious.

"This circumstance," reported Casey,

"in connection with the fact that Colonel Hunt, my general
officer of the day, had reported to me that his outer pickets
had heard cars running nearly all night on the Richmond end
of the railroad,

led me to exercise increased vig i l a n c e ."63

All Johnston knew, of course, was that Washington
simply disappeared.

In the meantime, Lieutenant Beckham

rode back to the army commander's field headquarters with
the news that he had found not only General Longstreet but
his entire division and all its trains on the Williamsburg
Road.

Since Beckham had pursued Longstreet on his own

initiative, however,

he had had no orders to pass on to the

63"Reports of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army,
commanding Second Division," June -, 1862, in OR, XI (part
1):
p .
914.
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commander of the right wing.

It was now nearly 10:00 A. M.

To send a courier back to Longstreet with orders to transfer
three brigades back to the Nine Mile Road would consume at
least another hour, by which time the frontal attack by
Hill's and Huger's Divisions should have commenced;
risked even more confusion..

and

In Johnston's mind there would

have been only two viable options at this point:

either to

call off the attack entirely and regroup, or follow L o n g 
street 's lead.
Johnston vacillated.

As he told Major S. B. French,

Smith's Chief Commissary, to post himself outside his a d 
vanced headquarters and listen for the sound of musketry
from the south, he made a remark that revealed an inclination
to cancel the attack.

"He said that he wished the troops

were back in their camps," recalled French.64

Left to

himself, Johnston might well have called off the offensive,
but within a few minutes another event occurred, an event
that rendered such a course impossible in Johnston's mind:
Robert E. Lee appeared on the field.
Lee could not bring himself to remain in Richmond,
doing nothing but shifting papers while the army battled for
the city.

He made sure that the orders forwarding Walker's

and Ripley's troops had gone out, and ordered Pemberton to
send an additional pair of regiments from South Carolina.
Sometime during the morning, his patience exhausted,

the

64smith, The Battle of Seven P i n e s , p. 26.
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Commanding General mounted Traveller and rode out toward
Johnston's headquarters.

Eventually, probably about 11:00

A. M . , Lee arrived at Johnston's forward command post in a
house just off to the right of the Nine Mile Road, where the
road to New Bridge turned off.65
There is little doubt that Lee approached Johnston on
May 31 with exactly the same intentions in mind that he had
sent Colonel Long to communicate the previous day.
wanted to help.

He needed,

He

for his own peace of mind,

involved in the defense of Richmond.

to be

He had told Johnston

he would be happy to serve in any capacity; and, he did not
seek to usurp command.

The remainder of Lee's military

career provides mute testimony to his sincerity:

he rarely

interfered directly in the tactical conduct of his corps,
division, or brigade commanders.

He would have been far

less likely to do so in the case of a general— who m he
considered a peer and a friend— commanding an army.
But Johnston,

growing more anxious each moment for the

success of his plan, was hardly in a state to appreciate
this fact.

His design had already begun to go awry with

Gustavus Smith as an unwelcome witness.

As he waited for

the guns that would herald the belated attack on the W i l 
liamsburg Road, his confidence further unraveled.

Johnston

could not see Lee in any other light than as a threat to his
reputation and his command.

Would Lee take some sort of

65preeman, R. E. L e e , II:

p. 68.
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action if he found out about the morning's miscues?

If the

attack commenced after Lee's arrival, would he somehow be
accorded the credit?
"There was a tenseness in the air" between the two men
at that moment, wrote Douglas Southall Freeman.

It was

obvious that an attack was brewing, although not yet under
way; but, Johnston was hardly in a mood to confide his plans
or his problems to Lee.

Lee was caught in the prison of his

own "hands-off" attitude; he would not ask until Johnston
seemed willing to a n s w e r . ^

The net result was that Johnston

now found himself with two pairs of eyes gazing directly
over his shoulders.
He waited.

Longstreet had nearly 30,000 soldiers

between his own and the divisions of Hill and Huger.

There

was no reason that even an attack delayed into midday might
not crush Keyes.

He "still had full faith," he told Smith,

possibly with more bravura apparent than he actually felt as
noon approached,
IV Corps.67

that Longstreet's attack would destroy the

Smith, who had the luxury of being very nearly

an uninvolved bystander, was not so sure.
The minutes dragged silently past, until sometime in
the early afternoon when Johnston finally decided that he
needed another update on Longstreet's position and progress.

66I b i d . ; see also Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants,

I;

236 .
67Smith, Confederate War P a p e r s , p. 171.
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He directed Smith to send Major Whiting across country to
check on the Georgian.

About 2:00 P. M . , the staff officer

spurred his mount south through the woods toward the W i l 
liamsburg R o a d . 68

Everyone else— Johnston and his staff,

Smith and his, and Robert E. Lee--waited nervously as their
apprehension grew.

Something must have gone horribly wrong.

A dull roar sounded in the woods to the south shortly
before 4:00 P. M.

Johnston listened, but heard only cannon.

An artillery duel, he concluded.

To Lee's ear the noise

contained the faint echo of musketry, and he said as much.
Johnston could not discern it.69
the day had lapsed without combat.
daylight left,

More than two-thirds of
With only a few hours of

it almost sounded as if the army commander

was hoping that Longstreet had the sense to postpone an
assault which would be made too late to be decisive.
But Lee was correct:
the Williamsburg Road.

a bloody battle was rolling down

Major Whiting confirmed this at 4:00

P. M. when he galloped back to headquarters with an urgent
message from Longstreet.

The full text has been lost, but

Smith's report summarized its substance:
[H]e had attacked and beaten the enemy after
several hours, severe fighting; that he had been
disappointed in not receiving assistance upon his

68smith did not specify a time for Whiting's departure
in his memoirs.
Freeman guessed at 2:00 P. M . , which seems
logical enough, since the trip should have consumed about an
hour each way, and the Major returned at 4:00 P. M.
See
Ibid., p. 167; Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I:
p. 236.
69pavis, Rise and F a l l , II:

p. 122.
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left; and, although it was now nearly too late,
that an attack, by the Nine Mile road, upon the
right flank and rear of the enemy would probably
yet enable him to drive them into the Chickahominy
before dark.70
Johnston was taken aback.
launched several hours earlier.

Longstreet's attack had been
How was it possible that

neither the report of a signal gun, nor sounds beyond the
barely audible noise heard-'nalf an hour ago had penetrated
to the Nine Mile Road?

After reading the Georgian's note,

Johnston concluded that perhaps, with swift action, he might
yet achieve his goal that afternoon.
brigades;

Three of Whiting's

those of Hood, J. J. Pettigrew, and Whiting's own

under its senior colonel had halted in the vicinity of
headquarters.

The need for haste drove all thoughts of

proper chain of command from Johnston's mind.
pausing to locate Whiting,
into line.

Without

he began to order those units

He dispatched Smith back up the road to bring

forward the remainder of the division:

the brigades of Wade

Hampton and Robert Hatton.71
What had happened on the Williamsburg Road?
Longstreet's impromptu change of the attack plan had
required three divisions to share at least a part of that

70This sentence is from the version of Smith's report
printed in his memoirs, not that which he submitted to the
Adjutant General after Johnston later requested several
omissions.
Smith, Confederate War P a p e r s , p. 170.
71johnston
assumed command
Smith and Davis
Davis, Rise and

never later admitted that he personally
of Whiting's Division, but on this point
agreed convincingly.
See Ibid., p. 174;
Fa l 1 , II:
pp. 122-123.
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road as they deployed for battle.

When Huger's lead brigade

arrived at rain-swollen Gillies Creek,

it discovered Long

street 's troops had beaten it to the ford which they were
crossing single file on a plank laid across a wagon
There was ample reason for Huger to be surprised.

b e d .

72

He had

never even been informed that Longstreet's Division was
involved in the attack, and could claim precedence at the
crossing— his troops had the assignment of relieving Rodes
on the Charles City Road so that the battle could commence.
But Longstreet's men refused:

they had built the bridge and

intended to cross it first.73
Impatient at this delay, Huger asked for the location
of Longstreet's command post and urged his horse across the
creek to the Poe House, farther down the Williamsburg Road.
There he found Longstreet and D. H. H ill.74

Huger voiced

his complaint, and probably demanded to know which other
parts of the plan had been kept from him.

Hill, by far the

most junior of the three generals, would have had little to
say.

Longstreet,

as he often did when challenged,

fell back

on his authority as commander of the right wing to justify
his division passing the creek first.

Huger then played

^^Longstreet, Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x , p. 91; Smith, Two
D a y s ," p . 229.
^ E n d o r s e m e n t by Benjamin Huger, August 10, 1862,
appended to "Reports of Maj Gen. James Longstreet, C. S.
Army, commanding Right Wing," June 10, 1862, in OR, XI (part
1):
p. 942.
74Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I:

p. 235.
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what he considered to be his trump card.
his date of commission which,

He asked Longstreet

if junior to his own, would

give Huger the overall command despite any-of Johnston's
intentions.

Both men had the same date of rank as major-

generals, which put the issue back to either their respective
standings in the skeletal Confederate Regular Army or the
prewar United States Army.

Longstreet was suspiciously

vague on the dates of his own commissions.

Huger, with old-

army rank-consciousness had no trouble providing his first,
at which point--without citing specifics— Longstreet flatly
asserted his own seniority.

Huger was personally uncon

vinced, but found himself maneuvered into a position where
it seemed necessary to drop the issue.

Longstreet retained

command, and Huger's troops continued to cool their heels as
his men inched across the precarious bridge.75
Longstreet now decided to further modify Johnston's
simple plan of attack.

As wing commander, controlling three

^^Most historians have correctly dismissed Longstreet's
contention in his memoirs that he had admitted to Huger that
he was the junior officer and that Huger had declined to take
command, citing Endorsement by Benjamin Huger, August 10,
1862, appended to "Reports of M a j . Gen. James Longstreet, C.
S. Army, commanding Right Wing," June 10, 1862, in OR, XI
(part 1):
p. 942.
There is, however, even more compelling
evidence to support Huger's position, a letter he addressed
to Lee the next week concerning Longstreet's rank and the
reponse from the Adjutant General's Office, which reveals
that the discussion had extended to dates of rank in the
Confederate Regular Army.
It may also be inferred from this
document that Longstreet did not give Huger specific dates
for his own commissions, or else Huger would have phrased
his letter to confirm them rather than to ascertain them.
Benjamin Huger to Robert E. Lee, June 7, 1862, Samuel Cooper
to Benjamin Huger, June 8, 1862, in L R - A I G O , M-474, Reel 27.
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divisions, he evidently did not feel that his proper place
was the direct tactical supervision of a single division.
So he divided his six brigades into two demi-divisions,
under Brigadier-Generals Richard Anderson and Cadmus Wilcox.
Wilcox would take his own troops, plus those of Colston and
Pryor, down the Charles City Road and support Huger on the
extreme right of the attack, operating under the now-dis
gruntled major-general's orders.

Anderson, with his own

brigade as well as James Kemper's

(A. P. Hill's old brigade),

would support Hill's attack.

George Pickett was deployed

independently along the line of the York River Railroad in a
half-hearted attempt to connect Hill's left with the right
flank of the troops on the Nine Mile Road.
Longstreet's revised dispositions eradicated any possi
ble advantage of increased weight of numbers gained by
sending his division down the Williamsburg Road.
brigade was wasted.

Pickett's

Rodes had not yet rejoined Hill, which

left his main attack with only five brigades--three of his
own and two of Longstreet's.

The possibility of the six

brigades under Huger achieving anything decisive on the
Charles City Road was questionable:

the ground there was

exceedingly swampy, and Hill had reported on May 3 0 that he
did not believe that there was any significant body of
Federal troops within r e a c h . W o r s e ,

the new attack plan

7^The best reconstruction of these orders is in Freeman,
Lee's L ieutenants, I: p. 239.
But see also "Reports of Maj.
Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding Right Wing,"
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entailed even more delays.

Longstreet, Huger, and Hill met

sometime around 10:00 A. M . 77

When the meeting adjourned,

Longstreet's Division— including Wilcox's detachment which
had been designated to move down the Charles City Road—
pulled off to the side of the road and watched Huger's
Division march past.7^

This pointless "leapfrog" arrangement

consumed still more precious time.
The continuing delays weighed more heavily in the mind
of D. H. Hill than they apparently did to Longstreet or
Huger.

The aggressive North Carolinian had been waiting all

morning to strike his blow, and following the meeting of the
three generals he decided to take some actions of his own.
He correctly reasoned that his right flank would be secured
by Huger's six brigades quickly enough to risk recalling his
own detached brigade to strengthen his attack.

Either he

asked Longstreet for permission or, on his own authority as
division commander, Hill sent orders to Rodes not to wait
for Huger's Division to relieve him before rejoining the
main body of the division.

Even so, Rodes' Alabama and one

Mississippi regiment took a great deal of time struggling

June 10, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 939-942; Longstreet,
Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x , p. 92; Smith, "Two Days," p. 229;
Smith, The Battle of Seven P i n e s , p. 77.
77"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command
ing division," -- -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 943.
78"Report of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox, C. S. Army,
commanding brigade," June 12, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p.
986.
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north through White Oak Swamp.

"The men had to wade in

water waist-deep and a large number were entirely submerged,"
Hill reported.

"It was absolutely necessary to proceed with

great caution to prevent the loss of both ammunition and
life."79
Longstreet had'not relieved Hill of the necessity of
awaiting Huger's deployment on the right to initiate the
attack.

But by 1:00 P. M . , the North Carolinian could not

wait any longer.
front:

He lined his division up in a two-brigade

Rodes' Brigade south of the Williamsburg Road,

Samuel Garland's to the north,

supported respectively by the

brigades of Gabriel Rains and George B. Anderson.

There was

still no word from Huger, and only Rodes' skirmishers had
arrived.

Nonetheless,

apparently on his own initiative, D.

H. Hill fired his signal guns and sent his division for
ward.80
Advancing at the sound of the signal guns, BrigadierGeneral Samuel Garland was unaware that, across the road,
only Rodes' skirmishers were present, and that for the first
fifteen minutes his brigade would be attacking the Federal

7 9 "Report
of Brig. Gen. R. E.
manding brigade," June 7, 1862, in

Rodes, C. S. Army, com
OR, XI (part 1): p. 971.

80"Report
of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command
ing division,"
— -, 1862, "Report
of Brig. Gen. R.E.
Rodes, C. S. Army, commanding brigade," June 7, 1862, in O R ,
XI (part 1):
pp. 943, 971.
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IV Corps all by itself.81

But the woods were too dense for

Garland's regiments to keep their alignment with each other,
much less to discover that the brigade on their right had
not moved.

"The difficulties of the ground were almost

insurmountable," Garland stated four days later:
The recent rains had formed ponds of water through
out the woods with mud at the bottom, through
which the men waded forward knee-deep, and occ a 
sionally sinking to the hips in boggy places,
almost beyond the point of extrication.
The
forest was so thick and the undergrowth so tangled
that it was impracticable to see the heads of the
several regiments as they moved forward, and the
deploying intervals were consequently very imper
fectly preserved.82
Nonetheless, Garland's 2,200 men, unaware that for the
first half hour they constituted the entire attacking force
of Johnston's army in the Battle of Seven Pines, moved out
a g g r e s s i v e l y . 83

<phe 2nd Mississippi Battalion had been

ordered out as skirmishers, with directions to remain at
least 150 yards ahead of the main body of the brigade.

But

in the confusion caused by the limited visibility, when the
Mississippians became engaged with the first line of Yankee
pickets,

the remaining five regiments under Garland's command

closed the distance and moved up through them.

The 2nd

8 1 "Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command
ing division," — -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 943.
82"Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland, Jr., C. S. Army,
commanding Third Brigade, Third Division," June 3, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 1):
p. 961.
83Garland, in Ibid., reported his strength at 2,065
effectives.
Allowing 6.5% for officers, this would have
given him about 2,199 soldiers carried into action.
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Mississippi Battalion ceased to exist as a separate fighting
force, even though it had taken as yet few casualties;
individual companies and squads attached themselves to the
nearest regiment and fought on their own for the remainder
of the afternoon.84
This was only the beginning of the disintegration of
the formal command structure of Garland's Brigade and Hill's
Division.

Within minutes, as his brigade hit the first line

of Federal abatis, Garland began to lose control of events.
His senior colonel, Duncan McRae of the 5th North Carolina,
who had been entrusted with the supervision of the brigade's
right flank, had not completely recovered from his wound at
Williamsburg.
field,

Physical exhaustion caused him to leave the

and forced Garland to personally move to the far

right of his lines.

It only required a few minutes for the

brigade commander to restore order to the Tarheels;

but,

while he did so, Colonel Daniel H. Christie's 23rd North
Carolina had halted,
retreat.

believing it had heard an order to

Simultaneously, the only field officer in the 24th

Virginia, Major Richard L. Maury, was hit by Federal fire,
leaving the brigade's largest regiment in

c

o

n

f

u

s

i

o

n

.

85

His troops now heavily engaged with the enemy and
somewhat out of control, Garland began to wonder where his
supporting brigade was.

8

4

i

b

i

d

.

,

He wanted to send a courier back to

p. 962.

8 5 i b i d .
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speed Anderson's march to the battle, but discovered that
his entire staff was busy just trying to straighten out his
own line of battle.

"I trusted to Colonel Anderson's intui

tion as an accomplished soldier to perceive that we were
hotly engaged," wrote Garland— trusting Anderson's instincts
more likely from necessity than choice.
disappointed:

But he was not

"as I anticipated, he arrived upon the scene

just at the proper t i m e . "86
Colonel Anderson brought up his own 1,835 men, rein
forced by two regiments from Brigadier-General Richard
Anderson's Brigade of Longstreet's Division, adding weight
to Garland's attack just as it stalled.

Yet the addition of

six more regiments to the fight was only a mixed blessing.
The impenetrability of the woods caused Anderson's regiments,
like Garland's before them, to march forward in a somewhat
haphazard fashion.

The 28th Georgia, for example,

ended up

on the right of the 49th Virginia when it entered the battle,
after beginning the approach march on the Virginian's left.87
When Anderson's augmented brigade arrived at the forward
line of the battle, the ability of Confederate commanders to
control the attack diminished even further.

Garland e x 

plained in his official report that "the passage of lines
being a feat in tactics which had never been practiced by

86ibid.
87"Report of Colonel George B. Anderson, Fourth North
Carolina Infantry, commanding Special Brigade," June 5, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 951, 953.
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any of us,

large fragments of those regiments who were left

without field or company officers were joined in and con
tinued forward with that brigade."®®
Much the same thing occurred on the north side of the
Williamsburg Road as had happened with Longstreet's Division
at the Battle of Williamsburg several weeks earlier.

Inade

quate reconnaissance left regimental commanders blind.

The

attacking brigades became so intermingled that no one r e 
tained effective cont r o l .

Brigade commanders scurried about

the field rallying and reorganizing individual companies and
regiments.

The senior generals, in this case D. H. Hill and

Richard Anderson,

found themselves able to do little more

than continue to pour reinforcements into the battle.
The brigades on the left of Hill's Division, however,
continued to make headway throughout the afternoon, because
Federal reactions were equally disjointed.

Though he claimed

that the capture of Lieutenant Washington alerted him to the
possibility of an attack, the only action that BrigadierGeneral Silas Casey took to prepare the troops in front of
Garland to receive it was to support his picket line witn a
single regiment,

the 430-man-strong 103rd Pennsylvania.®®

88"Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland, Jr., C. S. Army,
commanding Third Brigade, Third Division," June 3, 1862, in
O R , XI (part 1):
p. 963.
89"Reports of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army,
commanding Second Division," June -, 1862, "Report of M a j .
Audlev w. Gazzam.
One hundred and third Pennsylvania Infan
try," June 2, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 914, 928.
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Casey did not order his division under arms until two Confed
erate artillery shells "were thrown over my camp," by which
time the 103rd Pennsylvania was trying to resist five times
its own numbers.

It held for about fifteen minutes.

As

Casey began to order his division into line— still in p i e c e 
meal fashion— the Pennsylvanians "came down the road in some
confusion, having suffered considerable loss.

. . ."90

Nonetheless, with more than 4,200 men in his own three
brigades, reinforced by as many men as IV Corps commander
Erasmus Keyes could spare while organizing a second line of
defense, Casey might have succeeded in holding his own
against the Confederates attacking north of the Williamsburg
Road.

But fifteen minutes after Samuel Garland's men a s 

saulted the 103rd Pennsylvania, Robert Rodes finally brought
his own brigade into the battle.
In his haste to open the battle, D. H. Hill committed
an error very similar to that of Richard Anderson at W i l 
liamsburg:
flanks.

he did not pay enough attention to one of his

By the time Garland's Brigade had deployed in the

line of battle, Hill could see elements of two regiments
from Rodes' Brigade on the south side of the Williamsburg
Road.

Colonel John B. Gordon's 6th Alabama had spread out

in front as skirmishers,

and Colonel William H. Taylor's

12th Mississippi had fallen in about 150 yards behind them.

90"Reports of Brig. Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. Army,
commanding Second Division," June -, 1862, in OR, XI (part
1):
p p . 914.
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Rodes warned Hill that he could not possibly have the remain
der of the brigade in place for at least another fifteen
minutes and possibly as much as half an hour.

Nonetheless,

Hill had resolved to order the attack.91
This decision presented Rodes with the difficult tactic
al problem of just how to get his brigade, arriving unit by
unit and

already exhausted

by its passage through the swamps,

into the

battle as quickly

as possible.

hear the

sound of musketry on his left to indicate that

Garland was engaged.

He could already

In an instant, Rodes reacted with the

type of decisiveness that would begin, this day, to mark him
as one of the premier,

small-unit tacticians of the army; he

determined to attack almost immediately en e c h e l o n , bringing
each regiment through the dense woods into the battle in
successive lines.

As he closed with the Yankees — literally

under their guns--Rodes intended to redeploy his units from
parallel lines into a brigade front with all five regiments
a b r e a s t .92
The maneuver was more than audacious,
dangerous.

it was downright

Garland's Brigade to his left had already proven

unable to perform a passage of the lines of its own skirmish
ers, and had been thrown into total disorder by its rein
forcements.

What Rodes prepared to do was more complicated

91"Reports of Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes, C. S. Army,
commanding brigade," June 7, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
971 .

92jbid.
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by several orders of magnitude.
Yet despite appalling casualties, Rodes' Brigade managed
to implement its commander's plan.

Gordon's 6th Alabama
ka

capitalized on the fact that the Federal pickets to the
north of the road were distracted by the firing there, and
advanced without pause over the first line of abatis, and
threatened Casey's main line of rifle pits almost before
anyone knew they had attacked.

Colonel Gordon himself was

the first man through Casey's line of outposts,

leaping his

horse over the abatis, and shouting for his men to follow
him through.

Though a cry of "Shoot that man on horseback"

echoed through the Federal line, the Colonel miraculously
continued to press home his attack unscathed.9 3
Union resistance stiffened beyond the first pickets,
however, and the 6th Alabama and 12th Mississippi stalled in
front of Casey's main line of defense.

Rodes placed himself

at the head of the 5th Alabama as it struggled up from its
trek from the Charles City Road and led it to support the
Mississippians.

His remaining two infantry units--a heavy

artillery battalion,

under Captain C. C. Otey; and the 12th

Alabama— had been instructed to enter the line of battle at
predesignated points as they marched up.

If everything

proceeded as planned, all 2,200 men of the brigade would be

93"Report of Col. John B. Gordon, Sixth Alabama Infan
try," June 7, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 979; Gordon,
Reminiscences, p. 56.
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in action within half an

h o u r .

94

Of course the conditions under which Rodes operated
were no better than those which bedeviled Garland on the far
side of the road.

The woods were so thick that Rodes himself

lost track of half of the 5th Alabama, ending up on the
flank of the 12th Mississippi with only five companies.
heavy artillery battalion,

The

new to the army and composed

primarily or older men who had never intended to be infantry
in the first place, decided that it had been given orders to
halt short of the battle.
far right flank,

The 12th Alabama, ordered to the

had discovered easier ground and advanced

out of step with the rest of the brigade, to the point of
crowding Gordon's skirmishers.9 5
Rodes' Brigade was poised, at that moment, on the point
of the same degenerating confusion that had already made a
shambles of the command structure on the left of the divi
sion.

That did not happen here, however, due to Rodes'

skill, the high standard of training in his brigade,

the

movements of his supporting brigade, and a healthy dose of
luck.

The lost companies of the 5th Alabama, under their

field officers,

reoriented themselves,

and arrived as a unit

on the opposite side of the 12th Mississippi,

allowing Rodes

to quickly reunite the entire regiment during a momentary

94"Reports of Brig. Gen. R. E. Rodes, C. S. Army,
commanding brigade," June 7, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
971-972.
95ibid.
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break in the firing.

He personally bullied the heavy a r t i l 

lery battalion into the fight.

Colonel Robert T. Jones of

the 12th Alabama joined Gordon's 6th Alabama on the far
right of the brigade and, without orders, provided enfilading
fire against the Federal line.96
At this juncture, Rodes' original orders called for him
to sidestep his entire brigade to the right, allowing Rains'
Brigade to attack through his lines.

But Rains had percep

tively noticed that Rodes had his hands full just forming
his brigade under fire, and was certainly not prepared to
perform a right oblique march.

So the commander of the

supporting brigade swung his own regiments around the right
of Rodes' units.

The maneuver proved decisive despite the

considerable amount of time it took Rains ' men to pick their
way through the swamps, and Rodes' later complaints that
Rains had left his men without support for too long a period.
Rains' attack, when it came, rolled up Casey's left flank
and levered his entire division out of its line.97
It had taken about two hours to drive the Federals from
their first defensive line, and the fact that the Confederate
attack continued to roll forward was due far more to momentum
than planning or organization.

Hill's main role after 3:00

P. M. was to try to keep his brigades separate and moving

96ibid.
9 7 i b i d .; "Report of Brig. Gen. Gabriel J. Rains, C. S.
Army, commanding brigade," June 8, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p p . 969-97 0 .
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forward at roughly the same pace.

He fed reinforcements

into the battle more cautiously now, paying close attention
to avoiding the kind of snafu that had threatened to paralyze
his left in the early going.98
Longstreet's role in the battle after it opened was far
less significant than Hill's.

He had released Anderson and

Kemper to the division commander before the opening of the
attack,

so when the North Carolinian committed their troops

it was on his own initiative.

The Georgian never appeared

anywhere near the front line of the battle.99

His sole

contribution to Hill's attack seems to have been to order
Wilcox's Brigade to countermarch yet again, back from Charles
City Road to the Williamsburg Road, where Wilcox arrived too
late to make any real contribution to the battle.100

By the

time Longstreet penned his 4:00 P. M. note to Johnston that
his men were driving the enemy, Hill had supervised--if
loosely— all the fighting.

And all the fighting had been

done, thanks to Longstreet's orders, by six of thirteen
available brigades.
Yet there was more than a kernel of truth in L o n g 
street 's contention that he had defeated the Yankees and

98"Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command
ing division," -- -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 944.
99 d . H. Hill to
in Smith, The Battle

Gustavus W. Smith, May 22,
of Seven P i n e s , p. 66.

1885, quoted

100»Report of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox,
C. S. Army,
commanding brigade,"
June 12, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1): pp.
986-987.
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that they needed only one more sharp push to disintegrate
the IV Corps,

if not also the III.

Despite the substantial

reinforcements from Samuel Heinztelman's III Corp which had
arrived to bolster his position, and the fact that he had
enjoyed several hours to deploy Couch's division as Casey's
men slowly crumbled, Erasmus Keyes could not hold his second
line.

Hill's men, admittedly at the cost of murderous

casualties, sent the Yankees reeling back again.

By this

point Hill's reinforced division had captured ten cannon and
held a field scattered with "6,700 muskets and rifles in
fine condition, ordnance, commissary, and medical stores."101
A flank attack down the Nine Mile Road might well have
delivered the coup de g r a c e , at least to the extent of
routing two Federal corps back to the Chic k a h o m i n y .
But by the time that Johnston received Longstreet's
message,

the conditions under which such an attack would

have been possible had changed.

Even as Johnston frantically

prepared to attack with Whiting's Division,

another Federal

corps commander took decisive action to save the day for the
Army of the Potomac.

Edwin Vose Sumner's II Corps, deployed

along the north bank of the Chickahominy between the Upper
and Lower Bridges, was the portion of McClellan's army
closest to the fighting.

But the bridges were under water,

and Sumner was the commander who had vacillated so long at

1 0 1 "Report of Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, C. S. Army, command
ing division," -- -, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 945.
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Williamsburg that he allowed Hancock's flanking action to
accomplish nothing.

It should have been a recipe for d i s a s 

ter .
Yet when the moment came on May 31, Sumner did not
hesitate.

At 1:00 P. M., McClellan advised him that an

attack had commenced south of the river and ordered Sumner
"to be in readiness to move at a moment's warning."

At 2:30

P. M., the call came to cross the bridges and march to
support Keyes and Heintzelman.102

perhaps the difference

from Williamsburg was that Sumner was not in overall command;
he merely had to react to orders.

His division commanders,

Israel B. Richardson and John Sedgwick, were instructed to
cross the Chickahominy,
bridges.
wade

regardless of the condition of the

"Our men," reported Richardson,

"were obliged to

(part of the bridge having been swept away) nearly up

to their middles in water,

and of course could follow but

slowly.103

Sedgwick's division was marching

By 4:00 P. M.,

into position on the Federal right at Seven Pines, and the
advance by Whiting's Division would not hit the flank of a
defeated enemy, but would encounter three fresh brigades of
unbloodied Yankees.
Johnston ordered Hood's Brigade into the woods and

102''RepOrt of Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, U. S. Army,
commanding Second Corps," June 9, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 763.
103"Rep Ort of Brig. Gen. Israel B. Richardson, U. S.
Army, commanding Division," June 6, 1862, in OR, XI (part
1):
p. 764.
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swamps between the Nine Mile and Williamsburg Roads,

in an

attempt to link Whiting's right flank with Hill's left.

The

Texans obligingly angled off into the forest and promptly
got lost, removing themselves from the remainder of the
b a t t l e .

1^4

The army commander planned to send Pettigrew's

and Whiting's Brigades abreast in line of battle down the
Nine Mile Road.

When Smith brought up Hampton and Hatton,

the former would extend the line, and the latter would
become the division

r e s e r v e .

105

was a relatively orthodox

deployment for those four brigades, marred only by two
facts:

there were three different generals supervising the

move and nobody knew that Sedgwick's division was in the
woods.
By taking personal command of the division, Johnston
had,

in his anxiety, both abdicated his role as army command

er and also reduced Smith and Whiting to high-ranking super
numeraries.

He sent Smith dashing back and forth— first to

bring up Hampton and Hatton; again to modify their marching
orders; and finally, when contact was made at Fair Oaks
Station,
river.

to detach brigades from Magruder farther down the
These were errands that any competent lieutenant

serving as an aide de camp should have been able to handle.
Johnston kept Whiting at his side; but while he issued his

104jy[cMurry, H o o d , p. 41; Smith, Confederate War P a p e r s ,
p. 174.
105gmith, Confederate War P a p e r s , pp. 174-175.
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own orders through the division commander, Johnston did not
allow him to function as a commanding general.

In the case

of Smith, whom Johnston already distrusted, his actions were
understandable,

if not laudable.

In the case of Whiting,

who was one of Johnston's most trusted subordinates, his
usurpation of the Brigadier-General's command revealed just
how badly he was feeling the strain of battle.
As a result of these unwieldy command arrangements,
Whiting's Division took far longer than it should have to
deploy for battle.
peared.

Hood, as already noted,

simply disap

Hampton's Brigade, blundering around in the woods,

almost engaged in a fire fight with Pettigrew's

m e n .

106

& s

the sun began to sink, the division finally moved forward,
only to run into the unexpected fire of Sedgwick's division.
Two batteries of Federal artillery,
Sedgwick's brigades:

supported by two of

the First under Brigadier-General

Willis A. Gorman and the Third under Brigadier-General
Napoleon J. T. Dana, had arrived in the vicinity of Fair
Oaks Station.

Sedgwick himself was farther down the line,

supervising the movement of his other brigade as it connected
with the right flank of the hard-pressed III and IV Corps at
Seven Pines.

This left the immediate direction of the bulk

of his division in Sumner's

h a n d s .

1^7

106I b i d ., p. 175.
107»RepOrt of Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick, U. S. Army,
commanding Second Division," June 4, 1862, in OR, XI (part
1):
p. 792.
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Whiting, ever pessimistic, had warned Johnston that the
Federals might have crossed the river.

But suddenly sensing

a chance to win a victory regardless of all the day's misc u e s , Johnston ignored him.

"Oh!" one of Whiting's staff

officers recalled the army commander exclaiming,
Whiting, you are too c a u t i o u s ."108

"General

when the Union artillery

opened on the unsuspecting Confederates,

the response of the

leading brigades was an immediate, uncoordinated attack.
This assault failed in short order.

Since it had occurred

more or less spontaneously, and had not involved all the
personnel of the three brigades, the troops rallied very
quickly.

They were ordered in again.109

This attack involved all four of the available brigades,
and was pressed with a great deal more vigor.

Brigadier-

General Gorman, whose troops supported one of the batteries,
reported the contest "as severe a fire of musketry as ever
was witnessed or heard, perhaps, by the oldest officers of
the army.

. . ."HO

practically invisible in the woods and

supported by twelve cannon, the Federal troops at Fair Oaks
made up for the ignominious retreat of their comrades at
Seven Pines.

Neither Gorman's nor Dana's brigades suffered

108 j3_ w . Frobel to Gustavus W. Smith, February -,
quoted in Smith, Confederate War P a p e r s , p. 179.

1868,

109Ibid.
110'iRepOr-t- 0 f Brig. Gen. Willis A. Gorman, U. S. Army,
commanding First Brigade," June 3, 1862, in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 800.
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more than 200 casualties; the four brigades of Whiting's
Division took nearly 1,300.
brigadiers went down:

Three of his four engaged

Hatton killed, Pettigrew seriously

wounded and captured, Hampton shot in the foot.
began to fall,

As dusk

it was no longer a question of whether or not

Whiting's men could break through the enemy, but whether
they could hold their g r o u n d . m
The abortive attack of Whiting's Division highlighted
the tactical mismanagement of the Battle of Seven Pines.
Johnston started his brigades forward without any attempt to
reconnoiter for Yankees along their route of march.

By

accompanying the division personally, the army commander not
only confused its chain of command, but also removed himself
from the best location on the field from which to coordinate
reinforcements.

There was no one left at his former head

quarters with either complete knowledge of the battle plan
or authority to shift troops in Johnston's absence;

if

McClellan had been industrious enough to counterattack
Johnston's far left flank, there would have been no way for
A. P. Hill to request reinforcements quickly.

Given all of

this, why did Johnston decide to supervise Whiting's attack
in person?
Three answers suggest themselves, all of which may have

111"Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac at
the Battle of Fair Oaks, of Seven Pines, V a ., May 31-June 1,
1862," in OR, XI (part 1):
p. 758; Smith, Confederate War
Pap e r s , pp. 176-177.
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affected the army commander's choice, and rest upon a clear
understanding of the mental strain Johnston felt in the late
afternoon hours of May 31.
Johnston had been conscious of his growing cadre of
observers since before dawn.

Smith, who had every reason

now to be a critical witness, had been with him since first
light, accompanied by his entire staff.

Whiting, who had

ridden up as his division approached at midmorning, had
hovered around headquarters all day as well;

though Johnston

accounted him as a friend, Whiting represented another
officer whose opinion of the army commander's capabilities
might suffer as the result of a botched battle.

To these

two, Lee's presence was added sometime around noon--his rank
and his position both made his presence discomforting to
Johnston as he waited for the battle to open.

And finally,

at just about 4:00 P. M . , as Johnston received Longstreet's
note, President Davis himself cantered down the Nine Mile
Road to join the impromptu entourage that had conglomerated
around h i m . H ^
The President's arrival may have been the last straw
for Johnston.

He knew that Davis's opinion of his adminis

trative ability had been marred by the President's recent
excursions to the front when the Chief Executive had been
greeted by disorganization and nonexistent attacks.

He

could also be sure that Davis, unlike Lee, would immediately
H2[)a v iSf Rise and Fall , II:

p. 122.
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open any conversation with direct inquiries into the progress
of the battle.

With Smith around and fully aware of the

original design, Johnston would be forced to admit that
nothing had thus far transpired in accordance with his
wishes.

He would have to tell Davis that Longstreet had

taken the wrong road, that the attack had opened six to
eight hours late, and that no one on the Nine Mile Road had
been sure enough that the fight had begun to launch the left
wing into action promptly.
On the other hand, if Johnston rode off with Whiting's
Division, he would escape such a painful situation, at least
for the moment.

If Whiting's attack succeeded, and he could

bring back tidings that included the destruction of at least
one Federal corps, then he could reasonably expect that
embarrassing post mortems would be delayed for a much longer
time, and might be avoided forever in the flush of a desper
ately needed victory.
It is also possible that Johnston, whose ambitious
strain always made him consider the question of personal
reputation and ultimate credit for battles won, rode with
Whiting's Division not because he feared the President's
inquisition, but because he scented victory.

Johnston never

forgot that at Manassas he had dispatched Beauregard to the
threatened flank rather than going there himself;
Narrative he wrote:

in his

"After assigning Beauregard to the

command of the troops immediately engaged, which he properly
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suggested belonged to the second in rank, not to the command
er of the army,
field. " H 3

I returned to the supervision of the whole

After that battle,

noted Freeman,

"there was

praise for Johnston, to be sure," yet "the concentration of
the two armies, not less than the victory itself, was assumed
to be the work of Beauregard."114
said or wrote,
impression.

Nothing that Johnston

then or later, ever managed to dispel this

If Whiting or Longstreet delivered the knockout

blow at Seven Pines while Johnston remained again at head
quarters,

it must have occurred to him that history might

well repeat itself.
Both of the foregoing explanations reflect less than
favorably on Johnston's personal integrity.

They imply that

the army commander might base his actions on personal m o 
tives— and not purely military considerations— even under
the strain of a battle that had gotten out of his control.
There is also the possibility that the overriding concern in
Johnston's mind was one of command.

His two most trusted

lieutenants had each botched a major operation:

Smith by

declining to attack on May 28, and Longstreet that morning
by following the wrong road.

The Kentuckian and the Georgian

were the two generals whom Johnston had always considered
not only competent but absolutely indispensable.

If he

could not safely assign missions to them, how could he rely

H3johnston,
l^Freeman,

N a r rative, pp. 48-49.
Lee's Lieutenant's, I:

p. 80.
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on their juniors?

When the instant came in which Johnston

expected to strike the decisive blow, he may well have acted
out of a belief that the only way to assure an immediate and
aggressive movement was to lead it himself.
It should be emphasized, however, that Johnston's
choice to accompany Whiting's Division was made in minutes
if not seconds.

All of the considerations detailed above

may have influenced him to a greater or lesser degree; but,
in the necessity for haste that he would have felt upon the
receipt of Longstreet's note, Johnston had precious little
time to think the options through.

He did not have the

luxury of hours to brood and rationalize like Longstreet the
previous night; he had to determine his course as immediately
as did Rodes when be brought his brigade into the fighting
south of the Williamsburg Road.

It is quite possible that

all of these considerations passed so rapidly through the
army commander's mind that later, upon reflection,

he could

not reconstruct his reasons even to h i m s e l f .H 5
There would be no occasion for such reflection that
evening, however,

for Joseph Johnston.

As it became obvious

115The manner in which Johnston rewrote his role at the
key moment in the battle during the postwar years gives a
very strong indication of just how uncomfortable the General
was with his rather rash decision to lead Whiting's Division
himself.
In both the Narrative and his article for Battles
and Lead e r s , Johnston related that he had directed that the
division be sent forward, omitting the fact that he accompa
nied it and issued orders directly to its brigadiers.
See
Johnston, N a r r a t i v e , pp. 136-137; Johnston, "Manassas to
Seven Pines," B & L , II:
p. 214.
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that Whiting's Division had been stalemated and the evening
shadows grew longer and longer, he realized that his army
could not follow up the blow that had sent two Federal corps
reeling, at least not that day.

Yet despite the result at

Fair Oaks Station, Longstreet's apparent partial victory
might be completed with another attack the next day.
announced to my staff officers," Johnston recalled,

"So I
"that

each regiment must sleep where it might be standing when the
contest ceased for the night, to be ready to renew it at
dawn next morning. "
But the battle,

®
if it was to continue on June 1, would

have to do so in his absence.

Johnston had hardly given

those last orders when a stray musket ball hit him in the
right shoulder.

Though this inflicted little more than a

superficial wound, the effects of the random fragment of a
Federal artillery shell which then slammed into his chest
were far more serious.

The impact unseated him from his

saddle, and though he never lost consciousness it was a
dazed and severely wounded Johnston that his aides carried
off the field.H-7
Though he did not yet realize it, Joseph E. Johnston's
campaign in the defense of Richmond had abruptly ended.

l l ^ J o h n s t o n ,

N ar r a t i v e , p. 138.

117Ibid.
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Chapter Twelve
Johnston's Campaign:

An Assessment

As cynical as the proposition appears, dying in battle
at the proper moment can do great things for a general's
reputation, while surviving even a great victory can be a
dreadful mistake.

The American Civil War was full of exampl

that proved both cases.

For almost a century following the

death of Albert Sidney Johnston, the fatal wound he received
on the first day of the Battle of Shiloh deflected from his
memory criticism of his conduct of operations in the months
preceding the battle.

From the standpoint of his entrance

into the pantheon of Confederate legends, no novelist or
scriptwriter could have imagined a more dramatic end for
"Stonewall" Jackson than to be shot down by his own men at
Chancellorsville,

in the hour of one of his most audacious

and successful maneuvers.
On the opposite side of the coin, by surviving Gettys
burg, both George Meade and George Pickett found themselves
forced to endure the decline of their reputations from glory
into mediocrity.

Meade lived to be castigated for failing

to pursue Lee's beaten army, raked over the coals by an
unsympathic Congressional committee,

superseded by Grant,

and eventually denied the post of Commanding General of the
United States Army in favor of a man who had been his junior
495
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throughout the war.

Pickett faced humiliation and defeat at

Five Forks and questions after the war about just how he,
among all the generals and all but one of the field officers
in his three brigades, had avoided Yankee fire in the charge
that destroyed his division.

Ironically, the verdict of their

peers and historians on both men would probably have been much
more favorable if Meade had fallen defending Cemetery Ridge
and Pickett had died assaulting it.
Johnston's eventual recuperation from the wounds he
received at Seven Pines landed him in the company of Meade and
Pickett rather than Jackson or the other Johnston.

By the

time Johnston had recovered sufficiently to return to active
duty, Robert E. Lee had an undisputable claim to command of
the Army of Northern Virginia.

He had driven McClellan away

from Richmond in the Seven Days Battles, routed John Pope at
Second Manassas,

invaded Maryland,

and fought the Army of the

Potomac to a bloody standstill at Antietam Creek.

When Lee's

accomplishments were compared to Johnston's record— partial
credit for victory at First Manassas, a minor defensive
success at Williamsburg,

and the disjointed stalemate at

Seven Pines— it was obvious that no one could expect Jeffer
son Davis to remove Lee from command in order to reinstate
Johnston.
But the President could hardly be accused of injustice
to the man who had become the Confederacy's second ranking
field general.

Johnston was assigned in November,

1862, to
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command Department No.

2, a vast theater that included both

Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee and John C. Pemberton's
army defending Vicksburg.

It was not a fortunate assignment.

Johnston, who would have preferred to lead any single field
army,

saw his authority as "little more than n o m i n a l . H e

quarreled with the President over strategy,

complained that

he could never get Pemberton to follow his orders, and
presided over the Confederate debacle at Vicksburg.

With

defeat came frenzied rounds of mutual recriminations that
extended to generals and politicians alike; Johnston did not
escape unscathed.
Yet Vicksburg did not end his career as it did Pember
ton's.

After Bragg's defeat at Missionary Ridge in November,

1863, the President set personal rancor aside and appointed
Johnston to succeed Bragg in command of the Army of Tennessee.
His administrative abilities paid immediate dividends in the
restoration of morale and efficiency to his dispirited
divisions,

and when the campaign of 1864 opened he was back

in the spotlight again:

defending Atlanta against Sherman

while Lee resisted Grant before Richmond.

But Johnston's

fabian policy of retreating, with the avowed intent of
drawing Sherman deeply enough into Confederate territory to
assure his army's destruction,
at all.

did not suit Jefferson Davis

By mid-July, Johnston had backed up to the suburbs

of Atlanta, and when he could not get from the army commander

Ijohnston, Na r r a t i v e , p. 154.
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what he considered to be sufficient guarantees of offensive
action, the President sacked Johnston in favor of John Bell
Hood.

Hood attacked and lost thousands of men and the city.

Johnston claimed that he had been on the verge of launching
a successful offensive when relieved; Davis countered that the
General had, in fact, been on the verge of abandoning Atlanta
without a fight.
The final postscript to Johnston's career was his recall
in February,

1865, this time at the insistence of Lee, to

undertake the hopeless task of trying to halt Sherman's
rampage through the Carolinas.

Johnston scored a small

tactical victory at the Battle of Bentonville on March 19,
attacking an isolated wing of Sherman's army; but,

it was far

too late to have any effect on the course of the war.
When the war ended it was followed in remarkably short
order by a war of words among ex-Confederate politicians and
military officers,

scrambling to avoid being assessed the

responsibility for the South's defeat.

Men who had fought and

bled together now divided into new camps and attacked each
other with a petty vindictiveness that often served more to
diminish their reputations than to protect them.

Carefully

worded statements of fact— as misleading as they were true—
along with innuendo, edited documents,
reminiscences,
second,

artfully doctored

and outright lies were the weapons in this

far less honorable conflict.

None of the principals in Johnston's defense of Richmond
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managed to remain above the mud-slinging.

The memoirs and

articles of Joseph Johnston, Jefferson Davis, Gustavus Smith,
and James Longstreet were colored by self-justification and
marred by inaccuracies, as were those of lower ranking
officers from Jubal Early to John Gordon, Armistead Long to
John Bell Hood.

For anyone determined to pick his way through

the literary charges and countercharges in order to reconcile
all the discrepancies,

it represents an assignment as hazard

ous as that handed to the Yankee pickets who had to enter
Yorktown after Gabriel Rains had booby-trapped the town with
explosives.
The campaign to defend Richmond represents a particular
problem for the historian intent upon assessing Johnston's
performance as a general,

for the course of events leading up

to Seven Pines has received relatively little attention,
among the writers of memoirs.

even

This is due, in part, to the

fact that, while the defense of Richmond in 1862 ended
successfully under the direction of Lee and not Jackson,
those of Vicksburg and Atlanta did not.

Generals rarely

feel the need to defend victorious campaigns.

When the

question of Johnston's Peninsular Campaign did arise in his
own memoirs, it was often merely as a blind for some argument
about Vicksburg or Atlanta.

Hood,

for example, voiced the

contention that Johnston had supposedly contemplated the
evacuation in 1862 as a rationale for believing that he
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would have deserted Atlanta in 1864.2
To evaluate Johnston's performance in 1862 fairly then,
it is necessary to approach that campaign as much as possible
without reference to later battles or subsequent controver
sies.

In one sense, it is almost necessary to pretend that

Johnston's wound at Seven Pines indeed proved fatal in order
to reach a judgment on his capacity as a general at that time.
Johnston quickly convinced himself that his injuries had
snatched victory from his grasp.
June 24,

In his initial report,

filed

1862, Johnston ignored Longstreet's mistake in

following the Williamsburg Road (he also asked Gustavus Smith
to purge a reference to it from his own report) and relied
heavily on the Georgian's recounting of the fighting in front
of Seven Pines.

Longstreet,

anxious to find a scapegoat for

his delay in opening the attack, blamed Huger for not marching
into position in time.

Johnston picked this up and asserted

that "had Major-General Huger's Division been in position and
ready for action when those of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill
moved,

I am satisfied that Keyes' corps would have been

destroyed instead of being merely

d e f e a t e d .

Eventually, due primarily to the efforts of Gustavus

^Hood, Advance and R e t r e a t , pp.

23,

154-156.

^"Report of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army,
commanding Army of Northern Virginia, and resulting c orre
spondence," June 24, 1862, "Reports of Maj. Gen. James L o n g 
street, C. S. Army, commanding Right Wing," June 10, 1862,
in OR, XI (part 1):
pp. 935, 939-941; Smith, Confederate War
P a p e r s , pp. 165-171.
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Smith, Huger would be exonerated of the charge that he did not
arrive at his designated objective on time.^

Johnston,

still

convinced that a decisive success had only narrowly eluded
him,

shifted the ground of his argument,

on Smith.

and laid the blame

"Darkness o n l y ," halted the battle on May 31,

Johnston contended, but after the army was turned over to
Smith there was "no serious fighting" on June 1, despite the
fact that "advantage of position and superiority of numbers
would have enabled them to defeat that

[Keyes'] corps had

the engagement been renewed on Sunday morning.

. . ."^

Though Smith spent thirty years presenting evidence to
disprove this assertion,

arguing that he had attempted to

attack on the second day, only to be frustrated by Lon g 
street 's inaction,

he never managed to escape the image of a

general who folded up under the strain of combat.

Freeman,

the first historian to examine the evidence closely,
condemned the Kentuckian for "vacillation,
conflicting orders" on June 1.6

seriously

overcaution and

Though his rationalizations

^Smith dealt with Huger's "alleged 'slow movements'" in
everything he wrote about the battle, more out of an interest
in smearing Longstreet's name than from any regard or friend
ship for Huger.
The best case is made in Smith, The Battle
of Seven P i n e s , pp. 64-82.
^That Johnston did not initially blame Smith for the
failure to gain a victory on June 1 is evident from the tone
of his June 24, 1862 report.
"Report of General Joseph E.
Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Northern Virginia,
and resulting correspondence," June 24, 1862, in OR, XI (part
1):
pp. 933-935; Johnston, Narrative, pp. 139, 141.
^Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, I:

p. 243.
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changed, Johnston enjoyed great success for many years in
advancing the idea that, as Beauregard was almost universally
blamed for not pressing home the attack on Grant after Albert
Sidney Johnston fell at Shiloh, Smith was the culprit for
not delivering the coup de grace at Seven Pines.
Though there was in truth very little to praise in
Smith's conduct of the battle on June 1, Johnston's accusation
that he had forfeited the fruits of a hard-won victory was
without any factual basis.

By Sunday morning, there were an

equal number of Federal and Confederate soldiers on the field
south of the Chickahominy,

including fresh troops on both

sides that had not participated in the previous days' fight
ing.

Of the Union units which had been bloodied in Hill's

attack, only a portion of Casey's division

had not been

sufficiently reorganized to go into combat

again.

The

Confederate advantage of surprise had certainly been lost.
Casualties among general officers had been severe for a battle
of no more than five hours and included the army commander
and four of the ten brigade commanders who were actually
engaged.

Yankee confidence,

far from being shattered,

remained solid enough that almost all the actions of June 1
were Federal and not Confederate attacks.^
But the opportunity to smash at least
May 31 had been very real.

^"McClellan's Report

K e y e s ' IV Corps on

Had Johnston's original plan been

(2)," in OR, XI (part 1):

pp.

42.
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executed,

Keyes' six brigades would have been assaulted by

thirteen Confederate brigades:
Hill, and six under Longstreet.

three under Huger, four under
Union reinforcements a vail

able in the first two hours would only have been Heintzelman's
six brigades, while Johnston had four under McLaws and five
under Whiting in reserve.

But Johnston's relatively simple

plan went hopelessly awry from the very beginning.
It is questionable to what extent Johnston may be faulted
for Longstreet's carefully rationalized disobedience.

Both

Robert E. Lee and Braxton Bragg discovered in their turn that
Longstreet, while undeniably talented, was incredibly willful,
and his cooperation with operations of which he did not
approve was notoriously poor.

Nonetheless, given the vague

nature of the orders Johnston dispatched to Huger, it is
possible to suspect that Johnston may well have employed
somewhat ambiguous language in his final oral orders to his
wing commander.
It is a military truism that no plan survives contact
with the enemy.

It is the army commander's responsibility

to adapt to unexpected events; therefore,

the delegation of

an important mission such as Longstreet's supervisory author
ity over the attack of the right wing does not relieve the
commanding general from the responsibility to maintain
control of the various detachments of his army.
terms,

In these

at the Battle of Seven Pines, Joseph Johnston failed

miserably.
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Johnston made no provisions for couriers or staff
officers to move on a regular basis between the separated
wings of his army in order to keep him updated on the progress
of each division.

When the first reports arrived that

Longstreet had taken the wrong road, Johnston wasted precious
hours without deciding on a modified plan or a cancellation
of the attack.

In the event the signal guns did not carry,

there was no back-up for alerting units on the Nine Mile
Road that the attack to the south had begun.

Finally,

Johnston totally abdicated his responsibility for the overall
conduct of the battle when he led Whiting's Division down the
Nine Mile Road to Fair Oaks Station.
Yet it must be noted that similar failings bedeviled
almost every commanding general, Confederate or Union,
first offensive battle.

in his

Civil War battles were almost all

planned and fought by generals who had never commanded more
than a single regiment under fire prior to 1861.

Lee at

Mechanicsville, Bragg at Stone's River, Hood at Peachtree
Creek,

and Beauregard at Drewry's Bluff all committed the same

or comparable mistakes,

as did McClellan at Antietam,

Hooker

at Chancellorsville, Meade at Mine Run, Sherman at Chicksaw
Bluffs, and Grant at Belmont.

The good generals learned from

their mistakes, and slowly, painfully,
ances in subsequent battles.

improved their perform

It was, however, as Bruce

Catton pointed out with regard to Ulysses Grant,

"at a

prodigious cost to himself and to some thousands of young men
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who, without quite realizing it, had joined the Union Army in
order to pay for his education."8

In almost every case,

it

was very difficult to render a valid judgment on the basis
of' the first offensive battle, because almost no one ever
performed well.

The value of a general could best be deter

mined by observing whether or not he was able to improve
upon this performance.
If Johnston had botched Seven Pines, he had not done so
in a disastrous manner:
defeated either;
again.

he had not won, but he had not been

and, his army certainly survived to fight

A man as realistic as Jefferson Davis would have known

that the proof would come the next time.
would eventually be the rub.

And that, of course,

Robert E. Lee handled the Battle

of Mechanicsville on June 26, 1862,

little, if any, better

than Johnston managed the Battle of Seven Pines.

But Lee's

second attack, the Battle of Gaines' Mill, came on the
following day and proved that if he had not become perfect
overnight he was capable of learning something from his own
mistakes.

Johnston may well have been just as able to learn

from his own mistakes as Lee, and might have proved that on
June 1 had he not been wounded.

Through choice or circum

stance, however, Joseph Johnston did not fight another
offensive battle until nearly three years later, at Bentonville on March 19,

1865.

^Bruce Catton, Grant Moves South
and Company, 1960), pp. 216-217.

(Boston:

Little,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Brown

506

This, of course, was hardly knowable on the evening of
May 31, 1862.

Based on his performance at Seven Pines, a

verdict on Johnston as a battlefield commander would have
been a provisional one:

if he had not proved to be an imme

diate savant, he had not been an unmitigated disaster.
conduct rated another opportunity,

His

and throughout the war

Jefferson Davis made good-faith efforts to give him that
chance.
Johnston claimed that, even allowing for his failure to
totally crush Keyes' corps, the Battle of Seven Pines resulted
in two very favorable advantages for his successor.

The

attack had rocked McClellan enough to freeze him in his tracks
for about three weeks,

and this period of inaction provided

enough time for Lee to receive substantial reinforcements:
"General Lee did not attack the enemy until June 26th, because
he was engaged from June 1st until then in forming a great
army.

. . ."9
The first of these contentions was valid:

the first

thing McClellan did in the battle's aftermath was demand
that more troops be sent to him before he could advance.10
But Johnston's insistence that Lee benefited from the time
to build a great army that he had been denied was inaccurate.
Johnston cited the Army of Northern Virginia as having been
augmented between June 1 and 26 with the divisions of Holmes,

^Johnston,

"Manassas to Seven Pines," B & L , II:

p. 217.

lOsears, M c C l e l l a n , pp. 196-197.
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Jackson,

and Ewell, as well as the brigades of Ripley and

Alexander Lawton and miscellaneous troops .
argument here was spurious.

But Johnston's

Holmes and Ripley were in the

Richmond area on May 31 and already subject to his orders.
If he had considered their participation critical to success,
it required but a single day's delay in his battle plan.
Jackson and Ewell were also under Johnston's command; they
were not available at the end of May because Johnston himself
had approved the operations in the Shenandoah Valley which
detained them.

As has already been shown, in May,

1862,

Johnston definitely considered the absence of those two
divisions to be completely compensated for by the correspond
ing absence of the armies of Banks and McDowell on his
flanks.

Thus,

in Johnston's catalogue of units sent to Lee

during June, only Lawton's Georgia Brigade had not actually
been near his army or under his control on May 31, and
Lawton's regiments did not quite muster enough m e n — even by
Johnston's own optimistic estimate— to do more than replace
the battle losses of Seven Pines.12

The time won at Seven

Pines benefitted Lee by allowing Jackson to finish the Valley
Campaign

(the troops already in transit to arrive), and to

dig substantial entrenchments in front of Richmond.
The successes and failures of Seven Pines, however, were
hardly the whole measure of Johnston's defense of Richmond up

Hjohnston,

"Manassas to Seven Pines," B & L , II:

p. 217.

^^ibid .
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to May 31, 1862.

Between the February conference in Richmond

and Johnston's fall from his horse beside the Nine Mile Road,
the Confederates had gained several important strategic
advantages.

First and foremost,

the campaign had bought for

Jefferson Davis three months of valuable time--time to produce
or import weapons,

time to muster and train new troops, and

time to reorganize the army onto a wartime footing.

The

second material result of Johnston's campaign was that by the
end of May the overwhelming numerical advantage of Union
numbers— nearly a four-to-one superiority in February--had
been reduced so far at the point of contact that Johnston's
inferiority to the Army of the Potomac was roughly 10,000
men.

In armies of 80,000-100,000 troops, this hardly repre

sented any decisive disadvantage.

And Lee fared even better

the next month, entering the Seven Days' Battles with a slight
numerical superiority, and fielding the largest army the
Confederacy ever sent into battle.

This had been achieved by

a combination of strategic juggling in Virginia and along
the Atlantic Coast, where garrisons were stripped to bare
essentials;

and the operational maneuvers of Confederate

forces in Virginia which led to the immobilization of Banks
and McDowell.

Finally, from the nucleus of detached garri

sons, strung out across the Potomac frontier throughout the
winter of 1861-1862,
army had been formed:

a solid, well-organized, maneuverable
the Army of Northern Virginia.

was not, and it never became,

It

a perfect organization, but
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the army that Joseph Johnston unknowingly and unwillingly
bequeathed to Robert E. Lee stood upon a very firm foundation.
But these accomplishments cannot be ascribed to Joseph
Johnston simply because he commanded the Department of
Northern Virginia.

Other key leaders,

from Davis to Lee and

from Jackson to Magruder, played essential roles in the
defense of Virginia.

To what extent did Joseph Johnston

contribute to the successes of early 1862?
The breathing spell won for the Confederacy in this
campaign was chiefly the result of three events:

the Valley

Campaign, the siege of Yorktown, and the retreat up the
Peninsula.

Johnston's role in the Valley Campaign was

supportive but not seminal.

He clearly envisioned the

potential for combined operations between Jackson and Ewell
when the rest of the army left northern Virginia for the
Yorktown line, though he did not map out a specific strategy.
He expected Jackson and Ewell to react opportunistically to
Federal miscues.

It was the correspondence of Lee and Jackson

in late April that developed the original premises of the
campaign which would paralyze several Federal armies and
terrorize Washington.

Nonetheless, Johnston supported the

general thrust of the operation when he found out about it,
and though his mid-May strategic concepts were slightly at
variance with those of Lee and Jackson, they were equally
workable.

Johnston certainly never lost sight of the impor

tant contribution that active forces in the Valley and
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central Virginia could make to the defense of Richmond, and
he never pursued a myopic strategy of concentration of all the
troops in Virginia under his immediate control as a panacea
to overcome his own manpower deficiencies.
Initial credit for the delay of McClellan at Yorktown has
to be accorded without question to John B. Magruder.

In the

critical two weeks between March 17 and 31, he held his line
with bravado and a paltry number of troops while Lee wrestled
with the problems of determining McClellan's intentions and
reinforced him with agonizing slowness.

From April 1 through

Johnston's evacuation on May 3, 35,000 soldiers on the
Peninsula would probably have bought the Confederacy as much
time as the 7 0,00 0 eventually committed there.

All that was

required of a commanding general throughout most of the
month was a stolid resolution to defend the trenches and
redoubts.

Magruder himself, Longstreet,

Smith, or even D. H.

Hill had the skill and tenacity to maintain that line during
April,

1862.

What Johnston provided was twofold:

the only

realistic evaluation of just how long Yorktown could be held,
and the insight to know exactly when it must be abandoned.
The first, even though Johnston's views did not prevail during
the April conference in Richmond, alerted both Lee and Davis
to the amount of time that they could continue to defer making
some very tough choices.

The second, if McClellan's own

engineers are to be believed, at least saved the army thou
sands of casualties, and possibly avoided its capture.
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Johnston's army remained in the Yorktown entrenchments when
the Confederate batteries at Gloucester Point were dismounted,
there would have been no troops far enough up the Peninsula
to resist Franklin's landing at West Point:

the army would

have been cut off from Richmond and assailed from both front
and rear.

Johnston's was the key decision that kept the

seige of Yorktown from turning into an irredeemable disaster.
The month that the Army of the Potomac required to creep
from Yorktown to Seven Pines must be equally attributed to
Joseph Johnston and George McClellan.

It is arguable that had

Johnston merely decamped from Yorktown and never looked back,
the Federal commander could have taken, in his own timidity,
almost as long to approach Richmond as he did with Johnston
retreating slowly and stopping periodically to offer battle.
But that fact does not diminish Johnston's efficiency— only
extremely incompetent generals depend upon their enemies to
do the wrong thing.
Despite his failure to closely supervise the Battle of
Williamsburg,

Johnston's retreat was marked by skillful

maneuver and strategic insight under difficult conditions.
Clear thinking and careful supervision of the army's movements
were needed to overcome the muddy roads and general scarcity
of transportation.

Johnston was able to overcome these

hindrances and to balance the deployment of his four divi
sions so that two would be present to handle the rear guard
contest at Williamsburg and two would be close enough to
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oppose an amphibious landing near West Point.

The point

between the Pamunkey and Chickahominy River at which Johnston
chose to end his retreat and await McClellan was selected
based on a sound appreciation of his strategic position.
His lines were clear of navigable water,
venient to Richmond,

logistically con

and heavily enough wooded to partially

negate McClellan's still prevalent numerical advantage.
was also a line that,

It

for as long as he held it, kept Johns

ton's army solidly between McClellan and McDowell.

If the

failure of the Richmond authorities to press the completion
of the fortifications at Drewry's Bluff had not compelled
him to retreat across the Chickahominy, McClellan would have
been faced with a serious operational dilemma.

He would

either have to attack Johnston on ground of Johnston's own
choice in which his soldiers had been digging entrenchments
and laying out abatis for three to five days, forfeiting the
advantages of his naval and heavy artillery, or he would
have to risk crossing the Chickahominy with the Confederates
on his flank.

In the end, fear of Federal ironclads and not

McClellan forced Johnston out of this position.
Thus, from an operational
quite well.

standpoint, Johnston performed

He contributed to the Valley Campaign, made the

key decision at Yorktown, and handled the retreat up the
Peninsula with efficiency and aplomb.

If his initial concep

tion of strategy in the Valley was somewhat hazy, he knew
how to exploit the opportunities presented him.

Confronted
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with multiple threats, his instincts were consistently
sound, and, as in the case of his timing of the Yorktown
evacuation, sometimes inspired.
As the Commanding General of the Confederate Army,

it was

Lee and not Johnston who found the steady stream of troops who
reinforced the army between March and June.

Lee made the best

possible use of the time won by Johnston, Jackson,

and

Magruder to muster new troops and cajole governors and
generals alike into accepting smaller forces in Georgia and
the Carolinas.

Lee took pains to see that when new regiments

were organized they went to the static garrisons to replace
more seasoned troops to reinforce the army in Virginia.

Thus

Johnston consistently received the best-trained brigades
available in the eastern Confederacy.

Yet Johnston had been

the one participant in the April conference who insisted that
it was feasible to reduce the coastal garrison.
his point adamantly;

He had argued

as an army commander there was really

nothing else he could do.
Johnston consistently used his administrative skills to
maintain the army assembled under him at the highest possible
strength.

Prom the winter through the spring, Joseph Johnston

proved himself an exceptionally capable administrator,
managing his limited supplies as efficiently as possible,
and combatting desertion, malingering,
and disaffection every day.

sickness, malnutrition,

Johnston conducted both the

retreat from the Potomac and the retreat from Yorktown with
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minimal

losses of critical supplies,

and supervised the

transitional elections required by the Conscription Act in a
manner that minimized their damage to the army's efficiency.
His instincts for command organization were sound, but
continually thwarted by Confederate law.

He did not ever

favor operating his army as separate divisions, realizing that
such an arrangement was terminally unwieldy for an army in
battle or on the march.

His original organization of the army

in northern Virginia had been in two corps of two divisions
each, with a strong reserve division, which he maintained
until the President ruled that the law did not recognize the
position of corps commander.

This glaring defect in Confed

erate military organization was not remedied until October,
1862, with the creation of the rank of Lieutenant General,
but Johnston--like Lee after him--circumvented the statutes
by creating unofficial
division commanders.

"wing" commands under his senior
Gustavus Smith and James Longstreet

commanded wings of two divisions each in the Manassas and
Yorktown withdrawals.

As his army grew when stationed on

the Chickahominy by the subdivision of Magruder's command
into two divisions and the addition of A. P. Hill and H u g e r ,
Johnston reorganized his army into three unofficial corps
with an army artillery reserve and an independent cavalry
force--an organization strikingly similar to the one employed
by Lee from Chancellorsville onward.
Johnston's choices for command of wings and divisions
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proved that he had a keen, if occasionally myopic, eye for
picking talented commanders.

Discounting Magruder, who was

incorporated into his army by virtue of his former depart
mental command, of all Johnston's choices for senior posi
tions, only Gustavus Smith failed in the rest of the war to
justify his confidence.

Longstreet, Jackson,

A. P. Hill, Richard Anderson,

Stuart, Ewell,

Early, and Hampton rose to corps

command under Lee; D. H. Hill achieved the same position in
the Army of Tennessee.

Though he never advanced beyond

division command, Whiting competently carried out the thank
less task of defending the critical port city of Wilmington
until the last months of the war.

All these men owed their

initial recommendations for promotion to Joseph Johnston.
Yet the allegation that Johnston turned over a demoral
ized and disorganized body of troops to Lee, who had to
quickly whip it into shape has persisted to the present day.
Colonel Robert H. Chilton, who served faithfully on Lee's
staff, contended after the war that the condition of the Army
of Northern Virginia on June 1, 1862
appeared to me to be in a very disorganized condi
tion.
Large unauthorized absences of officers and
men greatly weakened its force, exhausting w a s t e 
fulness pervaded all departments, especially
apparent with each change of camp, in the abandon
ment of supplies of different kinds, and a laxity
of discipline prevailed, which greatly impaired
the efficiency of this Army. . . .13

l^Robert H. Chilton to Jefferson Davis, December 14,
1877, in Rowland, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, VIII:
p. 60.
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But two facts should be noted about Chilton's statement, which
is typical of the assertions made about the army's state in
early June.

First, Chilton himself later attributed these

conditions not to any lack on the part of Johnston, but to the
deleterious effects of the recent elections and the necessity
for fighting two battles in the same month.

Secondly,

Chilton's accusation conveniently ignored the fact that
several of the staff officers whose departments he castigated,
notably Pendleton and Alexander, were the same men who rapidly
gained reputations for administrative excellence under Lee.
Douglas Southall Freeman made a point of emphasizing
Lee's administrative ability by exaggerating the condition of
Johnston's army at the end of May:
In some of its aspects discipline had been lax
under Johnston; drunkenness had been frequent; many
things were at loose ends.
Some of the regiments
reported a third of the troops sick.
Lee worked as
fast as he could to improve the condition of the
men.
The commissary and the quartermaster's
service were improved.
Favoritism in granting
details for service in the rear was ended.
But Freeman's own footnotes reveal
paragraph was.

just how misleading this

The allegation concerning drunkenness was

supported only by a passage from gossipy War Office clerk J.
B. Jones and a Confederate Army regulation on stern penalties
for drunkenness

that was only issued on May 22.

referred specifically

It neither

to the Army of Northern Virginia nor was

it available to support Johnston's own efforts to combat

■^Freeman,

R.

E. L e e , II:

pp.

87-88.
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intoxication throughout his tenure in command.

His statement

of excessive sickness is buttressed not by army returns but
by a single regimental history.

Nothing is cited to support

Freeman's contention that Lee made immediate improvements in
the army's logistical services.

The praise given Lee for

ending "favoritism" in details comes from several documents
that Lee submitted to the War Office complaining that the
Richmond authorities had been the offenders,

not Johnston and

his officers, as Freeman's passage subtly implied.

In fact,

Lee's missives to Randolph and Cooper merely echoed complaints
that Johnston had been making since the fall of 1861.
In one aspect and one aspect only did the status of the
army immediately improve under Lee:
superiors.

relations with his civil

Johnston and Davis both suffered from the same

kind of stiff neck; neither could admit a fault gracefully.
Nor could either man readily forgive transgressions.

As the

friction slowly built between army commander and chief
executive over the spring of 1862, the necessary trust for a
desperate campaign quietly eroded.

Although Davis did not

lose his respect for Johnston as a general, and Johnston never
ceased to be formally respectful in his dealings with the
President,

from March through May, Lee constantly had to

intervene between them.

Johnston was a prickly subordinate

and Davis was not an easy master to serve.

In the necessary

aspects of civil diplomacy required of a senior military
officer in a republic, Johnston was plainly deficient where
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Lee was patently gifted.

It was a failing that haunted

Johnston for the rest of his career.
But on balance, Johnston's performance as an army
commander in Virginia should be rated as a success.

He was

far from perfect, and his two greatest lacks--the ability to
closely control a battlefield and the knack for getting along
with his superiors--would eventually develop into fatal
flaws.

But they were not such during the Peninsular Campaign.

Three years later, in a report drafted with the intention of
humiliating Joseph Johnston,

an embittered John Bell Hood said

that "the results of a campaign do not always show how the
General in command has discharged his duty.

Their enquiry

[sic] should be not what he has done, but what he should have
accomplished with the means under his c o n t r o l .

Hood's

standard was one that governments cannot always afford but
historians usually employ.

By either standard,

concrete

results or credible performance, Joseph Eggleston Johnston's
defense of Richmond fares quite w e l l .

ISjohn Bell Hood to Samuel Cooper, February 15,
Hood, Advance and R e t r e a t , p. 317.

1865,
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A P P E N D IX A

The deleted paragraph from
Joseph E. Johnston to Jefferson Davis,
September 12, 186 2
(original in the Robert Morton Hughes papers,
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia)

The spectacle which is presented in the conduct of the
Governments on the two sides of the Potomac towards their
Commanding Generals cannot fail to arrest our attention.
The Commanding General of the Northern army, a veteran of
more than fifty years is superseded by his junior of half
his years, of scarcely one-fourth of his period of service,
because defeated.
He is merely removed, however, from the
direct command.
His superior rank is left him.
When we
look to the South of the same line, what do we see?
The
greatest and most important battle ever fought in America
has been won.
It has been won by a general [holding] the
highest rank in
his republic. It has been won by his leav
ing the District in which he commanded, making a forced
march (of _____ miles), forming a junction with an army too
weak to maintain its ground, and by their united force,
against immense odds, winning a victory, which in the minds
of all men and nations establishes the glory and indepen
dence of the Confederate States, and crowns the army and its
generals with the highest honor to which they could aspire:
the applauding acclamation of the country, the Thanks of
Congress, voted unanimously.
Such is the first result pre
sented to our view.
What is the next reaped by the v i c 
torious General?
What next?
The General was already first
in the highest grade known to the service--He could not be
advanced.
Something should be done— so he was degraded.
Three officers,
his inferiors in grade, and in service, for
neither of them
had fought or won a battle for the Republic,
were placed above him.
Besides all this, a study in dignity
is offered him.
His noble Compeer in the battle has his
preferment connected with the victory won by their common
toils and dangers.
His commission bears the date of the
21st of July.
But care is taken to exclude the idea that
the general commanding had any part in winning our triumph.
His commission is made to bear such a date that his once
inferiors in the service of the United States, and of the
Confederate States, shall be above him.
But it must not be
dated as of the 21st July.
It shall (must) not suggest the
victory of Manassas.
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A P P E N D IX B

The Department of Northern Virginia,
S
March 1, 1862
(compiled from the Official R e c o r d s )

General Joseph E. Johnston,

commanding

Potomac District
1st Division:

Brigadier-General Jubal A. Early

Early's Brigade— Colonel Duncan K. McRae
20th Georgia
5th North Carolina
23rd North Carolina
24th Virginia
Jeff. Davis (Alabama) Artillery
Kershaw's Brigade— Brigadier-General Joseph B. Kershaw
2nd South Carolina
3rd South Carolina
7th South Carolina
8th South Carolina
Boykin's Rangers (South Carolina) Cavalry Company
Alexandria (Virginia) Artillery
Rodes' Brigade— Brigadier-General Robert E. Rodes
5th Alabama
6th Alabama
12th Alabama
12th Mississippi
King William (Virginia) Artillery

2nd Division:

Major-General Gustavus W. Smith

Jones' Brigade— Brigadier-General David R. Jones
7th Georgia
8th Georgia
9th Georgia
11th Georgia
Wise (Virginia) Artillery
Wilcox's Brigade--Brigadier-General Cadmus M. Wilcox
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9th Alabama
10th Alabama
11th Alabama
19th Mississippi
28th Virginia
Thomas (Virginia) Artillery
Toombs ' Brigade— Brigadier-General Robert Toombs
1st Georgia (Regulars)
2nd Georgia
15th Georgia
17th Georgia
Foster (Georgia) Artillery

3rd Division:

Major-General James Longstreet

Hill's Brigade— Brigadier-General A. P. Hill
1st Virginia
7th Virginia
11th Virginia
17th Virginia
Loudoun (Virginia) Artillery
R. H. Anderson's Brigade— Brigadier-General R. H. Anderson
4th South Carolina
5th South Carolina
6th South Carolina
9th South Carolina
Faquier (Virginia) Artillery
Pickett's Brigade— Brigadier-General George Pickett
8th Virginia
18th Virginia
19th Virginia
28th Virginia
Lynchburg (Virginia) Artillery

4th Division:

Major-General Richard S. Ewell

Elzey's Brigade— Brigadier-General Arnold Elzey
1st Maryland
3rd Tennessee
13th Virginia
16th Virginia
Baltimore Light (Maryland) Artillery
Trimble's Brigade--Brigadier-General Isaac R. Trimble
15th Alabama
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21st Georgia
16th Mississippi
21st North Carolina
Henrico (Virginia) Artillery
Taylor's Brigade— Brigadier-General Richard Taylor
6th Louisiana
7th Louisiana
8th Louisiana
9th Louisiana
1st Louisiana Battalion
Bedford (Virginia) Artillery

Forces near Dumfries:
Whiting

Brigadier-General W. H. C.

Whiting's Brigade--Colonel Dorsey Pender
4th Alabama
2nd Mississippi
11th Mississippi
6th North Carolina
1st Tennessee
Staunton (Virginia) Artillery
Hampton's Brigade— Colonel Wade Hampton
14th Georgia
19th Georgia
16th North Carolina
Hampton (South Carolina) Legion
Wigfall's Brigade— Colonel J. J. Archer
18th Georgia
1st Texas
4th Texas
5th Texas
Company D, 1st North Carolina Artillery
Nelson No. 2 (Virginia) Artillery
detachment—
Company A, 4th Virginia Cavalry

Forces at Leesburg:

Brigadier-General D. H. Hill

Griffith's Brigade— Brigadier-General Richard Griffith
13th Mississippi
17th Mississippi
18th Mississippi
21st Mississippi
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detachment-four companies, 2nd Virginia Cavalry
Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers, Company No.

1

Manassas garrison:
Colonel George B. Anderson
27th Georgia
28th Georgia
4th North Carolina
49th Virginia
Virginia Heavy Artillery Battalion

Cavalry Brigade:
Brigadier-General J. E. B. Stuart
1st North Carolina Cavalry
1st Virginia Cavalry
2nd Virginia Cavalry (minus four companies)
4th Virginia Cavalry
6th Virginia Cavalry
Jeff. Davis (Mississippi) Legion
Reserve Artillery:

Colonel William Nelson Pendleton

Pendleton's Command—
Company A, Sumter (Georgia) Artillery
Company E, Sumter (Georgia) Artillery
Hamilton Regular (Georgia) Artillery
Amherst (Virginia) Artillery
Ashland (Virginia) Artillery
Fluvanna (Virginia) Artillery
Fluvanna No. 2 (Virginia) Artillery
Morris Louisa (Virginia) Artillery
Powhatan (Virginia) Artillery
Walton's Command-- Major J. B. Walton
1st Company, Washington (Louisiana)
2nd Company, Washington (Louisiana)
3rd Company, Washington (Louisiana)
4th Company, Washington (Louisiana)
St. Paul's (Louisiana) Foot Rifles

Artillery
Artillery
Artillery
Artillery

Aquia District
Major-General Theophilus Holmes, commanding
French's Brigade--Brigadier-General Samuel French
2nd Arkansas Battalion
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35th Georgia
22nd North Carolina
2nd Tennessee
47th Virginia
Fredericksburg (Virginia) Artillery
Maryland Flying Artillery
Walker's Brigade— Brigadier-General John G. Walker
1st Arkansas
1st North Carolina (state troops)
2nd North Carolina (state troops)
3rd North Carolina (state troops)
Stafford (Virginia) Artillery
Purcell (Virginia) Artillery
detachments-9th Virginia Cavalry
40th Virginia
50th Virginia

Valley District
Major-General Thomas J. Jackson, commanding
Garnett's Brigade— Brigadier-General Richard Garnett
2nd Virginia
4th Virginia
5th Virginia
27th Virginia
33rd Virginia
Rockbridge (Virginia) Artillery
Allegheny (Virginia) Artillery
B u r k s ' Brigade--Colonel Jessee Burks
21st Virginia
42nd Virginia
48th Virginia
1st Virginia Regular (Irish) Battalion
Hampden (Virginia) Artillery
West Augusta (Virginia) Artillery
Fulkerson's Brigade--Colonel S. V. Fulkerson
23rd Virginia
37th Virginia
Danville (Virginia) Artillery
cavalry— Colonel Turner Ashby
7th Virginia Cavalry
Chew's (Virginia) Horse Artillery
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In transit between the Valley and the Aquia Districts:
S. R. Anderson's Brigade— Brigadier-General S. R. Anderson
7th Tennessee
14th Tennessee
3rd Arkansas
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A P P E N D IX C

The Army of Northern Virginia on the Peninsula,
May 1, 1862
(compiled from the Official R e c o r d s )

General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding
Right of Position:
McLaws ' Division:

Major-General John B. Magruder

Brigadier-General Lafayette McLaws

M c L a w s ' Brigade— Brigadier-General Lafayette McLaws
5th Georgia
10th Georgia
15th Virginia
Noland's Virginia Battalion
Williamsburg (Virginia) Artillery
Norfolk (Virginia) Artillery
Griffith's Brigade--Brigadier-General Richard Griffith
1st Louisiana Special Battalion
13th Mississippi
18th Mississippi
21st Mississippi
Peninsula (Virginia) Artillery
1st Company, Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers
Company A, 1st North Carolina Artillery
Read's (Georgia) Artillery
Henrico (Virginia) Artillery
Kershaw's Brigade— Brigadier-General Joseph B. Kershaw
2nd South Carolina
3rd South Carolina
7th South Carolina
8th South Carolina
Gracie's Alabama Battalion
Alexandria (Virginia) Artillery
Cobb's Brigade--Brigadier-General Howell Cobb
16th Georgia
24th Georgia
Cobb's (Georgia) Legion
2nd Louisiana
17th Mississippi
15th North Carolina
Morris Louisa (Virginia) Artillery
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detachment—
10th Georgia
Jones' Division:

Brigadier-General David R. Jones

Jones' Brigade--Brigadier-General Paul J. Semmes
7th Georgia
8th Georgia
9th Georgia
11th Georgia
1st Kentucky
Toombs' Brigade— Brigadier-General Robert Toombs
1st Georgia (Regulars)
2nd Georgia
15th Georgia
17th Georgia
38th Virginia

Forces at Williamsburg:
Colonel Benjamin S. Ewell
32nd Virginia
52nd Virginia Militia
68th Virginia Militia
115th Virginia Militia
Old Dominion (Virginia) Rifles
10th Virginia Heavy Artillery Battalion

Center of Position:

Major-General James Longstreet

Hill's Brigade--Brigadier-General A. P. Hill
1st Virginia
7th Virginia
11th Virginia
17th Virginia
Loudoun (Virginia) Artillery
R. H. Anderson's Brigade— Brigadier-General R. H.
Anderson
4th South Carolina Battalion
5th South Carolina
6th South Carolina
9th South Carolina
Faquier (Virginia) Artillery
Colston's Brigade--Brigadier-General Raleigh Colston
3rd Virginia
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13th Virginia
14th Virginia
Pickett's Brigade— Brigadier-General George Pickett
8th Virginia
18th Virginia
19th Virginia
28th Virginia
Lynchburg (Virginia) Artillery
Wilcox's Brigade--Brigadier-General Cadmus M. Wilcox
9th Alabama
10th Alabama
11th Alabama
19th Mississippi
3rd Company, Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers
Pryor's Brigade--Colonel Roger Pryor
8th Alabama
14th Alabama
14th Louisiana
Richmond Fayette (Virginia) Artillery

Left of Position:

Major-General D. H. Hill

Early's Division--Brigadier-General Jubal A. Early
Early's Brigade— Colonel Duncan K. McRae
20th Georgia
5th North Carolina
2 3rd North Carolina
24th Virginia
Jeff. Davis (Alabama) Artillery
Rodes' Brigade— Brigadier-General Robert E. Rodes
5th Alabama
6th Alabama
12th Alabama
12th Mississippi
King William (Virginia) Artillery
Ward's command— Colonel George Ward
2nd Florida
2nd Mississippi

Rains' Division:

Brigadier-General Gabriel J. Rains

Rains' Brigade— Brigadier-General Gabriel J. Rains
13th Alabama

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

529

26th Alabama
6th Georgia
23rd Georgia
Fe a t h erston's Brigade— Brigadier-General W. S.
Featherston
27th Georgia
28th Georgia
4th North Carolina
49th Virginia
nineteen heavy artillery batteries in Yorktown

forces at Gloucester Point— Colonel Charles Crump
46th Virginia
9th Virginia Militia
21st Virginia Militia
61st Virginia Militia
Mathews (Virginia) Light Dragoons Cavalry Company
Mathews (Virginia) Artillery
Virginia heavy artillery battalion

Reserve:

Major-General Gustavus W. Smith

S. R. Anderson's Brigade--Brigadier-General S. R.
Anderson
1st Tennessee
7th Tennessee
14th Tennessee
Fredericksburg (Virginia) Artillery
Pettigrew's Brigade--Brigadier-General J. J. Pettigrew
2nd Arkansas Battalion
35th Georgia
22nd North Carolina
47th Virginia
1st Maryland Battery

Whiting's Division:

Brigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting

Whiting's Brigade— Colonel Dorsey Pender
4th Alabama
2nd Mississippi
11th Mississippi
6th North Carolina
Staunton (Virginia) Artillery
Company D, 1st North Carolina Artillery
Hood's Brig a d e — Brigadier-General John B. Hood
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18th Georgia
1st Texas
4th Texas
5th Texas
Hampton's Brigade— Colonel Wade Hampton
14th Georgia
19th Georgia
16th North Carolina
Hampton (South Carolina) Legion
Madison (Louisiana) Artillery

Cavalry Brigade:
Brigadier-General J. E. B. Stuart
1st Virginia Cavalry
3rd Virginia Cavalry
4th Virginia Cavalry
Wise (Virginia) Legion Cavalry
Jeff. Davis (Mississippi) Legion
Studar (Virginia) Horst Artillery

Reserve Artillery:

Brigadier-General William N. Pendleton

Pendleton's Command-Company A, Sumter (Georgia) Artillery
Company E, Sumter (Georgia) Artillery
Hamilton Regular (Georgia) Artillery
Amherst (Virginia) Artillery
Ashland (Virginia) Artillery
Fluvanna (Virginia) Artillery
Fluvanna No. 2 (Virginia) Artillery
Powahatan (Virginia) Artillery
Walton's Command— Major J. B. Walton
1st Company, Washington (Louisiana)
2nd Company, Washington (Louisiana)
3rd Company, Washington (Louisiana)
4th Company, Washington (Louisiana)
St. Paul's (Louisiana) Foot Rifles

Artillery
Artillery
Artillery
Artillery
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A P P E N D IX D

Department of Northern Virginia
and troops in the vicinity of
Richmond, May 21, 1862
(compiled from the Official R e c o r d s )

General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding

Left Wing
Major-General Gustavus W. Smith, commanding
Smith's Division:

Brigadier-General W. H. C. Whiting

Whiting's Brigade--Colonel Dorsey Pender
4th Alabama
2nd Mississippi
11th Mississippi
6th North Carolina
Staunton (Virginia) Artillery
Company D, 1st North Carolina Artillery
Hood's Brigade--Brigadier-General John B. Hood
18th Georgia
1st Texas
4th Texas
5th Texas
Hampton's Brigade— Brigadier-General Wade Hampton
14th Georgia
19th Georgia
16th North Carolina
Hampton (South Carolina) Legion (minus cavalry)
Madison (Louisiana) Artillery
Hatton's Brigade--Brigadier-General Robert Hatton
1st Tennessee
7th Tennessee
14th Tennessee
Fredericksburg (Virginia) Artillery
Pettigrew's Brigade--Brigadier-General J. J. Pettigrew
2nd Arkansas Battalion
35th Georgia
22nd North Carolina
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47th Virginia
1st Maryland Battery

A. P. Hill's Division:

Major-General A. P. Hill

Field's Brigade— Brigadier-General Charles W. Field
5th Alabama Battalion
2nd Virginia Heavy Artillery
(in the process of reorganizing as 22nd Virginia
Battalion)
3rd Virginia Heavy Artillery, Local Defense Troops
(in the process of disbanding, with many of the
men going to other regiments)
40th Virginia
47th Virginia
55th Virginia
Purcell (Virginia) Artillery
Branch's Brigade— Brigadier-General L. O'Brien Branch
12th North Carolina
18th North Carolina
28th North Carolina
37th North Carolina
Company F, 13th North Carolina Artillery Battalion
J. R. Anderson's Brigade— Brigadier-General J. R.
Anderson
45th Georgia
4 9th Georgia
34th North Carolina
38th North Carolina
Pee Dee (South Carolina) Artillery
Gregg's Brigade--Brigadier-General Maxcey Gregg
1st South Carolina
1st South Carolina Rifles
12th South Carolina
13th South Carolina
14th South Carolina

Center
Major-General John B. Magruder, commanding
Magruder's Division:

Major-General Lafayette McLaws

McLaws' Brigade--Brigadier-General Paul J. Semmes
5th Louisiana
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10th Louisiana
15th Virginia
Noland's Virginia Battalion
Williamsburg (Virginia) Artillery
Norfolk (Virginia) Artillery
Kershaw's Brigade— Brigadier-General Joseph B. Kershaw
2nd South Carolina
3rd South Carolina
7th South Carolina
8th South Carolina
G r a d e ' s Alabama Battalion
Alexandria (Virginia) Artillery
Cobb's Brigade— Brigadier-General Howell Cobb
16th Georgia
24th Georgia
Cobb's (Georgia) Legion (minus cavalry)
2nd Louisiana
17th Mississippi
15th North Carolina
Morris Louisa (Virginia) Artillery
Griffith's Brigade— Brigadier-General Richard Griffith
1st Louisiana Special Battalion
13th Mississippi
18th Mississippi
21st Mississippi
1st Company, Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers

D. R. Jones' Division:

Major-General David R. Jones

D. R. Jones' Brigade--Colonel George T. Anderson
7th Georgia
8th Georgia
9th Georgia
11th Georgia
1st Kentucky
Toombs ' Brigade— Brigadier-General Robert Toombs
1st Georgia
2nd Georgia
15th Georgia
17th Georgia

Reserve Artillery:
Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Cabell
Pulaski (Georgia) Artillery
Company A, 1st North Carolina
Peninsula (Virginia) Artillery
Henrico (Virginia) Artillery
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Left Wing
Major-General James Longstreet,
Longstreet's Division:

commanding

Brigadier-General R. H. Anderson

R. H. Anderson's Brigade— Colonel Micah Jenkins
4th South Carolina Battalion
5th South Carolina
6th South Carolina
9th South Carolina
Faquier (Virginia) Artillery
Kemper's Brigade— Colonel James Kemper
1st Virginia
7th Virginia
11th Virginia
17th Virginia
Loudoun (Virginia) Artillery
Pickett's Brigade--Brigadier-General George Pickett
8th Virginia
18th Virginia
19th Virginia
28th Virginia
Lynchburg (Virginia) Artillery
Colston's Brigade— Brigadier-General Raleigh Colston
3rd Virginia
13th North Carolina
14th North Carolina
Donaldson (Louisiana) Artillery
Wilcox's Brigade--Brigadier-General Cadmus M. Wilcox
9th Alabama
10th Alabama
11th Alabama
19th Mississippi
3rd Company, Richmond (Virginia) Howitzers
Pryor's Brigade— Brigadier-General Roger Pryor
8th Alabama
14th Alabama
14th Louisiana
Richmond Fayette (Virginia) Artillery

D. H. Hill's Division:

Major-General D. H. Hill
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Featherston's Brigade--Colonel George B. Anderson
27th Georgia
28th Georgia
4th North Carolina
49th Virginia
Garland's Brigade— Brigadier-General Samuel Garland
2nd Florida
2nd Mississippi Battalion
5th North Carolina
23rd North Carolina
24th Virginia
38th Virginia
Jeff. Davis (Alabama) Artillery
Rains' Brigade— Brigadier-General Gabriel J. Rains
13th Alabama
2 6th Alabama
6th Georgia
23rd Georgia
R o d e s ' Brigade--Brigadier-General Robert E. Rodes
5th Alabama
6th Alabama
12th Alabama
12th Mississippi
4th Virginia Heavy Artillery Battalion
(serving as infantry)
King William (Virginia) Artillery
Wise's Brigade— Brigadier-General Henry Wise
(this brigade probably still in the process of
moving up from Richmond)
4th Virginia Heavy Artillery (serving as infantry)
20th Virginia
26th Virginia
46th Virginia
Mathews (Virginia) Artillery
Artillery— Major Scipio F. Pierson
Hardaway (Alabama) Artillery
Hanover (Virginia) Artillery

Huger's Division:

Major-General Benjamin Huger

Armistead's Brigade--Brigadier-General Lewis Armistead
5th Virginia Battalion (minus one company)
9th Virginia
14th Virginia
53rd Virginia
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Goochland

(Virginia) Artillery

Mahone's Brigade— Brigadier-General William H. Mahone
3rd Louisiana
12th Virginia
41st Virginia
Lynchburg No. 2 (Virginia) Artillery
Portsmouth (Virginia) Artillery
Blanchard's Brigade— Brigadier-General A. G. Blanchard
3rd Georgia
4th Georgia
2 2nd Georgia
1st Louisiana
Norfolk United (Virginia) Artillery

Cavalry Brigade:
Brigadier-General J. E. B. Stuart
1st Virginia Cavalry
3rd Virginia Cavalry
4th Virginia Cavalry
9th Virginia Cavalry
10th Virginia Cavalry (formerly Wise Legion)
Cobb (Georgia) Legion Cavalry
Jeff. Davis (Mississippi) Legion
Hampton (South Carolina) Legion Cavalry
Stuart (Virginia) Horse Artillery

Artillery Reserve:

Brigadier-General William N. Pendleton

Pendleton's Command—
(in the process of being broken into battalions)
Company A, Sumter (Georgia) Artillery
Company E, Sumter (Georgia) Artillery
Hamilton Regular (Georgia) Artillery
Chesapeake (Maryland) Artillery
Lloyd's (North Carolina) Artillery
Rhett's (South Carolina) Artillery
Amherst (Virginia) Artillery
Ashland (Virginia) Artillery
Fluvanna (Virginia) Artillery
Fluvanna No. 2 (Virginia) Artillery
Hupp's (Virginia) Artillery
Long Island (Virginia) Artillery
Mosely's (Virginia) Artillery
Orange (Virginia) Artillery
Parker's (Virginia) Artillery
Powhatan (Virginia) Artillery
Ringgold (Virginia) Artillery
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Walton's
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
St.

Command— Major J. B Walton
Company, Washington (L o uisiana)
Company, Washington (L o uisiana)
Company, Washington (Louisiana)
Company, Washington (L o uisiana)
Paul's (Louisiana) Foot Rifles

Artillery
Artillery
Artillery
Artillery

Troops detraining in Richmond, assigned to the
Department of Northern Virginia:
Ripley's Brigade— Brigadier-General Rosewe'll Ripley
44th Georgia
4 8th Georgia
1st North Carolina
3rd North Carolina

Troops from the Department of North Carolina marching toward
Drewry's Bluff and Richmond, already assigned to the
Department of Northern Virginia:
Holmes' Division:

Major-General Theophilus H. Holmes

Ransom's Brigade— Brigadier-General Robert Ransom
24th North Carolina
25th North Carolina
26th North Carolina
35th North Carolina
48th North Carolina
49th North Carolina
Daniel's Brigade— Colonel Junius Daniel
43rd North Carolina
45th North Carolina
50th North Carolina
14th Virginia Cavalry Battalion
Walker's Brigade— Brigadier-General John G. Walker
3rd Arkansas
2nd Georgia Battalion
27th North Carolina
46th North Carolina
30th Virginia
Artillery— Colonel James Deshler
Company C, 1st North Carolina Artillery
Petersburg (Virginia) Artillery
Stafford (Virginia) Artillery

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

538

Troops stationed at Drewry's and Chaffin's Bluffs:
Infantrydetached from Huger's Division—
6th Virginia
16th Virginia
56th Virginia
57th Virginia
other detachments—
Simms' Battalion, Conference Marines (two
c o m panies)
Carrol's (Confederate) Company of Sappers and
Miners

Artillery-Army heavy artillery-Bowyer's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery
Dabney's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery
Jones' (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery
Patterson's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery
Pierce's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery
Price's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery
Southside (Virginia) Heavy Artillery
Naval crews serving as artillery— Captain S. S. Lee
Jamestown
Patrick Henry
Virginia

Troops in and around the Richmond area:
Infantry—
Company F, 5th Virginia Battalion
6th Virginia Local Defense Battalion (Tredegar)
19th Virginia Militia
25th Virginia Local Defense Battalion (City)
(the City Battalion just organizing)
179th Virginia Militia
Confederate Guards Company
Ordnance Guard Company
Artillery--Lieutenant Colonel J. C. Shields
companies incorporated in June into the
18th Virginia Heavy Artillery Battalion-Atlantic (Virginia) Artillery
Cockade (Virginia) Mounted Artillery
Southhampton Lee (Virginia) Artillery
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companies incorporated in June into the
19th Virginia Heavy Artillery Battalion—
Bossieux (Virginia) Guards
Campbell's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery
Chalmer's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery
United (Virginia) Artillery
companies incorporated in June into the
20th Virginia Heavy Artillery Battalion—
Robertson's (Virginia) Company, Heavy Artillery
St. Brides' (Virginia) Artillery
Cavalry-2nd (Pate's) Virginia Cavalry Battalion
(in the process of reorganizing into a new
5th Virginia Cavalry)
5th Virginia Cavalry
(in the process of disbanding and reorganizing as
the 16th Virginia Cavalry Battalion)
15th Virginia Cavalry Battalion
(in the process of initial organization)

Valley District
Major-General Thomas J. Jackson, commanding
Jackson's Division:

Major-General Thomas J. Jackson

Winder's Brigade--Brigadier-General Charles Winder
2nd Virginia
4th Virginia
5th Virginia
27th Virginia
33rd Virginia
Allegheny (Virginia) Artillery
Rockbridge (Virginia) Artillery
Patton's Brigade--Colonel John M. Patton
21st Virginia
42nd Virginia
48th Virginia
1st Virginia Regular (Irish) Battalion
Hampden (Virginia) Artillery
West Augusta (Virginia) Artillery
Taliaferro's Brigade--Brigadier-General W. B.
Taliaferro
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10th Virginia
23rd Virginia
37th Virginia
Danville (Virginia) Artillery

Ewell's Division:

Major-General Richard S. Ewell

Elzey's Brigade— Brigadier-General Arnold Elzey
12th Georgia
13th Virginia
25th Virginia
31st Virginia
Scott's Brigade--Colonel W. C. Scott
44th Virginia
52nd Virginia
58th Virginia
Taylor's
1st
6th
7th
8th
9th
Trimble's
15th
21st
16th
21st

Brigade--Brigadier-General Richard Taylor
Louisiana Battalion
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Brigade— Brigadier-General Isaac Trimble
Alabama
Georgia
Mississippi
North Carolina

Maryland Line--Colonel Bradley Johnson
1st Maryland
Baltimore (Maryland) Light Artillery
Artillery-Richmond (Virginia) Artillery
Rockbridge No. 2 (Virginia) Artillery
Lynchburg Lee (Virginia) Artillery
8th Star (Virginia) Artillery

Cavalry— Brigadier-General Turner Ashby
7th Virginia Cavalry
Steuart's Command— Brigadier-General George H. Steuart
2nd Virginia Cavalry
6th Virginia Cavalry
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APPENDIX E

Seniority of General Officers in the
Department of Northern Virginia,
March 1, 1862

This list has been drawn from L S - A I G O , Ezra Warner's
Generals in G r a y , and Francis H e i t m a n 's Biographical
R e g i s t e r . When it has been impossible to determine
definitely relative seniority between generals (i. e., two
generals without previous military records appointed on the
same d a y ) , the assumption has been made that the order in
which the Adjutant and Inspector General received their
names was the intended precedence of rank.

General
1.

J. E. Johnston; July 4, 1861;
depa r t m e n t .

commanding

Major-Generals
2.
G. W. Smith; September 19, 1861; commanding 2nd
Divis i o n .
3.
T. H. Holmes; October 7, 1861; commanding Aquia
Distr i c t .
4.
J. Longstreet; October 7, 1861;
commanding 3rd
Division.
5.
T. J. Jackson; October 7, 1861; commanding Valley
District.
6.
R. S. Ewell; January 23, 1862; commanding 4th
Division.
Brigadier-Generals
7.
D. R. Jones; June 17, 1861; commanding brigade.
8.
S. R. Anderson; July 9, 1861;
"
"
9.
D. H. Hill; July 10, 1861; commanding forces at
Leesburg.
10.
R. H. Anderson; July 19, 1861; commanding brigade.
11.
R. Toombs; July 19, 1861;
"
"
12.
A. Elzey; July 21, 1861;
13.
J. A. Early; July 21, 1861; commanding 1st Div i 
sion .
14.
I. R. Trimble; August 9, 1861; commanding brigade.
15.
W. H. C. Whiting; August 28, 1861; commanding
forces at Dumfries.
16.
J. E. B. Stuart; September 24, 1861; commanding
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17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

cavalry brigade.
C. M. Wilcox; October 21, 1861; commanding bri g 
ade .
R. E. Taylor; October 21, 1861; commanding brig
ade .
R. Taylor; October 21, 1861; commanding brigade.
S. French; October 23, 1861;
"
"
R. Griffith; November 2, 1861;
"
"
Richard Garnett; November 14, 1861; commanding
brigade.
J. G. Walker; January 9, 1862; commanding brigade.
G. E. Pickett; February 13, 1862;
"
"
J. B. Kershaw; February 13, 1862;
"
"
A. P. Hill; February 26, 1862;
"
"

Even a superficial examination of this list reveals
that seniority was not always the determining factor when
Johnston decided on the men to handle key assignments.
There were seven brigadiers senior to Jubal Early, who
remained in command of brigades while he headed a division.
Likewise Whiting, the commander of Johnston's de facto
division on the Potomac, was also junior to seven other men
who still commanded only brigades.
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APPENDIX P

Seniority of General Officers in the
Department of Northern Virginia,
May 31, 18 62

This list has been drawn from LS-AIGO, Ezra Warner's
Generals in G r a y , and Francis Heitman's Biographical Regis
ter . When it has been impossible to determine definitely
relative seniority between generals (i.e., two generals
without previous military records appointed on the same
d a y ) , the assumption has been made that the order in which
the Adjutant and Inspector General received their names was
the intended precedence of rank.

General
1. J. E. Johnston; July 4, 1861; commanding depart
ment .
Major-Generals
2.
G. W. Smith; September 19, 1861; commanding Left
Wing.
3.
T. H. Holmes; October 7, 1861; commanding division.
4.
B. Huger; October 7, 1861; commanding division.
5.
J. Longstreet; October 7, 1861; commanding Right
Wing.
6.
J. B. Magruder; October 7, 1861; commanding Center.
7.
T. J. Jackson; October 7, 1861; commanding Valley
District.
8.
R. S. Ewell; January 23, 1862; commanding division.
9.
D. H. Hill; March 26, 1862;
"
10.
D. R. Jones; April 5, 1862;
"
"
11.
L. M c L a w s ; May 23, 186 2;
"
"
12.
A. P. Hill; May 26, 1862;
Brigadier-Generals
13.
H. A. Wise; June 5, 1861; commanding brigade.
14.
R. H. Anderson; July 19; 1861; commanding division.
15.
R. Toombs; July 19, 1861; commanding brigade.
16.
A. Elzey; July 21, 1861;
"
"
17.
I. R. Trimble; August 9,
1861; "
"
18.
R. S. Ripley; August 21,
1861; "
"
19.
W. H. C. Whiting; August 28, 1861; commanding
division.
20.
J. R. Anderson; September 3, 1861; commanding
brigade.
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21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

A. G. Blanchard; September 21, 1861; commanding
brigade.
G. J. Rains; September 23, 1861; commanding brigade,
J. E. B. Stuart; September 24, 1861; commanding
cavalry brigade.
C. M. Wilcox; October 21, 1861; commanding brigade.
R. E. Rodes; October 21, 1861; commanding brigade,
R. Taylor; October 21, 1861;
R. Griffith; November 2, 1861;
W. Mahone; November 16, 1861;
L. O'B. Branch; November 16, 1861;
M. Gregg; December 14, 1861;
R. E. Colston; December 24, 1861;
J. G. Walker; January 9, 1862;
R. Ranson; February 12, 1862;
G. E. Pickett; February 13, 1862;
J. B. Kershaw; February 13, 1862;
H. Cobb; February 13, 1862;
J. J. Pettigrew; February 26, 1862;
J. B. Hood; March 3, 1862;
W. B. Taliaferro; March 4, 1862;
G. H. Steuart; March 6, 1862; commanding cavalry
detachment in Valley District.
C. Winder; March 7, 1862; commanding brigade.
C. W. Field; March 9, 1862;
"
W. N. Pendleton; March 26, 1862; commanding
Artillery Reserve.
L. A. Armistead; April 1, 1862; commanding brigade.
R. Pryor; April 16, 1862;
"
"
W. Hampton; May 23, 1862;
"
"
T. Ashby; May 23, 1862; commanding cavalry, Valley
District.
R. Hatton; May 23, 1862; commanding brigade.S. Garland; May 23, 1862;
"
"

The much expanded officer corps of the Department of
Northern Virginia on May 31, 1862, reveals one of the major
reasons that the Confederacy would eventually enact legis
lation creating the rank of Lieutenant-General for corps
commanders.
Johnston's three wing commanders held unoffi
cial commands; technically Smith, Magruder, and Longstreet
were all division commanders who led their wings by virtue
of being the senior division commander.
But the return of
Holmes and the addition of Huger would have quickly upset
Johnston's organizational scheme, because both officers were
senior to Magruder and Longstreet.
A quick glance at the
list will also explain why Johnston resisted the addition of
Henry Wise to his army for as long as possible; the politi
cal general, whose record included non-cooperation in w e s t 
ern Virginia and disaster at Roanoke Island, would have
immediately become the senior brigadier-general in the d e 
partment, and very likely an early candidate for a division

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

co m m a n d .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

546

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Manuscript Sources
Chicago Historical Society, Chicago,

IL

Jefferson Davis papers
College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA
Civil War Collection
Benjamin Stoddert Ewell papers
John Buchanan Floyd papers
Daniel Harvey Hill papers
Robert Morton Hughes papers
Joseph Eggleston Johnston papers
Stephen Russell Mallory papers
Library of Congress, Washington,
Manuscript Division

DC

Judah P. Benjamin diary
Alexander Hugh Holmes Stuart papers
Louis T. Wigfall papers
National Archives, Washington, DC
Richard Stoddert Ewell, Compiled Service Record
Daniel Harvey H i l l , Compiled Service Record
Thomas Jonathan Jackson, Compiled Service Record
Joseph Eggleston Johnston, Compiled Service Record
Robert Edward Lee, Compiled Service Record
Robert Edward Lee, Letterbook, 1862-1864
Letters and Telegrams Received, Confederate Quartermaster
General
Letters and Telegrams Received, Office of the Adjutant and
Inspector General, Confederate States of America
Letters and Telegrams Received, Secretary of War,
Confederate States of America
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Confederate Quartermaster
General
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Office of the Adjutant and
Inspector General, Confederate States of America
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Army of Northern Virginia,
January, 1862-March, 1863
Letters and Telegrams Sent, Secretary of War, Confederate
States of America
Letters Received, Secretary of War, Main Series, 1801-1870

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Letters Sent, Secretary of War, Main Series, 1801-1870
Letters Sent, W. H. C. Whiting, March-July, 1862
James Longstreet, Compiled Service Record
John Bankhead Magruder, Compiled Service Record
Gustavus Woodson Smith, Compiled Service Record
William Henry Chase Whiting, Compiled Service Record
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA
Robert Morton Hughes papers
United States Military History Institute,
Carlisle Barracks, PA
Murray J. Smith collection
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC
Southern Historical Collection
Thomas Bragg, diary
Stephen R. Mallory, diary
University of Alabama, University, AL
W. Stanley Hoole Special Collections
Jefferson Davis papers
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
William L. Clements Library
Joseph Eggleston Johnston papers
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA
Aldermann Library
Robert Mercer Taliaferro Hunter papers
Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Va
J. R. Anderson, Brigade Order Book, 186 2
Carter Family papers
Early Family papers
Harwood Family papers
Daniel Harvey Hill letter
Thomas Jonathan Jackson papers
Osmun Latrobe diary 1862-1865 (typescript)
George Bolling Lee papers
Charles T. Mason papers
James Ewell Brown Stuart papers
Talcott Family papers
Beverly Randolph Wellford papers

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

548

Primary Sources
Adjutant General.
Official Army Register For 1843-1862.
Washington, DC:
Adjutant General's Office, January of
appropriate year, except for additional August 1855
edition.
Alexander, E. P.
Military Memoirs of a Confederate.
York:
1907.

New

Armistead, Drury.
"The Battle in Which General Johnston was
Wounded."
Southern Historical Society P a p e r s . Vol.
XVIII (1890).
Blackford, W. W.
War Years with Jeb S t u a r t .
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945.

New York:

Clopton, William Izard.
"New Light on the Great Drewry's
Bluff Fight."
Southern Historical Society Pa p e r s .
Vol. XXXIV (1906).
Cook, Joel.
The Siege of Richmond:
A Narrative of the
military operations of Major-General George B. McClel
lan during May and June, 1862. Philadelphia:
G. W.
Childs, 1862.
Cowper, Pulaski, ed.
Extracts of Letters of Major-General
Bryan Grimes to his Wife, written while in Active
Service in the Army of Northern Virginia, together with
some personal recollections of the war written by him
after its close, etc.
Raleigh, N C : Alfred Williams,
1884 .
Davis, Jefferson F.
The Rise and Fall of the Confederate
Gover n m e n t . 2 volumes.
New York:
Thomas Yoseloff,
1958; reprint of 1881 edition.
Douglas, Henry Kyd.
I Rode with S t onewall. Chapel Hill,
NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1940.
Dowdey, Clifford, and Louis H. Manarin, ed.
The Wartime
Papers of R. E. L e e . New York:
Bramhall House, 1961.
Drewry, A. H.
"Drewry's Bluff Fight."
Society P a p e r s . Vol. XXIX (1901).

Southern Historical

Early, Jubal A.
War Memoirs; Autobiograhical Sketch and
Narrative of the War Between the S t a t e s . Bloomington,
IN:
Indiana University Press, 1960.
Foote, Henry S.
Charbydis.

War of the Rebellion; or Scylla and
New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1866.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

549

Freeman, Douglas Southall, ed.
Lee's Dispatches to
Jefferson Davis, 1862-1865. Ne w edition, enlarged,
with foreward by Grady McWhiney.
New York:
G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1957.
French, Samuel G.
Two Wars:
An Autobiography of Gen.
Samuel G. F r e n c h . Nashville:
Confederate Veteran,
1901.
Gallagher, Gary W. , ed.
Fighting for the Confederacy, The
Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter A lex
ander . Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina
Press, 1989.
----------- , Gary W. , ed.
"'We are our own Trumpeters,'
Robert E. Lee Describes Windfield Scott's Campaign to
Mexico City."
Virginia Magazine of History and Biogra
phy.
Vol. XCV (July 1987), No. 3.
Gordon, John B.
1928 .

Reminiscences of the Civil W a r .

New York,

Gorgas, Josiah.
"Ordnance Department of the Confederate
Government."
The Confederate Soldier in the Civil W a r .
New York:
Fairfax Press, n.d.
Grimsley, Mark, ed.
" 'We Prepare to Receive the Enemy Where
We Stand,' The Journal of the Comte de Paris,"
translated by Bernatello Glod.
Civil War Times
Illustrated. Vol. XXIV (May 1985), No. 3.
Hamilton, J. G. de Roulhac, ed.
The Papers of Randolph
Abbot Shotw e l l . 3 volumes.
Raleigh, NC:
North
Carolina Historical Commission, 1929.
Harrison, Mrs. Burton.
Recollections Grave and G r a y .
York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911.

New

Hassler, William W . , ed.
The General to His Lady, The Civil
War Letters of William Dorsey Pender to Fanny P e n d e r .
Chapel Hill, N C : University of North Carolina Press,
1962.
Hill, Daniel Harvey.
"The Haversack."
I (May 1866), No. 1.
"The Haversack."
1866), No. 2.
Hood,

Land We L o v e .

Land We L o v e .

Vol.

Vol.

I (June

John Bell.
Advance and R e t r e a t . Secaucus, N J :
and Grey, 1985; reprint of 1880 edition.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Blue

550

Howard, McHenry.
Recollections of a Maryland Confederate
Soldier and Staff Officer under Johnston, Jackson, and
L e e . Baltimore:
Williams and Wilkins,- 1914.
Hughes, Robert M . , ed.
"Some Letters from the Papers of
General Joseph E. Johnston."
William and Mary
Q u a r t e r l y . 2nd series, Vol. XI (October 1931), No. 4.
Jennings, T. D.
"Incidents in the Battle of Williamsburg."
Confederate Veteran.
Vol. V (September 1897), No. 9.
Johnson, Robert U . , and Clarence C. Buell, eds.
Battles and
Leaders of the Civil W a r . Secaucus, N J : Castle, 1980;
reprint of 1887 edition.
Johnson, W.
.rt.
"The Barksdale-Humphrey Brigade."
Confederate Veteran.
April 1894 Supplemental Issue.
Johnston, Joseph E.
"Manassas to Seven Pines."
Century
M a g a z i n e . Vol. XXX (May 1885), No. 1.
(A slightly
abridged version of this article was published under
the same title in Battles and Leaders of the Civil W a r ,
Vol. II.)
Narrative of Military Operations Directed
During the Late War Between the S t a t e s . Bloomington,
IN:
Indiana University Press, 1959.
"Responsibilities of the First Bull Run."
tles and Leaders of the Civil W a r . Vol. I.

Bat

Jones, John B.
A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate
States C a p i t a l . Edited by Howard Swiggett.
2 volumes.
New York:
Old Hickory Bookshop, 1935.
Laswell, Mary,
C. Giles,
Infantry,
Lee,

ed. Rags and Hope, The Recollections of Val
Four Years with Hood's Brigade, Fourth Texas
1861-1865. New York:
Coward-McCann, 1961.

Susan P., ed. Memoirs of William Nelson P e ndleton.
Philadelphia:
n.p., 1893.

Longstreet, James.
From Manassas to A p p o m a t t o x . Secaucus,
N J : Blue and Grey Press, 1984; reprint of 1887 ed i 
tion .
Lord, Walter, ed.
The Fremantle D i a r y .
Brown and Company, 1954.
Lowe, R. G.
Vol. V

"The Dreux Battalion."
(February 1897), No. 2.

Boston:

Little,

Confederate V e t e r a n .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

551

"Magruder's Defense of the Peninsula." Confed
erate V e t e r a n . Vol. VIII (March 1900), No. 3.
McClellan, H. B.
The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J.
E. B. St u a r t . Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1885.
McKinney, J. W.
"My First Experience at the Front."
Con
federate V e t e r a n .
Vol. Ill (January 1895), No. 1.
Manarin, Louis H., ed.
Richmond at War, the Minutes of the
City Council, 186 1 - 1 8 6 5 . Chapel Hill, NC:
University
of North Carolina Press, 1966.
Maury, Dabney H.
"Interesting Reminiscences of General
Johnston."
Southern Historical Society Pa p e r s . Vol.
XVIII (1890).
Recollections of a Virginian in the Mexican,
Indian, and Civil W a r s . New York:
Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1894.
Moffett, Mary Conner, ed.
Letters of General James Conner,
C . S . A . Columbia, SC:
R. L. Bryan, 1950.
Monroe, Haskell et a l ., ed.
The Papers of Jefferson D a v i s .
5 volumes to date.
Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State
University Press, 1971-1985.
Northrop, Lucius B.
"A Statement from the Confederate
Commissary General."
Century M a g a z i n e . Vol. XXXI
(March 1886), No. 5.
Oates, William C.
The War Between the Union and the
Confederacy and its Lost Oppor t u n i t i e s . (No
publication information in volume).
Parker, William H.
Recollections of a Naval Officer,
1 8 6 5 . New York:
Charles Scribner's Son, 1883.
Pendleton, S. H.
"Seven
V e t e r a n , April 1894

Pines, or Fair Oaks."
Supplemental Issue.

1841-

Confederate

Phillips, U. B . , ed.
The Correspondence of Robert Toombs,
Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb. . . . W a s h i n g 
ton, DC:
n.p., 1913.
Reagan, John H.
Memoirs, with special reference to
Secession and the Civil W a r . New York, 1906.
Report of the Commission Appointed Under the eighth section
of the Act of Congress of June 21, 1860, to examine

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

552

into the organization, system of discipline, and course
in instruction of the United States Miliary Academy at
West P o i n t . Washington, DC:
n.p., 1860.
Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War.
37th Congress, 3rd Session; House of Representatives.
3 volumes.
Washington, DC:
Government Printing
Office, 1863.
Richmond Howitzers in the War; Four years campaigning with
the Army of Northern Virginia, By a member of the
C o m p a n y . Richmond:
n.p., 1891.
Rowland, Dunbar, ed.
Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist:
His Letters, Papers and Speeches. 10 volumes.
Jack
son , MS: n.p., 1923.
Scott, Winfield.
Memoirs of L i e u t .-General Scott, L L . D . ,
Written by Hims e l f . New York:
Sheldon and Company,
1864 .
Shaw, Arthur Marvin, ed.
"Some Post-War Letters from
Jefferson Davis to His Former Aide-de-Camp William
Preston Johnston." Virginia Magazine of History and
B i o g r a p h y . Vol. LI (April 1943), No. 2.
Smith, Gustavus Woodson.
The Battle of Seven P i n e s .
York:
C. C. Crawford, 1891.

New

Confederate War Papers:
Fairfax Court House,
New Orleans, Seven Pines, Richmond, and North C a r o l i n a .
2nd edition.
New York:
Atlantic Publishing and
Engraving, 1884.
Sorrel, G. Moxley.
Recollections of a Confederate Staff
O f f i c e r . New York:
Neale, 1905.
Stiles, Robert.
Four Years under Marse R o b e r t .
DC, n.p., 1903.

Washington

Tapscott, J. B.
"Early War Incidents on the James."
Confederate V e t e r a n . Vol. VII, No. 1 (January 1898).
Taylor, Richard.
n . p . , 1889 .

Destruction and Reconstruction.

Taylor, Walter H.
Four Years with General L e e .
D. Appleton, 1877.

New York,

New York:

General Lee, His Campaigns in Virginia, 18611865, with Personal Reminiscences. Norfolk:
Nusbaum,
1906 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

553

Turner, Charles W. , ed.
Captain Greenlee Davidson, CSA,
Diary and Letters, 1851-1861. Verona, VA:
McClure,
1975 .
Vandiver, Frank, ed.
Confederate Blockade Running Through
Bermuda, 1861-1865, Letters and Cargo M a n i f e s t s . A u s 
tin, TX:
University of Texas, 1947.
Warfield, Edgar.
A Confederate Soldier's M e m o i r s .
Richmond:
Masonic Home Press, 1936.
Woodward, C. Vann, and Elisabeth Muhlenfeld, ed.
The
Private Mary Chesnut, the Unpublished Civil War
D i a r i e s . New York:
Oxford University Press, 1984.
Wright, Robert.
"Sinking of the Jamestown."
Southern
Historical Society P a p e r s . Vol. XXXIX (1901).
Younger, Edward, ed.
Inside the Confederate Government, The
Diary of Robert Garlick Hill K e a n . New York:
Oxford,
1957 .

Secondary Sources
Alexander, P. W.
"Confederate Chieftains."
Southern Lit
erary M e ssenger. Vol. XXXV (January 1863), No. 1.
Allan, William.
History of the Campaign of Gen. T. J.
(Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of
V i r g i n i a . Dayton, OH:
Morningside, 1974; reprint of
1880 edition.
Bell, Robert T.
11th Virginia Infantry.
E. Howard, 1985.

Lynchburg, VA:

Berry, Thomas S.
"The Rise of Flour Milling in Richmond."
Virginia Magazine of History and B i ography. V o l .
L X X V I I I , (October 1970), No. 4.
Black, Robert C., III.
The Railroads of the Co n f e d e r a c y .
Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press,
1952.
Boatner, Mark Mayo III.
York:
David McKay,

The Civil War Dictionary.
1959.

Boney, F. N.
John Letcher of V i r g i n i a .
University of Alabama Press, 1966.
Bradford, Gameliel.

New

University, AL:

Confederate Portraits.

Boston:

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

H.

554

Houghton Mifflin,

1912.

Bruce, Kathleen.
Virginia Iron Manufacture in the Slave
E r a . New York:
The Century Company, 1931.
Bryan, Charles F., Jr.
"Stalemate at Seven Pines."
Civil
War Times Illustrated. Vol. XII, No. 5 (August 1973).
Cauthen, Charles E.
South Carolina Goes to War, 1 8 60-1865.
Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press,
1950.
Chapla, John D.
42nd Virginia Infantry.
E. Howard, 1983.

Lynchburg, VA:

H.

Cleland, Robert G.
"Jefferson Davis and the Confederate
Cabinet."
Southwestern Historical Q u a r t e r l y . Vol.
XIX, (January 1916), No. 3.
Connelly, Thomas Lawrence.
Army of the Heartland; The Army
of Tennessee, 1 8 61-1862. Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana
State University Press, 1967.
-----------, and Archer Jones.
The Politics of Command, Fa c 
tions and Ideas in Confederate S t r a t e g y . Baton Rouge,
LA:-- Louisiana University Press, 1964.
Crute, Joseph H . , Jr.
Confederate Staff Officers,
1 8 6 5 . Powhatan, VA:
Derwent Books, 1982.

1861-

H. H. Cunningham, Doctors in Gray, the Confederate Medical
S e r v i c e . Gloucester, MA:
Peter Smith, 1970.
Daniel, Larry J.
"Manufacturing Cannon in the Confederacy."
Civil War Times Illustrated. Vol. XII, No. 7 (November
1973) .
Davis, William C.
Duel Between the First Ironclads. Baton
Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 1975.
Dederer, John Morgan.
"The Origins of Robert E. Lee's Bold
Generalship:
A Reinterpretation."
Military A f f a i r s .
Vol. XLVI (1985).
Denson, C. B.
"William Henry Chase Whiting."
Southern
Historical Society P a p e r s . Vol. XXVI, 1898.
Dew, Charles B.
Ironmaker to the Confederacy, Joseph R.
Anderson and the Tredegar Iron W o r k s . Wilmington, NC:
Broadfoot, 1987; reprint of 1966 edition.
Dickert, Augustus P.

History of Kershaw's Brig a d e .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

555

Newberry,

SC:

Elber H. Aull,

1899.

Dictionary of American Bi o g r a p h y . 11 volumes.
Dumas Malone
et a l ., ed.
New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955.
Divine, John E.
8th Virginia Infantry.
Lynchburg, VA;
H. E. Howard, 19 83.

1st edition.

Dowdey, Clifford.
The Seven Days, the Emergence of Robert
E. L e e . New York:
Fairfax, 1978.
Driver, Robert J., Jr.
VA:
H. E. Howard,

52nd Virginia I n f antry.
198 6.

Lynchburg,

Durkin, Joseph T.
Stephen R. Mallory, Confederate Naval
C h i e f . Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina
Press, 1954.
Eckenrode, J. J., and Bryan Conrad.
James Longstreet, Lee's
War H o r s e . Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North
Carolina Press, 1936.
The Randolphs, The Story of a Virginia F a m i l y .
New York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1946.
Evans, Eli N.
Judah P. Benjamin, The Jewish C o n f e derate.
New York:
Macmillan, 1988.
Faust, Patricia, ed„
Historical Times Illustrated Encyclo
pedia of the Civil W a r . New York:
Harper and Row,
1986 .
Fields, Frank E . , Jr.
28th Virginia I n f antry.
Lynchburg, VA:
H. E. Howard, 1985.

1st edition.

Flemming, Walter L.
"Jefferson Davis at West Point."
Publications of the Mississippi Historical S o c i e t y .
Vol. X (1909).
Freeman, Douglas Southall.
Lee's Lieutenants, A Study in
Co m m a n d . 3 volumes.
New York:
Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1942-1944.
R. E. Lee, A B i o graphy.
Charles Scribler's Sons, 1935.

4 volumes.

Frye, Dennis E.
2nd Virginia Infantry.
E. Howard, 1984.

New York:

Lynchburg, VA:

t

Gallagher, Gary W.
Stephen Dodson Ramseur, Lee's Gallant
G e n e r a l . Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North
Carolina Press, 1985.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

H.

556

Goff, Richard D.
Confederate Supply.
University Press, 1969.

Durham, NC:

Duke

Govan, Gilbert, and James W. Livingood.
A Different Valor,
The Story of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. A.
New
York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1956.
Grimsley, Mark.
"Jackson:
The Wrath of God."
Civil War
Times Illustrated, Vol. XXIII, No. 1 (March 1984).
"Rear Guard at Williamsburg."
Civil War Times
IIlustrated. Vol. XXIV (May 1985), No. 3.
Hanson, Joseph Mills.
Bull Run Remembers . . . The History
Traditions and Landmarks of the Manassas (Bull Run)
Campaigns Before Washington, 1 8 6 1-1862. Manassas, VA:
National Capitol Publishers, 1953.
Hamlin, Percy Gatling.
"Old Bald Head" (General R. S.
Ewell) The Protrait of a Soldier. Strasburg, VA:
Shenandoah Publishing House, 1940.
Hay, Thomas Robson.
"The Davis-Hood-Johnston Controversy of
1864."
Mississippi Valley Historical R e v i e w . Vol. XI
(June 19 24) .
Heitman, Francis B.
Historical Register and Dictionary of
the United States A r m y . 2 volumes.
Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1903.
Hittle, J. D.
The Military Staff, Its History and Develop
ment . Harrisburg, PA:
Stackpole, 1961.
Hotchkiss, Jedediah.
V i r g i n i a . (Vol. Ill of Confederate
Military H i s t o r y ). Expanded edition.
Dayton, OH:
Morningside, 1975; reprint.
Hughes, Robert M.
General Johnston.
A p p l e t o n , 1893.

New York:

D.

Hume, Edgar Erskine.
Peter Johnston, Junior, Virginia
Soldier and J u r i s t . Charlottesville, VA:
Historical
Publishing Company, 1935.
James, Alfred P.
"General Joseph Eggleston Johnston, Storm
Center of The Confederacy."
Mississippi Valley Histor
ical R e v i e w . Vol. XIV (December 1927), No. 3.
Johnson, Bradley T.
A Memoir of the Life and Public Service
of Joseph E. J o h n s t o n . Baltimore:
R. H. Woodward and
Company, 1891.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5 57

Johnston, Angus James II.
Virginia Railroads in the Civil
W a r . Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina
Press, 1961.
Jones, Archer.
Confederate Strategy from Shiloh to
V i c ksburg. Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State
University Press, 1961.
Jones, J. William.
Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee,
Soldier and M a n . New York:
Neale, 1906.
Jones, Terry L.
Lee's Tigers, the Louisiana Infantry in the
Army of Northern V i r g i n i a . Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana
State University Press, 1987.
Kendrick, Burton J.
Statesmen of the Lost Cause, Jefferson
Davis and His C a b i n e t . Boston:
Little, Brown, and
Co., 1939.
Klein, Maury.
Edward Porter A l e x a n d e r .
University of Georgia Press, 1971.

Athens, GA:

Krick, Robert E. L.
40th Virginia Infantry.
H. E. Howard, 1985.

Lynchburg, VA:

Krick, Robert K.
Lee's Colonels, A Biographical Register of
the Field Officers of the Army of Northern V i r g i n i a .
2nd edition, revised.
Dayton, OH:
Morningside, 1984.

Howard,

9th Virginia C a v a l r y .
1982.

Lynchburg, VA:

Howard,

30th Virginia Infantry.
1983.

Lynchburg, VA:

H. E.

H. E.

Livermore, Thomas L.
Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in
America, 1 8 61-1865. Dayton, OH:
Morningside, 1986.
Long, Armistead L.
Memoirs of Robert E. L e e .
M. Stoddart and Company, 1886.

New York:

J.

Luvaas, Jay.
"An Appraisal of Joseph E. Johnston."
Civil
War Times Illustrated. Vol. IV (January 1966), No. 9.
McMurry, Richard M.
John Bell Hood and the War for Southern
Independence. Lexington, K Y : University Press of
Kentucky, 19 82.
Two Great Rebel Armies, An Essay in Confederate
Military H i s t o r y . Chapel Hill, NC:
University of
North Carolina Press, 1989.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

558

M a n a n n , Louis H.
"Lee in Command:
Strategical and
Tactical Policies."
Ph.D. dissertation, Duke
University, 1965.
Martin, Samuel J.
"The Complex Confederate."
Civil War
Times Illustrated. Vol. XXV, No. 2 (April 1986).
Maurice, Frederick.
Robert E. Lee the S o l d i e r .
Houghton Mifflin, 1925.

Boston:

Meade, Robert Douthat.
Judah P. Beniamin, Confederate
S tatesman. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1943.
"The Relations Between Judah P. Benjamin and
Jefferson Davis:
Some New Light on the Working of the
Confederate Machine."
Journal of Southern History.
Vol. V (November 1939), No. 4.
Melvin, Philip.
"Stephen Russell Mallory, Southern Naval
Statesman."
Journal of Southern H i s t o r y . Vol. X (May
1944), No. 2.
Naval History Division, Naval Department, compilers.
Civil
War Naval Chronology, 1 8 61-1865. Six volumes.
Washington, DC:
U. S. Government Printing Office,
1971.
Nichols, James L.
Confederate Engineers. Tuscaloosa, AL:
Confederate Publishing Company, 1937.
Owsley, Frank L.
"Local Defense and the Overthrow of the
Confederacy."
Mississippi Valley Historical R e v i e w .
Vol. XI (March 1925), No. 4.
State Rights in the Confederacy.
University of Chicago, 1925.
Parish, Peter J.
The American Civil W a r .
and Meier, 1975.

Chicaqo:

New York:

Holmes

Patrick, Rembert.
Jefferson Davis and His C a b i n e t . Baton
Rouge, I.A:
Louisiana State University Press, 1944.
Piston, William Garrett.
Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant, James
Longstreet and His Place in Southern H i s t o r y . Athens.
GA:
University of Georgia Press, 1987.
Rankin, Thomas M.
H. E. Howard,
Riggs, David F.

23rd Virginia Infantry.
19 85.

7th Virginia Infantry.

Lynchburg, VA:

Lynchburg, VA:

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

H.

559
E.

H o w a rd ,

1982.

Robertson, James I.
18th Virginia Infantry.
H. E. Howard, 1984.
----------- . 4th Virginia Infantry.
Howard, 19 82.

Lynchburg, VA:

Lynchburg, VA:

H. E.

General A. P. Hill, the Story of a Confederate
W a r r i o r . New York:
Random House, 1987.
Roland, Charles.
Albert Sidney Johnston:
Soldier of Three
Rep u b l i c s . Austin, TX:
University of Texas, 1964.
Sanger, Donald B., and Thomas Robson Hay.
James L ongstreet.
Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press,
1952.
S c h a r f , J. Thomas.
History of the Confederate States Navy
From its Organization to the Surrender of its Last
V e s s e l . New York:
Rogers and Sherwood, 1887.
Schwab, John C.
The Confederate States of America, 18611865, A Financial and Industrial History of the South
During the Civil W a r . New Haven, CT:
Yale, 1913.
Sears, Stephen W.
George B. McClellan, The Young N a p o l e o n .
New York:
Ticknor & Fields, 1988.
Sifakis, Stewart.
Who Was Who in the Civil W a r .
Facts on File, 1988.

New York:

Stark, Richard B.
"Surgeons and Surgical Care of the
Confederate States Army."
Virginia Medical M o n t h l y .
Vol. LXXXVIII, No. 10.
Stiles, Kenneth L.
4th Virginia C a v a l r y .
H. E. Howard, 1985.

Lynchburg, VA:

Sublett, Charles W.
57th Virginia Infantry.
H. E. Howard, 1985.
Thomas, Emory.
New York:

Lynchburg, VA:

Bold Dragoon, The Life of J. E. B. S t u a r t .
Harper and Row, 1986.

Trask, Benjamin H.
9th Virginia I n f antry.
H. E. Howard, 1984.

Lynchburg, VA:

Turner, Charles W.
"The Virginia Central Railroad at War,
1861-1865."
Journal of Southern History. Vol. XII
(November 19 46), No. 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

560

United States Navy Department.
Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the
R e b e l l i o n . 30 volumes.
Washington, DC:
Government
Printing Office, 1896-1922.
United States War Department.
The War of the Rebellion:
A
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate A r m i e s . 128 volumes.
Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1880-1901.
Wakelyn, Jon L.
Biographical Dictionary of the C o n f e deracy.
Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 19 77.
Wallace, Lee A., Jr.
1st Virginia Infantry.
H. E. Howard, 1985.

Howard,

3rd Virginia Infantry.
1986.

Lynchburg, VA:

Lynchburg, VA:

H. E.

A Guide to Virginia Military Organizations,
1861-1865. 2nd edition, revised.
Lynchburg, VA:
H.
E. Howard, 1986.
Warner, Ezra.
Generals in Gray, Lives of the Confederate
Comm a n d e r s . Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana University
Press, 1959.
Wellman, Manly Wade.
Giant in Gray, A Biography of Wade
Hampton of South Carol i n a . New York:
Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1949.
Wert,

Jeffrey.
"I am so Unlike Other Folks."
Civil War
Times Illustrated. Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (April 1989).

----------- . "Lee's First Year of the War."
Civil War Times
Illustrated. Vol. XII, No. 8 (December 1974).
White, Laura.
Robert Barnwell Rhett:
New York:
Century, 1931.

Father of S e cession.

Wiatt, Alex L.
26th Virginia Infantry, Lynchburg, VA:
E. Howard, 1984.

H.

Williams, T. Harry.
"Freeman, Historian of the Civil War:
An Appraisal."
Journal of Southern H i s t o r y . Vol. XXI,
February, 1955, No. 1.
Wise, George.
C. S. A.
Wise,

History of the Seventeenth Virginia Infantry
Baltimore:
Kelly Piet & Co., 1870.

Jennings C.
The Long Arm of Lee, or the History of
the Artillery of the Army of Northern V i r g i n i a . 2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

561

volumes. Lynchburg, VA:

Bell, 1915.

Wise, Stephen R.
Lifeline of the Confederacy, Blockade
Running During the Civil W a r . Columbia, SC:
University of South Carolina Press, 1988.
Wright, Marcus J.
List of Staff Officers of the Confederate
Army, 186 1 - 1 8 6 5 . Washington, DC:
Government Printing
Office, 1891.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

562

VITA

STEVEN HARVEY NEWTON
Born in Dillwyn, Virginia, November 1, 1956.

Graduated

from Wilson Memorial High School, Fishersville, Virginia,
June,

1975.

B. A., St. Andrews Presbyterian College,

1979.

M. A., History, James Madison University,

1986, with a con

centration in American Military History.

In September,

1986, the author entered the College of William and Mary as
a graduate assistant in the Department of History.

Employed

as instructor in the Department of History at James Madison
University,

1988-1989, and currently employed as Assistant

Professor of History at Clarion University of Pennsylvania.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

